Nazir v. Super. Ct. ( 2022 )


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  • Filed 6/2/22
    CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION SEVEN
    REHAN NAZIR,                       B310806
    Petitioner,                (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. VA151320)
    v.
    THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    LOS ANGELES COUNTY,
    Respondent;
    THE PEOPLE,
    Real Party in Interest.
    ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS in mandate. Superior Court
    of Los Angeles County, Lee W. Tsao, Judge. Petition granted.
    Okabe & Haushalter, Mark Haushalter and Joe Weimortz;
    Kravis, Graham & Zucker, Bruce Zucker and Thomas Ian
    Graham for Petitioner.
    Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
    Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
    Assistant Attorney General, Michael R. Johnsen, Supervising
    Deputy Attorney General, and Blythe J. Leszkay, Deputy
    Attorney General as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner and
    Real Party in Interest.
    Claudia Y. Bautista, Public Defender (Ventura), and
    Michael C. McMahon, Senior Deputy Public Defender for
    California Public Defenders Association and Claudia Y. Bautista,
    Public Defender, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.
    Michael Romano, Erwin Chemerinsky, and Miriam Krinsky
    for 76 Current and Former Elected Prosecutors and Attorneys
    General as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.
    Frederick R. Bennett for Respondent.
    Browne George Ross O’Brien Annaguey & Ellis, Eric M.
    George, Thomas P. O’Brien, Nathan J. Hochman, David J.
    Carroll, and Matthew O. Kussman for Association of Deputy
    District Attorneys for Los Angeles County as Amicus Curiae on
    behalf of Respondent.
    Greg D. Totten and Robert P. Brown, Chief Deputy District
    Attorney (San Bernardino) for California District Attorneys
    Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Respondent.
    Kent S. Scheidegger and Kymberlee C. Stapleton for
    Criminal Justice Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of
    Respondent.
    George Gascón, District Attorney, Diana M. Teran, Deputy
    District Attorney; Hogan Lovells, Stephanie Yonekura, Neal
    Kumar Katyal, Jo-Ann Tamila Sagar, and Danielle Desaulniers
    Stempel for Real Party in Interest.
    _____________________________
    2
    INTRODUCTION
    “[T]here is a long history of dispute among the various
    branches of state government over the application of [Penal Code]
    section 1385 to sentencing allegations.”1 (People v. Superior
    Court (Romero) (1996) 
    13 Cal.4th 497
    , 521-522 (Romero).) In this
    latest chapter of that history, Rehan Nazir argues the trial court
    abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss under section 1385
    certain firearm enhancements the People alleged against him.
    Nazir and the People argue the trial court should have dismissed
    the sentence enhancements “in furtherance of justice” under
    section 1385 in accordance with a policy issued by the district
    attorney for Los Angeles County, George Gascón, upon his
    election. That policy directs all deputy district attorneys “to
    orally amend the charging document to dismiss or withdraw any
    [sentence] enhancement” alleged in a pending case.
    Based on the district attorney’s new policy, the prosecutor
    moved under section 1385 to dismiss firearm enhancements
    alleged under sections 12022.5 and 12022.53. The trial court
    denied the motion and refused to consider the new policy in
    determining whether to dismiss the enhancements under
    section 1385.
    We agree with Nazir and the People that the trial court
    misunderstood the scope of its discretion under section 1385
    when it refused to consider the district attorney’s new policy, but
    we disagree with the People that the trial court lacked discretion
    to deny a motion by the People to dismiss enhancements
    pursuant to that policy. Under the relevant statutory scheme,
    1     Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
    3
    long-standing case authority, and the rules of court governing
    sentencing, a trial court deciding whether to dismiss a sentence
    enhancement in furtherance of justice under section 12022.5 or
    12022.53 must consider case-specific factors as well as general
    sentencing objectives. Therefore, we grant Nazir’s petition for a
    writ of mandate and direct the trial court to vacate its
    December 18, 2020 order denying the People’s motion to dismiss
    and to conduct a new hearing to reconsider the People’s motion.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    A.     The People Charge Nazir with 35 Counts and Allege
    Certain Firearm Enhancements
    Nazir was a former Torrance police officer who became a
    bail agent. In July 2019 he was arrested for crimes allegedly
    committed in the course of his work, including kidnapping, false
    imprisonment, and grand theft of an automobile. Nazir was
    arraigned on July 26, 2019.
    The People filed a fourth amended complaint on May 4,
    2020, alleging 35 counts against Nazir. In connection with 22 of
    those counts, the People alleged Nazir personally used a firearm,
    within the meaning of section 12022.5, subdivision (a), an
    enhancement that could enhance Nazir’s sentence by three, four,
    or 10 years; committed an assault with a deadly weapon or by
    means likely to produce great bodily injury by personally
    shooting a firearm from an automobile, within the meaning of
    section 12022.5, subdivision (d), an enhancement that could
    enhance Nazir’s sentence by three, four, or 10 years; or
    personally used a firearm in the commission of a felony, within
    4
    the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (b), an enhancement
    that could enhance Nazir’s sentence by 10 years.
    B.      The New District Attorney Adopts a Policy Regarding
    Sentence Enhancements
    On November 3, 2020 the voters of Los Angeles County
    elected George Gascón to replace Jackie Lacey as district
    attorney. On December 8, 2020 the new district attorney issued
    Special Directive 20-08, which made changes to the Legal Policies
    Manual. Special Directive 20-08 stated that “sentence
    enhancements or other sentencing allegations . . . shall not be
    filed in any cases and shall be withdrawn in pending matters.”
    The Special Directive explained that “the current statutory
    ranges for criminal offenses alone, without enhancements, are
    sufficient to both hold people accountable and also to protect
    public safety” and that “studies show that each additional
    sentence year causes a 4 to 7 percent increase in recidivism that
    eventually outweighs the incapacitation benefit.” An appendix to
    Special Directive 20-08 stated that there was no compelling
    evidence California’s 100-plus sentence enhancements improved
    public safety, that such enhancements contributed to prison
    overcrowding, and that they “exacerbate[d] racial disparities in
    the justice system.” The appendix also stated “long sentences do
    little” to deter crime.
    Special Directive 20-08 instructed deputy district attorneys
    in pending cases to move to dismiss or withdraw sentence
    enhancement allegations. On December 15, 2020 the district
    attorney issued a clarification to Special Directive 20-08 for
    pending cases where the People had alleged prior serious or
    violent felony convictions under the three strikes law (§§ 667,
    5
    subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) or sentence enhancements.
    In such cases, Special Directive 20-08.1 directed deputy district
    attorneys to “make the following record”:
    “‘The People move to dismiss and withdraw any strike prior
    (or other enhancement) in this case. We submit that punishment
    provided within the sentencing triad of the substantive charge(s)
    in this case are [sic] sufficient to protect public safety and serve
    justice. Penal Code section 1385 authorizes the People to seek
    dismissal of all strike prior(s) (or other enhancements) when in
    the interests of justice. Supreme Court authority directs this
    Court to determine those interests by balancing the rights of the
    defendant and those of society “as represented by the People.”
    The California Constitution and State Supreme Court precedent
    further vest the District Attorney with sole authority to
    determine whom to charge, what charges to file and pursue, and
    what punishment to seek. That power cannot be stripped from
    the District Attorney by the Legislature, Judiciary, or voter
    initiative without amending the California Constitution. . . .
    Additional punishment provided by sentencing enhancements or
    special allegations provide[s] no deterrent effect or public safety
    benefit of incapacitation—in fact, the opposite may be true,
    wasting critical financial state and local resources.’”2 If a trial
    court refused to dismiss allegations of prior serious or violent
    2     We take judicial notice under Evidence Code sections 452,
    subdivision (c), and 459 of Special Directive 20-08.1. The
    prosecutor cited Special Directive 20-08.1 in the trial court, but
    Nazir did not include it in the record. (See Western States
    Petroleum Assn. v. State Dept. of Health Services (2002)
    
    99 Cal.App.4th 999
    , 1002, fn. 1 [taking judicial notice of a policy
    of an executive agency].)
    6
    felony convictions under the three strikes law or refused to
    dismiss sentencing allegations under section 1385, Special
    Directive 20-08.1 instructed deputy district attorneys to “seek
    leave of the court to file an amended charging document
    pursuant to Penal Code section 1009.”
    C.     The Trial Court Denies the People’s Motion To
    Dismiss the Firearm Enhancements
    On December 11, 2020 the People orally moved under
    section 1385 to dismiss the firearm enhancements alleged in the
    fourth amended complaint. The trial court, stating it understood
    the motion was “based solely on District Attorney Gascón’s
    Special Directive,” denied the motion. The court stated that “the
    People may file an amended information omitting the
    enhancements that are at issue here, and if they do that, we can
    proceed, but insofar as the motion to dismiss the existing
    information under . . . section 1385, it is without legal
    justification.” The court said the cases “are clear that the
    exercise of discretion under [section] 1385 must be based on an
    individualized consideration of the offense and the offender and
    not on any antipathy or disagreement with the statutory
    scheme.”
    On December 18, 2020 the People filed a written motion
    under section 1385 to dismiss the firearm enhancements,
    restating verbatim the arguments recited in Special Directive
    20-08.1. In the alternative the People sought leave to file an
    amended complaint omitting the firearm allegations. At the
    hearing, the prosecutor did not present any argument in support
    of the motions, other than parroting the language of Special
    Directive 20-08.1.
    7
    Counsel for Nazir argued the court erred in denying the
    People’s previous motion to dismiss by applying case law that
    involved a trial court dismissing prior convictions on its own
    motion, rather than a motion by the People. Counsel for Nazir
    also argued denying the People’s motion would violate Nazir’s
    equal protection rights because Nazir would be subject to greater
    punishment for the same crimes committed by someone charged
    (originally) by the new district attorney under Special Directive
    20-08. Counsel for Nazir further argued that, because a
    defendant charged before the change in policy was treated
    differently from a similarly situated defendant charged after the
    change, granting the People’s motion was in furtherance of
    justice under section 1385.
    The trial court again denied the People’s motion to dismiss
    the firearm allegations. The court stated that, because the
    “exclusive basis” for the motion was the Special Directive, in
    order to grant the motion the court “would have to adopt [the
    district attorney’s] rationale,” which the court concluded was “not
    a permissible basis” on which to grant the motion. The court,
    after considering “the preliminary hearing transcript,
    information, the probation report,” and “the nature of the offense
    and the background and character of Mr. Nazir,” ruled “the
    motion to dismiss the enhancements is not in the interest of
    justice.”
    The court, stating it had “rethought” its position since the
    December 11, 2020 hearing, also denied the People’s motion for
    leave under section 1009 to file an amended information that
    omitted the enhancement allegations. The court ruled it was not
    “proper” for the People to proceed on an amended information
    that omitted “the very enhancements” that were the subject of
    8
    the motion to dismiss under section 1385. The court stated that,
    if the People were “displeased” with the court’s ruling, they could
    appeal or dismiss the information and refile charges against
    Nazir that did not include the firearm allegations.
    D.     Nazir Files a Petition for Writ of Mandate or
    Prohibition
    The People did not appeal, but on March 8, 2021 Nazir filed
    a petition for writ of mandate or prohibition. Nazir argued the
    trial court abused its discretion in denying the People’s motion to
    dismiss the firearm enhancements and by denying, after initially
    indicating it would grant, the People’s motion for leave to file an
    amended information without the firearm enhancements. Nazir
    also argued the trial court’s rulings violated Nazir’s equal
    protection rights. Nazir sought a peremptory writ of mandate
    directing the trial court to vacate its decision denying the
    People’s motion to dismiss or in the alternative to vacate its order
    denying the People’s motion for leave to amend the information,
    and to grant Nazir “whatever alternative or further relief as may
    be appropriate in the interests of justice.”
    This court denied the petition, and Nazir filed a petition for
    review in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted the
    petition for review and transferred the matter to this court with
    directions to issue an order to show cause why the relief sought in
    the petition should not be granted. (Nazir v. Superior Court
    (May 26, 2021, S267713).)3
    3     We summarily denied the petition because we concluded
    Nazir, who was seeking writ review of the trial court’s order
    9
    DISCUSSION
    Nazir and the People argue the trial court’s ruling violates
    the separation of powers guaranteed under article III, section 3 of
    the California Constitution by denying the district attorney
    prosecutorial discretion over charging decisions.4 They also
    argue the court abused its discretion in failing to include Special
    Directive 20-08 among “the interests of society represented by the
    People” a court must consider in ruling on a motion to dismiss
    under section 1385. (See People v. Clancey (2013) 
    56 Cal.4th 562
    ,
    580.) We need not address whether the trial court’s ruling
    violated article III, section 3 of the California Constitution
    because we conclude section 1385 does not preclude a trial court
    from considering a district attorney’s policy in ruling on a motion
    to dismiss a firearm enhancement under section 12022.5 or
    12022.53 in furtherance of justice. (See Facebook, Inc. v.
    Superior Court (Hunter) (2018) 
    4 Cal.5th 1245
    , 1275, fn. 31 [“we
    are guided by the familiar principle that we should address and
    resolve statutory issues prior to, and if possible, instead of,
    constitutional questions”]; In re White (2019) 
    34 Cal.App.5th 933
    ,
    959 [same]; see also People v. Williams (1976) 
    16 Cal.3d 663
    , 667
    [“we do not reach constitutional questions unless absolutely
    denying the People’s motion (i.e., not his motion), lacked
    standing. The Supreme Court apparently thought otherwise.
    4     Article III, section 3 of the California Constitution states:
    “The powers of state government are legislative, executive, and
    judicial. Persons charged with the exercise of one power may not
    exercise either of the others except as permitted by this
    Constitution.”
    10
    required to do so to dispose of the matter before us”]; Newsom v.
    Superior Court (2021) 
    63 Cal.App.5th 1099
    , 1112, fn. 2 [“‘it is
    often deemed prudent to address a statutory or other ground to
    avoid reaching a constitutional ground’”].)
    A.    Standard of Review
    We review a trial court’s order denying a motion to dismiss
    a sentence enhancement under section 1385 for abuse of
    discretion. (People v. Carmony (2004) 
    33 Cal.4th 367
    , 373-374;
    People v. Flores (2021) 
    63 Cal.App.5th 368
    , 376; People v. Pearson
    (2019) 
    38 Cal.App.5th 112
    , 116.) A trial court may abuse its
    discretion where “its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no
    reasonable person could agree with it,” “where the trial court was
    not ‘aware of its discretion’” to dismiss a sentencing allegation
    under section 1385, or “where the court considered impermissible
    factors in declining to dismiss.” (Carmony, at pp. 377-378; see
    People v. Tirado (2022) 
    12 Cal.5th 688
    , 694 (Tirado) [a “court
    acting while unaware of the scope of its discretion is understood
    to have abused it”]; People v. Pearson (2013) 
    56 Cal.4th 393
    , 419
    [a court abuses its discretion when it misunderstands the scope of
    that discretion].)
    “Because ‘all discretionary authority is contextual’
    [citation], we cannot determine whether a trial court has acted
    irrationally or arbitrarily in refusing to strike a [sentencing]
    allegation without considering the legal principles and policies
    that should have guided the court’s actions.” (People v. Carmony,
    supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 377.) Thus, whether the trial court in this
    case abused its discretion depends on the scope of that discretion
    under sections 1385, 12022.5, and 12022.53. We review this
    11
    question of statutory interpretation de novo. (Tirado, supra,
    12 Cal.5th at p. 694.)
    B.    The Statutory Scheme
    1.    Section 1385
    Section 1385, subdivision (a), provides that a “judge or
    magistrate may, either on motion of the court or upon the
    application of the prosecuting attorney, and in furtherance of
    justice, order an action to be dismissed.” Section 1385 applies to
    a motion to dismiss “the entire action or, as here, only an
    enhancement allegation.” (People v. Bonnetta (2009) 
    46 Cal.4th 143
    , 145-146; see Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 696 [“Though
    section 1385 literally authorizes the dismissal of ‘an action,’ it
    has been construed to permit the dismissal of parts of an action
    [citation], including a weapon or firearm use enhancement.”];
    Romero, 
    supra,
     13 Cal.4th at p. 508 [“we have construed section
    1385[, subdivision] (a) as permitting a judge to dismiss not only
    an entire case, but also a part thereof, including the allegation
    that a defendant has previously been convicted of a felony”];
    People v. Hernandez (2000) 
    22 Cal.4th 512
    , 522 [“‘The authority
    to dismiss the whole includes, of course, the power to dismiss or
    “strike out” a part.’”]; see also § 1385, subd. (b) [referring to a
    court’s authority to strike or dismiss an enhancement].)
    “[S]ections 1385 and 1386, enacted in 1872, codify
    California’s rejection of the English rule of nolle prosequi, under
    which the prosecutor alone had authority to discontinue a
    prosecution, in favor of granting sole authority to the courts to
    12
    dismiss actions in furtherance of justice.”5 (People v. Bonnetta,
    
    supra,
     46 Cal.4th at pp. 148-149, fn. omitted.) “Because nolle
    prosequi is abolished in California, the prosecutor may not
    unilaterally abandon a prosecution (Pen. Code, § 1386); only the
    court may dismiss a criminal charge (id., § 1385, subd. (a)).”
    (Steen v. Appellate Division of Superior Court (2014) 
    59 Cal.4th 1045
    , 1055; see Romero, 
    supra,
     13 Cal.4th at p. 512 [“when the
    Legislature does permit a charge to be dismissed the ultimate
    decision whether to dismiss is a judicial, rather than a
    prosecutorial or executive, function”].) Thus, a “‘district attorney
    can only recommend dismissal to the court. Dismissal is within
    the latter’s exclusive discretion.’” (People v. Roman (2001)
    
    92 Cal.App.4th 141
    , 145; see People v. Levins (1978) 
    22 Cal.3d 620
    , 623-624 [section 1385 “does not require that a court dismiss
    a criminal action upon application of the district attorney; rather,
    the statutory language clearly indicates the creation of a
    discretionary power in the court”]; People v. Ward (1890) 
    85 Cal. 585
    , 590 [“we find no authority for the proposition that ‘it is the
    duty of a justice . . . to enter a dismissal upon the motion of the
    district attorney’”].)
    In general, a court may dismiss an action or sentence
    enhancement in furtherance of justice in any situation where the
    Legislature has not clearly evidenced a contrary intent. (See
    5     Section 1386 provides: “The entry of a nolle prosequi is
    abolished, and neither the Attorney General nor the district
    attorney can discontinue or abandon a prosecution for a public
    offense, except as provided in Section 1385.” Nolle prosequi is
    “Latin for ‘not to wish to prosecute.’” (Zike v. Advance America,
    Cash Advance Centers of Missouri, Inc. (8th Cir. 2011) 
    646 F.3d 504
    , 508, fn. 4.)
    13
    People v. Fuentes (2016) 
    1 Cal.5th 218
    , 230 [“in light of section
    1385’s ‘prominent and contentious history’ [citation], it is critical
    and even ‘demanded,’ that the legislative intent to divest a court
    of its section 1385 discretion be abundantly clear”]; People v.
    Clancey, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 580 [there is “no statutory or
    constitutional basis” preventing a court from dismissing a prior
    conviction under section 1385 in the context of an indicated
    sentence]; see also People v. Hatch (2000) 
    22 Cal.4th 260
    , 269
    [“Because the trial court’s power to dismiss ‘in furtherance of
    justice’ is statutory, the Legislature may eliminate it.”].) None of
    the parties cites, nor have we found, any evidence of a clear
    intent by the Legislature to preclude a court from dismissing a
    sentence enhancement under section 1385 where a district
    attorney has legitimate concerns that applying the sentencing
    scheme in question was not in furtherance of justice, and instead
    created injustice.
    But that does not end the inquiry; a court does not have
    absolute power to dismiss an action in furtherance of justice.
    (See People v. Williams (1998) 
    17 Cal.4th 148
    , 158 (Williams)
    [“‘“The trial court’s power to dismiss an action under [section
    1385], while broad, is by no means absolute.”’”]; see also Romero,
    
    supra,
     13 Cal.4th at p. 530; People v. Orin (1975) 
    13 Cal.3d 937
    ,
    945; Wheeler v. Appellate Division of Superior Court (2021)
    
    72 Cal.App.5th 824
    , 842.) Although section 1385 does not define
    “in furtherance of justice,” a large body of precedent has created
    boundaries on the judicial power conferred by the statute.
    (Williams, at p. 159; see People v. Hatch, 
    supra,
     22 Cal.4th at
    p. 268 [“the concept of ‘furtherance of justice’ [citation] is
    amorphous”].) Under section 1385 trial courts must balance
    “‘“‘the constitutional rights of the defendant, and the interests of
    14
    society represented by the People, in determining whether there
    should be a dismissal.’”’” (Williams, at p. 159; see Hatch, at
    p. 268; Orin, at p. 945.)
    Almost all of that precedent arose in the context of a trial
    court dismissing an action, charge, or enhancement on its own
    motion, followed by an appeal by the People. (See Williams,
    
    supra,
     17 Cal.4th at p. 159 [addressing whether the trial court
    abused its discretion in dismissing on its own motion one of two
    prior serious or violent felony convictions under the three strikes
    law]; People v. Hatch, 
    supra,
     22 Cal.4th at p. 268 [addressing the
    consequences of a trial court order dismissing on its own motion
    certain charges for lack of evidence]; Romero, 
    supra,
     13 Cal.4th at
    p. 530 [addressing whether a trial court may dismiss on its own
    motion a prior serious or violent felony conviction under the three
    strikes law in furtherance of justice]; People v. Orin, supra,
    13 Cal.3d at p. 945 [addressing whether the trial court could
    dismiss on its own motion two of three counts against the
    defendant].) In that context, the “‘“interests of society
    represented by the People”’” refers to the “‘legitimate interest in
    “the fair prosecution of crimes properly alleged,”’” and a
    “‘“‘dismissal which arbitrarily cuts those rights without a
    showing of detriment to the defendant is an abuse of
    discretion.’”’” (Romero, at p. 531, italics omitted; accord,
    Williams, at p. 159; see Orin, at pp. 946-947 [“appellate courts
    have shown considerable opposition to the granting of dismissals
    under section 1385 in instances where the People are thereby
    prevented from prosecuting defendants for offenses of which
    there is probable cause to believe they are guilty as charged”].)
    When the trial court, on its own motion or at the request of the
    defendant, considers whether to dismiss an action under section
    15
    1385, the court must keep the “scales of justice . . . in balance”
    (People v. Winters (1959) 
    171 Cal.App.2d Supp. 876
    , 887) by not
    having a case brought by the People “thrown out of court except
    for a reason which can be said to be that which would motivate a
    reasonable judge” (People v. Curtiss (1970) 
    4 Cal.App.3d 123
    , 126;
    see People v. Clancey, supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 580-581; People v.
    Vasquez (2021) 
    72 Cal.App.5th 374
    , 381). Thus, for example, a
    court may not on its own motion dismiss a charge or allegation
    “‘“to accommodate judicial convenience or because of court
    congestion”’” (Clancey, at p. 581), “‘because a defendant pleads
    guilty’” (ibid.), or based on “bare antipathy to the consequences
    for any given defendant” (Williams, at p. 161; see Romero, at
    p. 531 [“[n]or would a court act properly if ‘guided solely by a
    personal antipathy for the effect that the three strikes law would
    have on [a] defendant,’ while ignoring ‘defendant’s background,’
    ‘the nature of his present offenses,’ and other ‘individualized
    considerations’”]).
    But “the interests of society represented by the People” do
    not begin or end with the mechanical prosecution of charges
    properly alleged. “The public prosecutor ‘“is the representative
    not of any ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty
    whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its
    obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a
    criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that
    justice shall be done.”’” (People v. Eubanks (1996) 
    14 Cal.4th 580
    ,
    589; accord, People v. Dehle (2008) 
    166 Cal.App.4th 1380
    , 1387.)
    “‘The nature of the impartiality required of the public prosecutor
    follows from the prosecutor’s role as representative of the People
    as a body, rather than as individuals. “The prosecutor speaks not
    solely for the victim, or the police, or those who support them, but
    16
    for all the People. That body of ‘The People’ includes the
    defendant and his family and those who care about him. It also
    includes the vast majority of citizens who know nothing about a
    particular case, but who give over to the prosecutor the authority
    to seek a just result in their name.”’” (Dehle, at p. 1388, quoting
    Corrigan, On Prosecutorial Ethics (1986) 13 Hastings Const.L.Q.
    537, 538-539.) Thus, “the district attorney is expected to exercise
    his or her discretionary functions in the interests of the People at
    large . . . .” (Eubanks, at p. 589; accord, People v. Martin (2018)
    
    26 Cal.App.5th 825
    , 838; Dehle, at p. 1388.)
    In conducting a trial the “prosecutor has the responsibility
    to decide in the public interest whether to seek, oppose, accept, or
    challenge judicial actions and rulings. These decisions . . . go
    beyond safety and redress for an individual victim; they involve
    ‘the complex considerations necessary for the effective and
    efficient administration of law enforcement.’” (Dix v. Superior
    Court (1991) 
    53 Cal.3d 442
    , 452; see People v. Birks (1998)
    
    19 Cal.4th 108
    , 134 [a prosecutor’s discretion to choose “the
    actual charges from among those potentially available arises
    from ‘“the complex considerations necessary for the effective and
    efficient administration of law enforcement”’”]; see also People v.
    Dehle, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 1387 [“[s]ubject to supervision
    by the Attorney General [citations], . . . the district attorney of
    each county independently exercises all the executive branch’s
    discretionary powers in the initiation and conduct of criminal
    proceedings”].)
    For example, after charges have been filed, a prosecutor
    may seek a dismissal under section 1385 for many reasons,
    including to effectuate a plea agreement. (See People v. Bonnetta,
    
    supra,
     46 Cal.4th at p. 153, fn. 5; People v. Orin, supra, 
    13 Cal.3d 17
    at p. 946.) By definition, plea “bargaining” trades a defendant’s
    maximum exposure for expediency and finality (see People v.
    Segura (2008) 
    44 Cal.4th 921
    , 929 [plea agreements benefit the
    criminal justice system by “promoting speed, economy, and the
    finality of judgments”]), factors a court may not consider in
    dismissing a charge under section 1385 on its own motion
    (see People v. Clancey, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 581; Romero, 
    supra,
    13 Cal.4th at p. 531). Thus, under section 1385 the “interests of
    society” promoted by a prosecutor’s motion to dismiss under
    section 1385 are broader than those a court may seek to advance
    on its own motion. (See People v. Superior Court (1967)
    
    249 Cal.App.2d 714
    , 718 (King) [“Under the adversary nature of
    our criminal procedure, the prosecuting attorney, as the People’s
    representative, is often in a position to make application for a
    dismissal ‘in furtherance of justice’ when the record then before
    the trial judge would not justify a dismissal by the judge on his
    own motion.” (Italics omitted.)].)6
    6      In People v. Superior Court (Howard) (1968) 
    69 Cal.2d 491
    the Supreme Court appeared to question whether a trial judge’s
    “discretion to dismiss on his own motion is not as great as his
    discretion to dismiss on the motion of the prosecutor.” (Id. at
    pp. 503-504, citing King, supra, 249 Cal.App.2d at p. 718.) In
    Howard, however, the Supreme Court considered whether a trial
    court had discretion under section 1385 to dismiss an action on
    its own motion after a jury returned a guilty verdict. In
    responding to the People’s argument that a trial court could only
    do so with the prosecutor’s approval, the Supreme Court made
    clear that, contrary to the suggestion in King, a trial court has
    discretion to dismiss an action under section 1385 before or
    during trial, “notwithstanding the fact that there is sufficient
    evidence of guilt,” so long as the court “is convinced that the only
    18
    Moreover, in the context of sentencing, the Legislature has
    stated that the “interests of justice” under section 1385 include
    ensuring defendants receive proportionate punishment. (See
    People v. Stamps (2020) 
    9 Cal.5th 685
    , 701-702 [citing legislative
    history stating that “‘“punishments that are disproportionate to
    the offense [do] not serve the interests of justice, public safety, or
    communities”’”]; People v. Flores, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 384
    [same].) Because this case involves the denial of a motion to
    dismiss sentence enhancements, we consider the sentencing
    scheme in question “to give content to the concept of ‘furtherance
    of justice.’” (Williams, 
    supra,
     17 Cal.4th at p. 160; see 
    ibid.
    [considering “the ‘letter’” and the “‘spirit’” of the three strikes law
    in determining whether a court abused its discretion in
    dismissing on its own motion a prior serious or violent felony
    conviction]; Wheeler v. Appellate Division of Superior Court,
    
    supra,
     72 Cal.App.5th at p. 843 [identifying “the ‘interests of
    society’ as expressed in the ordinances at issue” in the case];
    People v. Orabuena (2004) 
    116 Cal.App.4th 84
    , 96 [considering
    “the goals of Proposition 36,” the Substance Abuse and Crime
    Prevention Act of 2000, in concluding the trial court had
    discretion under section 1385 to dismiss a defendant’s conviction
    for a non-drug crime so that the defendant, who was otherwise
    disqualified from Proposition 36 treatment, would be eligible for
    the program]; People v. Jordan (1978) 
    86 Cal.App.3d 529
    , 537
    purpose to be served by a trial or a retrial is harassment of the
    defendant.” (Howard, at p. 504.) The Supreme Court did not
    address whether there were other circumstances in which a
    prosecutor’s legitimate motives for seeking a dismissal under
    section 1385 were broader than a court’s motives.
    19
    [“dismissal for the purpose of effectuating the legislative design
    may properly be designated in ‘furtherance of justice’”].)
    2.    Sections 12022.5 and 12022.53
    As discussed, the People alleged sentence enhancements
    against Nazir under sections 12022.5, subdivisions (a) and (d),
    and 12022.53, subdivision (b). Section 12022.5, subdivision (a),
    imposes an additional prison term of three, four, or 10 years for
    any person who personally uses a firearm in the commission of a
    felony or attempted felony. (See People v. Le (2015) 
    61 Cal.4th 416
    , 420.) Section 12022.5, subdivision (d), imposes the term
    proscribed under section 12022.5, subdivision (a) (i.e., three, four,
    or 10 years), for any violation of section 245 (assault with a
    deadly weapon or by means of force likely to produce great bodily
    injury) “if a firearm is used.” “The intent of [section 12022.5] is to
    ‘“deter persons from creating a potential for death or injury
    resulting from the very presence of a firearm at the scene of a
    crime”’ [citation], and to ‘“deter the use of firearms in the
    commission of violent crimes by prescribing additional
    punishment for each use.”’” (In re Tameka C. (2000) 
    22 Cal.4th 190
    , 196; see People v. Ahmed (2011) 
    53 Cal.4th 156
    , 161-162.)
    “Section 12022.53 was first enacted in 1997 as part of the
    state’s ‘Use a Gun and You’re Done’ law. [Citation.] The statute
    sets out ‘sentence enhancements for personal use or discharge of
    a firearm in the commission’ of specified felonies.” (Tirado,
    supra, 12 Cal.5th at pp. 694-695, fn. omitted; see People v.
    Anderson (2020) 
    9 Cal.5th 946
    , 950-951.) Under section
    12022.53, subdivision (b), a person who “personally uses a
    firearm” in the commission of one of the enumerated felonies
    20
    “shall be punished by an additional and consecutive term of
    imprisonment in the state prison for 10 years.”
    Before 2018, sections 12022.5 and 12022.53 prohibited a
    trial court from striking a firearm enhancement in the interest of
    justice under section 1385. (See Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th at
    p. 695; People v. Humphrey (2020) 
    44 Cal.App.5th 371
    , 377.)
    “[T]he Legislature’s goal” was “to protect Californians and deter
    violent crime by imposing . . . the harshest applicable
    punishment” in each case. (Tirado, at p. 701.) But eventually
    “the enhancement scheme ‘caus[ed] several problems,’” including
    a significant increase in the prison population and its
    corresponding impact on the state’s budget. (Ibid.) The
    Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 620 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) to
    amend sections 12022.5 and 12022.53, effective January 2018, to
    give a trial court discretion to dismiss a firearm enhancement in
    the interest of justice under section 1385. (Stats. 2017, ch. 682,
    § 1; see Tirado, at pp. 695-696; Humphrey, at p. 377.) Sections
    12022.5, subdivision (c), and 12022.53, subdivision (h), now
    provide that a “court may, in the interest of justice pursuant to
    Section 1385 and at the time of sentencing, strike or dismiss an
    enhancement otherwise required to be imposed by this section.”7
    7     None of the parties, nor any of the amicus curiae, argues
    section 12022.5, subdivision (c), or section 12022.53,
    subdivision (h), precludes a trial court from dismissing a firearm
    enhancement at a time other than “at the time of sentencing.”
    Although we do not reach this issue, we observe that the
    statutory language does not bar a trial court from dismissing a
    firearm enhancement before or during trial. (See Romero, 
    supra,
    13 Cal.4th at p. 518 [“we will not interpret a statute as
    21
    The legislative history of Senate Bill No. 620 indicates the
    Legislature was also motivated to amend sections 12022.5 and
    12022.53 by research showing that mandatory sentence
    enhancements “[d]isproportionately increase[d] racial disparities
    in imprisonments,” had “no material deterrent effect,” and
    “[g]reatly increase[d] the population of incarcerated persons.”
    (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 620 (2017-2018
    Reg. Sess.) Apr. 25, 2017, p. 3.) Thus, the Legislature authorized
    a trial court to dismiss a sentencing allegation or an
    enhancement under section 1385 for a “deserving defendant,” but
    allowed a trial court to impose the enhancement on “a defendant
    who merited additional punishment for the use of a firearm in
    the commission of a felony . . . .” (Sen. Com. on Public Safety,
    Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 620 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 25, 2017 at
    p. 7.) The Supreme Court recently said of Senate Bill No. 620:
    “This history reflects a legislative intent to retain the core
    characteristics of the sentencing scheme. More severe terms of
    imprisonment with the harshest applicable sentence remained
    the default punishment. However, courts were granted the
    flexibility to impose lighter sentences in appropriate
    circumstances.” (Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th at pp. 701-702.)
    In determining whether to dismiss a firearm enhancement
    under section 12022.5 or 12022.53, a court considers the same
    factors considered “‘when handing down a sentence in the first
    instance.’” (People v. Flores, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 377; see
    People v. Yanaga (2020) 
    58 Cal.App.5th 619
    , 626-627; People v.
    Pearson, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 117.) These factors include
    eliminating courts’ power under section 1385 ‘absent a clear
    legislative direction to the contrary’”].)
    22
    those listed in California Rules of Court, rule 4.410 (general
    objectives in sentencing), rules 4.421 and 4.423 (circumstances in
    aggravation and mitigation), and rule 4.428(b) (discretion in
    striking an enhancement and punishment for an enhancement
    under section 1385). These rules refer to circumstances specific
    to the crime and the defendant’s criminal history, as well as to
    broader societal objectives, such as “[d]eterring others from
    criminal conduct by demonstrating its consequences” and
    “[i]ncreasing public safety by reducing recidivism through
    community-based corrections programs and evidence-based
    practices.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.410(a)(4) & (8).) The rules
    state the trial court “should be guided by statutory statements of
    policy, the criteria in [the Rules of Court], and any other facts
    and circumstances relevant to the case.” (Id., rule 4.410(b).)
    C.     The Trial Court Erred in Refusing To Consider the
    District Attorney’s Special Directive in Denying the
    People’s Motion To Dismiss Under Section 1385
    The trial court misunderstood the scope of its discretion
    when it refused to consider Special Directive 20-08 in
    determining whether to grant the motion to dismiss the firearm
    enhancements alleged against Nazir. Special Directive 20-08
    states that the district attorney’s new policy was based on
    research showing that existing sentence enhancements do not
    deter crime or reduce recidivism, which are objectives of the
    criminal justice system a court may consider in determining
    whether to impose a firearm enhancement under section 12022.5
    or 12022.53, and thus are relevant to determining whether to
    dismiss an enhancement. (See People v. Pearson, supra,
    38 Cal.App.5th at p. 117; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.410(a)(4)
    23
    & (8).) The court’s statement on December 11, 2020 that it could
    not base a ruling under section 1385 on “any antipathy or
    disagreement with the statutory scheme,” and the court’s
    statement a week later that to grant the motion it “would have to
    adopt [the district attorney’s] rationale,” misapplied the Supreme
    Court’s guidance in Williams.
    In Williams the trial court, on its own motion, dismissed
    one of two 13-year-old prior convictions for serious or violent
    felonies, observing that, although the defendant had “‘run afoul
    [of] the law many times,’” he had not in the interim committed
    “‘crimes involving actual violence.’” (Williams, 
    supra,
     17 Cal.4th
    at pp. 156-157.) In considering whether the trial court abused its
    discretion, the Supreme Court stated trial courts must “look for
    ‘justice’ in the [sentencing] scheme’s interstices, informed by
    generally applicable sentencing principles relating to matters
    such as the defendant’s background, character, and prospects,”
    and the Court cited the California Rules of Court as the source of
    such “sentencing principles.” (Id. at p. 160 & fn. 5.) The
    Supreme Court held the three strikes law, which was the
    sentencing scheme at issue, precluded a trial court from giving
    weight to “factors extrinsic to the scheme” when balancing a
    defendant’s constitutional rights against “society’s legitimate
    interests” in “the fair prosecution of properly charged crimes.”
    (Id. at pp. 160-161.) Thus, as discussed, a trial court may not
    consider antipathy toward the law or its consequences in a
    particular case; instead, in determining whether dismissing a
    prior serious or violent felony under the three strikes law would
    be in furtherance of justice, a court must consider only whether a
    defendant falls “outside the scheme’s spirit” by reference to
    “factors intrinsic to the scheme, such as the nature and
    24
    circumstances of the defendant’s present felonies and prior
    serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of
    his background, character, and prospects.” (Ibid.)
    The Supreme Court’s decision in Williams did not constrain
    the trial court in this case for two reasons. First, as stated, the
    “interests of society represented by the People” are broader than
    fairly prosecuting properly charged crimes. (See Williams, 
    supra,
    17 Cal.4th at p. 161.) But when a court considers on its own
    motion whether to dismiss a charge or an enhancement, the scope
    of those interests narrow to reflect the separation of powers
    between the prosecution, which has sole discretion to “‘determine
    whom to charge, what charges to file and pursue, and what
    punishment to seek’” from among those potentially available
    (Steen v. Appellate Division of Superior Court, 
    supra,
     59 Cal.4th
    at pp. 1053-1054; see People v. Birks, 
    supra,
     19 Cal.4th at p. 134),
    and the court, which has sole discretion to “dismiss a criminal
    charge” (id. at p. 1055). A court may not “frustrate the orderly
    and effective operation of our criminal procedure as envisioned by
    the Legislature,” or “preclude the prosecution” of offenses for
    which there is probable cause, by dismissing an action, offense, or
    enhancement under section 1385 “without proper and adequate
    reason.” (People v. Orin, supra, 13 Cal.3d at pp. 947-948.) Those
    reasons cannot include the court’s “‘“personal antipathy”’”
    (Williams, at p. 159) for the effect of the sentencing scheme
    without materially impairing the inherent functions of the
    prosecutor. (See Steen, at p. 1053 [separation of powers doctrine
    “does not prohibit one branch from taking action that might
    affect another,” but “the doctrine is violated when the actions of
    one branch defeat or materially impair the inherent functions of
    another”]; Department of Fair Employment & Housing v.
    25
    Superior Court (2020) 
    54 Cal.App.5th 356
    , 400 [same].) In
    contrast, where a prosecutor, in his or her discretion, asks the
    court to dismiss an enhancement because the prosecutor, as a
    representative of the People, legitimately questions the deterrent
    effect or value to public safety of imposing a sentence
    enhancement, a court may consider that position in determining
    whether granting the motion furthers justice. Such consideration
    does not “frustrate the legitimate prosecution of a defendant” or
    “‘“arbitrarily cut[ ]”’” the rights of the People to prosecute
    properly alleged crimes because it is the People, rather than the
    court, requesting dismissal. (Orin, at p. 947; see Romero, 
    supra,
    13 Cal.4th at p. 531.)
    Second, the Legislature amended sections 12022.5 and
    12022.53 to give courts the ability to dismiss an enhancement in
    the interest of justice precisely because a growing body of
    research (that did not exist in 1998 when the Supreme Court
    decided Williams) indicated firearm enhancements had “no
    material deterrent effect.” (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Rep. on
    Sen. Bill No. 620, supra, at p. 3.) The district attorney cited some
    of that research in the appendix to Special Directive 20-08. The
    district attorney’s concerns the firearm enhancements alleged
    against Nazir would not produce their desired deterrent effect
    falls within the “spirit” of sections 12022.5 and 12022.53. (See
    Williams, 
    supra,
     17 Cal.4th at p. 160.)8
    8      The respondent superior court and amici curiae in support
    of the court argue that the party seeking a dismissal has the
    burden of offering evidence in support of a motion under section
    1385 and that neither the People nor Nazir offered any evidence
    concerning Nazir’s background, character, prospects, or other
    circumstances relevant to the individualized analysis required by
    26
    Contrary to the position of the district attorney, however, a
    prosecutor’s motion to dismiss an enhancement under section
    1385 is not “a constitutionally protected exercise of prosecutorial
    discretion,” and the trial court may deny such a motion. As
    discussed, once a district attorney files charges and invokes the
    court’s jurisdiction, only the court, not the district attorney, can
    dismiss an action or enhancement under section 1385. (People v.
    Bonnetta, 
    supra,
     46 Cal.4th at pp. 148-149; see Romero, 
    supra,
    13 Cal.4th at pp. 515-516 [“the prosecutor may ask the court to
    dismiss pursuant to section 1385, but ‘neither the Attorney
    General nor the district attorney can discontinue or abandon a
    prosecution for a public offense, except as provided in Section
    1385’”]; People v. Tenorio (1970) 
    3 Cal.3d 89
    , 94 [the “prosecutor
    has never been able to ‘exercise’ the power to dismiss a charged
    prior—he has only been able to invite the judicial exercise of that
    power”].) The district attorney’s argument the trial court “lack[s]
    the power to deny” a prosecutor’s motion under section 1385 is
    contrary to the Legislature’s decision in 1872 to abolish nolle
    prosequi.
    Williams. They argue the People instead relied solely on the
    Special Directive, which without more is not a sufficient basis to
    show that dismissing the enhancements was in furtherance of
    justice. The trial court, however, made clear it would not
    consider the Special Directive at all, whether in conjunction with
    the Williams factors or otherwise. Thus, the court misunderstood
    the scope of its discretion by failing to apply the factors relevant
    to considering whether to dismiss a sentence enhancement (see
    Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.428(b)) and by refusing to consider the
    Special Directive.
    27
    The district attorney also argues that he has the
    prerogative to determine “‘whether to continue a prosecution’”
    (People ex rel. Kottmeier v. Municipal Court (1990)
    
    220 Cal.App.3d 602
    , 609) and that, “[a]s a practical matter, it
    would be impossible for the court to compel a district attorney to
    proceed with a prosecution that a district attorney no longer
    wished to pursue.” The district attorney points to the plea
    bargaining process and cites the Supreme Court’s statement in
    People v. Orin, supra, 
    13 Cal.3d 937
     that a prosecutor may secure
    a plea agreement through the “dismissal of one or more counts of
    a multi-count indictment or information.” (Id. at p. 942.) But the
    Supreme Court’s statements in Orin did not mean a prosecutor
    can on his or her own authority dismiss a count. The Supreme
    Court merely identified dismissal of one or more counts as one of
    several possible consequences of a plea agreement, with “the
    People’s acceptance of a plea to a lesser offense than that
    charged” as another possibility. (Ibid.) Moreover, in the very
    next sentence of its opinion in Orin the Supreme Court made
    clear that “[j]udicial approval is an essential condition precedent”
    to any plea agreement. (Id. at pp. 942-943; see §§ 1192.1, 1192.3,
    1192.4, 1192.5.) While the prosecutor has sole authority to
    negotiate on behalf of the People, a plea agreement is not self-
    executing; the court must approve it. (People v. Clancey, supra,
    56 Cal.4th at p. 570; Orin, at p. 943). Thus, if a court rejects a
    plea agreement, the prosecutor must continue to prosecute the
    case or request dismissal for another reason. (See, e.g., People v.
    Stringham (1988) 
    206 Cal.App.3d 184
    , 190-191 [trial court
    rejected a plea agreement after the victim’s family opposed it,
    and the case proceeded to trial]; People v. Cobb (1983)
    
    139 Cal.App.3d 578
    , 581 [trial court refused to consider a plea
    28
    agreement proposed after the deadline established by local
    rules].) Similarly, if the court denies a prosecutor’s request for
    dismissal under section 1385, the prosecutor must continue the
    prosecution, appeal the ruling, or seek dismissal on another
    ground, for example, by announcing the prosecution is unable to
    proceed. (See People v. Chacon (2007) 
    40 Cal.4th 558
    , 561 [after
    the trial court ruled for the defendant on a motion in limine, the
    People announced they were unable to proceed, and the trial
    court dismissed the action under section 1385]; People v. Nguyen
    (2017) 
    12 Cal.App.5th 574
    , 581 [same].) Section 1387 “generally
    permits the prosecution to refile felony charges following
    dismissal” at least once. (Jackson v. Superior Court (2017)
    
    4 Cal.5th 96
    , 103.)
    Nor is there merit to the district attorney’s argument there
    is “no need for the [trial] court to consider whether, on the facts of
    a particular case, dismissal furthers the interests of justice”
    because, “as the People’s representative,” the prosecutor “has
    already determined that it is not within the People’s interest to
    prosecute the defendant for a violation of [the applicable]
    legislative scheme.” As discussed, if a prosecutor moves to
    dismiss an enhancement before proving it, the abolition of nolle
    prosequi requires the court to exercise its discretion in
    determining whether dismissal furthers the interests of justice.
    If a prosecutor moves to dismiss an enhancement that has been
    proven, the court must exercise its sentencing discretion in
    determining whether to grant the motion. (See People v. Clancey,
    supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 580 [“‘The imposition of sentence and the
    exercise of sentencing discretion are fundamentally and
    inherently judicial functions.’”]; People v. Sandoval (2007)
    
    41 Cal.4th 825
    , 847 [“The trial court’s sentencing discretion must
    29
    be exercised in a manner that is not arbitrary and capricious,
    that is consistent with the letter and spirit of the law, and that is
    based upon an ‘individualized consideration of the offense, the
    offender, and the public interest.’”].) In the context of sections
    12022.5 and 12022.53, the Supreme Court in Tirado, supra,
    
    12 Cal.5th 688
     stated the Legislature intended for judges “‘to
    impose sentences that fit the severity of the offense’” by giving
    judges “the flexibility to impose lighter sentences in appropriate
    circumstances.” (Id. at pp. 701-702.) A judge cannot exercise
    that flexibility without making case-by-case assessments whether
    dismissal of a firearm enhancement is in furtherance of justice
    under section 1385. Case-by-case assessments also conform with
    California Rules of Court, rules 4.410, 4.421, and 4.423, which
    list individualized factors a court may consider in determining
    whether to dismiss a firearm enhancement under section 1385.
    (See People v. Flores, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 377; People v.
    Yanaga, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at pp. 626-627; People v. Pearson,
    supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 117; Cal. Rules of Court,
    rule 4.428(b).)
    On remand the trial court must consider Special Directive
    20-08 in determining whether to dismiss the firearm allegations
    against Nazir. Pursuant to the amendments to section 1385 that
    went into effect on January 1, 2022, the court must also “consider
    and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant” to
    prove that any of the enumerated mitigating circumstances
    apply. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).) Those circumstances include
    whether multiple enhancements are alleged in a single case, in
    which case “all enhancements beyond a single enhancement shall
    be dismissed,” and whether the application of an enhancement
    30
    could result in a sentence of over 20 years, in which case the
    enhancement “shall be dismissed.” (Id., subd. (c)(3)(B) & (C).)
    DISPOSITION
    Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing the
    superior court to vacate its December 18, 2020 order denying the
    People’s motion to dismiss the sentence enhancements alleged
    against Nazir and to enter a new order scheduling a hearing to
    determine whether this is an appropriate case in which to
    dismiss the sentence enhancements under sections 1385, as
    amended, 12022.5, subdivision (c), and 12022.53, subdivision (h).
    In so doing, the court must consider Special Directive 20-08,
    among other factors, in determining whether dismissing the
    firearm enhancements is in furtherance of justice.
    SEGAL, J.
    We concur:
    PERLUSS, P. J.                WISE, J. *
    *     Judge of the Alameda County Superior Court, assigned by
    the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
    California Constitution.
    31