In re Micah Y. CA1/3 ( 2022 )


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  • Filed 6/24/22 In re Micah Y. CA1/3
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
    ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION THREE
    In re Micah Y., a Person Coming
    Under the Juvenile Court Law.
    THE PEOPLE,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                          No. A162902
    v.
    (Solano County
    Micah Y.,
    Super. Ct. No. J21996)
    Defendant and Appellant.
    More than two decades after the juvenile court terminated delinquency
    jurisdiction, Micah Y. moved to dismiss and seal his juvenile court records
    pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 786. (Undesignated
    statutory references are to this code.) The juvenile court denied the motion.
    We affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    In 1990, Micah, then twelve years old, admitted committing unlawful
    sexual intercourse with another minor. The juvenile court declared Micah
    a ward of the court and placed him on probation. The prosecution filed
    supplemental wardship petitions while Micah was on probation, and Micah
    admitted committing two felonies and several misdemeanors. In 1993, the
    1
    court terminated jurisdiction over Micah after finding he successfully
    completed probation. Subsequently, Micah suffered felony convictions — as
    a juvenile and an adult — for car theft, evading a police officer, and illegal
    firearm possession. He also suffered numerous misdemeanor convictions,
    including for reckless driving.
    In 2018, and again in 2019, Micah moved to seal his juvenile records
    pursuant to section 781. The juvenile court denied the motions. It found
    Micah was ineligible for relief under section 781 because he suffered “felony
    convictions subsequent to his successful completion of probation.” In 2021,
    Micah sought relief for a third time. As relevant here, Micah moved to
    dismiss and seal his juvenile court records pursuant to section 786. The
    prosecution opposed the motion, arguing Micah was not entitled to relief
    because the statute took effect more than two decades after Micah completed
    probation. After considering extensive briefing and argument, the court
    denied the motion. Relying on In re O.C. (2019) 
    40 Cal.App.5th 1196
     (O.C.),
    the court reasoned that section 786 did not apply because Micah completed
    probation before the statute’s January 2015 effective date.
    DISCUSSION
    Micah’s sole contention is section 786 mandates the “sealing and
    destruction of his juvenile record.” He is mistaken.
    Sections 781 and 786 allow “for the sealing of a minor’s juvenile
    delinquency file.” (S.V. v. Superior Court (2017) 
    13 Cal.App.5th 1174
    , 1181.)
    “Section 781 provides for a noticed petition procedure for sealing a person’s
    juvenile court records.” (O.C., supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 1204.) Under that
    statute, a person may petition the juvenile “court to seal the person’s juvenile
    court records . . . ‘in any case’ after the person has reached age 18, and in
    other circumstances.” (O.C., at p. 1200.) To obtain relief under section 781,
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    the petition must “show that, since the juvenile court’s jurisdiction was
    terminated . . . , the person was not convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor
    involving moral turpitude, and the person has attained rehabilitation to the
    satisfaction of the court.” (O.C., at p. 1200.) When a minor’s records are
    sealed under section 781, “ ‘the proceedings in the case shall be deemed never
    to have occurred.’ ” (S.V., at p. 1181.)
    Section 786, by contrast, provides “a streamlined, court-initiated
    procedure for dismissing juvenile delinquency petitions and sealing juvenile
    records.” (In re A.V. (2017) 
    11 Cal.App.5th 697
    , 705.) Since its January 2015
    effective date, the statute has required juvenile courts “to automatically and
    immediately dismiss a qualifying person’s juvenile court petition and seal the
    person’s juvenile court records . . . as soon as the person ‘satisfactorily
    completes’ ” probation. (O.C., supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 1200, italics added;
    1207 [“without requiring a noticed petition”]; § 786, subds. (a), (c)(1).)
    Micah acknowledges the juvenile court terminated his probation long
    before section 786 took effect, but he nevertheless asserts the statute
    mandates the sealing and destruction of his juvenile records. Although we
    typically review a juvenile court’s denial of a motion to seal records for abuse
    of discretion, our review here is de novo as the court’s decision concerns an
    issue of statutory interpretation. (In re D.H. (2020) 
    58 Cal.App.5th 44
    , 51.)
    O.C., supra, 
    40 Cal.App.5th 1196
     considered — and rejected — the
    argument Micah makes here. In that case, the minor successfully completed
    probation in 2011; seven years later, she moved to dismiss and seal her
    juvenile records under section 786. (O.C., at pp. 1200, 1202.) The juvenile
    court denied the motion and the appellate court affirmed. Relying on the
    statute’s unambiguous language and its legislative history, as well as the
    statutory scheme as a whole, O.C. held section 786 applies “to persons who
    3
    have satisfactorily completed their juvenile court . . . probation after [the
    statute] went into effect on January 1, 2015.” (O.C., at p. 1208, italics added;
    1206–1208.)
    O.C. noted section 786 uses present tense — if a person “ ‘satisfactorily
    completes’ ” probation — and defines “ ‘satisfactory completion’ ” of probation
    as occurring if the person has no wardship findings or specified convictions
    “ ‘during the period of . . . probation.’ ” (O.C., supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at
    pp. 1206–1207.) This language, the O.C. court concluded, evinced an intent
    that the statute apply prospectively, and not to persons like the minor who
    completed “probation before section 786 went into effect.” (O.C., at p. 1206.)
    Moreover, O.C. determined the legislative history supported its
    interpretation, and the fact “that the Legislature did not repeal section 781
    when it enacted section 786,” was further evidence that section 786 applies
    to those who satisfactorily complete juvenile court probation after the
    statute’s effective date. (O.C., at p. 1208.)
    O.C. reasoned that because the minor completed juvenile court
    probation before section 786’s effective date, she was “not entitled to
    have her records automatically sealed under section 786.” (O.C., supra,
    40 Cal.App.5th at p. 1208.) Applying section 786 to the minor’s sealing
    petition would, the O.C. court concluded, allow the minor “to circumvent
    section 781’s sealing requirements.” (O.C., at p. 1209.) And as O.C.
    explained, allowing “persons who cannot meet section 781’s . . . requirements
    to seal their records under section 786 would allow such persons to escape
    section 781’s sealing requirements. Such an approach would render section
    4
    781 of no effect and would give such persons a benefit that neither sections
    781 nor 786 contemplates.” (Id. at p. 1210.)1
    We reach the same result. As in O.C., the juvenile court terminated
    delinquency jurisdiction — and Micah’s probation — years before section 786
    took effect. And like the minor in O.C., Micah’s felony convictions rendered
    him ineligible for relief under section 781. (O.C., supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at
    pp. 1205, 1208.) Allowing Micah to circumvent section 781’s sealing
    requirements would bestow “a benefit that neither sections 781 nor 786
    contemplates.” (O.C., at p. 1210.) For all of the reasons espoused in O.C.,
    Micah cannot utilize section 786 to dismiss and seal his juvenile records.
    Section 786 “is intended to apply to minors who have a pending delinquency
    petition.” (In re G.F. (2017) 
    12 Cal.App.5th 1
    , 3; Cal. Rules of Court, rule
    5.830(a)(1).) The statute is not “intended to be a panacea for all sealing
    issues.” (In re Y.A. (2016) 
    246 Cal.App.4th 523
    , 527.) In sum, we conclude
    the juvenile court did not err by concluding Micah was not eligible for relief
    under section 786.
    DISPOSITION
    The June 2021 order denying Micah’s motion to seal his juvenile
    records under section 786 is affirmed.
    1In reaching this conclusion, O.C. distinguished In re I.F. (2017)
    
    13 Cal.App.5th 679
     and In re W.R. (2018) 
    22 Cal.App.5th 284
    . (O.C., supra,
    40 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1209–1210 & fn. 8.) We reject Micah’s reliance on
    these cases for the reasons articulated in O.C. Likewise, we find Micah’s
    reliance on section 786’s legislative history unavailing. (See O.C., at
    pp. 1207–1208.)
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    _________________________
    Rodríguez, J.
    WE CONCUR:
    _________________________
    Fujisaki, Acting P. J.
    _________________________
    Petrou, J.
    A162902
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A162902

Filed Date: 6/24/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 6/24/2022