People v. Mayfield CA4/1 ( 2016 )

Filed 5/10/16 P. v. Mayfield CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D069657
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. FWV1401417)
JUNE MAYFIELD,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino County,
Gerard S. Brown, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
Robert L.S. Angres, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General,
Barry Carlton and Heidi Salerno, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Defendant June Mayfield was convicted by a jury of one count of resisting an
executive officer (Pen. Code, § 69)1 and, in a bifurcated proceeding, the court found true
three allegations that Mayfield had suffered prior prison convictions within the meaning
of section 667.5, subdivision (b). The court sentenced Mayfield to the upper term of
three years for the underlying conviction and three additional one-year terms for each of
the prior conviction allegations, along with various fines and probation conditions. On
appeal, Mayfield asks this court to independently review the trial court's ruling on his
Pitchess2 motion for error, and also challenges various aspects of his sentence.
I
FACTS
A. Prosecution Case
On February 27, 2014, two deputy sheriffs working for the San Bernardino County
Sheriff's Office (Deputies Cabrera and Macias) were transporting prisoners, including
Mayfield, on a bus headed for the West Valley Detention Center. Mayfield was wearing
specialized clothing and was placed in a special "cage" on the bus because he had been
classified as exhibiting unstable or assaultive behavior. During the ride, Mayfield was
verbally disruptive and he disregarded orders to stay quiet. The orders instead only
increased Mayfield's agitation. Mayfield told Macias several times during the ride to
wait until his handcuffs were off because then Mayfield would kick his ass.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
2 Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal. 3d 531.
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When Macias removed Mayfield from the cage and took him off the bus, Mayfield
resisted Macias's efforts to guide him to the West Valley Detention Center and instead
attacked him. Another deputy, Deputy Patella, came to Macias's aid while Cabrera went
to summon help. The struggle was intense and officers finally used Tasers on Mayfield.
The deputies were finally able to subdue him.
B. Defense Version
Mayfield testified he spoke to a female inmate passenger on the bus, but Macias
told him to "shut the fuck up," and Mayfield replied in kind. Macias then warned
Mayfield that, when they got back to the cell, "I'm going to skull fuck the shit out of
you." Mayfield was then quiet for the rest of the trip.
Mayfield testified that, as he was getting off the bus, Macias grabbed him and he
believed Macias was going to push him down the stairs. Once outside the bus, Macias
and a deputy Bradshaw3 attacked and repeatedly struck Mayfield. He tried to move
away from his attackers but deputies used Tasers on him and beat him.
ANALYSIS
A. The Pitchess Claim
Prior to trial, Mayfield filed a motion under Pitchess seeking discovery of
personnel information for deputies Macias, Patella and Cabrera relating to allegations of
excessive use of force, racial bias, and fabrication of evidence or charges. The trial court
3 On rebuttal, evidence was introduced that no deputy named Bradshaw worked in
that division.
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found good cause to hold an in camera hearing as to Macias only, and held that hearing.
(See Warrick v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal. 4th 1011, 1019 ["[i]f the trial court finds
good cause for the discovery, it reviews the pertinent documents in chambers and
discloses only that information falling within the statutorily defined standards of
relevance"].) After reviewing the personnel records in camera, the court ruled there were
no discoverable records in the file. Mayfield now asks this court to independently review
the hearing and the records for error, and the People do not oppose that request.
On appeal, this court is required to examine the materials in camera and determine
whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to disclose the contents of the
officers' personnel files. (People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal. 4th 287, 330; People v. Mooc
(2001) 26 Cal. 4th 1216, 1229.) We have examined the personnel records in camera and
conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding there were no records in the
file responsive to Mayfield's motion.
B. The "Prison Prior" Claim
Mayfield contends the court erred when it added a one-year term for a "prison
prior" for the term he was to serve for his conviction in case No. FSB1304811 because, at
the time of the present offense, he had not completed (or indeed even begun serving) any
prison term for that conviction.4 The People concede, and we agree, that it was error to
impose a term for a "prison prior" in connection with his conviction in case
4 Mayfield was on probation for his conviction in case No. FSB1304811 at the time
of the instant offense, and he was not sentenced to county jail for that offense until
April 10, 2014, after the present offense.
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No. FSB13048113. (See People v. Weeks (2014) 224 Cal. App. 4th 1045, 1051 [where
defendant had not completed his prison term for the prior offense at time new offenses
took place, it is error to find prior offense constituted a prison prior under § 667.5, subd.
(b)].) The trial court on remand shall strike the term imposed under section 667.5,
subdivision (b), in connection with Mayfield's conviction in case No. FSB1304811.
C. The Restitution Fine Claim
Mayfield challenges the addition of a $30 surcharge contained in the minute order
of the court because, although the $300 restitution fine on which the surcharge was
calculated was imposed by the court's oral pronouncement of sentence, the surcharge was
not separately mentioned in the court's oral pronouncement of sentence. He contends the
minute order prepared by the court clerk unilaterally included this additional surcharge
and asserts that, because the oral pronouncement of a sentence controls over the minute
order, the surcharge must be stricken.
Section 1202.4, subdivision (b), provides: "In every case where a person is
convicted of a crime, the court shall impose a separate and additional restitution fine,
unless it finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so and states those
reasons on the record," and subdivision (e) of that section provides that the restitution
fine imposed pursuant to subdivision (b) "shall be deposited in the Restitution Fund in the
State Treasury." Section 1202.4, subdivision (l), then provides, "At its discretion, the
board of supervisors of any county may impose a fee to cover the actual administrative
cost of collecting the restitution fine, not to exceed 10 percent of the amount ordered to
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be paid, to be added to the restitution fine and included in the order of the court, the
proceeds of which shall be deposited in the general fund of the county."
The statutory language contemplates that, once the board of supervisors has
exercised the discretion granted to them by section 1202.4, subdivision (l), to impose the
10 percent administrative fee, the surcharge is "to be added to the restitution fine and
included in the order of the court." Although section 1202.4, subdivision (b), provides a
trial court with discretion to decline to impose any restitution fine, once it has elected to
impose the fine, we interpret section 1202.4, subdivision (l), as statutorily obligating the
trial court to follow the direction of the board of supervisors5 and add that administrative
fee to the restitution fine imposed. (Cf. People v. Robertson (2009) 174 Cal. App. 4th 206,
210.)
Because a trial court's failure to add a mandatory administrative fee would result
in an unauthorized sentence subject to correction on appeal (see, e.g., People v. Talibdeen
(2002) 27 Cal. 4th 1151, 1157; cf. People v. Smith (2001) 24 Cal. 4th 849, 852), we see no
impediment to a trial court adding it to the minute order rather than waiting to have the
order corrected on appeal. Addition of the surcharge to the minute order was not
prejudicial error.
5 There has been no suggestion in this case that San Bernardino County's board of
supervisors has not elected to impose an administrative fee of 10 percent to cover its
administrative cost of collecting restitution fines pursuant to section 1202.4, subdivision
(l).
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D. Challenges to Probation Conditions
Mayfield attacks numerous probation conditions imposed by the court.6
The Explosives Condition (Condition 10)
A condition of Mayfield's probation, as imposed by the court, was that he not
"possess nor have under your control any deadly weapons or explosive devices or
material to make explosive devices." (Italics added.) Mayfield argues the italicized
language of that condition is unconstitutionally vague because he cannot reasonably
know what items are barred by that condition; it could encompass ordinary tools (such as
pliers or screwdrivers) that could be employed to construct an explosive device, or other
ordinary items (such as clocks, wires, batteries, etc.) that could be a component of an
explosive device. He asserts the condition should be modified to narrow the condition to
ban possession or control "of any deadly weapons or explosive devices."
The People agree this court may modify a mandatory supervision condition so that
it conforms to law (People v. Freitas (2009) 179 Cal. App. 4th 747, 752-753), and agree
the condition should be modified, but asserts the proper language should narrow the
condition to ban possession or control "of any deadly weapons or explosive devices or
explosive materials." We agree the People's proposed language provides adequate notice
of the thrust of conduct that is properly proscribed, and will adopt that language to
modify Condition 10.
6 The court imposed a six-year term but ordered that Mayfield serve the last three
years of the term on mandatory supervision subject to various terms and conditions of
probation.
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The Gang Conditions (Conditions 18, 26 and 28)
Mayfield asserts that Conditions 18, 26 and 28, which involve various
proscriptions on gang associations or conduct, are unconstitutionally vague because the
term "gang" is undefined and could encompass "benign connotations." (People v. Lopez
(1998) 66 Cal. App. 4th 615, 631.) The People agree with Mayfield, and submit that the
solution approved by the court in In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal. App. 4th 902 cures the
problem of vagueness. In Victor L., the court rejected a claim that the language of the
conditions concerning "gang" associations and activities could preclude "benign"
activities because the condition "include[d] a clause specifying that a 'gang' 'mean[s] a
criminal street gang as defined in Penal Code section 186.22[, subdivision] (f)," and the
Victor L. court concluded this definition clarified that the probationer "need not worry
about attending a Rotary Club meeting or an Eagle Scout campout." (Id. at p. 914.) We
agree that Victor L.'s solution provides Mayfield with adequate notice of the proscribed
conduct and therefore direct that the terms and conditions of probation shall be modified
as described in Victor L.
The "Stay Away" Condition (Condition 27)
Mayfield asserts that Condition 27, which requires him to stay one block away
from schools, is invalid because it does not contain a scienter requirement and therefore
he could violate that condition by unknowingly entering the proscribed radius. We agree
with the analysis of the court in People v. Patel (2011) 196 Cal. App. 4th 956:
"Since at least 1993, appellate courts have issued opinions
consistently holding that conditions of probation must include
scienter requirements to prevent the conditions from being
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overbroad. [Citations.] However, with dismaying regularity, we
still must revisit the issue in orders of probation, either at the request
of counsel or on our own initiative. The latter in particular is a drain
on the public fisc that could be avoided if the probation departments
at fault would take greater care in drafting proposed probation
orders. [¶] . . . [T]here is now a substantial uncontradicted body of
case law establishing, as a matter of law, that a probationer cannot
be punished for presence, possession, association, or other actions
absent proof of scienter. . . . [Citations.] We also do not discern
how addressing this specific issue on a repetitive case-by-case basis
is likely to dissuade a probation officer inclined to act in bad faith
from finding some other basis for harassing an innocent probationer.
As a result, we reject the conclusions reached in [Victor L., supra,
182 Cal. App. 4th 902 and People v. Garcia (1993) 19 Cal. App. 4th
97], and now give notice of our intent to henceforth no longer
entertain this issue on appeal, whether at the request of counsel or on
our own initiative. We construe every probation condition
proscribing a probationer's presence, possession, association, or
similar action to require the action be undertaken knowingly. It will
no longer be necessary to seek a modification of a probation order
that fails to expressly include such a scienter requirement." (Id. at
pp. 960-961, fn. omitted.)
In the interests of fiscal and judicial economy, and to avoid the repetitive nature of
this appellate issue, we follow Patel and will "construe every probation condition
proscribing a probationer's presence, possession, association, or similar action to require
the action be undertaken knowingly. It will no longer be necessary to seek a modification
of a probation order that fails to expressly include such a scienter requirement." (Ibid.) It
is unnecessary to add any explicit scienter language to those conditions of Mayfield's
probation that proscribe his presence, possession, association, or similar actions.
The Payment Conditions (Conditions 14, 15 and 32)
Conditions 14, 15 and 32 impose on Mayfield certain obligations as conditions of
his mandatory supervision. Mayfield does not challenge the obligations themselves, but
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only those portions of conditions 14, 15 and 32 requiring him to pay the costs associated
with those obligations. The People concede a court cannot require a defendant to pay for
the costs of mandatory supervision and, as an unauthorized sentence, concede those
clauses must be stricken. (People v. Ghebretensae (2013) 222 Cal. App. 4th 741, 763-767;
People v. Fandinola (2013) 221 Cal. App. 4th 1415, 1418.) We agree with the People and
direct those clauses be stricken.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of conviction is affirmed. On remand, the court shall modify
Mayfield's sentence as follows: the court shall strike the term imposed under section
667.5, subdivision (b), in connection with his conviction in case No. FSB1304811. The
court shall also modify Condition 10 of the conditions of probation to require that
Mayfield not "possess nor have under your control any deadly weapons or explosive
devices or explosive materials." The court shall also modify the conditions of probation
to include a statement that "the term 'gang' as used herein means a criminal street gang as
defined in Penal Code section 186.22[, subdivision] (f)." Conditions 14, 15 and 32 shall
be modified to strike the requirement that Mayfield pay the costs associated with the
obligations imposed by those conditions. As so modified, the sentence is affirmed.
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McDONALD, J.
WE CONCUR:
BENKE, Acting P. J.
IRION, J.
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