Marriage of Halamandaris CA4/2 ( 2022 )

Filed 10/10/22 Marriage of Halamandaris CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re the Marriage of CHRIS and
CATHERINE BEACOM-
HALAMANDARIS.
CHRIS HALAMANDARIS,
E076933
Respondent,
(Super.Ct.No. FLRI2005230)
v.
OPINION
CATHERINE BEACOM-
HALAMANDARIS,
Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Dorothy McLaughlin,
Judge. Reversed with directions.
The Zacher Firm and Dieter Zacher for Appellant.
Holstrom, Block & Parke, James R. Parke, Ronald B. Funk; and Chris
Halamandaris, in pro. per., for Respondent.
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Wife appeals an order awarding her husband $38,395 in attorney fees as the
prevailing party after he successfully opposed her request for a restraining order under
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the Domestic Violence Prevention Act. (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq. (DVPA).) She
argues, among other things, that the fee award lacks evidentiary support. We agree.
In his declaration supporting the fee request, husband’s counsel disclosed only the
total amount his client had incurred in his defense ($38,395); he failed to include the
amount of hours he worked on the matter or his hourly rate. At the hearing on the request,
the trial judge asked counsel his hourly rate ($600), then backed into the lodestar
calculation by dividing the total requested fee by the hourly rate and concluding that 64
hours was a reasonable amount of time to have spent defending the restraining order
request. Because this calculation was based not on evidence but on counsel’s unsworn
statements, we reverse the order as insufficiently supported by the record and remand the
matter with directions to redetermine the fee award.
I
FACTS
Catherine Beacom-Halamandaris and Chris Halamandaris are married and live in
Corona. In July 2020, Catherine filed a request for a domestic violence restraining order
against Chris. However, because the appellate record contains neither her supporting
declaration nor a reporter’s transcript of the evidentiary hearing, we don’t know the
1 Unlabeled statutory citations refer to the Family Code.
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substance of her allegations. In any event, on October 15, 2020, after a four-day trial,
Riverside County Superior Court Judge Dorothy McLaughlin concluded Catherine had
failed to meet her burden of proof and denied her request.
On December 17, 2020, Chris filed a request for attorney fees of $38,395 as the
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prevailing party under section 6344. Chris’s attorney, James R. Parke, Certified Family
Law Specialist, submitted a declaration in support of the request. Parke said he was a
partner at the law firm of Holstrom, Block & Parke, and had served as the managing
attorney on the case. He said that from the time Chris had retained his firm “on July 31,
2020 until October 15, 2020, the date on which the Court dismissed [Catherine’s]
domestic violence request, [his client] incurred the total sum of $38, 395.00 in attorney’s
fees.” He said the following services “were provided by my staff and me”:
a. Multiple conferences with client;
b. Multiple email communications with client;
c. Review of domestic violence application of Catherine
d. Preparation of Responsive Declaration of Chris;
e. Prepare opening statement for Chris;
f. Preparation of questions for client for trial;
g. Preparation of cross-examination questions for Catherine;
2 Section 6344, subdivision (a) provides that, in any domestic violence restraining
order matter, “[a]fter notice and a hearing, the court may issue an order for the payment
of attorney’s fees and costs of the prevailing party.” (Loeffler v. Medina (2009) 174
Cal.App.4th 1495, 1508.)
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h. Interview potential third party witnesses;
i. Review and organize exhibits and impeachment documents;
j. Review exhibits from Catherine and prepare objections;
k. Prepare closing argument;
1. Travel to and from court appearances; and
m. Court appearances for trial and closing argument.
He said that, “[b]ased upon my legal background and experience, the total amount
of fees which my staff incurred to defend [Chris] ($38,395.00), was reasonable in all
aspects.”
Catherine filed a response, arguing (among other things) that Chris’s counsel
failed to provide a basis for the requested fee by submitting invoices or other information
describing how much time was spent on the matter and the associated hourly charge or
charges.
The hearing on the fee request took place before Judge McLaughlin. At the outset,
the judge said she found Catherine’s objection to the basis for the fee amount “the most
persuasive” aspect of her response, and the following exchange took place with Parke:
“THE COURT: So one piece of information that does not appear to be in what’s
been submitted to the Court is Mr. Parke’s hourly rate. So, Mr. Parke, would you
mind sharing that information, please, with the Court?
“COUNSEL: Yes, it’s $600 an hour, your Honor.
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“THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. All right. So at $600 an hour the Court
calculates that’s approximately 64 hours of work, and the Court would be inclined
to find that that amount of work for this domestic violence restraining order is
reasonable.”
Catherine’s counsel argued the hourly rate was not the only information missing
from Parke’s declaration and pointed out that Parke had not provided the rates for his
staff who had worked on the matter or the hours staff had worked. The judge asked Parke
to respond to the fact he had provided a list of various tasks performed “but it’s not
broken out in terms of time.”
Parke replied, “[o]n this particular DV action this was primarily if not 100 percent
of my time. This is getting ready for a hearing. I don’t usually have staff do anything for
me when I’m getting ready for trial. It’s all me.” He added, “the only thing that staff
would have done on this would have been the charge for the preparation of the pleadings,
which at most would have been $2,000 at the most.”
Catherine’s counsel responded that because Parke was not under oath and the
unsworn information he was providing the court was not in his declaration, there was
“absolutely no way for my client to be able to appropriately attack or argue against . . .
the amount of fees.” “It’s completely unfair and prejudicial for my client to have to rely
on this type of evidence and not be in a position to be able to oppose that which is her
right. So I’m very concerned about it and I’ve always been concerned about it . . . . And
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we keep peeling back the onion finding out we need more information and more
information which leads to my basic argument that it’s just not able to be calculated
properly, and my client doesn’t have the ability to argue against the declaration in a fair
and reasonable and proper manner.”
Parke responded, “I know the Court probably remembers this case because it went
on for the four days and it was a pretty lengthy domestic violence action in live court, so
I’m sure the Court does remember it. Took a lot of time. There were a lot of allegations
made and we had to do a lot of preparation for this as well as present our evidence and
cross-examine [Catherine].”
The judge awarded Chris attorney fees in the requested amount of $38,395, and
Catherine filed a timely appeal.
II
ANALYSIS
Catherine argues Chris failed to carry his burden of proving he had incurred
$38,395, and as a result, the fee award lacks evidentiary support. We agree.
The prevailing party seeking attorney fees “bear[s] the burden of establishing
entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly
rates.” (City of Colton v. Singletary (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 751, 784 (Singletary)
[cleaned up], quoting Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315,
1320, italics added.) To that end, the court may require the moving party “to produce
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records sufficient to provide ‘a proper basis for determining how much time was spent on
particular claims” and “may properly reduce compensation on account of any failure to
maintain appropriate time records.’” (Singletary, at p. 784.)
When faced with a challenge to a fee award, we defer to the trial court because
they are “the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in [their] court,”
but our review is not unfettered. (Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th
819, 832.) We will reverse a fee award if the court applies the wrong legal standard or if
the award is not supported by substantial evidence. (See Gorman v. Tassajara
Development Corp. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 44, 92 [wrong test or standard is a ground for
reversal]; Blickman Turkus, LP v. MF Downtown Sunnyvale, LLC (2008) 162
Cal.App.4th 858, 894 [reversal required if “necessary findings [are] not supported by
substantial evidence”].)
Here, the judge used the lodestar method, which involves three steps. First, the
court determines the actual hours counsel has spent on the case, next it subtracts any
hours it finds inefficient or unreasonable, and finally, it multiplies that amount by the
applicable billing rate (if it finds the rate reasonable). (Syers Properties III, Inc. v. Rankin
(2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 691, 697; Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State
University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 395.) The problem with the fee award in this
case is that Parke did not provide sufficient evidence for the judge to perform these three
steps.
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The only evidence counsel submitted in support of the fee request was a list of
tasks performed by him and his staff and his statement that Chris had incurred a total of
$38,395 in defending the matter. Missing from the record is evidence of the number of
hours spent on the case, by whom, and at what rate.
“[A] fee request ordinarily should be documented in great detail.” (Weber v.
Langholz (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1578, 1587.) While time records and invoices are not
required, what is required—at a bare minimum—are the “verified . . . statements of [an]
attorney.” (Singletary, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at p. 785.) At bottom, “[t]he evidence
should allow the court to consider whether the case was overstaffed, how much time the
attorneys spent on particular [tasks], and whether the hours were reasonably expended.”
(Christian Research Institute v. Alnor , supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 1320.)
As Catherine’s counsel pointed out at the hearing, the information necessary to
complete the lodestar calculation was not presented in the form of evidence. Instead, the
information came from Parke’s unsworn statements during the hearing. As a result, we
conclude the fee award is not supported by substantial evidence and therefore remand the
matter for a new determination supported by the record. Our conclusion makes it
unnecessary for us to address Catherine’s other challenges to the award.
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III
DISPOSITION
We reverse the order awarding attorney fees, and we remand to the trial court to
determine, based on evidence, the reasonable value of Chris’s attorney fees. Respondent
shall bear costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
SLOUGH
J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ
P. J.
McKINSTER
J.
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