People v. Marquez CA2/6 ( 2014 )


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  • Filed 10/1/14 P. v. Marquez CA2/6
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION SIX
    THE PEOPLE,                                                                  2d Crim. No. B247903
    (Super. Ct. No. NA078607)
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                               (Los Angeles County)
    v.
    LOUIE MARQUEZ,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    Pursuant to a plea agreement, the execution of appellant Louie Marquez's
    felony sentence was suspended and he was placed on formal probation for five years.
    Four years later, the trial court revoked his probation and ordered execution of the
    suspended four-year prison term because of two subsequent criminal convictions. At the
    probation revocation hearing, the trial court offered appellant the opportunity to address
    the court. He declined to do so. Appellant contends that the court should have allowed
    him to speak in mitigation of his punishment through a statement in a probation report.
    We affirm.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    In exchange for a negotiated sentence, appellant waived his trial rights and
    pled no contest to a charge of corporal injury to his spouse. (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd.
    (a).) Appellant was sentenced to state prison for a term of four years. The trial court
    suspended execution of sentence and placed appellant on formal probation for five years
    with terms and conditions including that he serve 180 days in county jail.
    While on probation, appellant suffered two misdemeanor convictions. In
    case number 1LT03497, appellant was convicted of driving under the influence of
    alcohol. (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a).) In case number 0LT04772, appellant was
    convicted of driving with a blood alcohol percentage of 0.08 or more. (Id. at subd. (b).)
    The trial court held a probation revocation hearing in which it considered
    appellant's memorandum in support of sentencing mitigation and heard argument by
    appellant's counsel. The court revoked appellant's probation and committed him to state
    prison for four years with 458 days of custody credit. At the conclusion of the hearing,
    the court stated that it "would be glad to hear from [appellant] today if he would like to
    make a statement." Appellant's counsel informed the court that appellant "wasn't
    prepared today for testimony."
    DISCUSSION
    There are two problems with appellant's argument on appeal—one factual
    and one legal. The factual problem is that appellant does not provide any evidence of his
    contention that he requested a new probation report and the trial court denied his request.
    Appellant claims that this exchange occurred on November 15, 2012. The minute order
    from that date does not so reflect and appellant does not provide us with the reporter's
    transcript of the proceeding.
    The other problem with appellant's argument is that the only California case
    he cites for his purported right to make a statement in mitigation of punishment, In re
    Shannon B. (1994) 
    22 Cal. App. 4th 1235
    , is no longer good law.1 In People v. Evans
    (2008) 
    44 Cal. 4th 590
    , 597, the Supreme Court held, contrary to Shannon B., that "[Penal
    Code] section 1200 does not entitle the defendant, in response to the trial court's
    1
    We remind counsel of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 5-200(D), which
    states that an attorney "[s]hall not, knowing its invalidity, cite as authority a decision that
    has been overruled . . . ."
    2
    allocution, to offer a personal statement in mitigation of punishment." (Fn. omitted.)2 It
    further held that a criminal defendant has no right under the federal Constitution to make
    an unsworn personal statement at sentencing without being subject to cross-examination.
    (Id. at pp. 599-600.) These holdings foreclose appellant's argument.
    Moreover, appellant is not contesting his opportunity to speak at
    sentencing. His challenge concerns the probation revocation hearing. But "[r]evocation
    of probation is not part of a criminal prosecution, and therefore the full panoply of rights
    due in a criminal trial does not apply to probation revocations." (People v. Stanphill
    (2009) 
    170 Cal. App. 4th 61
    , 72.) The hearing "is more flexible and less formal than a
    criminal trial." (People v. Quarterman (2012) 
    202 Cal. App. 4th 1280
    , 1294.) The
    probationer is entitled to speak on his own behalf and explain any mitigating
    circumstances. (People v. Harris (1992) 
    8 Cal. App. 4th 104
    , 108.) Appellant had this
    opportunity. Due process requires no more.
    DISPOSITION
    The judgment is affirmed.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
    PERREN, J.
    We concur:
    GILBERT, P. J.
    YEGAN, J.
    2
    Penal Code section 1200 provides in relevant part that "[w]hen the defendant
    appears for judgment he must be [asked] by the Court . . . whether he has any legal cause
    to show why judgment should not be pronounced against him."
    3
    Arthur Jean, Jr., Judge
    Superior Court County of Los Angeles
    Law Offices of Jaime Jasso and Jaime Jasso for Defendant and Appellant.
    Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant
    Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr., Supervising Deputy Attorney General, David
    F. Glassman, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B247903

Filed Date: 10/1/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014