People v. Moeum CA2/8 ( 2023 )


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  • Filed 1/3/23 P. v. Moeum CA2/8
    Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citi ng or relying on opinions
    not certified for publication or ordered published, ex cept as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
    has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION EIGHT
    THE PEOPLE,                                                    B300707
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                 (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. TA111652)
    v.
    SOPHORN J. MOEUM,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
    County. Laura R. Walton, Judge. Reversed and remanded with
    directions.
    Eric R. Larson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
    for Defendant and Appellant.
    Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General,
    Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan
    Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Charles S. Lee and
    Stephanie A. Miyoshi, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
    and Respondent.
    **********
    In April 2010, defendant and appellant Sophorn J. Moeum,
    along with seven accomplices, participated in a violent robbery at
    an auto parts store that resulted in two fatalities. A jury found
    defendant guilty of two counts of first degree murder and one
    count of attempted murder, in addition to five other felonies, and
    found true the robbery-murder special-circumstance allegations.
    Defendant’s accomplices were also found guilty. In 2014, we
    affirmed defendant’s conviction after modifying the judgment to
    address several sentencing errors. (People v. Kol (June 13, 2014,
    B243664) [nonpub. opn.].)
    Following passage of Senate Bill 1437 (2017–2018
    Reg. Sess.) which, among other changes, resulted in the
    enactment of Penal Code section 1170.95, defendant filed a
    petition for resentencing with the trial court. During the
    pendency of this appeal, former section 1170.95 was renumbered
    as section 1172.6 with no change in the text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58,
    § 10.) We refer to the statute only by its new designation for
    clarity.
    The trial court appointed defendant counsel and the parties
    filed briefs. After a hearing, the court denied defendant’s petition,
    reasoning he was not eligible for relief under the statutory
    scheme on the murder counts in light of the special circumstance
    findings and not eligible on the attempted murder count because
    attempted murder was not included within the scope of Penal
    Code section 1172.6.
    We affirmed the denial of defendant’s resentencing petition.
    (People v. Moeum (Feb. 4, 2021, B300707) [nonpub. opn.].) At
    that time, there was a split in the Courts of Appeal as to whether
    a jury’s true finding on a special circumstance allegation
    pursuant to Penal Code section 190.2 precluded resentencing
    2
    relief under section 1172.6. In affirming the trial court’s denial,
    we said that pending further guidance from the Supreme Court,
    we would follow those cases concluding a true finding did
    preclude relief and that defendant’s remedy was to pursue relief
    by way of habeas corpus. As to the attempted murder count, we
    held the statutory language did not include convictions for
    attempted murder.
    Defendant sought and was granted review by the Supreme
    Court.
    In October 2021, the Legislature passed Senate Bill 775
    (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) which, among other things, amended the
    language of Penal Code section 1172.6 to expressly include that
    individuals convicted of attempted murder under a natural and
    probable consequences theory may seek resentencing relief.
    (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2.)
    In August 2022, the Supreme Court issued its decision in
    People v. Strong (2022) 
    13 Cal.5th 698
     (Strong). Thereafter, the
    Supreme Court transferred this case to us with directions to
    vacate our decision and reconsider the matter in light of Strong
    and the passage of Senate Bill 775. In supplemental briefing to
    this court, the parties agree that remand is warranted to allow
    the trial court to conduct further proceedings in accordance with
    Penal Code section 1172.6.
    Having vacated our prior decision and reconsidered the
    issues presented in light of Strong and in light of the passage of
    Senate Bill 775, we reverse and remand with directions to the
    superior court to conduct further proceedings in accordance with
    Penal Code section 1172.6.
    3
    DISCUSSION
    The Supreme Court explained in Strong that its decisions
    in People v. Banks (2015) 
    61 Cal.4th 788
     and People v. Clark
    (2016) 
    63 Cal.4th 522
    , “both substantially clarified the law
    governing findings under Penal Code section 190.2,
    subdivision (d): Banks elucidated what it means to be a major
    participant and, to a lesser extent, what it means to act with
    reckless indifference to human life, while Clark further refined
    the reckless indifference inquiry.” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
    pp. 706–707.) As a result, Strong concluded that “[f]indings
    issued by a jury before Banks and Clark do not preclude a
    defendant from making out a prima facie case for relief under
    Senate Bill 1437. This is true even if the trial evidence would
    have been sufficient to support the findings under Banks and
    Clark.” (Strong, at p. 710.)
    Here, the jury convicted defendant of first degree murder
    and made its true findings on the robbery-murder special
    circumstance allegations before our Supreme Court issued its
    decisions in Banks and Clark. The People therefore concede that
    remand is appropriate in light of the Supreme Court’s discussion
    and holding in Strong. The People also concede that with the
    passage of Senate Bill 775 during the pendency of this appeal,
    remand is also appropriate on the attempted murder count.
    We agree. We therefore reverse the trial court’s denial of
    defendant’s resentencing petition and remand for further
    proceedings pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6,
    subdivisions (c) and (d).
    DISPOSITION
    The trial court’s order denying defendant Sophorn J.
    Moeum’s petition for resentencing is reversed and the case is
    4
    remanded to the superior court. On remand, the superior court is
    directed to conduct further proceedings pursuant to Penal Code
    section 1172.6, subdivisions (c) and (d).
    GRIMES, J.
    WE CONCUR:
    STRATTON, P. J.
    WILEY, J.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B300707A

Filed Date: 1/3/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/3/2023