People v. Woods ( 2017 )

Filed 5/16/17; pub. order 6/7/17 (see end of opn.)
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D070477
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCE351815)
MARSHA MARY WOODS,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Daniel
Goldstein, Judge. Reversed, with directions.
Bonnie M. Dumanis, District Attorney, James E. Atkins and Brooke E. Tafreshi,
Deputy District Attorneys, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Russell S. Babcock, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Respondent.
Defendant Marsha Mary Woods was on probation for two prior offenses when she
was arrested and charged with five theft- and drug-related offenses. Under a plea
agreement, she agreed to plead guilty to one count of attempted burglary and admit one
strike prior, and to serve concurrent sentences of 16 months on the current offense and
seven years on each of the probation cases. In exchange, the prosecution agreed to
dismiss the remaining charges and allegations. The trial court accepted the plea. At
sentencing, however, after expressing frustration at the parties' disagreement over the
proper calculation of custody credits, the trial court sentenced defendant to 16 months for
the current offense and terminated probation on her earlier cases, reasoning the stipulated
seven-year sentences on the probation cases were "just about eaten up by credits."
The People appeal, contending the sentence imposed by the trial court is not
within the bounds of the parties' plea agreement. Defendant maintains the People
forfeited this challenge by failing to assert it below. Alternatively, she argues she has
earned enough custody credits to satisfy the seven-year sentences and, thus, either the
People have suffered no prejudice, or their request for relief is moot. We agree that the
sentence imposed by the trial court is not within the bounds of the parties' plea
agreement. We reject defendant's contentions as to forfeiture, prejudice, and mootness.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings as directed
below.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
Probation Cases
In 2012, defendant pleaded guilty in case SCE314699 (Case 699) to vandalism
over $400, and she admitted having one prison prior and one strike prior. She was
granted five years' formal probation.
2
In 2013, a jury convicted defendant in case SCE323042 (Case 042)1 of residential
burglary, grand theft, and petty theft. The jury also found true an out-on-bail
enhancement and prison- and strike-prior allegations. She was again granted five years'
formal probation.
Current Offenses
In 2015, while still on probation in the Probation Cases, defendant was arrested for
allegedly stealing approximately $1,850 worth of tools from a residential yard. When
police searched defendant, they found in her purse a glass smoking pipe and a plastic
baggie containing methamphetamine.
The People charged defendant with five offenses: burglary, grand theft of
personal property, receiving stolen property, possession of a controlled substance, and
possession of paraphernalia used for narcotics. The People also alleged numerous prison
and strike priors.
Plea Bargain
Defendant and the prosecution reached a plea bargain. Defendant agreed to (1)
plead guilty to one count of attempted burglary; (2) admit one strike prior; (3) admit
violating probation in the Probation Cases; and (4) serve concurrent sentences of 16
months on the current offense (the lower term doubled) and seven years for each of her
probation violations in the Probation Cases. In exchange, the prosecution agreed to
dismiss the remaining charges and allegations.
1 We will refer to Case 699 and Case 042 collectively as the Probation Cases.
3
The trial court found defendant was "making knowing, voluntary, and intelligent
waivers, understanding the nature and consequences of the plea." The court accepted
defendant's guilty plea, granted the prosecutor's motion to dismiss the remaining charges
and allegations, and referred the matter to the probation department for a presentence
report.
Sentencing
The probation department submitted two presentence reports: an initial report and
a supplemental report. The reports were consistent on the calculation of the actual days
defendant served in custody in connection with the Probation Cases and the current
offense. They differed, however, on the number of additional custody credits to which
defendant was entitled. The initial report proposed 15 percent custody credits under
Penal Code2 section 2933.1 because one of defendant's priors was allegedly a violent
felony. Defendant objected to this calculation at the initial sentencing hearing and asked
that the probation department recalculate the custody credits granting full credit under
section 4019. The trial court continued the sentencing hearing.
The probation department's supplemental report recalculated defendant's custody
credits granting full credit under section 4019 as follows:
Current Offense
June 30, 2015 to July 1, 2015 2 days
July 24, 2015 to March 22, 2016 243 days
Actual days: 245 days
Credits: 244 days
Total credits: 489 days
2 All subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code.
4
Case 699
September 20, 2011 to March 28, 2012 191 days
August 15, 2012 to October 22, 2013 434 days
July 24, 2015 to March 22, 2016 243 days
Actual days: 868 days
Credits: 868 days
Total credits: 1,736 days
Case 042
August 10, 2012 to October 22, 2013 439 days
July 24, 2015 to March 22, 2016 243 days
Actual days: 682 days
Credits: 682 days
Total credits: 1,364 days
At the continued sentencing hearing, defendant and the prosecution continued to
disagree about whether defendant was entitled to full credit under section 4019 or limited
to partial credit under section 2933.1. The trial court expressed frustration over the
differing calculations:
"The calculations have been a disaster in that every time they've
been—we've recalculated it three times now, and every time it's a
different answer, okay? [¶] . . . [¶] But why don't I just sentence her
on the new case and terminate probation on everything else? That's
seven years that exists there that's just about eaten up by credits, and
I have a problem with the way we've been calculating credits on it,
that it has been hit or miss. And so it creates a situation where the
defense lawyer in a case like this can't adequately advise his client of
what the credits are because it becomes a moving target . . . ."
Defendant and the prosecution submitted. The court then sentenced defendant:
"So what I'm going to do on [the Probation Cases], [is] credit for time served. Probation
is terminated. [¶] On [the current case], it's a stip[ulated] 16 [months]. That's the low
term of eight months. It's doubled [due to a strike prior]." The court determined
defendant had served 245 days in actual custody on the current offense, with 244 days of
credit under section 4019, for a total of 489 days.
5
The prosecutor disagreed with the sentence: "Your honor, I'd just like to note for
the record, I understand why the Court is doing what [it's] doing. I do believe she should
be getting the seven years." The trial court replied: "Tell me how much credit she has?"
The prosecutor responded: "Your Honor, again, that's not in the [district attorney]'s
purview to do. I believe she's supposed to serve 80 percent of this, and if the Court is to
strike both of those,[3] then she should get [the] upper term based on her record, not a
lower term." The court did not change defendant's sentence.
The abstract of judgment reflects the court's calculation of defendant's custody
credits for the current offense, but not the Probation Cases.
DISCUSSION
I. Forfeiture
Defendant contends the People have forfeited their right to argue that the trial
court departed from the plea bargain because the prosecutor did not object on that basis
below. We are not persuaded. After the trial court terminated probation in the Probation
Cases, the prosecutor stated: "I do believe she should be getting the seven years." This
was obviously a reference to the provision of the plea bargain that required seven-year
sentences on the Probation Cases. This was sufficient to preserve the People's challenge
for appeal.
II. Prejudice/Mootness
Defendant next contends that either the People have suffered no prejudice, or their
claim for relief is moot, because defendant has already served the stipulated seven-year
3 The prosecutor's reference to "both of those" presumably refers to the Probation
Cases.
6
(or 2,555-day) sentences. She bases this conclusion on the assertion that the probation
department's "most current calculation showed that she had custody credit for 3,100 total
days (eight and one-half years) in [the Probation Cases] at the time she was sentenced."4
Defendant reaches the sum of 3,100 days by adding 1,736 days5 in Case 699 and 1,364
days6 in Case 042. However, as we will explain, this approach is fundamentally flawed
because it improperly double-counts each probation case's custody credits in the other
probation case. A sentence-by-sentence analysis shows why this approach is erroneous.
The plea bargain requires defendant to serve 2,555 days (seven years x 365 days)
in Case 699. The probation department's supplemental report credits her with 868 actual
days and 868 days of section 4019 credits, for a total of 1,736 days. This leaves 819 days
remaining on her sentence in Case 699.
Similarly, the plea bargain requires defendant to serve 2,555 days in Case 042.
The probation department's supplemental report credits her with 682 actual days and 682
4 Defendant relies on the calculation in the probation department's supplemental
presentence report, which we summarize above. It is the sentencing court's duty to
calculate a defendant's presentence custody credits and to record them in the abstract of
judgment. (§ 2900.5, subd. (d).) The trial court did not calculate and record defendant's
custody credits with respect to the Probation Cases. Therefore, for illustrative purposes
only, we will use the calculation contained in the probation department's supplemental
presentence report. However, because the issue is not properly presented in this appeal,
we express no opinion on whether defendant is entitled to custody credits under section
4019, section 2933.1, or some other provision.
5 Adding 868 actual days to 868 days of section 4019 credits totals 1,736 total days.
6 Adding 682 actual days to 682 days of section 4019 credits totals 1,364 total days.
7
days of section 4019 credits, for a total of 1,364. This leaves 1,191 days remaining on
her sentence in Case 042.
This examination of defendant's actual and earned custody credits on a sentence-
by-sentence basis shows she has not served seven years in either of the Probation Cases.
Defendant's calculation of custody credits exceeds seven years only because she
improperly adds her custody credits from each probation case to the other. This double-
counting error is compounded by the substantial overlap of the actual days defendant
served in custody in the Probation Cases. That is, all but five of the 682 days that
defendant actually served in custody in Case 042 are subsumed within the 868 days she
actually served in custody in Case 699.7 Defendant's creative accounting would
improperly give her two days of actual custody credit for every one overlapping day she
actually served. Defendant's calculation further compounds this error by then basing her
section 4019 credits on the already-improperly-doubled actual-day calculation.8
Because defendant's prejudice and mootness arguments are premised on a
fundamentally flawed calculation, the arguments fail.
7 The five-day discrepancy results from the slight difference between the credited
custody period of August 10, 2012 to October 22, 2013 (439 days) served in Case 042
and the credited custody period of August 15, 2012 to October 22, 2013 (434 days)
served in Case 699.
8 A simple hypothetical shows the absurdity of defendant's calculation. By
defendant's reasoning, a hypothetical defendant serving 10 concurrent 20-year sentences
will have earned 20 years of custody credits after serving only one year in actual custody.
That is, the hypothetical defendant would receive one year of actual custody credit for
each of her 10 concurrent sentences, totaling 10 years of actual custody credit. She
would then receive an additional 10 years in section 4019 credits. Thus, after having
served only one year in actual custody, the hypothetical defendant would have earned 20
years in total custody credits, thereby satisfying all 10 of her 20-year sentences.
8
III. Plea Bargain
Turning to the merits of the People's appeal, we conclude the trial court erred by
sentencing defendant outside the bounds of the parties' plea bargain.
A. Relevant Legal Principles
Plea bargains are "an accepted and 'integral component of the criminal justice
system and essential to the expeditious and fair administration of our courts.' " (People v.
Segura (2008) 44 Cal. 4th 921, 929 (Segura).) "A plea bargain is a contract between the
accused and the prosecutor." (In re Ricardo C. (2013) 220 Cal. App. 4th 688, 698; People
v. Vargas (2001) 91 Cal. App. 4th 506, 533.) "Both these parties are bound to the terms of
the agreement; when the court approves the bargain, it also agrees to be bound by its
terms." (In re Ricardo C., at p. 698; People v. Armendariz (1993) 16 Cal. App. 4th 906,
911.) "Both the accused and the People are entitled to the benefit of the plea bargain."
(In re Ricardo C., at p. 698; People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal. 4th 68, 80.) " 'When either
the prosecution or the defendant is deprived of benefits for which it has bargained,
corresponding relief will lie from concessions made.' " (In re Ricardo C., at p. 698;
People v. Collins (1978) 21 Cal. 3d 208, 214.) Available relief includes a remand to
allow withdrawal of the plea agreement; specific performance of the agreement as made;
or "substantial specific performance." (People v. Kim (2011) 193 Cal. App. 4th 1355,
1362.)
"Although a plea agreement does not divest the court of its inherent sentencing
discretion, 'a judge who has accepted a plea bargain is bound to impose a sentence within
the limits of that bargain.' " (Segura, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 931.) Yet, courts have broad
9
discretion to withdraw their approval of negotiated pleas. (In re Ricardo C., supra, 220
Cal.App.4th at p. 699.) " 'Such withdrawal is permitted, for example, in those instances
where the court becomes more fully informed about the case [citation], or where, after
further consideration, the court concludes that the bargain is not in the best interests of
society.' " (Ibid.) However, once a court withdraws its approval of a plea bargain, the
court cannot "proceed to apply and enforce certain parts of the plea bargain, while
ignoring" others. (Ibid.) Instead, the court must restore the parties to the status quo ante.
(Ibid.; Segura, at p. 931 [" 'Should the court consider the plea bargain to be unacceptable,
its remedy is to reject it, not to violate it, directly or indirectly.' "].)
In reviewing a challenge involving a plea bargain, we apply the standards of
review applicable to contracts, generally. (Segura, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 930.) " '[T]he
"interpretation of a contract is subject to de novo review where the interpretation does not
turn on the credibility of extrinsic evidence." ' " (In re Ricardo C., supra, 220
Cal.App.4th at p. 696.)
B. Analysis
The sentence imposed by the trial court exceeded the bounds of the parties' plea
bargain. The parties stipulated that defendant would receive concurrent sentences of 16
months on the current offense and seven years on each of the Probation Cases. The trial
court imposed the 16-month sentence, but "terminated" probation in the Probation Cases
instead of imposing the stipulated seven-year concurrent sentences. This was a clear
departure from the plea bargain.
10
The trial court's stated rationale for its selected sentence—that the seven-year
sentences were "just about eaten up by credits"—does not warrant the court's departure
from the parties' plea bargain. First, it is factually inaccurate, as shown by our illustrative
sentence-by-sentence calculation above.9 Indeed, the court's own wording—"just
about"—indicates defendant's credits had not entirely satisfied the stipulated seven-year
sentences. Second, as indicated by the trial court's reference to the approximate amount
of defendant's custody credits, the trial court did not formally calculate defendant's
custody credits and record them in the abstract of judgment as required by section 2900.5,
subdivision (d). Absent a proper determination that defendant had earned seven years of
custody credits, a sentence imposing less than that on the Probation Cases departed from
the parties' plea bargain.
To be sure, the trial court retained its discretionary authority to sentence defendant
differently than the parties had agreed. (In re Ricardo C., supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p.
699.) But once it chose to do so, the court was required to withdraw its approval of the
plea bargain in its entirety; it was not free to enforce some portions of it but not others.
(Ibid.) By doing the latter, the trial court improperly allowed defendant to receive her
benefit of the plea bargain—and deprived the People of theirs.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. On remand, the trial court is directed to either (1)
sentence defendant in accordance with the parties' plea bargain, which will require the
9 Although revealed by a detailed review of the probation department's presentence
reports, it does not appear from the appellate record that either party apprised the trial
court of the substantial overlap of dates on which the calculation of defendant's actual
custody credits was based.
11
trial court to calculate and record on the abstract of judgment the custody credits to which
defendant is entitled in connection with the Probation Cases;10 or (2) withdraw its
approval of the plea bargain and restore the parties to the status quo ante, which includes
allowing the People to reinstate the dismissed charges and allegations.
HALLER, J.
WE CONCUR:
MCCONNELL, P. J.
AARON, J.
10 This will require the trial court to determine in the first instance the relevant
provisions under which defendant's custody credits are to be calculated.
12
Filed 6/7/17
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D070477
Plaintiff and Appellant,
(Super. Ct. No. SCE351815)
v.
ORDER CERTIFYING OPINION
MARSHA MARY WOODS, FOR PUBLICATION
Defendant and Respondent.
THE COURT:
The opinion in this case filed May 16, 2017, was not certified for publication. It
appearing the opinion meets the standards for publication specified in California Rules of
Court, rule 8.1105(c), the request pursuant to rule 8.1120(a) for publication is
GRANTED.
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the opinion meets the standards for publication
specified in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c); and
ORDERED that the words "Not to Be Published in the Official Reports" appearing
on page 1 of said opinion be deleted and the opinion herein be published in the Official
Reports.
MCCONNELL, P. J.
Copies to: All parties