Singh v. Three B Hotels CA2/3 ( 2022 )


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  • Filed 6/22/22 Singh v. Three B Hotels CA2/3
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
    opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
    opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION THREE
    JASBIR SINGH,                                                  B308425
    Plaintiff and Appellant,                                  Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No.
    v.                                                        19STCV39938
    THREE B HOTELS LLC et al.,
    Defendants and Respondents.
    APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
    Angeles County, Susan Bryant-Deason, Judge. Affirmed.
    Betty Agawa and Ronald W. Betty for Plaintiff and
    Appellant.
    Knisbacher Law Offices and Alden Knisbacher for
    Defendants and Respondents.
    _______________________________________
    INTRODUCTION
    This litigation concerns two former business partners and
    their limited liability company. Plaintiff and appellant Jasbir
    Singh and defendant and respondent Manmohan Singh Bhamra
    were equal managing partners of Three B Hotels, a Limited
    Liability Company (the LLC), which owned and operated a
    Holiday Inn Express in Enid, Oklahoma. Singh sued Bhamra in
    Oklahoma alleging Bhamra breached the LLC’s operating
    agreement in several ways, including by misappropriating funds.
    Singh sought to dissolve the LLC and distribute its assets to the
    parties. Singh dismissed the Oklahoma lawsuit with prejudice
    following a successful mediation and the sale of his interest in the
    LLC to Bhamra at an agreed-upon price.
    Shortly after completing the sale, Singh initiated the
    present litigation against Bhamra and the LLC in the Los
    Angeles Superior Court, claiming the LLC owed him a portion of
    profits received during 2018 and 2019—the time period between
    the mediation and the completion of the sale. Singh had raised
    this issue in the Oklahoma lawsuit to no avail. Bhamra and the
    LLC therefore demurred on the ground that this litigation is
    barred by the parties’ comprehensive releases of legal claims in
    connection with the mediation in Oklahoma. The trial court
    sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and entered a
    judgment dismissing Singh’s lawsuit. We affirm the judgment.
    2
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    1.    Oklahoma Litigation1
    1.1.   Complaint
    In March 2018, Singh filed an action against Bhamra in the
    district court for Garfield County in Oklahoma (the Oklahoma
    lawsuit). Singh filed the action on his own behalf and derivatively
    on behalf of the LLC. The complaint alleged that Singh and
    Bhamra were equal managing partners of the LLC, which was
    then doing business as a Holiday Inn Express in Enid, Oklahoma.
    Singh alleged Bhamra had taken total control of the LLC and
    was misusing its funds in violation of the LLC’s operating
    agreement. Singh asserted causes of action styled as breach of
    fiduciary duty, breach of written operating agreement, abuse of
    control, corporate waste, unjust enrichment, partition, and
    dissolution.
    In August 2018, the court entered a stipulated restraining
    order and scheduling order. As pertinent here, the parties had
    agreed that no distribution of funds should be made to the
    members of the LLC until certain conditions were met. They also
    agreed to have the hotel owned and operated by the LLC
    appraised on or before September 15, 2018, and to mediate the
    dispute on or before October 15, 2018. Further, the parties agreed
    to “engage Ken Klingenberg as a court appointed expert to assess
    the claims of personal use of the funds of [the LLC] and any other
    claims of inappropriate use or expenditure of company funds
    1The trial court took judicial notice of certain documents filed in the
    Oklahoma litigation. We take judicial notice of those documents as
    well. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, 459.)
    3
    specifically to include the appropriateness of expenditures for
    hotel use, further that each party shall have an equal and fair
    opportunity to explain their positions to Mr. Klingenberg and
    further each reserves the opportunity to contest any findings by
    Mr. Klingenberg before [the Oklahoma] court.”
    1.2.   Mediation Agreement
    The parties mediated the dispute and signed a mediation
    agreement on December 20, 2018. Singh agreed to sell his
    interest in the LLC to Bhamra for $3.8 million less certain debts
    of the LLC. The parties committed to draft a formal settlement
    agreement that would include a release of claims (the first
    release) as follows: “The Parties shall release one another of all
    claims, whether asserted in the Lawsuit or not, related to [the
    LLC] or the Holiday Inn Express in Enid, Oklahoma, including
    any claims relating to or arising from the operation of [the LLC]
    or the Holiday Inn Express in Enid, Oklahoma. The Parties
    expressly reserve and do not release any and all other claims
    whether asserted or not asserted as of the date of this Mediation
    Agreement. The Parties also expressly reserve and retain all
    rights arising under this Mediation Agreement and the
    Settlement Agreement.”
    The parties also agreed that Klingenberg’s findings
    regarding any improper use of the LLC’s funds would “be binding
    upon them, adopted by the Court, and non-appealable.”
    4
    1.3.   Klingenberg’s Report
    Klingenberg provided an initial report to the parties in
    May 2019 and a final report in August 2019.2 After the initial
    report, both Singh and Bhamra submitted lists of concerns to
    Klingenberg, and the final report includes Klingenberg’s
    resolution of those concerns.
    As pertinent here, Klingenberg’s final report noted that the
    parties disagreed about the ending date for his inquiry regarding
    the potential misuse of LLC funds. Bhamra took the position that
    the inquiry should terminate as of December 20, 2018, the date
    the mediation agreement was signed and the parties agreed on a
    sale price for Singh’s half of the LLC. Singh, by contrast, urged
    that the income and expenses of the LLC should be evaluated
    through “the most recent date available,” i.e., including the end of
    2018 and most of 2019. Klingenberg determined that
    December 20, 2018 was the appropriate date, in part because the
    parties agreed to the sale as well as the price for the sale on
    December 20, 2018. He ultimately concluded that Singh was
    owed an additional distribution of $103,644.13 from the LLC,
    reduced by half the amount of Klingenberg’s fees.
    1.4.   Certificate of Sale
    In early August 2019, Singh and Bhamra signed a
    “Certificate of Sale of Membership Interest” that contained
    details of the sale and which included the following release (the
    second release): “The Parties shall release one another from all
    claims, whether asserted in the lawsuit or not, that are related to
    [the LLC] and the Holiday Inn Express in Enid, Oklahoma,
    2   Only the final report is included in the appellate record.
    5
    including any claims arising from the operation of [the LLC] and
    the Holiday Inn Express in Enid, Oklahoma. The parties also
    expressly reserve and retain all rights under the Mediation
    Agreement and Settlement Agreement.”
    In addition, the Certificate of Sale stated that Singh “shall
    file a Dismissal With Prejudice of all claims asserted in the
    [Oklahoma lawsuit] within 30 days after receiving the funds [due
    to Singh.]”
    1.5.   Singh’s Request for Profits from 2018 and 2019
    Bhamra filed a motion to enforce the mediation agreement
    in late August 2019. The motion asserted that Bhamra was ready
    to complete the sales transaction and pay Singh all monies owed
    according to the terms of the mediation agreement and
    Klingenberg’s final report, but that Singh had refused to sign the
    closing documents and was raising “issues that were either not
    agreed to at mediation, eight months ago, or were not discussed
    during the ten hour marathon mediation.”
    Singh opposed the motion. He argued, among other things,
    that certain aspects of Klingenberg’s findings and calculations
    were incorrect, that certain misappropriated funds had not been
    accounted for, and that certain assets had not been included in
    the appraiser’s valuation. Relevant here, Singh asserted, “In
    addition to receipt of the sale price for his interest in [the LLC],
    Singh is entitled to his share of the profit or loss attributable to
    his 50% interest in [the LLC] for 2018 and 2019.” He requested
    that the closing of the sale be delayed so that he could review the
    LLC’s accounting and tax records and determine his share of the
    profit or loss attributable to his interest in the LLC.
    On September 10, 2019, the Oklahoma court heard the
    motion to enforce the mediation agreement. The court’s order
    6
    noted that Klingenberg’s calculations were mathematically
    correct and, citing the parties’ mediation agreement, the court
    adopted Klingenberg’s final report. The court also found the
    mediation agreement was valid and enforceable.
    1.6.   Sale of Singh’s Interest in the LLC and Dismissal
    of the Action with Prejudice
    On October 25, 2019, Singh and Bhamra signed and
    submitted a revised payoff demand to escrow, reflecting that
    Singh would be paid $1,365,481.47 upon completion of the sale
    transaction. Escrow closed on October 31, 2019.
    On November 8, 2019, Singh dismissed the Oklahoma
    lawsuit with prejudice.
    2.    Present Litigation
    2.1.   Operative Complaint
    Singh initiated the present lawsuit in Los Angeles County
    Superior Court on November 5, 2019. The operative third
    amended complaint names Bhamra and the LLC as defendants
    and includes five claims: breach of contract, breach of oral
    agreement, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, and a
    request for an accounting. Singh generally alleges that he agreed,
    as part of the mediation agreement signed on December 20, 2018,
    to sell his interest in the LLC to Bhamra and that the transaction
    was completed on or about October 31, 2019. Singh also asserts
    that as part of the mediation agreement, Singh and defendants
    “agreed to utilize[ ] [Klingenberg] as the expert to determine
    whether and to what extent Bhamra and/or Singh improperly
    expended or received any monies of [the LLC.] [Klingenberg] did
    not make a determination regarding profits and losses due to
    Bhamra or Singh. [¶] [Klingenberg] only reviewed [the LLC] up
    7
    to and including December 20, 2018, and specifically refused to
    look at the financial status of [the LLC] after
    December 20, 2018.”
    The complaint alleges that defendants breached the written
    operating agreement for the LLC and breached an oral
    agreement by failing to make profit distributions from the LLC to
    Singh in 2018 and 2019. Further, Singh alleges that such conduct
    unjustly enriched defendants. Finally, Singh alleges defendants
    breached their fiduciary duty to him by failing to provide an
    accounting of the LLC’s financials and by refusing to pay the
    profits owed to him from 2018 and 2019. Singh also requests a
    court-ordered accounting to determine the amount of profit owed
    to him for 2018 and 2019.
    2.2.   Demurrer
    Defendants filed a demurrer, arguing that Singh’s
    dismissal of the Oklahoma complaint with prejudice, together
    with the doctrine of res judicata and the full faith and credit
    clause of the Constitution of the United States, bars the present
    action. Specifically, defendants asserted “[t]he parties mediated
    the Oklahoma lawsuit to a successful resolution and signed a
    mediation agreement and release of claims. Singh and Bhamra
    agreed to allow independent attorney Ken Klingenberg to value
    [the LLC], and to determine the buyout price. Klingenberg’s
    valuation was final with no right of appeal. Klingenberg rejected
    Singh’s bid for [the LLC’s] post-mediation, 2018-2019 profits. [¶]
    Singh appealed Klingenberg’s valuation to the Oklahoma trial
    court. The Oklahoma court rejected Singh’s attempt to back out
    of the mediation agreement, upheld Klingenberg’s valuation, and
    rejected Singh’s bid for [the LLC’s] 2018 and 2019 profits. [¶]
    Singh then signed a buyout agreement, and another full release,
    8
    Bhamra bought out Singh’s interest in [the LLC] for 1.4 million
    dollars, the Oklahoma court entered a final judgment, and Singh
    did not appeal.” In light of these undisputed facts, defendants
    argued, Singh’s claims in the current action have already been
    litigated and are therefore barred.
    2.3.   Ruling
    The court took judicial notice of several documents from the
    Oklahoma lawsuit, including the complaint, the mediation
    agreement, the motion to enforce the settlement agreement,
    Singh’s opposition to that motion, and Singh’s dismissal of the
    Oklahoma lawsuit with prejudice. Based on the judicially noticed
    records from the Oklahoma lawsuit, the court concluded Singh
    had released his claim for 2018 and 2019 profits from the LLC.
    Specifically, the court cited the first release, contained in the
    mediation agreement, that stated the parties released one
    another from “all claims … related to the LLC or the Holiday Inn
    Express in Enid, Oklahoma.” And, the court noted, the Oklahoma
    court found the mediation agreement was enforceable. The court
    also noted that Singh’s claim for half the LLC’s profits in 2018
    and 2019 was raised in the Oklahoma lawsuit and resolved
    against him, after which time Singh completed the sale and
    dismissed the Oklahoma lawsuit with prejudice, as required by
    the mediation agreement.
    In short, the court found, “The claim for lost profits is
    related to [the LLC] and was asserted in the [Oklahoma] lawsuit.
    [Singh] has therefore released these claims.” After noting Singh
    would be unable to amend his complaint to cure its defects, the
    court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend.
    9
    2.4.   Judgment and Appeal
    The court entered a judgment of dismissal on
    August 26, 2020. Singh timely appeals.
    DISCUSSION
    1.    Standard of Review
    We independently review a trial court’s order sustaining a
    demurrer to determine whether the operative complaint alleges
    facts sufficient to state a cause of action. (Ivanoff v. Bank of
    America, N.A. (2017) 
    9 Cal.App.5th 719
    , 725.) We assume the
    truth of all properly-pled factual allegations and matters that are
    judicially noticeable. (Ibid.) We also liberally construe the
    complaint’s allegations with a view toward substantial justice.
    (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 
    19 Cal.4th 26
    , 43, fn. 7.) But where facts appearing in attached exhibits or
    judicially noticed documents contradict, or are inconsistent with,
    the complaint’s allegations, we must rely on the facts in the
    exhibits and judicially noticed documents. (Ivanoff, at p. 726.)
    When a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, we
    decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that the plaintiff
    can amend the pleading to cure the defect. (Blank v. Kirwan
    (1985) 
    39 Cal.3d 311
    , 318.) If the defect can be cured, the trial
    court has abused its discretion and we reverse; if not, there has
    been no abuse of discretion and we affirm. (Ibid.) The burden of
    proving such reasonable possibility is squarely on the plaintiff.
    (Ibid.) Such a showing can be made for the first time on appeal.
    (Smith v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. (2001) 
    93 Cal.App.4th 700
    , 711; City of Torrance v. Southern California
    Edison Co. (2021) 
    61 Cal.App.5th 1071
    , 1083–1084.)
    10
    Finally, “ ‘we do not review the validity of the trial court’s
    reasoning but only the propriety of the ruling itself. [Citations.]’
    [Citation.]” (Align Technology, Inc. v. Tran (2009) 
    179 Cal.App.4th 949
    , 958.) Accordingly, we will affirm the “ ‘trial
    court’s decision to sustain the demurrer [if it] was correct on any
    theory. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
    2.    The court properly sustained defendants’ demurrer
    without leave to amend.
    The court found that Singh’s releases in the prior litigation
    bar his claims here. We agree that Singh’s claims are barred.
    The claim preclusion doctrine, formerly called res judicata,
    “prohibits a second suit between the same parties on the same
    cause of action.” (Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2010) 
    48 Cal.4th 788
    , 792 (Boeken); see also Kim v. Reins International
    California, Inc. (2020) 
    9 Cal.5th 73
    , 91 (Kim).) “Claim preclusion
    arises if a second suit involves (1) the same cause of action
    (2) between the same parties (3) after a final judgment on the
    merits in the first suit.” (DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 
    61 Cal.4th 813
    , 824.) “ ‘Retraxit’ describes the particular application
    of claim preclusion to a claim that has been dismissed with
    prejudice. [Citation.] A dismissal with prejudice is considered a
    judgment on the merits preventing subsequent litigation between
    the parties on the dismissed claim. [Citations.]”3 (Kim, at p. 91;
    see also Winterhalder v. Burggraf Restoration, Inc., 2011 OK CIV
    3 The full faith and credit clause of the federal Constitution obligates a
    state to honor judgments from the courts of sister states. (U.S. Const.,
    art. IV, § 1; see also 
    28 U.S.C. § 1738
     [federal statute codifying full
    faith and credit clause]; and see, e.g., R.S. v. PacifiCare Life & Health
    Ins. Co. (2011) 
    194 Cal.App.4th 192
    , 198.)
    11
    APP 38, ¶ 14, 
    256 P.3d 84
     [“It has long been the rule in
    Oklahoma that: [¶] A dismissal of a suit made after, and based
    upon, an agreement between the parties by which a compromise
    settlement and adjustment of the subject-matter in dispute is
    made, is a dismissal on the merits, and is equivalent to a
    judgment of retraxit at common law; and as such would be a bar
    to further litigation on the same subject between the parties.
    Turner v. Fleming, 
    1913 OK 155
    , ¶ 3, 
    130 P. 551
    , 552.”].)
    Taking the elements of claim preclusion in order, we first
    consider whether the Oklahoma lawsuit and the present one
    concern the same cause of action. “ ‘In California the phrase
    “cause of action” is often used indiscriminately … to mean counts
    which state [according to different legal theories] the same cause
    of action … .’ [Citation.] But for purposes of applying the doctrine
    of res judicata, the phrase ‘cause of action’ has a more precise
    meaning: The cause of action is the right to obtain redress for a
    harm suffered, regardless of the specific remedy sought or the
    legal theory (common law or statutory) advanced. [Citation.] As
    we explained in Slater v. Blackwood [(1975)] 15 Cal.3d [791,] 795:
    ‘[T]he “cause of action” is based upon the harm suffered, as
    opposed to the particular theory asserted by the litigant.
    [Citation.] Even where there are multiple legal theories upon
    which recovery might be predicated, one injury gives rise to only
    one claim for relief. “Hence a judgment for the defendant is a bar
    to a subsequent action by the plaintiff based on the same injury
    to the same right, even though he presents a different legal
    ground for relief.” [Citations.]’ Thus, under the primary rights
    theory, the determinative factor is the harm suffered. When two
    actions involving the same parties seek compensation for the
    same harm, they generally involve the same primary right.
    12
    (Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 
    25 Cal.3d 932
    , 954.)” (Boeken, 
    supra,
    48 Cal.4th at p. 798.)
    In the Oklahoma lawsuit, Singh generally alleged Bhamra
    had misappropriated funds and misused property belonging to
    the LLC. Singh, individually and on behalf of the LLC, sought to
    recover misused funds, sell the LLC’s assets, settle its debts and
    liabilities, close the business, and distribute the LLC’s assets to
    its members. Individually, then, Singh sought to maximize the
    value of and liquidate his interest in the LLC. And he did so. In
    the settlement agreement, the parties agreed to the terms of
    sale–$3.8 million less certain debts of the LLC and adjusted for
    misuse of corporate funds as determined by Klingenberg. The
    court found the settlement agreement to be enforceable and the
    sale of Singh’s interest was eventually consummated.
    In the present suit, Singh seeks to vindicate the same
    primary right, i.e., to recover the maximum value of his interest
    in the LLC. Specifically, he claims in this litigation that he is
    entitled to a share of profits generated by the LLC after the
    parties signed the settlement agreement but before the sale of his
    interest in the LLC was completed. And he asserts Bhamra
    violated the LLC’s operating agreement by failing to distribute
    profits from 2018 and 2019. Stated slightly differently, Singh
    contends in the present litigation that the value of his interest in
    the LLC at the time of sale was higher than the $3.8 million
    agreed-upon price because he was also entitled to undistributed
    profits received by the LLC. As already explained, this issue was
    presented and rejected in the Oklahoma lawsuit.
    As to the second element of claim preclusion, there is no
    question that the parties in the Oklahoma lawsuit and this
    lawsuit are the same: Singh, Bhamra, and the LLC.
    13
    Finally, and as to the third element, there is a final
    judgment in the Oklahoma lawsuit. “A dismissal with prejudice is
    considered a judgment on the merits preventing subsequent
    litigation between the parties on the dismissed claim.
    [Citations.]” (Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 91; see also Consumer
    Advocacy Group, Inc. v. ExxonMobil Corp. (2008) 
    168 Cal.App.4th 675
    , 694 [“A court-approved settlement acts as a final judgment
    on the merits for the purposes of res judicata.”].)
    Notably, “ ‘parties may by agreement limit the legal effect
    of a dismissal with prejudice by agreement so that it would not
    constitute a retraxit and affect their rights in a later pending
    action.’ ” (See Legendary Investors Group No. 1, LLC v. Niemann
    (2014) 
    224 Cal.App.4th 1407
    , 1411.) The parties here did just the
    opposite. As the trial court found, Singh signed two releases
    during the course of the Oklahoma litigation. Both releases
    stated that the parties “release[d] one another from all claims,
    whether asserted in lawsuit or not, that are related to [the LLC]
    and the Holiday Inn Express in Enid, Oklahoma, including any
    claims arising from the operation of [the LLC] and the Holiday
    Inn Express in Enid, Oklahoma.” Thus, Singh’s claim of
    entitlement to profits received by the LLC is not only barred
    under the claim preclusion doctrine, but it plainly falls within the
    scope of the parties’ releases.4
    4 Because we conclude Singh’s claims are barred, we need not address
    his argument that as a dissolved entity, the LLC is unable to defend
    itself in this lawsuit.
    14
    DISPOSITION
    The judgment is affirmed. Respondents Three B Hotels
    LLC and Manmohan Singh Bhamra shall recover their costs on
    appeal.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    LAVIN, J.
    WE CONCUR:
    EDMON, P. J.
    EGERTON, J.
    15
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B308425

Filed Date: 6/22/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 6/22/2022