People v. Ramirez CA2/1 ( 2022 )


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  • Filed 10/27/22 P. v. Ramirez CA2/1
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
    not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
    has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION ONE
    THE PEOPLE,                                                   B318337
    (Los Angeles County
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                           Super. Ct. No. MA048641)
    v.
    JOHNNY RAMIREZ,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
    Angeles County, Daviann L. Mitchell, Judge. Remanded with
    directions.
    Mary Jo Strnad, under appointment by the Court of
    Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
    Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
    Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
    Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Steven E. Mercer, Deputy
    Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    _____________________
    Defendant and appellant Johnny Ramirez challenges the
    trial court’s decision not to resentence him under former Penal
    Code section 1170, subdivision (d)(1).1 After the court made its
    decision, the Legislature amended the law to create new
    procedural and substantive requirements the court must apply in
    considering whether to resentence a defendant. Ramirez
    contends that we must remand his case to allow the court to
    reconsider resentencing him under the new version of the law.
    The People concede that he is correct, and we agree.
    BACKGROUND
    This case grows out of events occurring on October 24,
    2009, when Ramirez and a companion robbed a Radio Shack,
    shoved and moved two victims inside the store, and escaped in a
    car belonging to one of the victims. Ramirez was armed with a
    semiautomatic handgun.
    On March 22, 2010, Ramirez voluntarily walked into the
    Palmdale Sheriff’s Office and confessed to the robbery.
    In 2011, Ramirez pleaded no contest to one count of
    kidnapping in violation of section 207, subdivision (a), two counts
    of robbery in violation of section 211, and one count of grand theft
    auto in violation of section 487, subdivision (d)(1). As to each
    count, Ramirez admitted allegations pursuant to sections
    12022.53, subdivision (b), and 12022.5, subdivision (a) that he
    personally used a firearm in committing the offenses. He was
    sentenced to a total term of imprisonment of 17 years. The
    sentence consisted of five years for the kidnapping, eight months
    for grand theft auto, and 11 years four months for firearm
    1   Subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code
    2
    enhancements. The court stayed the punishment for the two
    counts of robbery and the associated firearm enhancements.
    In a letter to the superior court dated November 17, 2020,
    the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and
    Rehabilitation (CDCR) recommended pursuant to former section
    1170, subdivision (d)(1) that Ramirez’s sentence be recalled and
    that he be resentenced. The secretary recommended the court
    strike the firearm enhancement “in the interest of justice,” noting
    that courts had gained the authority to strike such enhancements
    only after Ramirez was sentenced. The secretary stated that she
    had reviewed Ramirez’s crimes and his record while incarcerated.
    She drew attention to mitigating considerations, including
    Ramirez’s voluntary surrender to the Palmdale Sheriff’s Office,
    the fact no victim suffered physical injuries, and Ramirez’s lack of
    criminal history—Ramirez had a prior juvenile record consisting
    of relatively minor offenses, but no prior adult record. He had no
    disciplinary record in prison, and his work and education
    progress were favorable.
    In a brief ruling issued on January 5, 2021, the court stated
    it had read the secretary’s letter and supporting documents, but
    despite acknowledging the discretion to do so, denied the request
    to modify Ramirez’s sentence.
    Nine months later, in October 2021, the Governor signed
    into law Assembly Bill No. 1540 (Stats. 2021, ch. 719), which
    enacted a new section 1170.03 to replace former section 1170,
    subdivision (d)(1), and established new guidelines for the trial
    court to consider when responding to recommendations for
    resentencing from the CDCR. In 2022, the Legislature
    renumbered section 1170.03 as section 1172.1 but made no
    3
    further substantive changes. (See Assembly Bill No. 200 (Stats.
    2022, ch. 58, § 9).)
    On September 13, 2021, Ramirez submitted an untimely
    notice of appeal from the denial. This court granted his request
    for relief from default, and deemed his notice timely filed.
    DISCUSSION
    Ramirez’s sole argument on appeal is that, in light of the
    recent amendments to section 1172.1, his case should be
    remanded for reconsideration of the sentencing recall request of
    the CDCR. The People agree, as do we.
    At the time the secretary of the CDCR sent her letter,
    section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) gave the trial court authority to
    recall a defendant’s sentence and resentence him at any time
    upon the recommendation of the secretary of the CDCR or certain
    other officials. The statute allowed the court to “resentence the
    defendant in the same manner as if he or she had not previously
    been sentenced, provided the new sentence, if any, is no greater
    than the initial sentence.” (Fmr. § 1170, subd. (d)(1).) As the
    Supreme Court explained, “under the recall provisions of section
    1170, subdivision (d), the resentencing court has jurisdiction to
    modify every aspect of the sentence, and not just the portion
    subjected to the recall.” (People v. Buycks (2018) 
    5 Cal.5th 857
    ,
    893.) It “may . . . impose any otherwise lawful resentence
    suggested by the facts available at the time of resentencing.”
    (Dix v. Superior Court (1991) 
    53 Cal.3d 442
    , 456.) But the
    statute did not establish any procedural requirements that the
    court must follow in addressing a recommendation from the
    CDCR; indeed, it “apparently [did] not require the court to
    respond to the recommendation.” (Id. at p. 459, fn. omitted.)
    4
    The new law, as enacted by Assembly Bill No. 1540,
    preserves the procedure by which the secretary of the CDCR and
    certain other officials may recommend recalling a defendant’s
    sentence, but it changes the manner in which the court responds
    to a recommendation. Under the new statute, when an official
    submits a resentencing recommendation, the court must “provide
    notice to the defendant and set a status conference within 30
    days after the date that the court received the request. The
    court’s order setting the conference shall also appoint counsel to
    represent the defendant.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (b)(1).) Before the
    court can deny a defendant resentencing, it must provide “a
    hearing where the parties have an opportunity to address the
    basis for the intended denial or rejection.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(8).)
    The court must also “state on the record the reasons for its
    decision to grant or deny recall and resentencing.” (§ 1170.03,
    subd. (a)(6).)
    Under the new law, the court gains the authority to
    “[v]acate the defendant’s conviction and impose judgment on any
    necessarily included lesser offense or lesser related offense,
    whether or not that offense was charged in the original pleading,
    and then resentence the defendant to a reduced term of
    imprisonment,” subject to the concurrence of the defendant and
    the local district attorney. (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(3)(B).) Finally, the
    law creates “a presumption favoring recall and resentencing of
    the defendant, which may only be overcome if a court finds the
    defendant is an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.”
    (§ 1172.1, subd. (b)(2).)
    In this case, because the trial court denied Ramirez’s
    petition before Assembly Bill No. 1540 was enacted, the court did
    not appoint counsel to represent Ramirez, nor did it explain its
    5
    reasons for denying recall and resentencing. In addition, the
    court did not apply a presumption in favor of recalling and
    resentencing Ramirez.
    The parties agree that in denying the CDCR secretary’s
    request for Ramirez to be resentenced, the trial court did not
    meet the requirements of the new law. They urge us to follow the
    conclusion reached in People v. McMurray (2022) 
    76 Cal.App.5th 1035
    , 1039-1041 that Assembly Bill No. 1540 applies
    retroactively to defendants like Ramirez. Regardless of whether
    McMurray was correctly decided, it would be a waste of resources
    to deny Ramirez’s request to remand for a new hearing. The
    CDCR has already decided that Ramirez is a worthy candidate
    for recall and resentencing. If we decided that the law does not
    apply retroactively to his case, the CDCR could simply file a new
    recommendation to recall Ramirez’s sentence under the
    standards of section 1172.1. Remanding the case now will avoid
    that unnecessary step.
    6
    DISPOSITION
    We reverse the January 5, 2021 order denying recall and
    remand this case to the trial court and direct it apply the
    provisions of section 1172.1.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
    BENKE, J.*
    We concur:
    ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
    BENDIX, J.
    * Retired  Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth
    Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
    article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B318337

Filed Date: 10/27/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/27/2022