In re T.O. ( 2022 )

Filed 11/1/22 (unmodified opinion attached)
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re T.O., a Person Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE,
E077783
Plaintiff and Appellant,
(Super. Ct. No. SWJ12000222)
v.
ORDER MODIFYING OPINION
T.O.,
[NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]
Defendant and Respondent.
The opinion filed in this matter on October 18, 2022, is modified as follows:
The opinion is modified to delete the citation to People v. Law (2020) 48
Cal.App.5th 811, 819 on page 7 on the opinion, and replace the citation with People v.
Gonzalez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1138, 1141.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
CODRINGTON
We concur: J
RAMIREZ
P. J.
McKINSTER
J.
1
See Concurring Opinion
Filed 10/18/22 (unmodified opinion)
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re T.O., a Person Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE,
E077783
Plaintiff and Appellant,
(Super. Ct. No. SWJ2000222)
v.
OPINION
T.O.,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Mark E. Petersen and
Bonnie Dumanis, Judges. Affirmed.
Michael A. Hestrin, District Attorney, and Natalie M. Lough, Deputy District
Attorney, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Steven L. Harmon, Public Defender, and William A. Meronek, Deputy Public
Defender, for Defendant and Respondent.
I.
INTRODUCTION
This is an appeal by the People after the juvenile court’s order declaring defendant
and respondent T.O. (minor) a ward of the court and placing him in a secure local facility
for committing a sexual offense against his seven-year-old cousin. The People contend
that the juvenile court erred in refusing to impose mandatory sex offender registration
1
pursuant to Penal Code section 290.008 because the court improperly relied on a strict
interpretation of section 290.008 without adequately considering the illogical or
consequences and harmonizing the statutory scheme. Based on the legislative intent in
enacting changes to the juvenile delinquency provisions and the plain language of section
290.008, we affirm the judgment.
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In April 2020, then 17-year-old minor pulled his seven-year-old cousin, Jane Doe,
into a bedroom, covered her mouth with a scarf, and then anally and vaginally raped her.
Jane reported the sexual assault to her mother and aunt the following day. Minor was
subsequently arrested.
1
All future statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
2
On May 6, 2020, a juvenile delinquency petition was filed charging minor, who
was six weeks shy of his 18th birthday, with rape of a child under 14 years old (§ 261,
subd. (a)(2)) and forcible sodomy on a child under 14 years old (§ 269, subd. (a)(3)).
On May 7, 2020, the Riverside County District Attorney’s Office filed a request to
transfer jurisdiction to adult criminal court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code
section 707, subdivision (a)(1).
On April 13, 2021, the juvenile court issued a written order denying the People’s
request to transfer the matter to adult court. The court thereafter referred the matter to the
probation department for dispositional recommendations.
The probation department pointed out three possible dispositions for minor: the
Alan M. Crogan Youth Treatment and Education Center (YTEC), Pathways to Success
(Pathways), or the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile
Justice (DJJ). YTEC “is a secure treatment facility, operating using the same basic levels
of promotion of a high school campus.” Pathways is “a secured treatment environment
with a four-tiered school campus model resembling” the YTEC. Regarding sexual
behavior treatment at Pathways, the probation officer noted that “a modified version of
the Department of Juvenile Justice’s (DJJ) program was developed” and that the “youth
do not have to register as a sex offender.” The probation officer also pointed out that
“[o]n June 30, 2021, DJJ will cease accepting youth into the program who were not
ordered prior to that date, with a final closure of their facility in 2023” and that youths
“must register as sex offenders” if placed in the DJJ program. Following further
3
interviews and meetings, the probation officer ultimately recommended that minor be
placed in the Pathways program.
The parties thereafter disputed whether minor would be required to register as a
sex offender pursuant to section 290.008 upon competition of the Pathways program
should he admit the allegations in the delinquency petition. The sole disputed issue was
whether the commitment to a local secure facility required sex offender registration
following Senate Bill No. 823 (Senate Bill 823), which codified the plan to close the DJJ
within the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and establish local programs.
On July 22, 2021, after reviewing the briefs and hearing arguments from the
parties, the juvenile court denied the People’s request to require minor to register as a sex
offender pursuant to section 290.008. After noting that Senate Bill 823 was silent on the
issue of registration under section 290, the court explained its ruling as follows: “The
relevant bills, the new bills that came out, did not discuss or did not accomplish anything
in regards to registration. But when you look at . . . section 290.008, subdivision (a), in
the Court’s view, this very straightforwardly premises mandatory sex offender
registration for juveniles on being, quote, discharged or paroled from the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [I]t’s important to note
that there is no similar requirement of registration for wards who have been committed to
juvenile hall for the same sexual offense. So just to kind of stop and pause there as to
that point, the Legislature did carve out situations in which the minor, as a ward, must
register as a sex offender, and then in other areas where they’re not required to register as
4
a sex offender. So, again, you have the requirement upon a discharge from the Youth
Authority or DJJ. We do not have the requirement perhaps on a discharge from juvenile
hall. [¶] . . . [¶] It’s my belief that the Court does not have the power, outside of . . .
section 290.008, to order a minor to register. As stated in the case of People versus
2
Eastman, a 2018 case, a trial court may not order an individual to register under section
290 when that individual does not fall within the scope of the act. Also it was stated in
3
Derrick B., a California Supreme Court case, that discretionary sex offender registration
provisions do not apply in juvenile cases. [¶] To me, as I look at the law right now as it
stands today, I think it’s a pretty straightforward answer. If the minor is not committed to
the custody of the Department of Corrections, they cannot be ordered to register as a sex
offender. [¶] Now, I don’t know what the Legislature thought of when they created or
when [Senate] [Bill] 823 was being put together and passed, but clearly the law, as
previously written and as written now, is very clear that they know the issue. The
Legislature knows that there’s an issue regarding registration. And if they wanted minors
to now register after completing a local program, they could have ordered that, and they
did not. [¶] . . . [¶] I believe based on the case law that I already cited and the law, as it
exists today, I simply cannot add to or create a requirement that a minor register as the
law stands today. [¶] Now, this may be fixed later down the road. The Legislature may
decide otherwise in the future, and they may amend certain things. But as it stands today,
2
People v. Eastman (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 638.
3
In re Derrick B. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 535.
5
I believe I’m without authority to order a minor to register. . . . [¶] So I would not be
imposing registration, whether it be in an admission, at a trial, at a jurisdictional
contested hearing. Regardless of how this case goes, I will not be ordering registration.”
On July 26, 2021, pursuant to a negotiated agreement, minor admitted that he had
raped a child under 14 years of age and seven or more years younger than him (§§ 261,
subd. (a)(2), 269, subd. (a)(1)). The juvenile court thereafter declared minor a ward of
the court, dismissed the remaining allegation in the petition, and placed him in the
Pathways program on various terms and conditions for a period of four years. The court
declined to impose sexual registration pursuant to section 290.008 based on the prior
determination. The People timely appealed.
III.
DISCUSSION
The People argue that the juvenile court erred in refusing to impose mandatory sex
offender registration because its statutory interpretation of section 290.008 misconstrued
the legislative intent by focusing solely on the plain language of the statute without
harmonizing the law in the context of the entire statutory scheme. The People also assert
the court ignored the established presumption against a repeal by implication and
inadequately considered the results of its interpretation. The People further contend that
application of the statute violates the equal protection clause because in-state juveniles
are treated differently than out-of-state juveniles with respect to sex offender registration.
6
Minor initially responds that the matter is not cognizable on appeal because the
court’s order is lawful. As to the merits, minor contends the juvenile court properly
denied the People’s request to impose a registration requirement because the plain
language of section 290.008 does not include sexual offender registration for those
minors committed to a county program such as Pathways and that the People did not
demonstrate a valid exception to the plain language rule of statutory construction.
Finally, minor asserts that the People’s equal protection argument fails.
A. Standard of Review
We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. (People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 961; In re Isabella G. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 708, 718 [“Our review of
the interpretation and application of a statute is de novo.”].) As with any case involving
statutory interpretation, our primary goal is to ascertain and effectuate the Legislature’s
intent. (People v. Lewis, supra, at p. 961.) We begin by examining the statute’s words,
as the most reliable indicator of legislative intent, giving them a plain, usual and
commonsense meaning. (People v. Law (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 811, 819.) “When the
language of a statute is clear, we need go no further. However, when the language is
susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, we look to a variety of extrinsic
aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to be remedied, the
legislative history, public policy, contemporaneous administrative construction, and the
statutory scheme of which the statute is a part. [Citations.]” (People v. Flores (2003) 30
Cal.4th 1059, 1063.)
7
B. Appealability
An appellate court has “no authority to hear an appeal in the absence of appellate
jurisdiction.” (In re Almalik S. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 851, 854.) Appeals from juvenile
court orders and judgments are permitted only as provided by statute: “The People’s
right to appeal in . . . juvenile court proceedings is conferred exclusively by statute.”
(People v. Superior Court (Arthur R.) (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 494, 497.) “It is settled
that the right of appeal is statutory and that a judgment or order is not appealable unless
expressly made so by statute. [Citations.] The orders, judgments and decrees of a
juvenile court [that] are appealable are restricted to those enumerated in [Welfare and
Institutions Code] section 800 [citations]. . . .” (People v. Chi Ko Wong (1976) 18 Cal.3d
698, 709, disapproved on another ground in People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 33-34;
In re Almalik S., supra, at p. 854.)
The People assert that the order at issue here is appealable under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 800, subdivision (b)(5). That provision provides that the People
may appeal from “[t]he imposition of an unlawful order at a dispositional hearing,
whether or not the court suspends the execution of the disposition.” (Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 800, subd. (b)(5).)
The People contend the juvenile court’s order denying its request to impose a
registration requirement is unlawful because the plain language of section 290.008
imposes a mandatory registration requirement for individuals adjudicated a ward of the
court and committed to the statutory equivalent of DJJ. The crux of the matter is the
8
juvenile court’s statutory interpretation of section 290.008. And depending on our review
of the juvenile court’s statutory interpretation of the law, the court’s order may or may
not be lawful. We find this issue appealable under Welfare and Institutions Code section
800, subdivision (b)(5), and will therefore address the merits of the People’s argument
concerning the purported flawed statutory construction analysis of section 290.008 by the
juvenile court.
C. Senate Bill 823
On September 30, 2020, Senate Bill 823 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) became effective.
On May 14, 2021, Senate Bill No. 92 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 92) became
4
effective. This bill made some amendments to the laws implemented by Senate Bill 823.
Through these bills, the Legislature has reduced the maximum period of
confinement a juvenile ward faces when committed to DJJ. Before this change in law, a
juvenile could be committed for the maximum term an adult would face if convicted of
the same offense. (Former Welf. & Inst. Code, § 731, subd. (c).) Under the current law,
however, a juvenile ward shall not be committed to DJJ “for a period that exceeds the
middle term of imprisonment that could be imposed upon an adult convicted of the same
offense.” (Welf. & Inst., Code, § 730, subd. (a)(2).)
4
Senate Bill 823 was operative from September 30, 2020, to July 1, 2021. As of
January 1, 2022, it will be deemed repealed. (See former Welf. & Inst. Code, § 731,
subd. (d).)
9
In addition, the Legislature has announced its intent to close DJJ, which will be
effective June 30, 2023. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 736.5, subd. (e).) Commencing July 1,
2021, responsibility for all juvenile wards will shift to county governments. (Welf. &
Inst. Code, § 736.5, subd. (a).) Welfare and Institutions Code section 736.5, subdivision
(a) explicitly provides, “It is the intent of the Legislature to close the Division of Juvenile
Justice within the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, through shifting
responsibility for all youth adjudged a ward of the court, commencing July 1, 2021, to
county governments and providing annual funding for county governments to fulfill this
new responsibility.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 736.5, subd. (a).)
Furthermore, the Legislature has announced that, beginning July 1, 2021, a
juvenile court (with certain limited exceptions) may no longer commit a ward to DJJ
unless the ward is transferred to a criminal court under Welfare and Institutions Code
section 707, subdivision (b). (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 736.5, subds. (b), (c).) The
exceptions are as follows: “Pending the final closure of [DJJ], a court may commit a
ward who is otherwise eligible to be committed under existing law and in whose case a
motion to transfer the minor from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction was
filed. The court shall consider, as an alternative to commitment to the [DJJ], placement
in local programs, including those established as a result of the implementation of
Chapter 337 of the Statutes of 2020.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 736.5, subd. (c).)
In the present matter, minor was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court on July 26,
2021, well after the effective date of Senate Bill 823 and before it was repealed, and after
10
the juvenile court could not commit minor to the DJJ. He was committed to the
Pathways program, a local secure program, as opposed to the DJJ, pursuant to Senate Bill
823 and Welfare and Institutions Code section 736.5.
We summarize the Legislative intent for Senate Bill 823, which is instrumental for
some of the arguments. In enacting Senate Bill 823, the Legislature declared as follows:
“Evidence has demonstrated that justice system-involved youth are more successful when
they remain connected to their families and communities. Justice system-involved youth
who remain in their communities have lower recidivism rates and are more prepared for
their transition back into the community.” (Stats. 2020, ch. 337, § 1, subd. (a).)
“To ensure that justice-involved youth are closer to their families and communities
and receive age-appropriate treatment, it is necessary to close [DJJ] and move the
jurisdiction of these youth to local county jurisdiction.” (Stats. 2020, ch. 337, § 1, subd.
(b).) In Senate Bill 823, the Legislature enacted Welfare and Institutions Code section
730 to provide for the following commitment options: A juvenile court “may order any
of the types of treatment referred to in [Welfare and Institutions Code] [s]ection 727, and
as an additional alternative, may commit the minor to a juvenile home, ranch, camp, or
forestry camp. If there is no county juvenile home, ranch, camp, or forestry camp within
the county, the court may commit the minor to the county juvenile hall.” (Wel. & Inst.
Code, § 730, subd. (a)(1).) In addition, a ward may be committed “to a sheltered-care
facility.” (Wel. & Inst. Code, § 730, subd. (a)(1)(B).) A ward may also be placed “at the
11
Pine Grove Youth Conservation Camp” if the ward meets certain placement criteria.
(Wel. & Inst. Code, § 730, subd. (a)(1)(D).)
“It is the intent of the Legislature and the administration for counties to use
evidence-based and promising practices and programs that improve the outcomes of
youth and public safety, reduce the transfer of youth into the adult criminal justice
system, ensure that dispositions are in the least restrictive appropriate environment,
reduce and then eliminate racial and ethnic disparities, and reduce the use of confinement
in the juvenile justice system by utilizing community-based responses and interventions.”
(Stats. 2020, ch. 337, § 1, subd. (e).)
Finally, the Legislature stated its intent “to end the practice of placing youth in
custodial or confinement facilities that are operated by private entities whose primary
business is the custodial confinement of adults or youth in a secure setting. It is further
the intent of the Legislature to end placements of justice system-involved youth in out of
state facilities that do not appropriately address the programming, service, safety, and
other needs of placed youth once appropriate and sufficient capacity within California is
achieved.” (Stats. 2020, ch. 337, § 1, subd. (f).)
D. Section 290.008
Section 290.008 sets forth the sex offender registration requirements for juvenile
offenders. (Ruelas v. Superior Court (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 374, 380; In re D.B. (2014)
58 Cal.4th 941, 946, fn. 3.) Effective January 1, 2021, this statute in relevant part
provides: “Any person who, on or after January 1, 1986, is discharged or paroled from
12
the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to the custody of which he or she was
committed after having been adjudicated a ward of the juvenile court pursuant to
[s]ection 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code because of the commission or
attempted commission of any offense described in subdivision (c) shall register in
accordance with the Act unless the duty to register is terminated pursuant to [s]ection
290.5 or as otherwise provided by law.” (§ 290.008, subds. (a), (g), italics added.)
Subdivision (c) of section 290.008 lists the specific offenses that require sex
offender registration. (See § 290.008, subd. (c)(1)-(3).) There is no dispute here that
minor’s admitted offense would qualify for sex offender registration.
Subdivision (d) of section 290.008 provide for tiered periods of registration.
Specifically, section 290.008, subdivision (d)(1) declares, “A tier one juvenile offender is
subject to registration for a minimum of five years. A person is a tier one juvenile
offender if the person is required to register after being adjudicated as a ward of the court
and discharged or paroled from the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation for an
offense listed in subdivision (c) that is not a serious or violent felony as described in
subdivision (c) of [s]ection 667.5 or subdivision (c) of [s]ection 1192.7.” (§ 290.008,
subd. (d)(1), italics added.) Subdivision (d)(2) states, “A tier two juvenile offender is
subject to registration for a minimum of 10 years. A person is a tier two juvenile
offender if the person is required to register after being adjudicated as a ward of the court
and discharged or paroled from the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation for an
offense listed in subdivision (c) that is a serious or violent felony as described in
13
subdivision (c) of [s]ection 667.5 or subdivision (c) of [s]ection 1192.7.” (§ 290.008,
subd. (d)(2), italics added.)
Finally, section 290.008, subdivision (e) states, “Prior to discharge or parole from
the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, any person who is subject to
registration under this section shall be informed of the duty to register under the
procedures set forth in the Act. Department officials shall transmit the required forms
and information to the Department of Justice.” (§ 290.008, subd. (e), italics added.)
E. Statutory Interpretation Analysis
The plain language of section 290.008 “requires registration of juvenile wards only
when they are discharged or paroled from the [DJJ] after having been committed for one
of the enumerated offenses.” (In re Bernardino S. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 613, 619-620,
italics added.) Courts have also construed the mandatory sex offender registration
requirement to apply only to a minor committed to the DJJ. (See Ruelas v. Superior
Court, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 380; In re Alex N. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 18, 24.)
Further, the juvenile court does not have the authority to impose discretionary sex
offender registration on juvenile offenders as it does with adult offenders. (In re Derrick
B., supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 537-540; see also § 290, subd. (f) [“Nothing in this section
shall be construed to require a ward of the juvenile court to register under the Act, except
as provided in [s]ection 290.008.”].)
As the People acknowledge, the plain language of section 290.008 makes clear
that a juvenile court cannot require a juvenile offender to register as a sex offender unless
14
the minor (1) committed an enumerated offense and (2) was adjudicated a ward of the
court and “discharged or paroled from the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation.” The provision “discharged or paroled from the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation” appears four times in the language of section 290.008.
The Legislature could not have been more clearer on this requirement. The plain,
commonsense language, “discharged or paroled from the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation,” requiring mandatory registration is unequivocal. The statute’s words
patently indicate the Legislature’s intent that mandatory registration is only required for
those juvenile offenders committed and discharged or paroled from the DJJ. There is no
ambiguity in the plain language of section 290.008. “When the language of a statute is
clear, we need go no further.” (People v. Flores, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 1063.)
Contrary to the People’s position, the language of section 290.008 does not
include “discharge or parole” from a secure county program or similar DJJ program, but
a commitment or “discharge or parole” from the DJJ. Hence, we disagree with the
People that the Legislature intended to include local secure facilities, such as Pathways,
as “equivalents” to DJJ. As noted by the probation officer, Pathways is “a secured
treatment environment with a four-tiered school campus model resembling” the YTEC
and that the sexual behavior treatment at Pathways is “a modified version” of the DJJ
program. The Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation includes the DJJ, but does
not include Pathways or any other local county program. County managed programs are
not equivalent to DJJ, rather they are an alternative to DJJ. (See § 13015, subd.
15
(c)(2)(D)(iv), [“‘Facility type’ includes . . . local facilities developed as an alternative to
Division of Juvenile Justice facilities.”].) Accordingly, mandatory sex offender
registration may not be imposed on juveniles, like minor, who were committed as wards
to a county-administered program, such as Pathways, rather than to the DJJ. The
language of section 290.008 “is clear and lends itself to only one reasonable
interpretation.” (See, e.g., In re D.B., supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 947.)
The People argue that it appears section 290.008 is in conflict with Welfare and
Institutions Code section 736.5 because “the latter requires a ward be committed to DJJ
for an enumerated offense before the court can impose a registration requirement on a
juvenile offender, whereas the former eliminates DJJ and requires all adjudicated minors
be discharged or transferred out of DJJ by 2023.” The People thus believe the juvenile
court’s “statutory construction analysis misconstrues the legislative intent by focusing
solely on the plain language of . . . section 290.008 without harmonizing the statute in the
context of the entire statutory scheme, ignoring the established presumption against a
repeal by implication, and not adequately considering the results of its interpretation.” It
appears the People are suggesting that a juvenile offender would not be subject to
registration under section 290.008 if a plain reading of the statute is construed since
section 290.008 “does not address Welfare and Institutions Code section 736.5 or the
pending closure of DJJ in any way.” Although we agree with the People that section
290.008 does not contemplate Welfare and Institutions Code section 736.5 and vice
versa, this issue is for the Legislature to resolve. As the juvenile court stated, section
16
290.008 also does not address a discharge from juvenile hall. The Legislature is very
well aware of the consequences of requiring sex offender registration, as well as capable
of crafting legislation that distinguishes between juvenile offenders convicted in adult
court and those adjudicated in juvenile court.
Furthermore, the People misconstrue these provisions. These statutory provisions
do not suggest sex offender registration for a juvenile offender is no longer possible. A
juvenile offender may still be subjected to registration if the juvenile’s case is transferred
to adult criminal court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b).
In addition, a juvenile may potentially be committed to DJJ before its closure so long as
“a motion to transfer the minor from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction was
filed.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 736.5, subd. (c).) The transfer motion does not need to
have been granted, just filed. Section 290.008 and Welfare and Institutions Code section
736.5 may be harmonized as the latter only restricts the type of juveniles who may be
committed to DJJ, and thus subjected to section 290.008’s registration requirement while
DJJ still remains open.
We also disagree with the People’s insinuation that Welfare and Institutions Code
section 736.5 impliedly repeals section 290.008. “Absent an express declaration of
legislative intent, we will find an implied repeal ‘only when there is no rational basis for
harmonizing the two potentially conflicting statutes [citation], and the statutes are
“irreconcilable, clearly repugnant, and so inconsistent that the two cannot have
concurrent operation.”’” (Garcia v. McCutchen (1997) 16 Cal.4th 469, 477, quoting In
17
re White (1969) 1 Cal.3d 207, 212.) As explained above, we believe that there is a
rational basis for harmonizing section 290.008 and Welfare and Institutions Code section
736.5.
Moreover, even if the juvenile court purportedly erred in only focusing on the
plain language of section 290.008, an examination of Senate Bill 823, the legislative
intent of Senate Bill 823, the legislative history of juvenile delinquency laws, public
policy, and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part supports the interpretation
that only those juvenile offenders committed and discharged or paroled from DJJ may be
subjected to mandatory registration. As noted previously, in enacting Senate Bill 823, the
Legislature declared that “[e]vidence has demonstrated that justice system-involved
youth are more successful when they remain connected to their families and
communities.” (Stats. 2020, ch. 337, § 1, subd. (a).) The Legislature also stated that
“[j]ustice system-involved youth who remain in their communities have lower recidivism
rates and are more prepared for their transition back into the community.” (Stats. 2020,
ch. 337, § 1, subd. (a).) For these reasons, the Legislature deemed “it is necessary to
close the [DJJ] and move the jurisdiction of these youth to local county jurisdiction” so
that the juvenile youths “are closer to their families and communities and receive age-
appropriate treatment.” (Stats. 2020, ch. 337, § 1, subds. (a), (b).)
It was also “the intent of the Legislature and the administration for counties to use
evidence-based and promising practices and programs that improve the outcomes of
youth and public safety, reduce the transfer of youth into the adult criminal justice
18
system, ensure that dispositions are in the least restrictive appropriate environment,
reduce and then eliminate racial and ethnic disparities, and reduce the use of confinement
in the juvenile justice system by utilizing community-based responses and interventions.”
(Stats. 2020, ch. 337, § 1, subd. (e).)
The Legislature also declared its intent “to end the practice of placing youth in
custodial or confinement facilities that are operated by private entities whose primary
business is the custodial confinement of adults or youth in a secure setting. It is further
the intent of the Legislature to end placements of justice system-involved youth in out of
state facilities that do not appropriately address the programming, service, safety, and
other needs of placed youth once appropriate and sufficient capacity within California is
achieved.” (Stats. 2020, ch. 337, § 1, subd. (f).)
These county-based facilities thus address different needs and purposes; serving as
an alternative to DJJ rather than an equivalent. (Sen. Bill 823 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.)),
§ 15; see also § 13015, subd. (c)(2)(D)(iv) [“‘Facility type’ includes . . . local facilities
developed as an alternative to Division of Juvenile Justice facilities.”].) Additionally, the
Legislature knew how to extend section 290.008’s reach to facilities that are “equivalent
to the [DJJ]” with respect to out-of-state facilities, requiring sex offender registration for
“[a]ny person who is discharged or paroled from a facility in another state that is
equivalent to the [DJJ]” for a comparable qualifying offense. (§ 290.008, subd. (b).) If
the Legislature had meant for mandatory sex offender registration to apply to in-state
juveniles discharged or paroled from county-administered facilities created by Senate Bill
19
823 it could have amended section 290.008, subdivision (a) to reference such facilities or
by broadening the language to include them as equivalent facilities. The Legislature,
however, did not do so.
Further, as evidenced by the tiered system, it appears the public and the
Legislature have recognized that some sex offenders, especially juveniles, may be
rehabilitated. In 2018, the Legislature adopted Senate Bill No. 1494 (2017-2018 Reg.
Sess.) which, amongst other things, modified sex offender registration for both juveniles
and adults to create a tiered system. (See §§ 290, subd. (d), 290.008, subd. (d).) For
juvenile offenders, the Legislature appears to have determined that the risk of recidivism
is low enough and the detrimental effects of sex offender registration high to justify no
sex offender registration given their age and the amenability of juveniles to the types of
treatment offered in local secure facilities. (See e.g. In re Bernardino S., supra, 4
Cal.App.4th at p. 620 [“The Legislature recognized the ‘stigma’ associated with sex
offender registration, and acknowledged some tension between registration and the
rehabilitative goals of the juvenile court law.”].)
We also reject the People’s contention that the juvenile court’s interpretation of
section 290.008 would lead to absurd or illogical consequences. As our Supreme Court
concluded, in the context of interpreting Welfare and Institutions Code sections 731 and
733: “These potential consequences . . . are not so absurd that we must override the plain
meaning of the statutory language. To justify departing from a literal reading of a clearly
worded statute, the results produced must be so unreasonable the Legislature could not
20
have intended them. [Citation.] We cannot so conclude here. [Welfare and Institutions
Code section] [s]ection [736.5] was enacted as part of comprehensive realignment
legislation. [Citation.] The Legislature’s primary purpose in enacting the statute was to
reduce the number of juvenile offenders housed in state facilities by shifting
responsibility to the county level ‘“for all but the most serious youth offenders.”’
[Citations.] Although reasonable minds may debate the wisdom of the chosen approach,
5
decisions about how to limit [DJJ] commitments are the Legislature’s to make.” (In re
D.B., supra, 58 Cal.4th at pp. 947-948.)
F. Equal Protection
Finally, the People contend that treating juvenile wards placed in out-of-state
facilities that are “equivalent to the [DJJ]” (§ 290.008, subd. (b)) than those committed to
in-state local facilities (see § 290.008, subd. (a)) with respect to sex offender registration
implicates the equal protection clause. We disagree.
“The crux of the constitutional promise of equal protection is that persons
similarly situated shall be treated equally by the laws. [Citation.] However, neither
clause [of the United States or California Constitutions] prohibits legislative bodies from
making classifications; they simply require that laws or other governmental regulations
be justified by sufficient reasons. The necessary quantum of such reasons varies,
5
We believe the factual background of minor’s crime supports a need for minor
to register and that the statute ignores public safety. However, that is a policy concern for
the Legislature and beyond our ability to change the language of the statute which is clear
and unambiguous. The statute ties our hands and we cannot legislate from the bench.
21
depending on the nature of the classification.” (In re Evans (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1263,
1270; see People v. Nolasco (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 209, 220.) Classifications based on
race or national origin or which affect fundamental rights are given strict scrutiny.
Classifications based on sex or illegitimacy are given intermediate scrutiny. (Clark v.
Jeter (1988) 486 U.S. 456, 461.) All other statutory classifications are evaluated merely
for the existence of a rational basis supporting its enactment. (In re Evans, supra, at p.
1270; Johnson v. Department of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 881.)
Prisoners are not a suspect class and they have no fundamental interest in a
specific term or type of imprisonment. (People v. Yearwood (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th
161, 178; People v. Wilkinson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821, 838; In re J.M. (2019) 35
Cal.App.5th 999, 1010 [“[J]uveniles have not been recognized as a suspect class.”].)
“Where, as here, a disputed statutory disparity implicates no suspect class or fundamental
right, ‘equal protection of the law is denied only where there is no “rational relationship
between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.”’”
(Johnson v. Department of Justice, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 881.) “‘This standard of
rationality does not depend upon whether lawmakers ever actually articulated the purpose
they sought to achieve. Nor must the underlying rationale be empirically substantiated.
[Citation.] While the realities of the subject matter cannot be completely ignored
[citation], a court may engage in “‘rational speculation’” as to the justifications for the
legislative choice [citation]. It is immaterial for rational basis review “whether or not”
any such speculation has “a foundation in the record.”’ [Citation.] To mount a
22
successful rational basis challenge, a party must ‘“negative every conceivable basis”’ that
might support the disputed statutory disparity. [Citations.] If a plausible basis exists for
the disparity, courts may not second-guess its ‘“wisdom, fairness, or logic.”’” (Ibid.)
In the present matter, we are not persuaded that juvenile wards placed in out-of-
state facilities that are “equivalent to the [DJJ]” are similarly situated to juvenile wards
committed to in-state local facilities with respect to registration. The lawmakers had to
create two different classifications for in-state and out-of-state juvenile offenders because
each group’s situation is different. For an out-of-state wards, the juvenile court must
examine whether their commitment facility is “equivalent to the [DJJ],” a task
presumably made necessary because there is no DJJ outside of California. (§ 290.008,
subd. (a).) However, for in-state wards the court need simply determine if the juvenile
was “discharged or paroled” from the DJJ. (§ 290.008, subd. (a).) The two groups are
not similarly situated. (See e.g. People v. Hernandez (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 637, 645,
disapproved of on other grounds in People v. Williams (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 445, 450
[persons with an in-state prior are not similarly situated to persons with an out-of-state
prior because “the Legislature may have reasonably intended two different classifications
and if so, since both are treated similarly within the class, the statute is uniform and does
not violate equal protection.”].)
Assuming for the sake of argument that juvenile wards committed to out-of-state
facilities “equivalent to the [DJJ]” are similarly situated to juvenile wards who are placed
in an in-state local facility for purposes of sex offender registration, treating wards
23
differently based on their placement is rationally related to a legitimate governmental
purpose. The Legislature may have reasonably concluded that some out-of-state facilities
may be the same as the DJJ, thus requiring sex offender registration for “[a]ny person
who is discharged or paroled from a facility in another state that is equivalent to the
[DJJ]” for a comparable qualifying offense. (§ 290.008, subd. (b).) The Legislature
utilized the word “equivalent,” as opposed to “alternative” to the DJJ. The Legislature
presumably used the word “equivalent” to the DJJ so that they did not have to name
every out-of-state facility that is equivalent to, or tantamount to, the DJJ. Notably, the
lawmakers did not use the words “local” and/or “county” in the phrase “from a facility in
another state that is equivalent to the [DJJ].” The Legislature could rationally conclude
that requiring juvenile wards placed in out-of-state facilities that are “equivalent” to the
DJJ to register was necessary to solve the issue of those wards who are discharged or
paroled to California, thereby aligning subdivisions (a) and (b) of section 290.008. This
represents a legislative judgment that every ward who is discharged or paroled from DJJ
or an out-of-state facility that is “equivalent to the [DJJ],” following commitment for
certain adjudicated offenses, should be treated exactly the same way with respect to sex
offender registration, regardless of placement in the DJJ or an out-of-state facility that is
“equivalent to the [DJJ].”
“Nothing compels the state ‘to choose between attacking every aspect of a
problem or not attacking the problem at all.’ [Citation.] Far from having to ‘solve all
related ills at once’ [citation], the Legislature has ‘broad discretion’ to proceed in an
24
incremental and uneven manner without necessarily engaging in arbitrary and unlawful
discrimination.” (People v. Barrett (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1081, 1110.) There is no equal
protection violation.
IV.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
CODRINGTON
J.
I concur:
McKINSTER
J.
25
[E077783, In re T.O.; The People v. T.O.]
Ramirez, P. J., Concurring
I agree with the conclusion, the analysis of the revised statutory scheme, and the
discussion of the majority. I write separately only to express concern that the recent
legislative actions have omitted an ingredient. In its zeal to insure for juvenile offenders
the opportunity to be rehabilitated without the disabilities accompanying a commitment
to the Department of Juvenile Justice or a conviction as an adult, which would require sex
offender registration, the safety of the public and the trauma to the victim have been
overlooked.
I agree with the legislative policy of insuring an opportunity for rehabilitation for
persons who commit offenses during their youth, when lack of or incomplete brain
development may lead them to commit acts that may not have been committed with the
benefit of the wisdom that comes with emotional maturity. This policy has emerged
following extensive scientific research and a series of decisions focusing on the lack of
cognitive development manifest in youth. “As the United States Supreme Court observed
in Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 570 [161 L. Ed. 2d 1, 125 S. Ct. 1183], ‘the
character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult,’ and consequently, ‘[t]he
personality traits of juveniles are more transitory, less fixed.’” (In re Miguel C. (2021) 69
Cal.App.5th 899, 907-908.) Scientific research increasingly supports the notion that
juveniles are evolving and that developments in psychology and brain science continue to
show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds.
1
As the United States Supreme Court observed, as compared to adults, juveniles
have “‘[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility’”; they “are
more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including
peer pressure”; and their characters are “not as well formed.” (Roper v. Simmons (2005)
543 U.S. 551, 569-570 [125 S. Ct. 1183, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1].) These salient characteristics
mean that “[i]t is difficult even for expert psychologists to differentiate between the
juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare
juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.” (Id., at p. 573 [125 S. Ct.
1183, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1].)
Our nation’s High Court therefore concluded that, “juvenile offenders cannot with
reliability be classified among the worst offenders.” (Roper v. Simmons, supra, 543 U.S.
at p. 569 [125 S. Ct. 1183, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1].) For this reason, “[a] juvenile is not
absolved of responsibility for his actions, but that his transgression ‘is not as morally
reprehensible as that of an adult.’” (Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 68 [130 S.
Ct. 2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825], quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma (1988) 487 U.S. 815, 835
[108 S. Ct. 2687, 101 L. Ed. 2d 702] (plurality opinion).)
While the legislation embodies the laudable concern for the rehabilitation of
juvenile offenders, it is not counterbalanced by concern for public safety (which was
responsible for the massive overhaul by Proposition 21, in 2000, providing prosecutors
with discretion to directly file criminal charges in adult court against minors of the age of
14 or older). The pendulum has now swung 180 degrees in the opposite direction.
2
Here, the denial of the People’s petition to transfer the minor’s case to adult court
through Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, was the singular determinant that he
would be retained for the rehabilitative programs available locally, without the
requirement of registration as a sex offender. Thus, under the revised statutory scheme,
he will suffer no additional burdens such as an adult would suffer if convicted of the
same offense. The legislative intent is laudable so far as this minor is concerned and
today’s decision well interprets the scheme. But the other side of the equation has not
been factored: the legislation does not include provisions to address public safety aside
from the period of commitment, or consider the trauma suffered by the victim. The
Legislature should take these considerations into account to achieve the legislative goals
while meeting the concerns of public safety and justice for the victim.
Because the opinion correctly analyzes and interprets the legislation as written, I
concur in the judgment.
RAMIREZ
P. J.
3