People v. Petronzi CA4/1 ( 2022 )


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  • Filed 5/6/22 P. v. Petronzi CA4/1
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION ONE
    STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    THE PEOPLE,                                                          D079422
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No. FWV18003963)
    DRAKE GIRARD PETRONZI, JR.,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino,
    Bridgid M. McCann, Judge. Affirmed.
    Vanessa Place, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
    Defendant and Appellant.
    Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
    Attorney General, Melissa Mandel, Assistant Attorney General, Robin
    Urbanski and Genevieve Herbert, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
    and Respondent.
    I
    INTRODUCTION
    Defendant Drake Girard Petronzi, Jr. was charged with one count of
    felony child abuse (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a))1 for causing or permitting
    injury to his severely malnourished three-month-old daughter. Prior to trial,
    a doubt was declared concerning the defendant’s competence to stand trial.
    The court held a competency hearing and found he was competent. The case
    proceeded to trial and the jury found the defendant guilty of the charged
    offense. It also returned a true finding on a special circumstance allegation
    that he personally inflicted great bodily injury on a child under the age of five
    years (§ 12022.7, subd. (d)).
    After the verdict was rendered, but before sentencing, a doubt was
    again declared as to the defendant’s competence. The court held a second
    competency hearing and the defendant was again found competent.
    Thereafter, the court sentenced the defendant to state prison for a term of 11
    years consisting of six years for the child abuse conviction and five years for
    the great bodily injury enhancement.
    On appeal, the defendant claims the trial court committed instructional
    error during the second competency proceeding. He argues the court should
    have instructed the jury to determine whether he was competent at the time
    of his trial, which occurred eight months earlier; however, it erroneously
    instructed the jury to determine his present competence at the time of the
    second competency proceeding. The defendant also contends substantial
    evidence did not support the competence verdict rendered in the second
    competency proceeding. We reject both of these arguments and affirm the
    judgment.
    1     Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
    2
    II
    BACKGROUND
    A
    Factual Background
    San Bernardino County deputy sheriffs responded to a call at a
    residence in Rancho Cucamonga. The defendant, his girlfriend A.J., and
    their three-month-old daughter Jane Doe lived in a travel trailer parked in
    the driveway of the residence. Both the defendant and A.J. were caregivers
    for Doe.
    When the deputies arrived, it was extremely hot in the trailer and the
    defendant was holding Doe in a wet towel that smelled of urine. Doe was
    visibly underweight and her head and face were discolored. The deputies
    sought medical assistance and Doe was transported to the hospital.
    Doe was hospitalized for severe malnutrition and suspected child
    abuse. She had very little subcutaneous fat and weighed just seven pounds
    two ounces. She suffered from diffused osteopenia (loss of bone mass),
    prolonged hypoglycemia, low protein and albumen levels, a low infection-
    fighting blood cell count, and anemia—all of which were indicative of
    malnutrition. She also suffered from oral thrush and widespread candidal
    infection around her diaper area, buttocks, neck, and ears. A forensic
    pediatrician who treated Doe testified her condition was one of the worst
    cases of malnutrition she had seen in her career.
    At the defendant’s trial, A.J. testified that the defendant understood
    Doe was “real skinny” and “needed to put on some weight.” However, neither
    the defendant nor A.J. took Doe to a doctor. A.J. testified that the defendant
    wanted Doe to gain weight before she was taken to a doctor because “it looked
    bad.”
    3
    A.J. testified that the defendant sometimes fed Doe alcohol to calm her.
    She testified that he blew marijuana smoke in Doe’s face as well. The
    defendant reportedly stated marijuana smoke was “good for [Doe] and
    everybody has it in their DNA.”
    B
    Procedural Background
    The defendant was charged by information with one count of felony
    child abuse and it was alleged that he personally inflicted great bodily injury
    on a child under the age of five. He was also held to answer in a separate
    criminal proceeding (Case No. FWV19000963; hereafter, the trailing case) for
    charges of willful infliction of corporal injury (§ 273.5, subd. (a)) and failure to
    appear for a hearing (§ 12022.1).
    On May 3, 2019, the court held a pretrial hearing. At the hearing, the
    defendant’s appointed counsel, deputy public defender Tony Costanzo,
    declared a doubt concerning the defendant’s competence to stand trial. He
    did not elaborate on the reasons for his declaration of doubt. The court did
    not disclose the basis for the declaration of doubt either. It stated, in full, as
    follows: “Under [section] 1368, based on the representations by
    Mr. Costanzo, I’m going to order criminal proceedings be suspended as to all
    matters, again under [section] 1368. I am going to order the appointment of
    a psychologist to provide the Court with a [section] 1368 evaluation.”
    Dr. Robert Sawicky, the court-appointed psychologist, interviewed the
    defendant in jail, reviewed his mental health file, and prepared an
    evaluation. The defendant reported no mental health treatment history, but
    admitted to a protracted history of abusing substances including
    methamphetamine. He reported suffering from post-traumatic stress
    disorder (PTSD), attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), depression,
    4
    and anxiety. Dr. Sawicky observed that the defendant’s thought process was
    “not always totally linear, but the content of his verbal productions [was]
    consistently lucid and relevant.” He opined the defendant was “aware of the
    pending charges” against him, the district attorney’s filing of a criminal
    complaint, and the consequences of a conviction. He opined the defendant’s
    “thought content [was] reality based and free of delusions,” he was “capable of
    cooperating with his attorney in formulating a possible defense,” and he was
    capable of effectively testifying on his own behalf. Although Dr. Sawicky
    found the defendant was “significantly anxious/depressed,” he concluded the
    defendant was competent to stand trial.
    On June 14, 2019, the court held a competency hearing and both
    parties submitted on Dr. Sawicky’s evaluation. Based on the evaluation and
    the parties’ submissions thereon, the court found the defendant was
    competent and criminal proceedings were reinstated.
    On September 18, 2020, the defendant’s trial began. The jury found
    the defendant guilty of the charged offense on September 23, 2020. It also
    returned a true finding on the personal infliction of great bodily injury
    enhancement.
    On November 13, 2020, the court held a hearing pursuant to People v.
    Marsden (1970) 
    2 Cal.3d 118
    . At the Marsden hearing, the defendant sought
    to have Costanzo relieved as his counsel. He voiced several concerns about
    Costanzo’s performance, arguing among other things that Costanzo failed to
    adequately highlight his “mental health issues.” In response, Costanzo
    stated he was initially “concerned about [the defendant’s] ability to
    comprehend” and, for that reason, he declared a doubt about the defendant’s
    competence at the May 3, 2019 pretrial hearing. Costanzo also stated he
    pursued mental health diversion for the defendant, but the expert deemed
    5
    the defendant ineligible. Costanzo added that he met with the defendant
    “many, many times” after the court’s first competence determination and he
    “believed [they] established a rapport so that . . . he underst[ood] what
    [Costanzo was] talking about, and [Costanzo] underst[ood] what [the
    defendant was] talking about.”
    While voicing other unrelated concerns regarding Costanzo’s
    performance, the defendant made statements that were sometimes
    incomprehensible and, at other times, troubling. For instance, he stated he
    felt “fricken trapped” and would “rather be dead almost.” He stated he
    wanted a microphone to be removed from his tooth and a camera to be
    removed from his eye. Additionally, he complained he was being “beat up
    and tortured and set up for a crime [he] didn’t commit.” On the record, the
    court noted that the defendant was trying to pull out his hair during the
    hearing. It also stated that the defendant was pointing at his mouth and his
    eye during the hearing.
    On its own motion, the court declared a doubt as to the defendant’s
    competence and suspended the criminal proceedings. The court stated the
    verdict in the upcoming competency proceeding would apply to both of the
    defendant’s criminal proceedings–the present child abuse case as well as the
    trailing case, which had not yet gone to trial. Further, the court clarified that
    the relevant question, for purposes of the child abuse case, was “not whether
    or not [the defendant was] competent to stand trial; [it was] whether [the
    defendant was] competent to know the nature of the proceedings [as they
    went] forward.” The People demanded a jury trial for the competency
    proceeding.
    The trial court appointed three medical experts to evaluate the
    defendant—Dr. Fazlollah Aldavoud, Dr. Teresa Fisher, and Dr. Nashira
    6
    Funn. All three experts evaluated him and testified at the second
    competency proceeding that took place on May 17, 18, and 19, 2021.
    Dr. Aldavoud is a clinical psychologist who works for the Department of
    Corrections and Rehabilitation. He interviewed the defendant in jail on
    February 5, 2021 for approximately one hour. According to Dr. Aldavoud, the
    defendant reported suffering from ADHD and PTSD. He also reported a
    history of abusing substances including methamphetamine.
    Dr. Aldavoud testified the defendant was communicative and
    cooperative during the jail interview, but he exhibited signs of persecutory
    paranoia and delusion. For instance, he repeatedly pointed at his teeth and
    told Dr. Aldavoud a camera or microchip had been implanted in his teeth. At
    times, he looked behind him to check whether anyone was listening in on the
    interview. Further, he stated he saw vampires and claimed “the cops” broke
    his leg. According to Dr. Aldavoud, the defendant was on psychotropic
    medication at the time of his evaluation.
    Dr. Aldavoud had a “working diagnosis” that the defendant suffered
    from an affective disorder or mood disorder with psychotic features. He did
    not believe the defendant could understand the court proceedings or assist
    his counsel due to his disorganized thinking and paranoia. He noted the
    defendant gave unresponsive answers when asked to define the term plea
    bargain. For these reasons, Dr. Aldavoud concluded the defendant was not
    competent. Dr. Aldavoud opined the defendant would benefit from a long-
    term residential drug program for individuals with dual mental illness and
    substance abuse diagnoses.
    Dr. Fisher is a clinical psychologist who works in a state prison. She
    interviewed the defendant in jail on April 2, 2021. The defendant reported he
    had been diagnosed with attention deficit disorder (ADD), ADHD, a learning
    7
    disability, schizophrenia, and PTSD. He also reported using substances
    including methamphetamine and heroin. According to Dr. Fisher, the
    defendant took psychotropic medication.
    Dr. Fisher testified the defendant was “easily able to understand” the
    questions she asked him and did not seem to have problems with memory or
    speech. She testified his speech sometimes wandered off-topic, but she was
    able to redirect him. According to Dr. Fisher, the defendant reported that he
    was being watched or monitored, vampires were bothering him, and a camera
    was implanted in his eye. However, she did not believe he suffered from a
    formal delusional disorder. She testified a person with a delusional disorder
    usually has “one story and everything fits into that story.” However, the
    defendant’s concerns did not “quite fit” with one another. Further, she
    believed the defendant might be malingering, or exaggerating his symptoms,
    to seem more mentally ill than he was. She believed he might be malingering
    because he brought up specific diagnoses and tried to “advance his own idea
    about how ill he was,” rather than answering her questions.
    Dr. Fisher administered a 14-point competency assessment on the
    defendant. For each area covered in the assessment, she assigned the
    defendant one of three ratings: competent; borderline incompetent; or clearly
    incompetent. Dr. Fisher considered the assessment results holistically and
    weighed all of the defendant’s responses to her questions in order to reach
    her overall determination on the defendant’s competence.
    Dr. Fisher found the defendant was competent in 11 areas:
    understanding of the charges; appreciation of the penalties; appraisal of
    available defenses; motivation to help himself in the legal process; planning
    of legal strategies; ability to cooperate rationally with counsel; capacity to
    disclose pertinent information to counsel; capacity to testify; capacity to
    8
    challenge prosecution witnesses; ability to manifest appropriate courtroom
    behavior; and ability to cope with the stress of incarceration awaiting trial.
    In her evaluation, she noted the defendant was “very clear about the charges
    against him,” knew he was assigned an attorney, was “aware of the possible
    penalties,” and had a “good memory for what happened on the day he was
    arrested.”
    Dr. Fisher found the defendant was borderline incompetent in three
    areas: appraisal of functions of courtroom participants; understanding of
    court procedures; and appraisal of likely outcome. She found he was
    borderline incompetent in these areas because he believed “everyone was
    against him,” he gave nonresponsive answers to certain of her questions, and
    he believed “they’ll probably just find [him] guilty and murder [him].” She
    attributed the findings of borderline incompetence to the defendant’s lack of
    effort or interest in discussing particular topics, not a lack of knowledge
    about those topics.
    Dr. Fisher’s overall assessment was that the defendant was competent.
    In her evaluation, she summarized her assessment as follows: “Mr. Petronzi
    is trial competent at this time. Although he exhibits symptoms of mental
    illness, he also is very able to articulate his current situation, and has a
    working knowledge of the court and its processes. He likes to discuss his own
    issues, but can be re-directed to the task at hand, although this may have to
    happen frequently.”
    Dr. Funn is the program manager for the San Bernardino County
    Department of Behavioral Health. She interviewed the defendant in jail on
    December 28, 2020 for approximately 30–45 minutes. The defendant did not
    report previous diagnoses or hospitalizations. However, he reported he used
    9
    methamphetamine for 12 years and consumed pruno (i.e., fermented fruit
    and bread) in jail.
    Dr. Funn testified the defendant exhibited symptoms of paranoia or
    delusion. In particular, he told her that “people were out to get him” and he
    had a device implanted in his tooth. However, Dr. Funn testified the
    paranoia and delusions did not affect the defendant’s ability to participate in
    the interview because she was able to redirect him. She attributed his
    paranoia and delusions to methamphetamine use and possibly pruno use.
    Dr. Funn testified the defendant was able to understand the nature of
    the criminal proceedings. She believed he exhibited an understanding of the
    criminal charges pending against him, the facts giving rise to the charges, the
    difference between a district attorney and a defense attorney, the meaning of
    a plea bargain, the consequences of a guilty verdict, and the defenses
    available to him. Based on the defendant’s ability to interact with her, his
    ability to present facts about the case, and his stated willingness to assist his
    attorney, Dr. Funn opined the defendant would be able to assist his counsel
    in a rational manner. For all these reasons, Dr. Funn determined the
    defendant was competent.
    After the expert witnesses testified, the jury deliberated and returned a
    verdict finding the defendant competent. Thereafter, the court reinstated the
    criminal proceedings, denied the still-pending Marsden request, and
    sentenced the defendant to 11 years in state prison.
    III
    DISCUSSION
    The defendant challenges the judgment of conviction on two grounds.
    First, he argues the trial court committed instructional error during the
    second competency proceeding. Second, he asserts the second finding of
    10
    competence was not supported by substantial evidence. For reasons we will
    explain, we reject both of these arguments.
    A
    The Trial Court Did Not Commit Instructional Error
    During the second competency proceeding, the court instructed the jury
    with CALCRIM No. 3451 (captioned “Present Mental Competence of
    Defendant”). It required the jury to determine “whether the defendant is
    mentally competent to stand trial.” (Italics added.) Elsewhere, it stated that
    the law presumes a defendant is mentally competent and, to overcome the
    presumption of competence, the defendant must prove “it is more likely than
    not that the defendant is now mentally incompetent . . . .” (Italics added.)
    The defendant claims the trial court erred insofar as it instructed the
    jury to decide his present competence. He asserts the “salient inquiry” is, or
    should have been, his past competence as of the date of his trial, which took
    place eight months earlier. We reject this argument, which misconstrues the
    trial record and the scope of the due process prohibition against trying and
    convicting an incompetent person.
    “The due process clause of the federal Constitution’s Fourteenth
    Amendment prohibits trying a criminal defendant who is mentally
    incompetent. [Citations.] A defendant is deemed competent to stand trial
    only if he ‘ “has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
    reasonable degree of rational understanding” ’ and ‘ “has a rational as well as
    factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” ’ [Citation.] [¶]
    When a trial court is presented with evidence that raises a reasonable doubt
    about a defendant’s mental competence to stand trial, federal due process
    principles require that trial proceedings be suspended and a hearing be held
    to determine the defendant’s competence.” (People v. Ary (2011) 
    51 Cal.4th 11
    510, 517.) In California, a hearing to determine a defendant’s competence
    must be conducted in accordance with the procedures set forth in
    section 1369.
    “If, after a competency hearing, the defendant is found competent to
    stand trial, a trial court may rely on that finding unless the court ‘ “is
    presented with a substantial change of circumstances or with new evidence”
    casting a serious doubt on the validity of that finding.’ ” (People v. Rodas
    (2018) 
    6 Cal.5th 219
    , 231.) “ ‘More is required than just bizarre actions or
    statements by the defendant to raise a doubt of competency’ [citation], or
    ‘counsel’s unparticularized assertion that defendant’s condition had
    deteriorated, with no explanation of how it had done so’ [citation].” (People v.
    Buenrostro (2018) 
    6 Cal.5th 367
    , 409–410.)
    Here, the trial court ordered a competency hearing prior to trial and
    found the defendant was competent. That determination has not been
    challenged on appeal. Then, after the jury returned its verdict of guilt, the
    court declared a doubt as to the defendant’s competence and scheduled a
    second competency proceeding.
    The record reflects that the court declared a doubt and ordered the
    second competency proceeding for two limited purposes: first, to assess
    whether the defendant was competent to proceed to sentencing in the present
    case; and second, to assess whether he was competent to stand trial in the
    trailing case. The court made this abundantly clear, stating on that record
    that the relevant issue to be addressed at the competency proceeding would
    not be whether the defendant was “competent to stand trial [in the present
    case]; [it would be] whether [the defendant was] competent to know the
    nature of the proceedings as [they went] forward.”
    12
    We agree with the trial court’s assessment. To determine whether the
    defendant could proceed to sentencing in the present case, or stand trial in
    the trailing case, the proper inquiry was whether the defendant was presently
    competent—not whether he was competent at some point in the past. (See
    People v. Young (2005) 
    34 Cal.4th 1149
    , 1216 [“The United States Supreme
    Court has defined competence to stand trial as a defendant’s ‘ “ ‘ “sufficient
    present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
    understanding” ’ and ‘ “a rational as well as factual understanding of the
    proceedings against him.” ’ ” ’ ”], italics added; accord § 1368, subd. (c) [“when
    an order for a hearing into the present mental competence of the defendant
    has been issued, all proceedings in the criminal prosecution shall be
    suspended until the question of the present mental competence of the
    defendant has been determined”], italics added; § 1369, subd. (c) [in a
    competency proceeding, “[t]he prosecution shall present its case regarding the
    issue of the defendant’s present mental competence”], italics added.)
    Nothing in the record suggests the court ordered the second
    competency proceeding based on any doubt concerning the defendant’s past
    competence. Further, the defendant has not argued that the court was
    presented with a substantial change of circumstances or new evidence casting
    a serious doubt on the validity of its pretrial finding of competence. Because
    the court ordered the second competency proceeding solely to assess the
    defendant’s competence to continue proceedings in this case, as well as his
    competence to begin trial in the trailing case—inquiries that both turned on
    the defendant’s present competence—the court did not err when it instructed
    the jury to assess the defendant’s present competence as of the date of the
    second competency proceeding.
    13
    At times in his appellate briefs, the defendant appears to suggest the
    due process competency right applies only prior to the rendering of a verdict
    of guilt; thus, any doubt as to his competence necessarily concerned, or
    should have concerned, his competence at the time of trial. For instance, he
    claims the “fundamental statutory and constitutional concern is whether the
    defendant is or was competent at the time of their trial.” (Italics added.)
    Further, he contends that any determination of his competence after the
    rendering of the verdict was “moot.” To the extent we have accurately
    summarized the defendant’s argument, the defendant is mistaken.
    “ ‘[T]he competency right does not end at a conviction,’ but rather
    persists through sentencing.” (U.S. v. Dreyer (9th Cir. 2013) 
    705 F.3d 951
    ,
    961; see U.S. v. Ahrendt (1st Cir. 2009) 
    560 F.3d 69
    , 74 [“The obligation to
    determine competency to stand trial is continuing, and persists throughout a
    proceeding including through the sentencing phase.”]; U.S. v. Pellerito (1st
    Cir. 1989) 
    878 F.2d 1535
    , 1545 [“Surely, the sentencing process necessitates
    that the defendant possess both a ‘present ability to consult with [a] lawyer
    with a reasonable degree of rational understanding,’ and a ‘rational as well as
    factual understanding of the proceedings.’ ”].) It extends through sentencing
    because “ ‘[s]entencing is a critical stage of the criminal process,’ [citations],
    and the defendant’s allocution, ‘is an essential element of a criminal
    defense.’ ” (Dreyer, at p. 961; see People v. Gutierrez (1986) 
    177 Cal.App.3d 92
    , 100 [“Sentencing is a critical phase in a criminal proceeding.”].)
    Because due process prohibits an incompetent person from being
    sentenced—not merely tried during the guilt phase of a trial—we cannot
    conclude that the trial court’s declaration of doubt necessarily concerned the
    defendant’s past competence at the time of his trial. Rather, as the trial
    court made clear, the declaration of doubt pertained solely to the defendant’s
    14
    present competence to proceed to sentencing in the case at hand, and to
    proceed to trial in the trailing case. Because the defendant’s present
    competence was the sole issue to be decided in the second competency
    proceeding, the trial court’s instructions were correct.
    B
    The Competency Verdict was Supported by Substantial Evidence
    The defendant claims substantial evidence did not support the jury’s
    finding that he was competent. We disagree.
    When a party challenges a finding of competence, the reviewing court
    applies “a deferential substantial evidence standard of review on appeal. ‘In
    reviewing a jury’s determination that a defendant is competent to proceed to
    trial, we give due deference to the trier of fact, and therefore view the record
    in the light most favorable to the verdict.’ ” (People v. Mendoza (2016) 
    62 Cal.4th 856
    , 871 (Mendoza); People v. Kirvin (2014) 
    231 Cal.App.4th 1507
    ,
    1514 (Kirvin) [“We review a trial court’s determination of competency for
    substantial evidence, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to that
    determination.”].) “ ‘Evidence is substantial if it is reasonable, credible and of
    solid value.’ ” (People v. Turner (2004) 
    34 Cal.4th 406
    , 425.)
    Applying this deferential standard of review to the present case, we
    conclude there was substantial evidence to support the jury’s finding of
    competence. Three court-appointed psychologists interviewed the defendant,
    prepared psychological evaluations of him, and testified at the second
    competency proceeding. Two of those court-appointed psychologists—
    Dr. Fisher and Dr. Funn—concluded the defendant was competent.
    Both Dr. Fisher and Dr. Funn rendered testimony upon which a
    reasonable trier of fact could find that the defendant understood the nature of
    the criminal proceedings pending against him. Dr. Fisher opined the
    15
    defendant was “very clear about the charges against him,” knew he was
    assigned an attorney, was “aware of the possible penalties,” and had a “good
    memory for what happened on the day he was arrested.” Similarly, Dr. Funn
    testified the defendant appeared to understand the criminal charges against
    him, the facts giving rise to the charges, the difference between a district
    attorney and a defense attorney, the meaning of a plea bargain, the
    consequences of a guilty verdict, and his available defenses.
    Dr. Fisher and Dr. Funn also rendered testimony upon which a rational
    jury could find that the defendant was able to assist his counsel. After
    administering a 14-point assessment on the defendant, Dr. Fisher concluded
    the defendant was “competent” in numerous areas including, of relevance
    here, his ability to appraise available defenses, help himself in the legal
    process, plan legal strategies, cooperate rationally with counsel, and disclose
    pertinent information to counsel. While acknowledging the defendant’s
    speech sometimes wandered off-topic, Dr. Fisher concluded he could “easily
    be re-directed” to the topic at hand. Like Dr. Fisher, Dr. Funn concluded the
    defendant could rationally assist defense counsel. She based this
    determination on her firsthand interactions with the defendant and the
    defendant’s own statement that he would assist his counsel.
    The evaluations and testimony of Dr. Fisher and Dr. Funn constituted
    ample evidence to support the jury’s finding of competence. (People v. Lawley
    (2002) 
    27 Cal.4th 102
    , 135 [expert report, even in the absence of testimony,
    supported competence finding]; People v. Stanley (1995) 
    10 Cal.4th 764
    , 811–
    812 [competency evidence from two medical experts deemed sufficient].)
    The defendant asserts substantial evidence did not support the jury’s
    finding of competence because he made certain statements to the court-
    appointed psychologists suggesting that he was unaware trial had already
    16
    occurred. In particular, he emphasizes that he told Dr. Fisher, “they’ll
    probably just find me guilty and murder me.” According to the defendant,
    this statement (and other statements that the defendant has not identified)
    showed he harbored a “manifest [mis]understanding that his trial was yet
    ahead of him . . . .”
    For at least two reasons, defendant’s argument does not persuade us.
    For one thing, the court ordered competency proceedings to assess the
    defendant’s competency in two separate proceedings—the present case and
    the trailing case, which had not yet gone to trial at the time the psychologists’
    interviews took place. It is reasonable to infer the defendant’s statements
    about an upcoming trial or guilty verdict concerned the trailing case, not the
    present case. The defendant has given us no reason to believe otherwise.
    Moreover, Dr. Fisher acknowledged that the statement upon which the
    defendant’s argument is based (“they’ll probably just find me guilty and
    murder me”) caused her to rate him as borderline incompetent in one of the
    areas she assessed—appraisal of likely outcomes. Despite his poor
    performance in this area (and two other areas), she nonetheless diagnosed
    him as competent overall given his apparent understanding of many other
    aspects of the legal system. Further, she believed the defendant’s lack of
    effort—not lack of knowledge—was the true reason he scored borderline
    incompetent in any areas at all. For both of these reasons, the defendant’s
    mere reference to a future trial or verdict does not mean that the finding of
    competence was unsupported by substantial evidence.
    The defendant also challenges the finding of competence on grounds
    that the jury received evidence from which it could have found that he was
    incompetent. Relying principally on the testimony of Dr. Aldavoud, he
    17
    argues the jury heard evidence that he suffered from a mental health
    condition and his ability to communicate with counsel was impaired.
    The defendant effectively asks us to reweigh the evidence, reassess
    witness credibility, and substitute our own finding for that of the jury. We
    decline his request, which misinterprets our function as an appellate court.
    “It is ‘not the role of this court to redetermine the credibility of experts or to
    reweigh the relative strength of their conclusions.’ ” (Kirvin, supra, 231
    Cal.App.4th at p. 1514.) Rather, our role is to determine whether substantial
    evidence, controverted or uncontroverted, supports the finding that was
    actually rendered by the trier of fact. (Mendoza, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 883
    [“We must emphasize that it is not our function to substitute our judgment
    for that of the jury or to reweigh the evidence. Rather, we are required to
    ‘view the record in the light most favorable to the verdict.’ ”].) For all the
    reasons discussed above, we conclude the evidence, viewed in the light most
    favorable to the verdict, was sufficient to support the jury’s finding of
    competence.
    18
    IV
    DISPOSITION
    The judgment is affirmed.
    McCONNELL, P. J.
    WE CONCUR:
    O’ROURKE, J.
    DATO, J.
    19
    

Document Info

Docket Number: D079422

Filed Date: 5/6/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 5/6/2022