Casillas v. Berkshire Hathaway Homestate Insurance Co. ( 2022 )


Menu:
  • Filed 6/10/22
    CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF
    CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION FOUR
    HECTOR CASILLAS, et al.,               B302442
    Plaintiffs and Appellants,      (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. BC670058)
    v.
    BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY
    HOMESTATE INSURANCE
    COMPANY, et al.,
    Defendants and Respondents.
    APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
    Los Angeles County, David S. Cunningham III, Judge.
    Affirmed.
    Green & Noblin, Robert S. Green, James Robert
    Noblin, and Emrah M. Sumer; Law Offices of Mark Ravis &
    Associates, Mark Ravis and David Martin, for Plaintiffs and
    Appellants.
    Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Deborah L. Stein, Jeremy S.
    Smith and Wesley Sze, for Defendants and Respondents
    Berkshire Hathaway Homestate Insurance Company and
    Cypress Insurance Company.
    Proskauer Rose, Lary Alan Rappaport and Jessica M.
    Griffith, for Defendant and Respondent Zenith Insurance
    Company.
    Manning & Kass, Ellrod, Ramirez, Trester and Dennis
    B. Kass, for Defendant and Respondent Oliver Glover.
    Freeman Mathis & Gary and Stephen M. Caine, for
    Defendant and Respondent William Reynolds.
    ________________________________________________
    INTRODUCTION
    The elements of the tort of trespass to chattels include
    “injury to the plaintiff’s personal property or legal interest
    therein.” (Intel Corp. v. Hamidi (2003) 
    30 Cal.4th 1342
    ,
    1348, 1350-1351 (Intel).) In this opinion, we hold appellants
    Hector Casillas and Adela Gonzalez failed to plead facts
    satisfying this element in alleging that respondents -- three
    insurance companies and two investigators -- copied
    appellants’ electronic litigation files from a third-party
    computer system, in violation of appellants’ interests in
    privacy and confidentiality. We conclude appellants failed to
    2
    allege any actionable injury because: (1) they did not allege
    damage or disruption to the computer system, as required by
    Intel; and (2) in any event, they did not allege injury to the
    copied files or their asserted property interests therein.
    According to appellants, respondents Berkshire
    Hathaway Homestate Insurance Company (Berkshire),
    Cypress Insurance Company (Cypress), Zenith Insurance
    Company (Zenith), William Reynolds, and Oliver Glover
    conspired to “hack” a third-party computer system. At the
    direction of the insurance-company respondents, Reynolds
    and Glover allegedly copied thousands of electronic litigation
    files, which had been uploaded to the system by workers’
    compensation and personal injury attorneys and their clients
    (including appellants), and transmitted the copies to
    insurers and insurance defense law firms for use in
    litigation. Appellants first sued respondents in federal
    district court on various causes of action, including invasion
    of privacy. After abandoning their invasion-of-privacy claim,
    they added a claim of trespass to chattels, which the district
    court dismissed without addressing the merits.
    Appellants then filed the instant trespass-to-chattels
    claim, to which respondents demurred. The trial court
    sustained respondents’ demurrers, concluding appellants
    failed to state a trespass-to-chattels claim because, inter
    alia, they did not allege any damage or disruption to the
    computer system from which the files were copied, as the
    court concluded was required under Intel, 
    supra,
     
    30 Cal.4th 1342
    . The court granted appellants leave to amend their
    3
    complaint, but appellants declined to do so, instead electing
    to appeal the judgment subsequently entered on the
    demurrers.
    On appeal, appellants contend the court erred in
    sustaining respondents’ demurrers to their claim of trespass
    to chattels. As indicated above and explained in more detail
    below, we agree with the trial court that appellants failed to
    state a claim. Accordingly, we affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    A. Respondents’ Copying of Electronic Files
    We take the following facts from the allegations of
    appellants’ complaint, which we must assume true on this
    appeal: HQSU Sign Up Services, Inc. owned the “‘HQSU
    system,’” comprising computer servers, a database housed on
    those servers, and a website through which the database
    was accessible. Attorneys for workers’ compensation and
    personal injury plaintiffs contracted with HQSU to provide
    administrative services for certain clients, including
    appellants. HQSU presented each new client with a blank
    in-take packet, in which the client entered “medical,
    financial and legal information.” HQSU uploaded the
    completed packet to HQSU’s database, in a file associated
    with the client’s counsel. Counsel used HQSU’s website to
    download the in-take packet, then created and uploaded
    “documents that would be typical in a litigation file, such as
    correspondence, memos to file, research memos, etc.” As the
    client’s case proceeded, the file was updated by counsel,
    4
    counsel’s staff, and the client, all of whom could use HQSU’s
    website to download or post comments on existing
    documents, and upload revised or additional documents.
    The website and file contained “password and privacy
    notifications,” because the file was “intended” to be available
    only to counsel, counsel’s staff, and the client, following
    verification of username and password.
    Respondents conspired to “hack” the files on the HQSU
    system. At the direction of respondents Berkshire, Cypress,
    and Zenith, respondents Reynolds and Glover “repeatedly
    launched what are known as directory traversal attacks. A
    directory traversal attack is a[n] HTTP exploit allowing
    hackers to access restricted directories and execute
    commands outside of the web server’s root directory.” By
    means of these directory traversal attacks, conducted almost
    daily for 15 months, Reynolds and Glover copied
    approximately 33,000 litigation files, including appellants’,
    from the HQSU system. They transmitted the copies to
    insurers and insurance defense law firms. Although the
    copying “was not done in connection with any particular
    litigation,” certain copied documents were later used in
    defense of workers’ compensation claims.
    B. Appellants’ Claim of Trespass to Chattels
    In 2015 and 2016, appellants separately filed
    complaints against respondents in federal district court,
    containing causes of action for, inter alia, invasion of
    privacy. Without specifically addressing the invasion-of-
    5
    privacy claim, the district court dismissed all of appellants’
    claims for failure to adequately allege standing to sue in
    federal court, and granted leave to amend. (Casillas v.
    Berkshire Hathaway Homestate Cos. (C.D.Cal. Aug. 22, 2016,
    No. CV 15-4763 AG (JEMx)) 2016 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 184127,
    at *6-*8.) Abandoning their invasion-of-privacy claim,
    appellants amended their federal complaints to include other
    claims, including a trespass-to-chattels claim under
    California law. The district court dismissed the complaints
    without addressing the merits of the trespass-to-chattels
    claim. (See Casillas v. Berkshire Hathaway Homestate Cos.
    (C.D.Cal. June 27, 2017, No. CV 15-04763 AG (JEMx)) 2017
    U.S.Dist.LEXIS 99549, at *8-*12 [dismissing appellants’ sole
    remaining federal law claim on the merits, and declining to
    exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims],
    affd. (9th Cir. 2019) 
    770 Fed.Appx. 329
    .)
    Soon thereafter (in July 2017), appellants filed the
    instant complaint, which contained a cause of action for
    1
    trespass to chattels. Appellants alleged respondents
    “intentionally interfered with Plaintiffs’ information in their
    litigation files hosted by HQSU on its database and servers
    and the documents they, their counsel, and counsel’s staff
    1
    We need not address the other cause of action contained in
    appellants’ complaint, viz., a claim for violation of the
    Confidentiality of Medical Information Act, Civil Code section 56
    et seq., to which the trial court also sustained a demurrer with
    leave to amend, as appellants raise no issue concerning it.
    6
    caused to be uploaded to the HQSU database and servers by
    obtaining that information from those files and those
    documents and then wrongfully using them for their own
    purposes.” They further alleged they suffered a number of
    harms: (1) “Their personal property interest in the
    information in the files, the files themselves, the documents
    used to generate those files, and the documents contained in
    those files were violated when accessed by others not
    entitled to access them and then made available for use
    against them in a court of law or administrative claims
    process”; (2) “Their right to privacy, including the right to
    privacy enshrined in Article 1 of the California Constitution,
    was and continues to be violated”; and (3) “Their attorney-
    client and work product privileges for communications with
    their counsel in their workers’ compensation proceeding, the
    2
    first of which is a right personal to them, was breached.”
    2
    Appellants alleged several other related harms based on
    respondents’ obtaining the information in the copied files,
    including: (1) violation of their statutory rights to privacy of
    medical information; (2) undermining of their “right to assistance
    of counsel in civil matters,” as well as their “faith in the integrity
    and fairness of the civil justice system”; and (3) unspecified costs
    incurred in taking steps to mitigate risks that the copied
    information might be used against them, including by “at least
    consider[ing]” settling their underlying litigation on unfavorable
    terms, and by taking unspecified protective measures against
    identity theft. We need not address these alleged harms, as
    appellants develop no argument concerning them.
    7
    Appellants sought compensatory damages and injunctive
    relief.
    C. Judgment on Respondents’ Demurrers
    In November 2017, respondents demurred to the
    3
    complaint. Relying on Intel, supra, 
    30 Cal.4th 1342
    ,
    respondents argued appellants failed to state a trespass-to-
    chattels claim because they did not allege any damage or
    disruption to the computer system from which the electronic
    files were copied. Respondent Glover additionally argued
    that the claim failed because (1) the copied information was
    not property; and (2) appellants failed to allege any injury to
    their asserted property interests in the information, instead
    complaining of injury to their privacy interests. In
    December 2017, appellants filed an opposition to the
    demurrers, and respondents filed replies (none of these
    briefs are in the record). The trial court stayed the case
    pending resolution of appellants’ appeal from the dismissal
    of their federal complaints; the stay was lifted in May 2019.
    In July 2019, the court issued a tentative ruling
    sustaining the demurrers with leave to amend, and held a
    hearing. Appellants conceded respondents had not damaged
    the HQSU system, corrupted the files they allegedly copied
    from the system, or impaired appellants’ access to the files.
    3
    Respondents Reynolds and Glover each filed separate
    demurrers, while respondents Berkshire, Cypress, and Zenith
    filed a joint demurrer.
    8
    Appellants argued they nevertheless suffered actionable
    harm, viz., the “loss of privacy and confidentiality” caused by
    respondent’s viewing and copying the files. They further
    argued Intel did not require them to allege damage or
    disruption to the HQSU system, because their claim
    concerned trespass to the files, not the system. Respondents’
    counsel maintained that appellants’ failure to allege damage
    or disruption to the HQSU system was fatal under Intel.
    Adopting its tentative ruling, the court concluded
    appellants had failed to state a claim of trespass to chattels.
    The court agreed with respondents that the claim failed
    under Intel: “[P]ursuant to Intel, a plaintiff alleging trespass
    to chattels based on unauthorized access to a computer
    system must allege damage or disruption to that computer
    system. Here, Plaintiffs have not done so.” The court
    rejected appellants’ attempt to distinguish Intel:
    “Plaintiffs argue that Intel does not control here,
    because the facts of Intel did not include
    unauthorized access to a computer system or
    downloading of files. . . . [¶] However, as
    Demurring Defendants note, the Intel court
    reached its holding by examining those cases
    involving robotic data collection, which did
    involve copying electronic information. See, e.g.,
    eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2000)
    
    100 F.Supp.2d 1058
     [(eBay)]; Register.com, Inc. v.
    Verio, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 
    126 F.Supp.2d 238
    [(Register)]; Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com,
    9
    Inc. (C.D. Cal., Aug. 10, 2000, Case No.
    99CV7654) 
    2000 WL 1887522
    [(Ticketmaster)]. . . . [¶] Subsequent cases have
    applied Intel to instances of alleged hacking,
    similar to Plaintiffs’ allegations here. See, e.g.,
    Capitol Audio Access, Inc. v. Umemoio (E.D. Cal.
    2013) 
    980 F.Supp. 2d 1154
    , 1160 [(Capitol Audio)]
    (dismissing a trespass to chattel claim where the
    plaintiff alleged the defendant had accessed a
    password protected, proprietary database without
    authorization); Vertkin v. Vertkin (N.D. Cal. Dec.
    6, 2007) 
    2007 WL 4287512
    , at *3 [(Vertkin)]
    (dismissing a trespass to chattel claim where the
    plaintiff alleged that the defendant had installed
    keystroke recording software onto the plaintiff’s
    computer ‘in order to obtain personal information’
    without authorization). [¶] None of Plaintiffs’
    authorities support the proposition that an
    actionable trespass to chattel claim exists when
    an alleged tortfeasor neither damages nor
    impairs a plaintiff’s computer system.”
    The court sustained the demurrers with leave to
    4
    amend.
    4
    As an additional ground for sustaining the demurrers to
    the trespass-to-chattels claim, the court concluded appellants
    failed to adequately allege they had any cognizable property
    interest in either the HQSU system or the information in the
    (Fn. is continued on the next page.)
    10
    In August 2019, appellants filed notice that they
    declined to amend their complaint. They stipulated to
    entry of judgment on the demurrers, which they timely
    appealed.
    DISCUSSION
    Appellants contend the trial court erred in sustaining
    respondents’ demurrers to their cause of action for trespass
    to chattels. “‘In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint
    against a general demurrer, we . . . “treat the demurrer as
    admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not
    contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.
    [Citation.] We also consider matters which may be judicially
    noticed.”’” (Lyles v. Sangadeo-Patel (2014) 
    225 Cal.App.4th 759
    , 764.) “When, as here, a demurrer to a complaint is
    sustained with leave to amend and the plaintiff declines to
    amend the complaint, . . . we assume the complaint
    contained the strongest statement of the plaintiff’s cause or
    causes of action. [Citation.] Thus, unlike when a demurrer
    is sustained without leave to amend, we determine only
    whether the plaintiff stated a cause of action, and not
    whether the plaintiff might be able to do so.” (Ibid.) “The
    judgment of dismissal must be affirmed if the unamended
    copied files. In defending the court’s ruling on appeal,
    respondents argue that “[m]ost fundamentally,” appellants failed
    to allege any injury to such a property interest. Because we
    agree, we need not address whether appellants adequately
    alleged they had such a property interest in the first instance.
    11
    complaint is objectionable on any ground raised by the
    demurrer.” (Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil
    Appeals & Writs (The Rutter Group 2021) Ch. 8-C
    ¶ 8:136.3e.) Below, we conclude the trespass-to-chattels
    claim was objectionable on a ground raised in the demurrers,
    viz., appellants’ failure to allege any actionable injury to a
    property interest.
    A.    Trespass to Chattels under Intel
    “[T]he trespass to chattels tort . . . may not, in
    California, be proved without evidence of an injury to the
    plaintiff’s personal property or legal interest therein.” (Intel,
    supra, 
    30 Cal.4th at 1348
    .) “In modern American law
    generally, ‘[t]respass [to chattels] remains as an occasional
    remedy for minor interferences, resulting in some damage,
    but not sufficiently serious or sufficiently important to
    amount to the greater tort’ of conversion.” (Id. at 1351.)
    “[I]njury to the personal property or the possessor’s interest
    in it is an element of the action . . . .” (Id. at 1352.)
    In Intel, our Supreme Court held this element was not
    satisfied in the absence of damage or disruption to the
    computer system allegedly trespassed against. (Intel, 
    supra,
    30 Cal.4th at 1347, 1352-1353
    .) There, Intel brought a
    trespass-to-chattels claim against former employee Hamidi
    who, on six occasions, had made unauthorized use of Intel’s
    email system to send criticisms of its employment practices
    to numerous current employees. (Id. at 1346, 1348-1349.)
    Although Intel presented no evidence the messages caused
    12
    physical damage or functional disruption to its computer
    system, it presented uncontradicted evidence that staff time
    was spent attempting to block further messages, and that
    the messages’ contents caused discussion among employees
    and managers. (Id. at 1346, 1349.) The trial court granted
    Intel summary judgment, and enjoined Hamidi from sending
    unsolicited emails on the system. (Id. at 1350.) The Court of
    Appeal affirmed, concluding the absence of injury to Intel’s
    property was immaterial in light of Intel’s showing that
    Hamidi’s use of its property disrupted its business. (Ibid.)
    Our Supreme Court reversed. (Id. at 1366.) After reviewing
    prior decisions analyzing unauthorized electronic contact
    with computer systems as potential trespasses to chattels,
    the court concluded, “the tort does not encompass, and
    should not be extended to encompass, an electronic
    communication that neither damages the recipient computer
    system nor impairs its functioning.” (Id. at 1347; see also 
    id. at 1352-1353
     [detailing absence of damage or impairment].)
    In explaining that its holding was consistent with the
    aforementioned caselaw, the Supreme Court discussed three
    cases in which the electronic contact at issue consisted of
    “unauthorized robotic data collection” from websites: eBay,
    supra, 
    100 F.Supp.2d 1058
    ; Register, supra, 
    126 F.Supp.2d 238
    ; and Ticketmaster, supra, 
    2000 WL 1887522
    . (Intel,
    
    supra,
     
    30 Cal.4th at 1354-1357
    .) Each case suggested that
    such data collection could constitute trespass to chattels only
    if it caused or threatened harm to the website’s computer
    system, either by finding insufficient evidence of such harm
    13
    to support a trespass-to-chattels claim (Ticketmaster), or by
    granting injunctive relief in reliance on evidence that third-
    party repetition of the data collection would harm the
    websites’ systems (eBay and Register). (See Intel, at 1354-
    1357.) Distinguishing the latter cases, our Supreme Court
    emphasized Intel had failed to show any appreciable effect
    on its computer system, or likelihood thereof. (Intel, at 1356-
    1357.)
    Regarding Hamidi’s messages’ alleged disruptive effect
    on Intel’s business, our Supreme Court concluded this effect
    was not the type of property harm actionable as trespass to
    chattels: “While unwelcome communications, electronic or
    otherwise, can cause a variety of injuries to economic
    relations, reputation and emotions, those interests are
    protected by other branches of tort law; in order to address
    them, we need not create a fiction of injury to the
    communication system. [¶] Nor may Intel appropriately
    assert a property interest in its employees’ time. . . .
    Whatever interest Intel may have in preventing its
    employees from receiving disruptive communications, it is
    not an interest in personal property, and trespass to chattels
    is therefore not an action that will lie to protect it.” (Id. at
    1359.) By analogy to intrusive telephone calls, the court
    implied that trespass to chattels likewise would not lie to
    protect interests in privacy: “The consequential economic
    damage Intel claims to have suffered, i.e., loss of
    productivity caused by employees reading and reacting to
    Hamidi’s messages and company efforts to block the
    14
    messages, is not an injury to the company’s interest in its
    computers . . . any more than . . . the loss of privacy caused
    by an intrusive telephone call would be an injury to the
    recipient’s telephone equipment.” (Intel, 
    supra,
     
    30 Cal.4th at 1347
    ; see also 
    id. at 1361-1362
     [“the contents of a telephone
    communication may cause a variety of injuries and may be
    the basis for a variety of tort actions (e.g., . . . invasion of
    privacy), but the injuries are not to an interest in property,
    . . . and the appropriate tort is not trespass”].)
    B.     Analysis
    We agree with the trial court that appellants failed to
    state a claim of trespass to chattels. Appellants conceded
    respondents’ alleged copying of electronic files from the
    HQSU system did not cause any damage or disruption to the
    system. As the trial court observed, “[P]ursuant to Intel, a
    plaintiff alleging trespass to chattels based on unauthorized
    access to a computer system must allege damage or
    disruption to that computer system. Here, Plaintiffs have
    not done so.” (See Intel, 
    supra,
     
    30 Cal.4th at 1347
    , 1352-
    1353.)
    For the same reasons given by the court, we reject
    appellants’ attempt to distinguish Intel on the ground that
    there, defendant Hamidi did not copy electronic files. First,
    as noted, Intel explained that its holding was consistent with
    prior cases suggesting that robotic data collection from a
    website -- including the copying of electronic information --
    could constitute trespass to chattels only if it caused or
    15
    threatened harm to the website’s computer system. (Intel,
    supra, 
    30 Cal.4th at 1354-1357
    .) Second, subsequent cases
    have applied Intel’s injury requirement to claims based on
    the copying of electronic files or information. (See Capitol
    Audio, supra, 980 F.Supp.2d at 1156, 1160 [online publisher
    failed to state trespass-to-chattels claim against defendant
    who made and distributed unauthorized copies of publisher’s
    electronic documents on publisher’s website, where publisher
    failed to allege actionable interference with property under
    Intel, viz., interference causing damage or disruption (citing
    Intel, at 1357)]; Vertkin, supra, 
    2007 WL 4287512
    , at *1, *3
    [plaintiff failed to state trespass-to-chattels claim against
    defendant who obtained personal information from plaintiff’s
    computers by means of secretly installed programs, where
    plaintiff “failed to allege that her computers were impaired
    as to their condition or quality or that she was unable to use
    these computers for a substantial period of time” (citing
    Intel, at 1357)]; Hiossen, Inc. v. Kim (C.D.Cal., Aug. 17, 2016,
    No. CV1601579SJOMRWX) 
    2016 WL 10987365
    , at *1-*3,
    *10-*11 (Hiossen) [corporation failed to state trespass-to-
    chattels claim against former employee and competitor,
    where former employee copied confidential information from
    password-protected customer accounts on corporation’s
    website, and used information to competitor’s advantage, but
    plaintiff failed to allege damage or disruption to computer
    system (citing Intel, at 1356)].) Appellants fail to address
    any of these cases, though all are cited in respondents’ brief
    on appeal, and two -- Capitol Audio and Vertkin -- were cited
    16
    in the trial court’s ruling. We conclude the court properly
    applied Intel in sustaining respondents’ demurrers to
    appellants’ trespass-to-chattels claim.
    Even had Intel not required appellants to allege
    damage or disruption to the HQSU system, we would
    conclude the demurrers were properly sustained, because
    appellants failed to allege any actionable injury to the copied
    files or their asserted property interests therein. Appellants
    conceded the files had not been corrupted, and their own
    access to the files had not been impaired. Because the
    copying did not affect the files or appellants’ ability to use
    them, it caused no actionable injury to their asserted
    property interests. (See 123 Los Robles LLC v.
    Metzler (C.D.Cal. Aug. 14, 2017, No. 2:17-CV-00392-RGK-
    SK) 2017 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 223232 (Los Robles), at *1, *12
    [LLC failed to state trespass-to-chattels claim against
    member who copied and used confidential information from
    financial records on LLC’s bank’s computers, where
    information “remained unaltered and available to [LLC] on
    the bank’s computers”]; cf. Intel, supra, 
    30 Cal.4th at 1348
    [disruption caused by contents of unauthorized emails was
    not actionable as trespass to chattels because it was “an
    injury entirely separate from, and not directly affecting, the
    possession or value of personal property”].)
    We reject appellants’ reliance on their interests in
    privacy and confidentiality. As noted, Intel implied that
    trespass to chattels would not lie to protect interests in
    privacy. (See Intel, 
    supra,
     
    30 Cal.4th at 1361-1362
     [“the
    17
    contents of a telephone communication may cause a variety
    of injuries and may be the basis for a variety of tort actions
    (e.g., . . . invasion of privacy), but the injuries are not to an
    interest in property, . . . and the appropriate tort is not
    trespass”]; 
    id. at 1347
     [analogizing Intel’s loss of
    productivity, which was not actionable as trespass to
    chattels, to loss of privacy caused by intrusive telephone
    call].) Consistent with Intel’s implication, subsequent cases
    have rejected trespass-to-chattels claims without regard to
    asserted violations of the plaintiffs’ privacy interests. (See
    Los Robles, supra, 2017 U.S.Dist.LEXIS at *12 [“Plaintiff’s
    interest in the confidentiality of its financial information is
    not the type of possessory interest protected by the tort of
    trespass to chattels”]; In re iPhone Application Litigation
    (N.D. Cal. 2012) 
    844 F.Supp.2d 1040
    , 1048-1051, 1069
    [plaintiffs failed to state trespass-to-chattels claim against
    companies that allegedly violated plaintiffs’ privacy rights by
    allowing third-party apps to collect and use confidential
    information from plaintiffs’ mobile devices]; Vertkin, supra,
    
    2007 WL 4287512
    , at *3-*4 [plaintiff failed to state trespass-
    to-chattels claim against defendant who obtained personal
    information from plaintiff’s computers by means of secretly
    installed programs, even though plaintiff adequately stated
    invasion-of-privacy claim on same allegations]; cf. Hiossen,
    supra, 
    2016 WL 10987365
    , at *11 [corporation’s “‘financial
    injury’” resulting from former employee’s copying
    confidential information and using it to competitor’s
    advantage was not actionable as trespass to chattels].)
    18
    Contrary to appellants’ contentions, the “merger
    doctrine” does not establish that their privacy interests were
    merged with their asserted property, much less allow them
    to convert privacy harms into property harms. The merger
    doctrine is merely an exception to the traditional rule that
    intangible property cannot be the subject of conversion; it
    recognizes conversion of intangible property, such as stock,
    where the plaintiff’s intangible property interests are merged
    with a document, such as a stock certificate. (See Gaab &
    Reese, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial,
    Claims and Defenses (The Rutter Group 2021) Ch. 12(II)-B
    ¶¶ 12:109-12:110.) Because the traditional rule has been
    eroded or rejected, the merger doctrine, as an exception to
    the rule, now has little or no significance. (See id. ¶ 12:111;
    Thomas et al., Cal. Civil Practice: Torts (2021) § 15:4.) Here,
    at most, the doctrine could support appellants’ position that
    they had cognizable property interests in the electronic files
    (an issue we need not address). The doctrine could not
    establish that such asserted property interests were injured.
    Appellants have not cited -- and we have not found --
    any authority supporting their reliance on privacy interests
    as a basis for their claim of trespass to chattels. Instead,
    appellants attempt to support their claim by
    misrepresenting a number of federal cases. For instance,
    appellants suggest that in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez
    (2021) 594 U.S. __ [
    141 S.Ct. 2190
    ], in which the Supreme
    Court held that certain members of a plaintiff class had
    Article III standing to bring a claim in federal court (id. at
    19
    2208-2209), the court relied on the defendant’s
    dissemination of confidential information about the class
    members, harming their interests in privacy. In fact, the
    court’s holding was based on the defendant’s dissemination
    of defamatory information about the class members, causing
    harm to their reputation. (See id. at 2200, 2209 [class
    members suffered concrete “reputational harm” when
    labeled as potential terrorists, drug traffickers, or serious
    criminals in credit reports disseminated by defendant].) The
    court’s holding is immaterial here, because it concerned the
    injury-in-fact requirement of Article III standing, which
    differs from the injury element of a trespass-to-chattels
    claim under California law. (See In re iPhone Application
    Litigation, supra, 844 F.Supp.2d at 1053-1055, 1069
    [concluding plaintiffs alleged sufficient injury in fact to
    establish Article III standing, but dismissing trespass-to-
    chattels claim on the merits for failure to allege actionable
    injury].) Indeed, Intel implied that reputational harm -- the
    injury in fact in TransUnion -- would not be actionable as
    trespass to chattels. (See Intel, 
    supra,
     
    30 Cal.4th at 1359
    [“While unwelcome communications, electronic or otherwise,
    can cause a variety of injuries to economic relations,
    reputation and emotions, those interests are protected by
    other branches of tort law” (italics added)].) As noted, Intel
    implied the same concerning harm to privacy interests.
    Appellants also misrepresent United States v.
    Ackerman (10th Cir. 2016) 
    831 F.3d 1292
    , a child-
    pornography prosecution in which the Tenth Circuit held,
    20
    contrary to a district court’s ruling on the defendant’s motion
    to suppress evidence, that a government actor’s opening and
    examining the defendant’s email constituted a search within
    the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. (Id. at 1294-1295,
    1308-1309.) Appellants assert the Tenth Circuit determined
    the unauthorized viewing of the email “injured the plaintiff
    [sic] by violating his Fourth Amendment rights,” in a
    manner that “would be the proper subject of a trespass to
    chattels claim.” In fact, the court discussed trespass to
    chattels only in explaining that the Fourth Amendment
    protects even dignitary interests in personal property -- as
    trespass-to-chattels doctrine did “at the time of the
    founding,” before adoption of the modern requirement for
    actual injury. (Id. at 1307-1308; see also Intel, 
    supra,
     
    30 Cal.4th at 1352
     [“modern day trespass to chattels differs
    both from the original English writ and from the action for
    trespass to land: ‘ . . . the dignitary interest in the
    inviolability of chattels, unlike that as to land, is not
    sufficiently important to . . . [warrant liability] in the
    absence of any actual damage’” (quoting Prosser & Keeton,
    Torts (5th ed. 1984) § 14, p. 87) (italics omitted)].)
    Finally, appellants misrepresent Synopsys, Inc. v.
    Ubiquiti Networks, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2018) 
    313 F.Supp.3d 1056
    .
    There, the plaintiff used anti-piracy software, secretly
    embedded into other software it knew the defendants would
    download, to collect data from the defendants’ computers.
    (Id. at 1063-1065.) One defendant filed a trespass-to-
    chattels counterclaim, which the district court dismissed,
    21
    stating: “To the extent defendants base their trespass claims
    on the accessing of their systems by the anti-piracy software,
    they must but have not alleged facts showing that access
    impaired the intended functioning of defendants’ systems.
    And to the extent that defendants base their trespass claim
    on the anti-piracy software’s securing of and use of
    defendants’ data, that common law claim would be
    preempted by [California’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act].” (Id.
    at 1080.) Contrary to appellants’ representations, the court
    neither “explicitly” recognized appellants’ theory of liability,
    nor suggested in dictum that the trespass-to-chattels
    5
    counterclaim would have had merit absent preemption.
    In sum, we conclude the trial court properly sustained
    respondents’ demurrers to appellants’ trespass-to-chattels
    claim, because appellants failed to allege any actionable
    injury to a property interest, whether in the HQSU system
    or in the files copied from it. In response to appellants’
    unfounded warnings that affirmance will leave future
    victims of hacking without any effective remedy, we
    emphasize that our holding concerns only appellants’
    attempt to plead the tort of trespass to chattels, an
    “‘occasional’” remedy for minor interferences with property.
    5
    Appellants’ reliance in their reply and at oral argument on
    U.S. v. Bohonus (9th Cir. 1980) 
    628 F.2d 1167
     is misplaced, as
    that case concerned an interpretation of the federal mail-fraud
    statute, not any common law tort, much less trespass to chattels
    under California law. (Id. at 1170-1172.)
    22
    (Intel, 
    supra,
     
    30 Cal.4th at 1351
    .) In light of appellants’
    declining to amend their complaint, we express no opinion
    whether they might have adequately pled other causes of
    action -- e.g., for violations of the Comprehensive Computer
    Data Access and Fraud Act (CCDAFA) (Pen. Code, § 502), or
    6
    for the tort of invasion of privacy. (Cf. Hiossen, supra, 
    2016 WL 10987365
    , at *5-*6, *8-*11 [allegations that defendant
    copied and used confidential information on corporation’s
    website failed to state trespass-to-chattels claim, but
    adequately stated claims for violations of CCDAFA and
    other statutes]; Vertkin, supra, 
    2007 WL 4287512
    , at *3-*4
    [allegations that defendant obtained personal information
    from plaintiff’s computers failed to state trespass-to-chattels
    claim, but adequately stated invasion-of-privacy claim].)
    Having abandoned a privacy claim during their federal
    litigation, appellants effectively attempted, both in the trial
    court and on appeal, to repackage an alleged invasion of
    privacy as a trespass to chattels. Because appellants failed
    to plead facts satisfying the latter tort’s element of injury to
    a property interest, the trial court properly sustained
    respondents’ demurrers.
    6
    Appearing to contradict their own warnings that similarly
    situated plaintiffs will lack any remedy other than trespass to
    chattels, appellants assert that their allegations satisfied the
    criteria for an invasion-of-privacy claim.
    23
    DISPOSITION
    The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded
    their costs on appeal.
    CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
    MANELLA, P. J.
    We concur:
    WILLHITE, J.
    CURREY, J.
    24
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B302442

Filed Date: 6/10/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 6/10/2022