People v. Diggs ( 2022 )


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  • Filed 6/30/22
    CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION FOUR
    THE PEOPLE,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,           A162679
    v.                                         (Alameda County
    MICHAEL DIGGS,                             Super. Ct. No. 175035)
    Defendant and Appellant.
    Defendant Michael Diggs appeals from the trial court’s denial of his
    petition for conditional release on the ground of restoration of sanity
    pursuant to Penal Code section 1026.2.1 We find that the trial court did not
    abuse its discretion in denying the petition and that neither defendant’s due
    process nor equal protection rights were violated. We therefore affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    A. The Underlying Offense and Commitment
    The commitment offense was for first degree murder. In 2014, Diggs
    sold methamphetamine to the victim, went to the victim’s house, and fell
    asleep on the couch while the victim smoked the methamphetamine.
    According to Diggs, he woke up to find the victim on top of him, unclothed.
    This triggered a flashback to sexual abuse Diggs had experienced as a child
    Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.1110, this
    *
    opinion is certified for publication with the exception of parts 2, 3, and 4 of
    the Discussion.
    All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
    1
    specified.
    and he reacted by striking the victim repeatedly with a hatchet, killing him.
    Diggs proceeded to pour bleach, Epsom salt, and other products on the victim
    to supposedly get rid of evil spirits. Diggs then left the house. At the time of
    the offense, Diggs was on parole and had been heavily using
    methamphetamine for about 45 days. He continued to use substances after
    the offense.
    In 2015, Diggs was found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) and
    was committed to Napa State Hospital (Napa) for a term of 50 years to life.
    Diggs was initially diagnosed with schizophrenia and posttraumatic stress
    disorder (PTSD). This diagnosis later changed to amphetamine-induced
    psychotic disorder, severe methamphetamine use disorder that was in
    sustained remission in a controlled environment, and antisocial personality
    disorder (ASPD) with narcissistic traits.
    In January 2017, two Christmas cards were sent to Diggs at Napa that
    contained methamphetamine. Diggs denied having any involvement with
    these cards being sent. In June 2019, Diggs tested positive for
    methamphetamine following a random drug test. He claimed that the result
    was a false positive and that he had been set up. His sample was sent out for
    a second confirmatory test that also came back positive. Following this
    incident, Diggs refused to participate in any further drug testing or
    treatment at Napa. In October 2019, Diggs was transferred to Patton State
    Hospital (Patton).
    B. Petition for Conditional Release
    In December 2020, Diggs filed the subject petition for release into a
    conditional release program (CONREP) pursuant to section 1026.2. In March
    2021, a hearing on the petition was held. Experts on behalf of both Diggs and
    the prosecution testified.
    1. Defendant’s Expert
    Diggs’ expert was Dr. Michael McCormick, a staff psychologist at
    Patton. McCormick began working with Diggs in January 2021 and reviewed
    Diggs’ treatment records and police reports. McCormick also ran a relapse
    prevention group that Diggs regularly attended twice a week. McCormick
    testified that Diggs’ main diagnosis was ASPD with narcissistic traits and a
    stimulant use disorder that was in remission in a controlled environment.
    According to McCormick, someone with ASPD may exhibit aggressive and
    manipulative behavior, lack of empathy, as well as a disregard for rules and
    violations. McCormick acknowledged that someone with ASPD could be
    dangerous under the standards of section 1026.2 but that he did not see any
    evidence that Diggs would be dangerous if released into CONREP.
    In support of this opinion, McCormick testified that Diggs was able to
    accept feedback from their therapy sessions and implement it into his daily
    life. McCormick acknowledged that Diggs’ current diagnosis could
    potentially make him dangerous if he were to use substances again but
    testified that Diggs had created a Wellness Recovery Action Plan that
    mitigated this danger.2 McCormick testified that Diggs expressed an
    awareness of his triggers that could potentially lead to substance use again,
    his lack of desire to use any substances, and a desire to continue his recovery
    treatment once in the community. McCormick believed Diggs had made
    advancements in his ability to deal with substance abuse, despite the fact
    that he received Christmas cards containing methamphetamine in 2017 and
    tested positive for methamphetamine in 2019.
    2 A Wellness Recovery Plan is required of all patients at Patton who
    seek to be released into CONREP.
    2. The Prosecution’s Experts
    The prosecution called Dr. Mario Souza, a senior psychologist specialist
    in the Forensic Evaluation Department at Patton. In October 2020, Diggs’
    treatment team asked Souza to conduct a violence risk assessment and
    evaluation of Diggs’ current risk level and whether it was appropriate to
    discharge him to the community. Souza then prepared a court report based
    on his assessment. In preparing this report, Souza interviewed Diggs for
    approximately five hours and reviewed police reports, CONREP placement
    recommendations, and Diggs’ treatment records.
    Souza diagnosed Diggs with ASPD and amphetamine use disorder.
    Souza testified that Diggs had a history of not only criminal behavior, but
    also impulsivity, manipulative behavior, and lack of remorse, all of which
    were characteristics of ASPD. Souza further testified that Diggs’
    methamphetamine use led to significant issues and caused him to experience
    psychotic-like symptoms.
    Souza employed the Historical Clinical Risk Management – 20 Version
    3 (HCR-20) that he described was the “the gold standard of violence risk
    assessment.” Of the ten historical factors that the HCR-20 considers,
    violence, antisocial behavior, personality disorder, substance use, traumatic
    experiences, and violent attitudes were all present and highly relevant for
    Diggs. Of the risk management factors, Souza found that Diggs’ future
    treatment plans were inadequate, that Diggs would face future problems
    with personal support and his living situation, and that he did not have the
    adequate coping skills to deal with his maladaptive personality patterns and
    stressors in the community. Souza concluded that Patton was the best place
    for Diggs for the time being and that he would be able to move to a less
    restrictive environment once he engaged in in-depth substance abuse
    treatment.
    The prosecution also called Janice Avery, an assistant community
    director at CONREP. Avery prepared a hospital liaison report in January
    2021 that concluded that although Diggs was near readiness, he was not yet
    ready to be released to CONREP. Avery testified that Diggs had more
    progress to make with respect to gaining insight regarding his substance
    abuse Avery was also concerned that Diggs was diagnosed with a substance
    use disorder and had possibly used methamphetamine and had
    methamphetamine sent to him while he was at Napa.
    3. The Trial Court’s Ruling
    The trial court denied Diggs’ petition at the conclusion of the hearing.
    The court found that Diggs had not carried his burden in showing by a
    preponderance of the evidence that he would not be a danger to the
    community if released into CONREP.
    The trial court stated its concern that “the nature of the offense which
    brought Mr. Diggs into the state hospitals as a result of a not guilty by reason
    of insanity finding, which was a murder and which occurred, apparently,
    because Mr. Diggs was placed in a psychotic state through his use of
    methamphetamines.”
    The trial court further noted that Diggs had not conquered his
    amphetamine use disorder since there were incidents of illegal possession
    and use of methamphetamine when he was at Napa. This was of particular
    concern to the court because the use of amphetamine, combined with Diggs’
    ASPD, “provide[d] the trigger to the very violent activity that we’ve seen.”
    Finally, the court stated that Diggs had not “engaged in the meaningful
    treatment that is necessary for substance-use disorder to be ready for
    [release] at this time.”
    Diggs filed a timely notice of appeal.
    DISCUSSION
    1. Relevant Law and Standard of Review
    A defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) may petition
    the court to be released from a state hospital prior to the expiration of his or
    her maximum term of commitment on the grounds of restoration of sanity.
    (§ 1026.2.) The petition involves a two-step process. The first step is an
    outpatient placement hearing, at which the applicant must prove by a
    preponderance of the evidence that he or she will not be “a danger to the
    health and safety of others, due to mental defect, disease, or disorder, if
    under supervision and treatment in the community.” (§ 1026.2, subds. (e),
    (k).) If the court makes this finding, the applicant is “placed with an
    appropriate forensic conditional release program for one year.” (§ 1026.2,
    subd. (e).)
    “The second step in the section 1026.2 release process is referred to as
    the restoration of sanity trial, and can only be reached if the applicant has
    already met the threshold test for placement in ‘an appropriate forensic
    conditional release program.’ ” (People v. Dobson (2008) 
    161 Cal.App.4th 1422
    , 1433.) The applicant again bears the burden to prove by a
    preponderance of the evidence that he or she will not be a danger due to
    mental defect, disease, or disorder. (§ 1026.2, subds. (e), (k).)
    The present appeal concerns a petition for outpatient placement under
    the first step of section 1026.2. The trial court’s denial of Diggs’ petition is
    reviewed for abuse of discretion. (People v. Cross (2005) 
    127 Cal.App.4th 63
    ,
    73.) “The term judicial discretion implies the absence of arbitrary
    determination, capricious disposition, or whimsical thinking. [Citation.]
    ‘When the question on appeal is whether the trial court has abused its
    discretion, the showing is insufficient if it presents facts which merely afford
    an opportunity for a difference of opinion. An appellate tribunal is not
    authorized to substitute its judgment for that of the trial judge. [Citation.]’
    [Citation.] Discretion is abused only if the court exceeds all bounds of
    reasons, all of the circumstances being considered.” (People v. Henderson
    (1986) 
    187 Cal.App.3d 1263
    , 1268.)
    2. Finding of Danger to the Health and Safety of Others
    Diggs contends that the evidence did not support the trial court’s
    finding that Diggs would be dangerous if released into CONREP. We
    disagree.
    As an initial issue, Diggs argues that the term “danger to the health
    and safety of others” under section 1026.2 is undefined and should therefore
    be read to mean “substantial danger of physical harm to others” as included
    under section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(1).3 We decline to do so as we have
    already addressed this issue in People v. Woodson (1983) 
    140 Cal.App.3d 1
    .
    There, we stated that those committed under section 1026 need not “all
    represent a substantial danger of physical harm to others or themselves.
    Whether they do represent a danger or not, depends on the nature of their
    mental disease, defect, or disorder and the underlying crime.” (Id. at p. 4.)
    Accordingly, we held that “[t]here is no requirement that there be a threat of
    physical harm to others for commitment under section 1026; and it should
    not be engrafted onto section 1026.2.” (Ibid.)
    Turning to the merits, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
    finding that Diggs would be a danger to the health and safety of others if
    released into CONREP. There was substantial evidence to support the
    court’s finding. As noted at the hearing, this case presented a “battle of the
    experts” to the trial court. While Diggs’ expert McCormick testified that
    3 Section 1026.5 sets forth the procedure for extending the commitment
    of a person found NGI beyond his or her maximum term of commitment.
    Diggs would not be a danger if released into CONREP, Souza, the
    prosecution’s expert, disagreed and found that based on his assessment,
    Diggs “continues to be a danger to others as a result of his severe mental
    disorder.” In support of this opinion, Souza explained that Diggs had yet to
    have adequate insight into the factors that drove his violence, had yet to
    accept his diagnosis of ASPD, and had yet to engage in substance abuse
    treatment despite testing positive for methamphetamine in 2019. On the
    other hand, McCormick believed that Diggs could adequately deal with his
    substance abuse despite the positive test and the incident with the Christmas
    cards. Simply put, the experts disagreed as to whether Diggs posed a danger
    if conditionally released.
    The trial court did not by any means act capriciously or arbitrarily in
    finding that Diggs posed a danger based on Souza’s testimony. (People v.
    Henderson, supra, 187 Cal.App.3d at p. 1268.) Souza is a senior forensic
    psychologist who received specialized training in risk assessment. He
    interviewed Diggs for approximately five hours and reviewed Diggs’
    treatment records from both Napa and Patton, police reports, and CONREP
    placement recommendations records. As part of the interview, Souza
    employed the HCR-20, the “gold standard” of violence risk assessment that
    has shown to be predictive across different populations. In addition, Avery,
    an assistant director at CONREP, testified that Diggs was not ready to be
    released into CONREP.
    Given the above, the trial court reasonably concluded that Diggs was
    not ready to be released into the community based on the violent nature of
    his offense, his current diagnoses of ASPD and an amphetamine-use disorder,
    and lack of meaningful treatment to address his substance abuse disorder.
    3. Finding of Mental Defect, Disease, or Disorder
    Diggs next contends the trial court abused its discretion in finding that
    he suffered from a mental defect, disease, or disorder based on his diagnosis
    of ASPD. We disagree.
    We first note that in denying the petition, the trial court specifically
    stated that its decision was based on the combination of Diggs’ ASPD and
    amphetamine use disorder. Diggs does not argue that an amphetamine use
    disorder is not a mental defect, disease, or disorder for purposes of continued
    commitment under section 1026.2.
    Diggs relies primarily on Foucha v. Louisiana (1992) 
    504 U.S. 71
    (Foucha) to support his argument that ASPD does not constitute a “mental
    defect, disease, or disorder” under section 1026.2. There, the high court held
    that a person committed based on NGI “may be held as long as he is both
    mentally ill and dangerous, but no longer.” (Id. at p. 77.) The high court
    found that Foucha’s continued commitment was improper where the
    testimony before the trial court showed that Foucha did not currently suffer
    from a mental disease or illness and the only argument for continued
    commitment was that his antisocial personality rendered him a danger to
    himself and others.4 (Id. at pp. 77–79.)
    In People v. Superior Court (Blakely) (1997) 
    60 Cal.App.4th 202
    , the
    Second District clarified that “in Foucha, ‘the State [did] not claim that
    Foucha [was] now mentally ill’ [citation], only that he had an ‘antisocial
    personality.’ [Citation.] Therefore, Foucha does not address whether a
    diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder may constitute a mental disorder
    4  At the hearing in Foucha, one of the doctors appointed to conduct a
    pretrial examination testified that an antisocial personality is “a condition
    that is not a mental disease and that is untreatable.” (Foucha, 
    supra,
     504
    U.S. at p. 75.)
    for purposes of an extended commitment.” (Id. at p. 213.) The court went on
    to hold that whether the defendant suffered from a mental disease, disorder
    or defect was “not a question of law, but rather one for the trier of fact to be
    resolved with the assistance of expert testimony.” (Ibid.)
    We agree with the above reasoning and do not interpret Foucha as
    holding that ASPD cannot as a matter of law be a mental disease, disorder, or
    defect for purposes of section 1026.2. As Diggs himself notes in his briefing,
    mental health is fluid and diagnoses may change over time with a better
    understanding of the illness and the patient being treated.
    Whether a defendant suffers from a mental illness is a question most
    appropriately left for medical experts to address and for the trier of fact to
    ultimately decide. In this case, experts on both sides diagnosed Diggs with
    ASPD and amphetamine use disorder. Souza testified that Diggs’ diagnosis
    of ASPD was manifested in his history of impulsivity, manipulative behavior,
    and lack of remorse or empathy. McCormick testified that someone with
    ASPD may exhibit aggressive and manipulative behavior, lack of empathy,
    and disregard for rules.
    This testimony supported the trial court’s implicit finding that Diggs
    suffered from a mental defect, disease, or disorder that rendered him
    considered by the trial court in addition to Diggs’ amphetamine-use disorder,
    to determine that Diggs posed a danger if released into CONREP. Further,
    in any event, the trial court relied primarily on Diggs’ amphetamine use
    disorder, with his ASPD taken into consideration, in denying his petition for
    release under section 1026.2.
    4. Due Process
    Diggs contends that his right to due process was violated because the
    trial court, in denying his petition, required that he engage in a substance
    abuse treatment program that has been shut down due to the pandemic. We
    are not persuaded.
    The People first argue that this claim is not ripe for review because
    Diggs was ordered to engage in future treatment before bringing another
    section 1026.2 petition, and that Diggs had not yet suffered any cognizable
    harm. We disagree. At the hearing, the trial court stated that it did not
    think that Diggs had “engaged in the meaningful treatment that is necessary
    for substance-use disorder to be ready for [release] at this time.” Diggs then
    raised a concern that the treatment program has been shut down with no
    indication of reopening, and the court responded that it shared Diggs’
    frustration regarding the limitations caused by the pandemic and that it
    hoped conditions would improve so that he could participate in the program.
    Since one of the court’s reasons in denying the subject petition was that Diggs
    had not engaged in intensive treatment (in the past), we find that his claim is
    ripe for review and turn to the merits.
    First, we disagree with Diggs’ contention that he has had no access to
    treatment through no fault of his own. In 2019, Diggs received treatment
    within the intensive substance recovery unit at Napa. After testing positive
    for methamphetamine, he refused to continue treatment or submit to any
    further drug testing. When Diggs was transferred to Patton, he interviewed
    to be admitted into its substance abuse recovery program but was not
    accepted. The reason is unknown, but Souza testified that this generally
    occurs when a patient is not deemed ready to engage in intensive treatment,
    such as where a patient tests positive but denies any drug use or drug
    problem.
    Second, we do not find that Diggs’ inability to participate in intensive
    substance abuse treatment due to COVID-19 constitutes a violation of his
    due process. The concept of due process is not absolute, and “the extent to
    which due process will be available depends on a careful and clearly
    articulated balancing of the interests at stake in each context. (People v.
    Ramirez (1979) 
    25 Cal.3d 260
    , 269.) The COVID-19 pandemic was an
    unprecedented global event that resulted in emergency orders and
    suspension of services across the country. In balancing a criminal
    defendant’s right to a fair and speedy trial with the health and safety of
    jurors and staff during this time, courts have held that the pandemic
    provided good cause for trial continuances. (See People v. Breceda (2022) 
    76 Cal.App.5th 71
    , 92; Stanley v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (2020)
    
    50 Cal.App.5th 164
    , 169.) Simply put, “[p]ublic health concerns trump the
    right to a speedy trial.” (People v. Tucker (2011) 
    196 Cal.App.4th 1313
    , 1314.)
    Here, due to COVID restrictions, Patton had to limit various services it
    previously provided to patients due to limitations regarding the number of
    patients who could be in a certain area at any given time. One such service
    that was suspended was the Recovery Lifestyle Program, an intensive
    substance abuse program Patton had offered. Despite this, Patton still
    offered group substance recovery treatment at least once every two weeks
    that Diggs attended. Given these limitations and the competing interest in
    maintaining the health and safety of both hospital staff and patients at
    Patton, we do not find that there has been a violation of Diggs’ right to due
    process.
    5. Equal Protection
    Lastly, Diggs argues that it is a violation of equal protection to allow
    continued commitment of NGIs based on a diagnosis of ASPD when this
    diagnosis is insufficient to support the continued commitment of a similarly
    situated group, mentally disordered offenders (MDO). Diggs initially frames
    the issue broadly as whether it is constitutional for continued commitments
    for MDOs to be tied to the mental disorder underlying their initial
    commitments while continued commitments for NGIs are not. In his reply
    brief, Diggs narrows the issue and argues that “[t]he focus is not on all
    changes to a committed person’s mental state but on resolution of the
    commitment disorder such that ASPD is the basis for continuing
    commitment.” Our analysis accordingly, will focus on the issue of ASPD
    under these two commitment schemes.5
    As both parties point out, the subject claim was not raised before the
    trial court. The People argue that this claim has been forfeited as a result.
    Although an equal protection claim may be forfeited if raised for the first
    time on appeal, we will exercise our discretion and consider the claim. (See
    People v. Dunley (2016) 
    247 Cal.App.4th 1438
    , 1447.)
    A. Similarly Situated
    “The constitutional guaranty of equal protection of the laws means
    simply that persons similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law
    must be similarly treated under the law. [Citations.] If persons are not
    similarly situated for purposes of the law, an equal protection claim fails at
    the threshold. [Citation.] The question is not whether persons are similarly
    situated for all purposes, but ‘whether they are similarly situated for
    purposes of the law challenged.’ ” (People v. Buffington (1999) 
    74 Cal.App.4th 1149
    , 1155 (Buffington).)
    Diggs argues that NGIs and MDOs are similarly situated for purposes
    of their continued commitment schemes. Diggs relies primarily on People v.
    McKee (2010) 
    47 Cal.4th 1172
    . There, our Supreme Court considered an
    5 Under the MDO scheme, a prerequisite to commitment and continued
    commitment is the finding of a “severe mental health disorder.” (§§ 2962,
    subd. (a)(2); 2972, subd. (c).) Under section 2962, subdivision (a)(2), “severe
    mental health disorder” excludes a personality disorder.
    equal protection challenge with respect to a law that allowed for
    indeterminate commitments of sexually violent predators (SVP). (Id. at
    p. 1196.) The court held that SVPs were similarly situated to MDOs in that
    both commitment schemes aimed to protect the public from dangerous
    offenders with mental disorders while providing treatment to them. (Id. at
    p. 1203.) The court went onto hold that SVPs and NGIs were similarly
    situated for these same reasons. (Id. at p. 1207.)
    We acknowledge that the schemes underlying the initial commitments
    of NGIs and MDOs differ in several respects. For example, “[a]n [NGI]
    acquittee has raised his mental illness as a defense to his criminal conduct
    and there has been an adjudication that he committed a criminal act and was
    legally insane when he did so.” (People v. Wilder (1995) 
    33 Cal.App.4th 90
    ,
    105.) By contrast, for a MDO, commitment can be ordered as a condition of a
    prisoner’s parole if it is shown that the prisoner, among other requirements,
    has a severe mental disorder that caused or was an aggravating factor in the
    commission of the offense. (§ 2962, subd. (b).)
    In terms of continuing their commitments, the burden of proof as well
    as the party who bears this burden differ for NGIs and MDOs. Under the
    NGI scheme, an applicant who seeks early release must prove by a
    preponderance of the evidence that he or she would not be “a danger to the
    health and safety of others, due to mental defect, disease, or disorder, if
    under supervision and treatment in the community.” (§ 1026.2, subds. (e),
    (k).) Under the MDO scheme, the burden is on the prosecution to prove
    beyond a reasonable doubt that the offender has a severe mental disorder
    that causes him to be a substantial danger of physical harm to others in order
    to justify extended commitment. (§ 2972.)
    Despite the differences, we find that NGIs and MDOs are similarly
    situated for purposes of the law in question because under both schemes,
    continued commitment is only warranted if the person has a current mental
    disorder that renders him or her a danger if released. These two groups need
    not share identical characteristics in order for us to find them similarly
    situated. (People v. McKee, 
    supra,
     47 Cal.4th at p. 1203.)
    B. Similar Treatment
    If two groups are found to be similarly situated, the next question
    under equal protection analysis is whether they are similarly treated under
    the law. (Buffington, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 1155.) “A legislature may
    distinguish between persons or groups in passing legislation.” (Ibid.) “Strict
    scrutiny is the correct standard of review in California for disparate
    involuntary civil commitment schemes because liberty is a fundamental
    interest.” (Id. at p. 1156.) Under this standard, disparate treatment is
    upheld only if it furthers a compelling state interest. (Ibid.) “There is
    certainly a compelling state interest in identifying, confining, and treating
    persons who represent a danger to the health and safety of others. . . .”
    (People v. Hubbart (2001) 
    88 Cal.App.4th 1202
    , 1231 (Hubbart).)
    The question of whether equal protection requires that personality
    disorders be excluded from an involuntary commitment scheme by virtue of
    their exclusion under the MDO commitment scheme has been addressed by
    other courts. In Buffington, the Third Appellate District held that “[e]qual
    protection does not require that ‘personality or adjustment disorders’ be
    excluded from the SVP mental disorder standard simply because they are
    excluded from the MDO standard.” (Buffington, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at
    p. 1158.) The court found that SVPs and MDOs are similarly situated and
    similarly treated “because the triggering mental disorder is defined as a
    current and recognized mental condition rendering those committed
    dangerous beyond their control.” (Ibid.)
    In Hubbart, the Sixth Appellate District similarly found no equal
    protection violation merely because personality disorders are excluded from
    the MDO scheme but not under the SVP scheme. (Hubbart, supra,
    88 Cal.App.4th at p. 1218.) “[T]he terms used to describe the degree of
    mental disorder required for civil commitment carry no ‘talismanic
    significance.’ ” (Ibid., citing Kansas v. Hendricks (1997) 
    521 U.S. 346
    , 359.)
    Under both schemes, a committed person is required to have a mental
    disorder that renders the person a danger to others. “While phrased
    differently, the two schemes set forth similar standards for the mental
    disorder necessary for commitment. The two schemes do not treat the
    committed person differently for purposes of defining the requisite mental
    disorder.” (Hubbart, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1218–1219.)
    We agree with the above reasoning and do not find that there has been
    a violation of equal protection on the grounds that personality disorders like
    ASPD are excluded under the MDO scheme for continued commitment but
    not under the NGI scheme. Once committed, the two groups are treated
    similarly as their continued commitment is tied to a showing that they suffer
    from a current mental disorder that renders them a danger to others.
    (§§ 1026.2, subd. (e), 2972, subd. (c).)
    DISPOSITION
    The trial court’s order denying defendant’s petition under section
    1026.2 petition is affirmed.
    NADLER, J.*
    WE CONCUR:
    POLLAK, P. J.
    STREETER, J.
    * Judge of the Sonoma County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief
    Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
    Trial Court:                Alameda County Superior Court
    Trial Judge:                Honorable Allan D. Hymer
    Counsel for Defendant and   Julia Freis, under appointment of the Court of Appeal
    Appellant:
    Counsel for Plaintiff and   Rob Bonta, Attorney General of California
    Respondent:                 Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General
    Charles C. Ragland, Senior Assistant Attorney General
    Melissa Mandel, Supervising Deputy Attorney General
    Teresa Torreblanca and Christen Somerville, Deputy
    Attorneys General
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A162679

Filed Date: 6/30/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 6/30/2022