P. v. Lim CA4/1 ( 2013 )


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  • Filed 3/28/13 P. v. Lim CA4/1
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION ONE
    STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    THE PEOPLE,                                                         D061834
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    v.                                                         (Super. Ct. No. SCD212846)
    MARK D. LIM,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Robert F.
    O'Neill, Judge. Affirmed.
    In November 2011, Mark D. Lim entered a negotiated guilty plea to second degree
    murder (Pen. Code,1 §§ 187, subd. (a)), 190, subd. (a)) (count 1), attempted murder
    (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664) with personal infliction of great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd.
    (a)) and personal use of a deadly or dangerous weapon (a knife) (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1))
    (count 2), making a criminal threat (§ 422) (count 5) and two counts of attempting to
    1        All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
    dissuade a witness (counts 12 and 18) (§ 136.1, subd. (a)(2)). In April 2012, the court
    sentenced Lim to a stipulated term of 15 years to life plus 15 years in prison: 15 years to
    life for second degree murder, the nine-year upper term for attempted murder, eight-
    month terms (one-third the middle term) for making a criminal threat and the two counts
    of attempting to dissuade a witness, three years for personal infliction of great bodily
    injury and one year for personal knife use. Lim appeals, contending the court abused its
    discretion by denying his request for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether he is a
    veteran suffering from mental health problems as a result of his military service
    (§ 1170.9); substantial evidence does not support a finding he had the ability to pay the
    $154 booking fee (also called a criminal justice administration fee) (Gov. Code,
    § 29550.1); and the court erred in ordering a penalty assessment on the section 1202.4,
    subdivision (b), restitution fine. Lim also contends that if his first two contentions were
    not preserved for appeal, trial counsel was ineffective. We affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    Lim threatened to kill his ex-girlfriend. Lim killed his ex-girlfriend's grandfather
    and attempted to kill her mother. Lim sent letters to his ex-girlfriend's new boyfriend
    threatening to have them both tortured and killed.
    SECTION 1170.9
    Section 1170.9 provides: "(a) In the case of any person convicted of a criminal
    offense who could otherwise be sentenced to county jail or state prison and who alleges
    that he or she committed the offense as a result of sexual trauma, traumatic brain injury,
    post-traumatic stress disorder, substance abuse, or mental health problems stemming
    2
    from service in the United States military, the court shall, prior to sentencing, make a
    determination as to whether the defendant was, or currently is, a member of the United
    States military and whether the defendant may be suffering from sexual trauma, traumatic
    brain injury, posttraumatic stress disorder, substance abuse, or mental health problems as
    a result of that service. The court may request, through existing resources, an assessment
    to aid in that determination. [¶] (b) If the court concludes that a defendant convicted of a
    criminal offense is a person described in subdivision (a), and if the defendant is otherwise
    eligible for probation and the court places the defendant on probation, the court may
    order the defendant into a local, state, federal, or private nonprofit treatment program for
    a period not to exceed that which the defendant would have served in state prison or
    county jail, provided the defendant agrees to participate in the program and the court
    determines that an appropriate treatment program exists."
    Before sentencing, Lim personally requested an evidentiary hearing to determine
    his eligibility for a section 1170.9 treatment program. The court denied the request
    "without prejudice." Lim contends this deprived him of due process and caused him
    prejudice. He argues a finding that he met the criteria of section 1170.9, subdivision (a),
    might have reduced the restitution fine,2 would have assisted the Department of
    Corrections and Rehabilitation in making treatment choices, might have resulted in future
    benefits if governmental resources became available and would have served as
    recognition of Lim's sacrifices as a member of the military.
    2      The court imposed the $10,000 maximum restitution fine. (§ 1202.4, subd. (b).)
    3
    To be eligible for treatment under section 1170.9, a defendant must be eligible for
    probation. (§ 1170.9, subd. (b).) Lim's plea bargain called for a stipulated prison
    sentence.3 He was not eligible for probation and waived his right to appeal the stipulated
    sentence. Furthermore, before Lim's sentencing, the language in section 1170.9
    providing for a hearing was deleted by the Legislature. For these reasons, we reject Lim's
    contentions.4
    THE BOOKING FEE
    To support his argument that substantial evidence does not support a finding he
    had the ability to pay the $154 booking fee, Lim relies on Government Code
    section 29550.2. Government Code section 29550.2 expressly requires an ability to pay
    on the part of defendants arrested "by any governmental entity not specified in Section
    29550 or 29550.1." Government Code section 29550.1, which does not contain an ability
    to pay requirement, applies to defendants arrested by "[a]ny city, special district, school
    district, community college district, college, university, or other local arresting
    agency . . . ." (Gov. Code, § 29550.1, subd. (a).) Lim was arrested by the San Diego
    3       Lim asserts the plea bargain did not specify that the stipulated term of 15 years to
    life plus 15 years was to be served in prison. Prison is the only place a sentence for Lim's
    crimes can be served; he was not eligible for imprisonment in county jail. (§§ 1170,
    subd. (h)(3), 667.5, subd. (c)(1), (8), (12), 1192.7, subd. (c)(1), (8), (9), (23), (37), (38).)
    4      The People ask us to augment the record with a Certification of Mental
    Competence (§ 1372) and an attached report, filed in the trial court in May 2010. The
    People contend the Certification is relevant to Lim's contention regarding section 1170.9.
    Lim opposes the motion, asserting a violation of his statutory and constitutional rights to
    privacy. Lim also notes that, contrary to the People's assertion, the sentencing court did
    not rely on the Certification and report in ruling on Lim's section 1170.9 motion. We
    deny the motion.
    4
    Police Department. Thus, Government Code section 29550.1 applies in this case, and the
    court was not required to find Lim had the ability to pay the fee.
    THE PENALTY ASSESSMENT
    The court orally stated there would be a penalty assessment applied to the section
    1202.4, subdivision (b), restitution fine. Lim correctly notes this was improper.
    (§ 1202.4, subd. (e).) As the abstract of judgment does not reflect the penalty assessment,
    however, there is nothing for us to correct.
    EFFECTIVENESS OF TRIAL COUNSEL
    Because we reject on the merits Lim's contentions regarding section 1170.9 and
    the booking fee, we need not address his contention that trial counsel was ineffective if
    those contentions were not preserved for appeal.
    DISPOSITION
    The judgment is affirmed.
    McDONALD, J.
    WE CONCUR:
    HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
    McINTYRE, J.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: D061834

Filed Date: 3/28/2013

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021