People v. Hernandez CA2/8 ( 2016 )


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  • Filed 5/2/16 P. v. Hernandez CA2/8
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION EIGHT
    THE PEOPLE,                                                          B262379
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                   (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. PA078689)
    v.
    FRANCISCO JAVIER HERNANDEZ,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, David B.
    Gelfound, Judge. Affirmed.
    Christopher Nalls, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
    Appellant.
    Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney
    General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Blythe J. Leszkay and Robert C.
    Schneider, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    ******
    Defendant Francisco Javier Hernandez, also known as Javier Francisco
    Hernandez, challenges the judgment of conviction. We affirm.
    FACTS
    Prior to November 2, 2013, a court ordered defendant to refrain from possessing
    any firearm. On November 2, 2013, officers lawfully stopped defendant for driving with
    a modified exhaust. Defendant tried to flee. Several officers assisted in arresting
    defendant. Their version and defendant’s version of the ensuing events are described in
    detail below.
    1. The Events According to Police
    On November 2, 2013, Officers Andre Silva and Katherine O’Brien were driving
    in a marked police vehicle and observed defendant driving a vehicle with a modified
    exhaust. Shortly after the officers activated their red lights and siren, defendant stopped.
    When he approached the driver side door of defendant’s vehicle, Officer Silva noticed an
    open beer bottle.
    Officer Silva asked defendant for his license and registration, and defendant did
    not answer or comply. When Silva asked defendant to exit the vehicle, defendant
    shouted aggressively, initially refusing to exit. Defendant eventually exited, but he
    refused to turn around when Silva requested it. Defendant said, “I’m not giving you my
    back” and attempted to flee. Silva was able to stop defendant, but was not able to control
    him. Silva pushed defendant onto the hood of defendant’s vehicle. Defendant bit Silva’s
    arm, causing Silva to suffer a crushing, burning sensation. Defendant and Silva
    continued to struggle. Silva pushed defendant’s face to the ground, and defendant
    punched Silva multiple times.
    Officer O’Brien called for backup. When defendant tried to reach into his
    sweatshirt pocket, O’Brien tried to grab defendant’s arm to stop him from reaching into
    his pocket. Officers Silva and O’Brien later learned that defendant had an illegal, fully
    loaded firearm in his pocket.
    In the continued struggle between defendant and Officer Silva, defendant
    “wrapped his hand and his fingers around the back of [Silva’s] head and ear and began to
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    put pressure on [Silva’s] eye with his [(defendant’s)] thumb.” Defendant was trying to
    push Silva’s eye in. Defendant was “pushing hard” and was trying to “destroy” Silva’s
    eye. Officer O’Brien saw defendant’s fingers in Silva’s eye and heard Silva yell, “he’s
    gouging my eye.” Silva was able to escape defendant’s hold. Silva punched defendant
    causing defendant’s body to shift and his handgun to fall out of his pocket.
    Using his left arm, Officer Silva was able to place defendant in a headlock. He
    observed defendant unsnap Silva’s gun holster and try to pull the gun out of the holster.
    Officer O’Brien heard Silva’s holster unsnap. O’Brien yelled at Silva to warn him
    defendant was trying to take his gun. Silva used his right elbow to push the gun back into
    the holster. Defendant used his free hand to try to gouge Silva’s eye again. He used his
    thumb to push into Silva’s eye. O’Brien was trying to grab defendant’s arm. Defendant
    hit her multiple times as he was flailing his arms and also kicked her.
    Sergeant Michael Smith arrived when defendant was trying to retrieve Silva’s
    gun.1 Sergeant Smith observed Officer Silva trying to push his gun down with his arm.
    When Sergeant Smith attempted to assist the officers in controlling defendant, defendant
    kicked Sergeant Smith in the chest.
    Officers Steven Smith and Ruben Aguirre responded to Officer O’Brien’s call for
    assistance. When he tried to assist, defendant struck Officer Smith in his left eye.
    Officer Aguirre used pepper spray and his collapsible baton. Together the officers
    eventually were able to place defendant in restraints.
    Officer Silva suffered bruises in his arm where defendant had bitten him. He had
    two sprained wrists and numerous scrapes. Officer O’Brien suffered abrasions and
    multiple sprains. Officer Smith had a small contusion on his left eye.
    1      Brandon Payne was a civilian passenger in Sergeant Smith’s vehicle. He observed
    defendant kick Sergeant Smith and overheard an officer scream that defendant was trying
    to take Silva’s gun.
    3
    2. The Events According to Defendant and Witnesses Who Testified on His Behalf
    Defendant testified that on November 2, 2013, he was stopped by officers as he
    was driving to his brother’s house. He admitted that he tried to flee, explaining that he
    had a gun in his pocket and did not want to be incarcerated. Defendant knew he was not
    permitted to poses a gun and knew the gun was loaded.
    Defendant testified that he believed Officer Silva was going to kill him and that he
    needed to defend himself. He bit Silva after Silva was choking him. He did not want to
    hurt Silva but wanted Silva to release him. Defendant admitted to touching officer
    Silva’s eye, but claimed his goal was for Silva to release him from a chokehold.
    Defendant testified: “I just touched it. And he let me go because—to me it seemed like
    he—he knew that I could . . . hurt him. So he let me go. I’m sure nobody wants their eye
    to be hurt.”
    Defendant testified he felt a bunch of officers on top of him. He was unable to
    defend himself. Defendant denied reaching for Officer Silva’s gun. He also denied
    trying to reach for the gun in his pocket. If he kicked anyone, it was in an effort to
    protect himself. Defendant testified that he “gave them [his] hands, put [his] hands
    behind [his] back and they wouldn’t cuff [him].” He testified he did not intend to kill the
    officers.
    Defendant’s girlfriend Maria DeFlores arrived in the midst of the officers’ attempt
    to restrain defendant. She believed the officers used excessive force and described
    defendant as standing with his arms extended. She testified that defendant was neither
    resisting arrest nor fighting with the officers. Yesenia Guevara, defendant’s brother’s
    girlfriend, also testified the officers used excessive force. Two additional eyewitnesses
    testified that they observed officers hitting defendant.
    PROCEDURE
    1. Amended Information
    Defendant was charged with two counts of attempted murder of a peace officer
    (Officers Silva and O’Brien), five counts of assault upon a peace officer by force likely to
    produce great bodily injury (Officers Silva, O’Brien, Aguirre, Smith & Sergeant Smith),
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    carrying an unregistered loaded handgun, attempted removal of Silva’s firearm, unlawful
    possession of a firearm in violation of his probation conditions, and assault with intent to
    commit mayhem.
    2. Pretrial Discovery
    Before trial, defendant sought discovery of police officer personnel records of
    Officers Silva, O’Brien, Aguirre, Smith and Sergeant Smith. Defendant’s attorney
    included a declaration stating that the information was necessary because the officers and
    Sergeant Smith “were not assaulted by Mr. Hernandez, who in turn did not reach for
    Officer Silva’s gun, that they deliberately fabricated that fact in an effort to justify and
    explain any complaints of excessive force or police brutality upon the person of
    Mr. Hernandez.” Counsel’s declaration contrasted this statement with Silva’s
    preliminary hearing testimony describing defendant’s conduct. Counsel’s declaration did
    not identify specific acts of officer force against defendant, but instead emphasized that
    Silva may have lied in his preliminary hearing testimony.
    The court held a hearing on defendant’s motion. The court asked defense counsel
    for “more clarification on what you are actually seeking here.” The court stated: “It
    appears that it is a claim for false reporting as to the reporting officers. If that’s the
    category, false reporting as to the reporting officers, false testimony under oath as to
    Officer Silva, and possible false reporting as to Sergeant Smith, who also prepared a
    report, the court’s indicated will be to grant on those grounds as to those officers.”
    Defense counsel agreed that he was seeking information on false reporting and
    added, “[i]n addition, maybe [the] allegation of excessive force.” The court suggested
    there may need to be more information if defendant were seeking discovery on excessive
    force. The court provided defense counsel additional time to prepare, and when the case
    was recalled, defense counsel stated that he submitted. Defense counsel did not argue
    that there was a need for evidence related to complaints of excessive force.
    The trial court found good cause for discovery of officer personnel files as to
    Officer Silva and Sergeant Smith for false reporting. After an in camera review of the
    personnel records, the court found no responsive documents.
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    3. Jury Instruction on Assault with Intent to Commit Mayhem
    Jurors were instructed that defendant was charged with assault with intent to
    commit mayhem. Jurors further were instructed that the People must prove “[w]hen the
    defendant acted, he intended to commit mayhem. [¶] The defendant intended to commit
    mayhem if he intended to unlawfully and maliciously: [¶] Put out someone’s eye or
    injure someone’s eye in a way that would so significantly reduce his ability to see that the
    eye would be useless for the purpose of ordinary sight. [¶] Someone commits an act
    willfully when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. [¶] Someone acts maliciously
    when he or she intentionally does a wrongful act or when he or she acts with the unlawful
    intent to annoy or injure someone else.”
    4. Defendant’s Convictions
    Jurors found defendant not guilty of the attempted murders. He was found not
    guilty of assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury on Sergeant Smith. He
    was convicted of the remaining counts.
    The trial court sentenced defendant to a total prison term of 10 years. This appeal
    followed.
    DISCUSSION
    1. No Error in Applying Pitchess
    Defendant argues that the trial court should have granted his Pitchess v. Superior
    Court (1974) 
    11 Cal. 3d 531
    (Pitchess) motion as to Officers O’Brien, Aguirre, and
    Smith. Defendant argues the court abused its discretion in denying the motion with
    respect to the other officers. Defendant also requests this court review the in camera
    Pitchess hearing with respect to Officer Silva and Sergeant Smith. As we shall explain,
    we find no error.
    a. No Error in Granting Motion Only As to Officer Silva and Sergeant Smith
    On appeal, defendant demonstrates no abuse of discretion in denying discovery as
    to officers O’Brien, Aguirre, and Smith. (Uybungco v. Superior Court (2008) 
    163 Cal. App. 4th 1043
    , 1049 [“We review a trial court’s ruling on a Pitchess motion for abuse
    of discretion.”].)
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    Pitchess, supra
    , 
    11 Cal. 3d 531
    and its progeny establish a scheme for balancing a
    criminal defendant’s due process right to a fair trial and a police officer’s privacy right to
    maintaining the confidentiality of his or her employment file. (People v. Mooc (2001) 
    26 Cal. 4th 1216
    , 1226.) To obtain discovery of police officers’ employment files “the
    information sought must be requested with sufficient specificity to preclude the
    possibility of a defendant simply casting about for any helpful information . . . .” (Ibid.,
    citation omitted.) Only evidence that is similar to the alleged misconduct is discoverable.
    (California Highway Patrol v. Superior Court (2000) 
    84 Cal. App. 4th 1010
    , 1020.)
    Further, to show good cause for discovery, a Pitchess motion must include “‘[a]ffidavits
    showing good cause for the discovery or disclosure sought, setting forth the materiality
    thereof to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation and stating upon
    reasonable belief that the governmental agency identified has the records or information
    from the records.’” (People v. Mooc, at p. 1226.) Good cause requires a “‘specific
    factual scenario’ which establishes a ‘plausible factual foundation’ for the allegations of
    officer misconduct committed in connection with [the] defendant.” (California Highway
    Patrol, at p. 1020.) “A showing of good cause is measured by ‘relatively relaxed
    standards’ that serve to ‘insure the production’ for trial court review of ‘all potentially
    relevant documents.’” (Warrick v. Superior Court (2005) 
    35 Cal. 4th 1011
    , 1016.)
    Here, defendant set forth no allegations that Officers O’Brien, Smith, and Aguirre
    committed misconduct in connection with defendant. Counsel’s declaration attached to
    his motion identified only Officer Silva’s testimony and stated that it was “deliberately
    fabricated.” Counsel’s statement of “maybe . . . excessive force” at the hearing failed to
    set forth any explanation of how the information being sought would support his defense
    or impeach the officers. (See Warrick v. Superior 
    Court, supra
    , 35 Cal.4th at p. 1021;
    People v. Thompson (2006) 
    141 Cal. App. 4th 1312
    , 1317.) Stated otherwise, the factual
    scenario outlined by counsel did not support discovery of the personnel records of
    Officers O’Brien, Aguirre or Smith. (See Warrick v. Superior Court, at p. 1025
    [counsel’s affidavit “must also describe a factual scenario supporting the claimed officer
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    misconduct”].) Defendant therefore fails to demonstrate the trial court abused its
    discretion in limiting discovery to Officer Silva and Sergeant Smith.
    b. No Error in Finding No Responsive Discovery
    Defendant requests this court review the transcript of the in camera Pitchess
    hearing. In response to defendant’s request, we have independently reviewed the sealed
    transcript of the trial court’s in camera hearing. We conclude the trial court did not abuse
    its discretion in finding no responsive documents.
    2. No Instructional Error
    Defendant next argues that the trial court should have sua sponte instructed jurors
    on simple assault as a lesser included offense of assault with intent to commit mayhem.2
    A trial court has a sua sponte duty “to instruct fully on all lesser necessarily included
    offenses supported by the evidence.” (People v. Breverman (1998) 
    19 Cal. 4th 142
    , 148-
    149.) “[A] trial court errs if it fails to instruct, sua sponte, on all theories of a lesser
    included offense which find substantial support in the evidence. On the other hand, the
    court is not obliged to instruct on theories that have no such evidentiary support.” (Id. at
    p. 162; see People v. Campbell (2015) 
    233 Cal. App. 4th 148
    , 162.)
    Although assault is a lesser included offense of assault with intent to commit
    mayhem, no substantial evidence supported an instruction on the lesser offense. (People
    v. De Angelis (1979) 
    97 Cal. App. 3d 837
    , 841.) Importantly, defendant admitted that in
    touching Officer Silva’s eye he “sent some kind of message to the officer that [he] better
    let go of this guy [(defendant)] or he [(defendant)] may really hurt me.” Defendant
    further testified that Silva let go because “he knew that I could . . . hurt him. . . . I’m sure
    nobody wants their eye to be hurt.” This testimony showed that defendant willingly and
    2      Penal Code section 203 provides: “Every person who unlawfully and maliciously
    deprives a human being of a member of his body, or disables, disfigures, or renders it
    useless, or cuts or disables the tongue, or puts out an eye, or slits the nose, ear, or lip, is
    guilty of mayhem.” Jurors were instructed defendant intended to commit mayhem “if he
    intended to unlawfully and maliciously: [¶] Put out someone’s eye or injure someone’s
    eye in a way that would so significantly reduce his ability to see that the eye would be
    useless for the purpose of ordinary sight.”
    8
    on purpose pushed on Silva’s eye in a manner showing he could seriously hurt him. The
    other evidence was consistent. Silva testified that defendant intended to “push my eye in
    or blow it out.” Officer O’Brien also confirmed that defendant was pushing on Silva’s
    eye and she heard him yell that defendant was trying to gauge his eye. Additionally,
    defendant pushed in Silva’s eye more than once, demonstrating that he intended to injure
    Silva’s eye. Further, defendant repeatedly used force when he bit and punched Silva.
    Defendant does not show an instruction on assault was warranted.
    Even assuming the trial court should have instructed jurors on assault, the failure
    to do so was harmless. No evidence supported the conclusion that defendant as guilty of
    only a simple assault. Therefore, contrary to defendant’s argument, there was no
    reasonable chance a properly instructed jury would have found him guilty of only the
    lesser offense.
    DISPOSITION
    The judgment is affirmed.
    FLIER, J.
    WE CONCUR:
    BIGELOW, P. J.
    GRIMES, J.
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