People v. Fredieu CA4/2 ( 2016 )


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  • Filed 4/29/16 P. v. Fredieu CA4/2
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION TWO
    THE PEOPLE,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                       E064196
    v.                                                                       (Super.Ct.No. FSB050720)
    BENJAMIN FREDIEU,                                                        OPINION
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Ronald M.
    Christianson, Judge. Affirmed.
    Rex Adam Williams, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
    and Appellant.
    Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney
    General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, and Charles C. Ragland and
    Brendon W. Marshall, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    1
    I. INTRODUCTION
    Pursuant to Proposition 47, defendant and appellant, Benjamin Fredieu, petitioned
    the trial court to reclassify his July 2005 felony commercial burglary conviction (Pen.
    Code, § 459)1 as a misdemeanor shoplifting conviction (§§ 459.5, 1170.18, subds. (f),
    (g)). Defendant pled guilty to the 2005 felony. His petition was denied following a
    hearing. He appeals, claiming his petition should have been granted because nothing in
    the record of his 2005 conviction establishes that the value of the property involved in the
    burglary did not exceed $950. (§ 459.5, subd. (a).) We conclude that the petition was
    properly denied, and affirm.
    A felony commercial burglary conviction may be reclassified as a misdemeanor
    shoplifting conviction only if, among other things, it involved the taking or intent to take
    money or property worth $950 or less. (§§ 459.5, subd. (a), 1170.18, subds. (f), (g).)
    Further, defendant had the initial burden of making a prima facie evidentiary showing
    that his 2005 commercial burglary conviction met the definition of misdemeanor
    shoplifting under section 459.5, including that the burglary involved his taking or intent
    to take property worth $950 or less. (People v. Sherow (2015) 
    239 Cal.App.4th 875
    , 879-
    880 (Sherow).) Defendant did not make this showing. He presented no evidence with his
    petition, or at the hearing on the petition, supporting his claim that he was eligible for the
    Proposition 47 relief he was seeking.
    1   All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
    2
    At the June 25, 2015, hearing on the petition, the People presented evidence,
    namely, the “original . . . probable cause declaration,” confirming that the 2005 burglary
    involved defendant’s cashing of a forged check in the amount of $1,871.55. Defendant
    did not dispute this evidence at the hearing. Though the record on appeal does not
    include the probable cause declaration, it ostensibly came from the court file and record
    of the 2005 conviction. Defendant’s claim that the trial court was limited to considering
    the record of his 2005 conviction in ruling on his petition is therefore moot, because the
    court did not consider evidence outside the record of the 2005 conviction in ruling on the
    petition.
    II. BACKGROUND
    On June 29, 2005, a felony complaint was filed charging defendant, then 20 years
    of age, with commercial burglary (count 1), forgery (count 2), and grand theft (count 3),
    and alleging he had a prison prior based on a November 19, 2003, conviction for
    commercial burglary. The complaint alleged that, on or about June 27, 2005, defendant
    entered a commercial building occupied by Arrowhead Credit Union with the intent to
    commit larceny and a felony (count 1), signed the name of another person or a fictitious
    person to a personal check (count 2), and unlawfully took $1,871.55 from Arrowhead
    Credit Union (count 3).
    On July 8, 2005, defendant pled guilty to one count of commercial burglary
    (§ 459) and was sentenced to 16 months in prison. Defendant stipulated that the police
    3
    report provided a factual basis for his plea. The police report is not part of the record on
    appeal.
    On May 5, 2015, defendant petitioned the trial court to reduce his July 8, 2005,
    felony commercial burglary conviction to a misdemeanor pursuant to Proposition 47.
    (§§ 459.5, subd. (a), 1170.18, subds. (f), (g).)2 On June 4, 2015, the People filed a
    response, opposing the petition on the ground defendant was not entitled to the relief he
    requested because: “Value over $950. Defendant entered credit union and cashed forged
    check for $1,871.55.” At the June 25, 2015 hearing on the petition, counsel for the
    People noted: “I was able to look in the court file, and it appears that the amount of loss
    . . . was . . . $1[,]871.55 . . . .” Defendant did not object to the evidence from the “court
    file,” and submitted the matter. The trial court then denied the petition, noting: “There is
    no police report, but there is the original of a probable cause declaration which does
    confirm that the amount of the forged check cashed was $1[,]871.55.”3
    2 Also on May 5, 2015, defendant filed a petition in San Bernardino County
    Superior Court case No. FRE006521 to reduce his November 19, 2003, commercial
    burglary conviction to a misdemeanor pursuant to Proposition 47. That petition was
    denied, and defendant has appealed the denial of that petition in case No. E064195.
    3  The police report, which included the factual basis of defendant’s 2005 guilty
    plea, was not presented to the trial court in connection with defendant’s petition and is
    not part of the record on appeal.
    4
    III. DISCUSSION
    A. Statutory Background
    In November 2014, California voters approved Proposition 47, “The Safe
    Neighborhoods and Schools Act” (Proposition 47 or the Act), and it became effective the
    next day. (Cal. Const., art. II, § 10, subd. (a).) “Proposition 47 makes certain drug- and
    theft-related offenses misdemeanors, unless the offenses were committed by certain
    ineligible defendants. These offenses had previously been designated as either felonies
    or wobblers (crimes that can be punished as either felonies or misdemeanors).” (People
    v. Rivera (2015) 
    233 Cal.App.4th 1081
    , 1091.) Proposition 47 added a new sentencing
    provision, section 1170.18, to the Penal Code, and a new statute defining misdemeanor
    shoplifting, section 459.5. (People v. Rivera, supra, at p. 1091; Voter Information Pamp.,
    Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014) text of Prop. 47, §§ 5, 14, pp. 71, 73-74
     [as of April 29, 2016].)
    Under section 1170.18, subdivision (f), a person who has completed his or her
    sentence for a felony conviction that would have been a misdemeanor had the Act been in
    effect at the time the felony was committed may petition the trial court that entered the
    judgment of conviction to have the conviction designated a misdemeanor. If the petition
    satisfies the criteria of section 1170.18, subdivision (f), the court “shall designate the
    felony offense . . . as a misdemeanor.” (§ 1170.18, subd. (g).)
    Section 459.5, subdivision (a), defines “shoplifting” as “entering a commercial
    establishment with intent to commit larceny while that establishment is open during
    5
    regular business hours, where the value of the property that is taken or intended to be
    taken does not exceed nine hundred fifty dollars ($950). Any other entry into a
    commercial establishment with intent to commit larceny is burglary.”4 Shoplifting must
    be punished as a misdemeanor, unless the defendant has one or more disqualifying prior
    convictions. (Ibid.)5
    B. The Court Did Not Consider Evidence Outside the Record of the 2005 Conviction
    Defendant claims his petition was erroneously denied because “[n]othing in the
    record” of his 2005 felony commercial burglary conviction establishes that he admitted,
    or that the court that accepted his 2005 guilty plea found true beyond a reasonable doubt,
    that he intended to steal more than $950 at the time of the burglary. He maintains that, in
    determining whether a person is eligible for relief under section 1170.18, the trial court is
    limited to examining the record of conviction underlying the felony that the defendant
    seeks to have reclassified a misdemeanor. He principally relies on People v. Bradford
    (2014) 
    227 Cal.App.4th 1322
     at pages 1338 to 1340, where the court concluded that, in
    4  The People do not dispute that the entry into a commercial establishment,
    including a bank, during normal business hours, with the intent to commit larceny, where
    the defendant intends to cash or cashes a forged check of $950 or less, constitutes
    shoplifting under section 459.5. (People v. Root (2016) 
    245 Cal.App.4th 353
    , 359-360.)
    5 In an attachment to his petition, defendant declared under penalty of perjury that
    he had no prior convictions that would disqualify him from having his 2005 felony
    conviction reduced to a misdemeanor, namely, a conviction described in section 667,
    subdivision (e)(2)(C), or a conviction requiring him to register as a sex offender under
    subdivision (c) of section 290. (§ 459.5, subd. (a); see also § 1170.18, subd. (a).) In their
    response, the People did not dispute this claim, and it was not questioned at the hearing
    on the petition.
    6
    Proposition 36 cases, the trial court is limited to examining the record of the defendant’s
    prior conviction in determining whether the conviction renders the defendant ineligible to
    be resentenced under section 1170.126. (See also People v. White (2014) 
    223 Cal.App.4th 512
    , 524-525.)
    Defendant further argues that “[n]either party bears a burden of proof on the
    question of eligibility [for relief under Proposition 47] because [section 1170.18] does not
    call for an evidentiary hearing. Instead, [the statute] provides for a sentencing hearing.
    Therefore, the trial court must look to the record of conviction to determine whether any
    findings were made showing the elements of the felony offense. If not, then the
    defendant would have been guilty of a misdemeanor under the Act.”
    Recently, in People v. Perkins (2016) 
    244 Cal.App.4th 129
    , this court questioned
    whether the trial court is limited to considering the record of the prior felony conviction
    in determining the defendant’s eligibility for Proposition 47 relief. We said: “We
    recognize the Third District Court of Appeal held evidence submitted at a resentencing
    hearing under the Three Strikes Reform Act [Proposition 36] must be from the record of
    conviction. ([People v.] Bradford, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1339-1340.) However,
    eligibility for resentencing under that statute [section 1170.126] turns on the nature of the
    petitioner’s convictions—whether an offender is serving a sentence on a conviction for
    nonserious, nonviolent offenses and whether he or she has prior disqualifying convictions
    for certain other defined offenses. (§ 1170.126, subd. (e).) By contrast, under
    Proposition 47, eligibility often turns on the simple factual question of the value of the
    7
    stolen property. In most such cases, the value of the property was not important at the
    time of conviction, so the record may not contain sufficient evidence to determine its
    value. For that reason, and because petitioner bears the burden on the issue (Evid. Code,
    § 500), we do not believe the Bradford court’s reasons for limiting evidence to the record
    of conviction are applicable in Proposition 47 cases. That does not mean there will be a
    mini-trial on the value of stolen property in every case, only that offenders may submit
    extra-record evidence probative of the value when they file their petitions for
    resentencing. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 140, fn. 5.)
    Here, it is unnecessary to determine whether the trial court was limited to
    considering the record of defendant’s 2005 conviction in determining whether the
    conviction met the statutory definition of misdemeanor shoplifting under section 459.5,
    because in ruling on the petition the court did not consider any evidence outside the
    record of the 2005 conviction. Instead, it based its ineligibility determination solely on
    the “original . . . probable cause declaration” from the “court file” and record of the 2005
    conviction.6 The court noted that the probable cause declaration “confirm[ed]” that the
    2005 burglary was based on defendant’s cashing of a forged check in the amount of
    $1,871.55, rendering him ineligible to have his 2005 felony commercial burglary
    conviction reclassified as misdemeanor shoplifting. (§ 459.5.)
    6 A defendant who has pleaded guilty or no contest to a crime may not appeal
    from the judgment of the conviction unless the trial court has signed and filed a probable
    cause declaration. (§ 1237.5.)
    8
    C. Defendant Failed to Meet His Burden of Proof on His Petition
    We disagree with defendant’s additional claim that neither party bears the burden
    of proof on a Proposition 47 petition. To be entitled to the relief he sought in his petition,
    defendant had the initial burden of making a prima facie evidentiary showing to the trial
    court that his 2005 commercial burglary conviction would have constituted misdemeanor
    shoplifting, under section 459.5, had section 459.5 been in effect at the time he
    committed the burglary. (Sherow, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at pp. 879-880; People v.
    Rivas-Colon (2015) 
    241 Cal.App.4th 444
    , 449-450.)
    As explained in Sherow, a party ordinarily has the burden of proving each fact the
    existence or nonexistence of which is essential to the claim for relief or defense the party
    is asserting. (Sherow, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 879.) This rule is based on Evidence
    Code section 500,7 which “places the burden of proof in any contested matter on the
    party who seeks relief. . . . ‘That is, if you want the court to do something, you have to
    present evidence sufficient to overcome the state of affairs that would exist if the court
    did nothing.’ [Citation.]” (Vance v. Bizek (2014) 
    228 Cal.App.4th 1155
    , 1163, fn.
    omitted.) As Sherow further explained: “[I]t is entirely appropriate to allocate the initial
    burden of proof to the petitioner to establish the facts upon which his or her eligibility is
    based. [¶] Applying the burden to [the petitioner] would not be unfair or unreasonable.
    He knows what kind of items he took from the stores in counts 1 and 2. . . . [¶] A proper
    7  Evidence Code section 500 states: “Except as otherwise provided by law, a
    party has the burden of proof as to each fact the existence or nonexistence of which is
    essential to the claim for relief or defense that he is asserting.”
    9
    petition could certainly contain at least [the petitioner’s] testimony about the nature of
    the items taken.” (Sherow, supra, at p. 880, italics added.)
    In our recent decision in People v. Perkins, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at pages 136 to
    140, we followed Sherow and discussed in detail the petitioner’s burden of proof on a
    Proposition 47 petition. We held that, though section 1170.18 “is silent as to who has the
    burden of establishing whether a petitioner is eligible for resentencing [or reclassification
    of a felony conviction as a misdemeanor],” the statute requires the petitioner to “set out a
    case for eligibility, stating and in some cases showing the offense of conviction has been
    reclassified as a misdemeanor and, where the offense of conviction is a theft crime
    reclassified based on the value of stolen property, showing the value of the property did
    not exceed $950. [Citations.] The defendant must attach information or evidence
    necessary to enable the court to determine eligibility.” (People v. Perkins, supra, at pp.
    136-137, italics added.)
    By his petition, defendant asked the court to change the status quo by reducing his
    2005 felony commercial burglary conviction to a misdemeanor. He therefore had the
    burden of proving his eligibility for the relief he was requesting. (Sherow, supra, 239
    Cal.App.4th at pp. 879-880; Evid. Code, § 500.) Defendant did not meet this burden. He
    offered no evidence, either with his petition or at the hearing on the petition, that his 2005
    burglary conviction met the new statutory definition of misdemeanor shoplifting,
    including that the burglary involved his taking or intent to take no more than $950 in
    money or property. (Pen. Code, § 459.5, subd. (a).)
    10
    Additionally, and as discussed, the People adduced evidence that defendant was
    ineligible for the Proposition 47 relief he was seeking: the “original . . . probable cause
    declaration” from the record of defendant’s 2005 conviction, which “confirm[ed]” that
    the 2005 burglary was based on defendant’s act of cashing a forged check in the amount
    of $1,871.55. (§ 459.5.) Though the probable cause declaration is not part of the record
    on appeal, defendant did not dispute its authenticity in the trial court and does not dispute
    it here. Because defendant did not attempt to prove his eligibility for Proposition 47
    relief and the People produced evidence from the record of the 2005 conviction that he
    was ineligible for such relief, the petition was properly denied.
    IV. DISPOSITION
    The June 25, 2015, order denying defendant’s Proposition 47 petition is affirmed.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    CODRINGTON
    J.
    We concur:
    MILLER
    Acting P. J.
    SLOUGH
    J.
    11
    

Document Info

Docket Number: E064196

Filed Date: 4/29/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021