People v. Lopez CA4/2 ( 2016 )


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  • Filed 6/28/16 P. v. Lopez CA4/2
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION TWO
    THE PEOPLE,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                       E061511
    v.                                                                       (Super.Ct.No. FWV1303253)
    LEONARDO LOPEZ,                                                          OPINION
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Bridgid M.
    McCann, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
    Christopher Love, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
    Appellant.
    Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney
    General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal and Minh
    U. Le, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    1
    Defendant and appellant Leonardo Lopez was charged by felony complaint with
    second degree robbery (Pen. Code,1 § 211, count 1), extortion (§ 520, count 2),
    dissuading a witness from reporting a crime (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(1), count 3), and street
    terrorism (§ 186.22, subd. (a), count 4). It was alleged that defendant committed the
    robbery in count 1 for the benefit of a criminal street gang. (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C).)
    It was also alleged that he served two prior prison terms. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).) Defendant
    entered a plea agreement and pled guilty to counts 1, 2, and 3, and he admitted the gang
    enhancement allegation (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)), as well as the two prison priors. In
    exchange for the plea, the parties agreed that the court would dismiss the remaining count
    and allegations and sentence defendant to an eight-year prison term, as follows: five
    years on count 1, a consecutive one year on count 2, a concurrent two years on count 3,
    and two consecutive one-year terms for the prison priors. It was also agreed that the
    court would strike the term on the gang enhancement. (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C).) The
    court sentenced defendant on May 27, 2014, in accordance with the agreement, except
    that the court imposed and stayed the gang enhancement term, instead of striking it.
    On appeal, defendant argues that the term on the gang enhancement must be
    stricken. The People concede, and we agree. In all other respects, the judgment is
    affirmed.
    1   All further statutory references will be to the Penal Code, unless otherwise
    noted.
    2
    ANALYSIS2
    The Matter Should Be Remanded for the Trial Court to Strike the Term on the Gang
    Enhancement
    Defendant argues that the court erred in staying the gang enhancement term,
    instead of striking it. The People correctly concede.
    “Because a ‘negotiated plea agreement is a form of contract,’ it is interpreted
    according to general contract principles. [Citation.] Acceptance of the agreement binds
    the court and the parties to the agreement.” (People v. Segura (2008) 
    44 Cal. 4th 921
    ,
    930.) “Although a plea agreement does not divest the court of its inherent sentencing
    discretion, ‘a judge who has accepted a plea bargain is bound to impose a sentence within
    the limits of that bargain. [Citation.] “A plea agreement is, in essence, a contract
    between the defendant and the prosecutor to which the court consents to be bound.”
    [Citation.] Should the court consider the plea bargain to be unacceptable, its remedy is to
    reject it, not to violate it, directly or indirectly. [Citation.] Once the court has accepted
    the terms of the negotiated plea, “[it] lacks jurisdiction to alter the terms of a plea bargain
    so that it becomes more favorable to a defendant unless, of course, the parties agree.”’”
    (Id. at p. 931.)
    In the instant case, the plea agreement clearly stated that the gang enhancement
    term would be stricken. The court accepted the terms of the plea agreement and was,
    2 We have not included a recitation of the facts since they are not relevant to the
    issue on appeal.
    3
    therefore, bound to honor the terms of the agreement. (People v. Blount (2009) 
    175 Cal. App. 4th 992
    , 997.) Thus, it is clear that the court erred when it imposed but stayed
    the term on the gang enhancement term.
    We note defendant’s argument that the court imposed an unauthorized sentence
    when it stayed, rather than struck, the gang enhancement. He contends that the court was
    required to either impose the enhancement or strike it, under section 186.22, subdivision
    (g). That statute provides that “the court may strike the additional punishment for the
    enhancements provided in this section . . . where the interests of justice would best be
    served, if the court specifies on the record and enters into the minutes the circumstances
    indicating that the interests of justice would best be served by that disposition.”
    (§ 186.22, subd. (g).) Defendant asserts that we should remand the matter for the trial
    court to strike the term on the gang enhancement and to state its reasons for doing so,
    pursuant to section 186.22, subdivision (g). However, the court should have struck the
    gang enhancement term in accordance with the terms of the plea agreement, not pursuant
    to any discretionary decision under section 186.22, subdivision (g). Thus, no statement
    of reasons under section 182.66, subdivision (g), is needed.
    DISPOSITION
    The superior court is directed to strike the prison term on the section 186.22,
    subdivision (b)(1)(C) gang enhancement, in accordance with the terms of the plea
    agreement. The court is further directed to amend the abstract of judgment to reflect this
    4
    modification and to forward a copy of the amended abstract of judgment to the
    Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The judgment, as modified, is affirmed.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    HOLLENHORST
    J.
    We concur:
    RAMIREZ
    P. J.
    SLOUGH
    J.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: E061511

Filed Date: 6/28/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021