People v. Stoecker CA5 ( 2022 )


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  • Filed 6/28/22 P. v. Stoecker CA5
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    THE PEOPLE,
    F081459
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    (Fresno Super. Ct. No. CF01662794)
    v.
    ROLAND FRIEDRICH STOECKER,                                                               OPINION
    Defendant and Appellant.
    THE COURT *
    APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Jonathan B.
    Conklin, Judge.
    Maureen M. Bodo, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
    Appellant.
    Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
    General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez, Cavan M.
    Cox II, and Lewis A. Martinez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    -ooOoo-
    * Before     Hill, P. J., Levy, J. and Poochigian, J.
    INTRODUCTION
    Appellant and defendant Roland Friedrich Stoecker pleaded guilty to eight counts
    and was sentenced to 27 years four months in prison. He filed a petition pursuant to
    Proposition 47 and his sentenced was reduced by 16 months. In this appeal, he contends
    his defense counsel was prejudicially ineffective for failing to move the court to dismiss
    the one-year term imposed for the prior prison term enhancement. We decline to find
    counsel was ineffective but remand for further appropriate proceedings, pursuant to the
    agreement of the parties, as to the validity of the prior prison term enhancement based on
    a recently enacted statute.
    FACTS1
    On August 14, 2001, defendant broke into an apartment and was ransacking the
    interior when the resident returned home. Defendant, whose face was covered,
    repeatedly punched the victim’s head and face, dragged her into the bedroom, tied her to
    the bed, and gagged her; he said he was sorry for what he was doing. He took several
    items from the residence, loaded them into the victim’s vehicle, and drove away in the
    victim’s vehicle. The victim managed to partially free herself and called 911. When the
    police arrived, she was bleeding from the back and side of her head and her eye was
    swollen. She was admitted to the hospital and had blurred vision, multiple soft tissue
    injuries, blood loss, and mild anemia.
    The victim’s vehicle was found the following day and had been set on fire. A few
    days later, the police received a tip that defendant was a possible suspect. Defendant was
    located and taken into custody on a parole violation. The victim’s property was found
    inside defendant’s car. Defendant was also in possession of marijuana and
    1  At defendant’s plea hearing, the parties stipulated to a factual basis for his pleas
    based on the preliminary hearing transcript and the police reports. The preliminary
    hearing transcript is not part of the instant appellate record. In their appellate briefs, the
    parties have cited to the police reports, as summarized in the probation report, for the
    facts in this case, and we shall do the same.
    2.
    methamphetamine. Defendant admitted he committed the burglary, claimed he did not
    mean to do it and did not want to hurt the victim. He asked how long he would get.
    PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    On October 17, 2001, an information was filed in the Superior Court of Fresno
    County case No. F662794-7 charging defendant count 1, first degree residential robbery
    (Pen. Code, § 211);2 count 2, first degree burglary with a nonparticipant present (§ 459);
    count 3, assault by means likely to cause great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(1));
    count 4, false imprisonment by violence (§ 236); count 5, carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a));
    count 6, unlawful driving or taking a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)); and
    count 7, arson of the victim’s 1997 Jeep Cherokee vehicle (§ 451, subd. (d)).
    Defendant was also charged with count 8, possession of a controlled substance,
    methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)); and count 9, misdemeanor
    possession of 28.5 grams or less of marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, § 11357, subd. (b)).
    As to counts 1, 3, 4, and 5, it was alleged defendant personally used a deadly and
    dangerous weapon, a blunt object (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)) and personally inflicted great
    bodily injury on the victim (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)).
    It was further alleged defendant had one prior serious felony conviction
    enhancement (§ 667, subd. (a)) and one prior strike conviction, both based on his
    conviction for first degree burglary (§§ 459, 460) in Sacramento County in 1999; and one
    prior prison term enhancement (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) based on his conviction for possession
    of a controlled substance, in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11350, in
    Orange County in 1997.
    Plea
    On February 27, 2002, defendant pleaded guilty to all charges and admitted all the
    special allegations and enhancements, with the exception of count 5, which the court
    2 All further statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
    3.
    dismissed on the prosecutor’s motion. The parties stipulated to the preliminary hearing
    transcript and the police reports as the factual basis.
    Sentencing
    On April 2, 2002, the court held the sentencing hearing. The victim addressed the
    court and stated defendant’s “violent rage” left her with a “haunting fear,” people would
    be safer every day he was in prison, and she would “still be here” whenever he was
    eligible for parole to ensure that he serves “every minute” of his prison sentence. The
    prosecutor urged the court to impose consecutive terms and stated that the other offenses
    were separate and apart from the burglary. The prosecutor further stated that defendant
    left on a kitchen burner after he incapacitated and restrained the victim.
    The court stated that the case was “extremely disturbing.” Defendant was not
    eligible for probation because of his prior strike. The court found he would not be a
    suitable candidate because of his prior criminal record, he was a parolee at large at the
    time of the offenses, and he committed an extremely violent act. The court
    acknowledged defendant apologized and explained his addiction was the reason for the
    offenses but said that did not excuse his behavior.
    The court sentenced defendant to 27 years four months in state prison: as to
    count 1, the upper term of six years, doubled to 12 years as the second strike term, plus
    three years for the great bodily injury enhancement, one year for the personal use
    enhancement, five years for the prior serious felony enhancement, and one year for the
    prior prison term enhancement; consecutive terms of eight months, doubled to 16 months
    (one-third the midterms, doubled as the second strike terms) for each of counts 4, 6, 7,
    and 8; a concurrent upper term of six years, doubled to 12 years, for count 2; and stayed
    the term imposed for count 3 pursuant to section 654.
    PROPOSITION 47
    Proposition 47 was approved in November 2014, and “makes certain drug- and
    theft-related offenses misdemeanors, unless the offenses were committed by certain
    4.
    ineligible defendants. These offenses had previously been designated as either felonies
    or wobblers (crimes that can be punished as either felonies or misdemeanors).” (People
    v. Rivera (2015) 
    233 Cal.App.4th 1085
    , 1091.) Proposition 47 “also added …
    section 1170.18, which permits those previously convicted of felony offenses that
    Proposition 47 reduced to misdemeanors to petition to have such felony convictions
    resentenced or redesignated as misdemeanors.” (People v. Buycks (2018) 
    5 Cal.5th 857
    ,
    871, fn. omitted.)
    “The ultimate burden of proving section 1170.18 eligibility lies with the
    petitioner.” (People v. Romanowski (2017) 
    2 Cal.5th 903
    , 916.) In reviewing a
    section 1170.18 petition, “the court has no obligation to hold an evidentiary hearing
    where the petitioner’s eligibility or ineligibility for relief is evident as a matter of law.”
    (People v. Simms (2018) 
    23 Cal.App.5th 987
    , 993.) “In many cases, the threshold issue
    of eligibility for relief … may be determined as a matter of law from the uncontested
    allegations of the petition or from the record of conviction.” (Ibid.)
    Defendant’s First Petition
    At some point in 2015, defendant apparently filed a petition pursuant to
    section 1170.18; the petition is not in the instant record. On September 11, 2015, the
    court filed an order in case No. F662794-7, summarily denying defendant’s petition with
    prejudice because his convictions were ineligible for relief under section 1170.18.
    Defendant’s Second Petition
    On January 21, 2020, defendant, in pro. per., filed another petition in case
    No. 6627947-2, requesting reduction of a felony conviction to a misdemeanor pursuant to
    section 1170.18. The petition did not specify which conviction was at issue but stated
    that he was sentenced to 16 months.
    5.
    The Court’s Ruling
    On June 22, 2020, the court held a hearing on defendant’s second section 1170.18
    petition. Defendant, who was in state prison, was not present, and defense counsel stated
    defendant waived his appearance.
    The prosecutor stated defendant’s conviction in count 8 for felony possession of a
    controlled substance, methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)),
    qualified for resentencing under Proposition 47, and his aggregate sentence would be
    reduced by 16 months. The prosecutor further stated that count 9, misdemeanor
    possession of less than 28.5 grams of marijuana, separately qualified for resentencing and
    dismissal under Proposition 64, and would not affect defendant’s aggregate sentence. 3
    The court agreed and dismissed count 9. It also reduced count 8 from a felony to a
    misdemeanor and ordered the 16-month sentence stricken. The court stated defendant’s
    aggregate term in case No. 6627947-2 was reduced from 27 years four months to 26
    years.
    On June 30, 2020, the court filed an amended abstract of judgment in case
    No. 6627947-2, that count 9 was stricken, count 8 was reclassified as a misdemeanor, and
    defendant’s aggregate sentence was reduced to 26 years.
    On July 23, 2020, defendant filed a notice of appeal from the court’s order of
    June 22, 2020.
    3“In 2016, the voters passed Proposition 64, which makes it lawful for persons
    aged 21 years and older to engage in various types of conduct involving cannabis,
    including the possession of up to 28.5 grams of cannabis (approximately one ounce),
    subject to certain exceptions. [Citation.] The initiative also includes a remedial
    provision that allows persons currently serving a sentence for a cannabis-related crime
    that is no longer an offense under Proposition 64 to file a petition requesting the dismissal
    of their sentence.” (People v. Raybon (2021) 
    11 Cal.5th 1056
    , 1060, fn. omitted.)
    6.
    DISCUSSION
    In this appeal, defendant has not raised any issues about the court’s ruling when it
    partially granted his section 1170.18 petition in case No. 6627947-2. Instead, he asserts
    his defense attorney was prejudicially ineffective for not moving the court to also reduce
    his felony conviction for the offense underlying the section 667.5, subdivision (b) prior
    prison term enhancement that he admitted in case No. 6627947-2: possession of a
    controlled substance, in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11350, in Orange
    County in 1997.
    Proposition 47
    Defendant first argues his attorney should have advised the court that the
    underlying conviction from Orange County was also subject to reclassification to a
    misdemeanor under Proposition 47, so that the court should have reduced the Orange
    County conviction to a misdemeanor and then stricken the additional term of one year for
    the prior prison term enhancement based on that conviction.
    The People reject defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance and assert that a
    section 1170.18 petition must be filed in the county where defendant’s conviction
    occurred, the conviction underlying the prior prison term enhancement occurred in
    Orange County, and the court in Fresno County did not have jurisdiction to reduce that
    conviction to a misdemeanor.
    The People are correct. “[T]he plain language of section 1170.18 … demonstrates
    that both for persons who are currently serving a sentence for a felony reduced by
    Proposition 47, and for those who have completed such a sentence, the remedy lies in the
    first instance by filing a petition to recall (if currently serving the sentence) or an
    application to redesignate (if the sentence is completed) in the superior court of
    conviction.” (People v. Diaz (2015) 
    238 Cal.App.4th 1323
    , 1331–1332, italics added.)
    In order for a prior felony conviction to be reclassified as a misdemeanor, the defendant
    “must file an application under section 1170.18, subdivision (f) to have the offense
    7.
    designated as a misdemeanor in the superior court of conviction ….” (Id. at p. 1332,
    italics added.)
    “A defense counsel is not required to make futile motions or to indulge in idle acts
    to appear competent.” (People v. Torrez (1995) 
    31 Cal.App.4th 1084
    , 1091–1092.)
    Defense counsel could not have requested the Fresno County Superior Court to reclassify
    his underlying felony conviction from Orange County since the court lacked jurisdiction
    to do so, and thus counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a meritless motion.
    Senate Bill Nos. 136 and 483
    As a separate matter, defendant argues that defense counsel was ineffective for
    failing to move for the court to strike the section 667.5, subdivision (b) prior prison term
    enhancement, that he admitted as part of his plea agreement, pursuant to the amendments
    enacted by Senate Bill No. 136.
    Effective January 1, 2020, Senate Bill No. 136 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) (Senate
    Bill 136) amended section 667.5, subdivision (b), to provide that the one-year prior
    prison term enhancement only applies when there is a prior separate prison term for a
    sexually violent offense as defined in Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600,
    subdivision (b). (Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1.) “By eliminating the one-year enhancement
    for prior prison terms that were not imposed for sexually violent offenses, the newly
    amended section reduces the punishment for such offenses.” (People v. Winn (2020)
    
    44 Cal.App.5th 859
    , 872.)
    We decline to find counsel was ineffective for failing to move to strike the prior
    prison term enhancement. At the time of the section 1170.18 hearing, it was not clear
    whether the court could strike every enhancement admitted as part of a plea agreement.
    (See, e.g., People v. Stamps (2020) 
    9 Cal.5th 685
    , 692.)
    More importantly, effective on January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 483 added
    section 1171.1 to the Penal Code. (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3
    (Senate Bill 483).) Senate Bill 483 extends the modifications brought about by Senate
    8.
    Bill 136 to judgments already final on appeal (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3), and applies
    retroactively “to all persons currently serving a term of incarceration in jail or prison for
    these repealed sentence enhancements.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 1.) Senate Bill 483
    expresses the Legislature’s intent “that any changes to a sentence as a result of [Senate
    Bill 483] shall not be a basis for a prosecutor or court to rescind a plea agreement.”
    (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 1, italics added.)
    Section 1171.1 declares that enhancements imposed before January 1, 2020, under
    former section 667.5, subdivision (b), are legally invalid except for any enhancement
    imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense. (§ 1171.1, subd. (a); People
    v. Flores (2022) 
    77 Cal.App.5th 420
    , 443.) It also provides for resentencing of
    defendants already sentenced to prior prison term enhancements and sets out specific
    instructions for any such resentencing. (§ 1171.1, subds. (c)–(e).) “Resentencing
    pursuant to this section shall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as
    a result of the elimination of the repealed enhancement, unless the court finds by clear
    and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety.
    Resentencing pursuant to this section shall not result in a longer sentence than the one
    originally imposed.” (Id., subd. (d)(1), italics added.)
    In the initial briefing in this case, the People did not address the possible
    application of Senate Bill 136 to the prior prison term enhancement imposed in this case
    as part of the plea agreement. We requested supplemental briefing from the parties about
    the impact of Senate Bill 483 to this issue. The parties agree that remand is required
    since defendant’s conviction from Orange County, underlying the prior prison term
    enhancement that he admitted as part of his plea agreement in case No. 6627947-2, was
    not for a sexually violent offense.
    We therefore remand the matter for the trial court and parties to address the
    amendments enacted by Senate Bills 136 and 483 to the prior prison term enhancement
    9.
    that defendant admitted, and the one-year term imposed in this case, and for resentencing
    pursuant to the provisions of section 1171.1.
    DISPOSITION
    The matter is remanded for further appropriate proceedings.
    10.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: F081459

Filed Date: 6/28/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 6/28/2022