People v. Starling CA1/4 ( 2022 )


Menu:
  • Filed 8/29/22 P. v. Starling CA1/4
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
    ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION FOUR
    THE PEOPLE,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    A164375
    v.
    ROBERT STARLING,                                                       (Sonoma County
    Super. Ct. No. SCR 5681391)
    Defendant and Appellant.
    Defendant Robert Starling appeals an order denying his petition for
    resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.91.1 We find no error and
    accordingly, we shall affirm.
    Background
    In April 2010, defendant was found guilty of four robberies (§ 211); two
    counts of conspiracy to commit robbery (§ 182, subd. (a)(1)); two counts of
    making false reports to police (§ 148.5, subd. (a)); one count of unlawfully
    wearing a mask (§ 185); and one count of intimidating a witness (§ 136.1,
    subd. (a)(1)). The jury also found true the allegation that defendant
    personally used a firearm during the commission of the robberies, within the
    meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (b), and that he was armed with a
    firearm during the conspiracies, within the meaning of section 12022,
    1   All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
    1
    subdivision (a)(1). (People v. Starling (A129084, July 7, 2011) [non.pub.
    opn.].)
    The evidence at trial established that between September 2007 and
    May 2009, defendant, who had previously worked for an armored truck
    company, robbed four armored truck guards and conspired to rob other
    armored truck guards. According to the California Department of Corrections
    and Rehabilitations (C.D.C.R.), “During these robberies, Starling approached
    the guards as they were transporting bags of cash from the businesses back
    to the armored trucks, and ordered them to the ground at gunpoint. Starling
    would take the bags of cash and flee the scene. He and his co-defendant
    conducted surveillance on other locations with the intent on robbing the
    transport guards.” Defendant was sentenced to a total term of 30 years four
    months in prison.2
    On August 25, 2021, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under
    section 1170.91. In conjunction with his section 1170.91 petition, defendant
    submitted documentation showing that he had been in the United States
    Army for about six years and that he suffers from post traumatic stress
    disorder (PTSD), which is “more likely than not . . . related to his reported
    trauma event experienced in Korea.” A hearing was scheduled and counsel
    was appointed for defendant.
    At the hearing, defendant testified that he served in the United States
    Army from December 28, 1993 through January 26, 2000. From April 1998
    through April 1999, he was stationed in South Korea. In South Korea,
    defendant was stationed “up on the border” with North Korea. “[I]t was a
    2In February 2019, the court received but declined to act on a letter
    from the C.D.C.R. recommending resentencing under section 1170,
    subdivision (d).
    2
    very intense hostile place.” He “developed serious difficulty sleeping” which
    necessitated “taking a great deal of medication to try to go to sleep.” He also
    suffered from “regular depression” and anxiety while in Korea. He testified
    that, prior to his service in South Korea, he had not suffered from any
    untreated, undiagnosed mental health issues. Since his service, defendant
    has continued to struggle with depression and anxiety. He also testified about
    his divorces, post-military service employment difficulties, and his
    imprisonment and how those problems affected him. Defendant has been
    prescribed antidepressants since being in prison. Defendant attributed his
    current PTSD symptoms to his military service.
    The trial court denied the petition, finding that while defendant had
    established eligibility for recall by showing that he may have a current
    qualifying condition that may be the result of military service, he was not
    suitable for resentencing. The court found that the link between defendant’s
    current PTSD symptoms and his military service was tenuous, as was “[a]ny
    causal connection between any military related PTSD and the commitment
    offenses.” The court noted the following additional factors that weighed
    against resentencing: Defendant’s offenses were committed over two years
    and showed a high degree of planning and sophistication. They were serious,
    violent, and placed numerous innocent persons in danger. Defendant tried to
    convince others to join his criminal enterprise and then threatened those
    individuals to stay quiet. Defendant did not take responsibility for his
    conduct at trial and falsely testified under oath. Defendant is a dangerous
    person capable of inflicting great bodily injury or death on individuals.
    Defendant exhibited no credible remorse. He took advantage of his former
    police training and took advantage of his training in armored car deliveries to
    commit the offenses. Defendant breached the trust of his former coworkers.
    3
    Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal.
    Discussion
    In 2014, the Legislature enacted former section 1170.91 (now identified
    as section 1170.91, subdivision (a)) (Stats. 2014, ch. 163, § 2), “which
    mandate[s] consideration of trauma resulting from military service as a
    mitigating factor when a court exercises determinate sentencing triad
    discretion. ” (People v. Brooks (2020) 
    58 Cal.App.5th 1099
    , 1103–1104.)
    In 2018, the Legislature amended section 1170.91 (Stats. 2018, ch. 523,
    § 1) “to add a retroactivity clause and a procedure for resentencing.” (Brooks,
    supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 1104.) As relevant here, section 1170.91,
    subdivision (b) “allows a person currently serving a prison sentence for a
    felony conviction, ‘whether by trial or plea,’ to petition for a recall of his
    sentence provided he meets the following initial requirements: (1) he is or
    was a member of the United States military, and (2) he ‘may be suffering
    from . . . post-traumatic stress disorder, . . . as a result of [such] military
    service.’ ” (Brooks, supra, at p. 1104.)
    “A section 1170.91, subdivision (b) petitioner must allege: ‘(A) [t]he
    circumstance of suffering from . . . post-traumatic stress disorder . . . as a
    result of the person's military service was not considered as a factor in
    mitigation at the time of sentencing,’ and ‘(B) [t]he person was sentenced
    prior to January 1, 2015.’ [Citation.] Provided that the petition so alleges, the
    sentencing judge or in his or her absence an assigned judge of the sentencing
    court ‘shall determine, at a public hearing’ held upon proper notice, whether
    the petitioner satisfies the requisite criteria.” (Brooks, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th
    at p. 1104, citing § 1170.91, subd. (b).) If those criteria are met, the petitioner
    may be resentenced, in the court’s discretion, with trauma resulting from
    military service taken into account as a mitigating factor. (Ibid.)
    4
    A. Judicial Bias
    At defendant’s 2010 sentencing hearing on his robbery convictions, the
    trial court stated that it found defendant’s trial testimony “incredulous,”
    described defendant as “manipulative and narcissistic” and noted that
    defendant’s credibility “has been totally destroyed with the court.” Eleven
    years later, the same judge presided over defendant’s section 1170.91 hearing
    and ultimately denied the petition, finding that the aggravating factors
    pertaining to the offenses justified the sentence imposed.
    Defendant contends the order denying his petition must be reversed
    because the trial court improperly prejudged his credibility. The Attorney
    General contends that defendant forfeited his judicial bias claim by failing to
    raise it in the trial court and that, in any event, his claim lacks merit.
    We agree that the claim has been forfeited. Defendant concedes that he
    failed to allege judicial bias in the superior court. (People v. Seumanu (2015)
    
    61 Cal.4th 1293
    , 1320 [“As a general rule, a specific and timely objection to
    judicial misconduct is required to preserve the claim for appellate review.”].)
    Defendant was aware of the court’s prior credibility findings, having
    addressed them directly in a letter to the court in 2019.3 He had an obligation
    to raise any concerns he had regarding bias at the “earliest practicable
    opportunity.” (People v. Guerra (2006) 
    37 Cal.4th 1067
    , 1111, overruled on
    another ground in People v. Rundle (2008) 
    43 Cal.4th 76
    , 151.) Defendant’s
    allegation that the bias in this case was so grossly unfair as to amount to a
    violation of due process does not relieve him of the obligation to raise the
    claim in the superior court. (People v. Samuels (2005) 
    36 Cal.4th 96
    , 114
    3In the 2019 letter, defendant acknowledges, “I lied during my
    testimony” and states, “I understand that I destroyed my credibility with you
    and the court. The memory of you calling my testimony ‘incredulous’ at my
    sentencing hearing has always stayed with me.”
    5
    [“Failure to raise the issue of judicial conduct at trial waives claims of
    statutory or constitutional error.”].)
    In any event, as the Attorney General notes, there is no evidence of
    likely bias, let alone “extreme” bias as defendant suggests. A defendant who
    alleges his due process rights were violated by alleged judicial bias does not
    need to prove actual bias, but must prove (under an objective standard) that
    the probability of bias on the part of the judge is so great that it is
    “constitutionally intolerable.” (People v. Freeman (2010) 
    47 Cal.4th 993
    ,
    1001.) “Mere expressions of opinion, based on observation of the witnesses
    and evidence, do not demonstrate judicial bias.” (Schmidt v. Superior Court
    (2020) 
    44 Cal.App.5th 570
    , 589, 591 [“The trial court’s credibility
    determinations did not show bias.”].) The trial court’s statement regarding
    defendant’s lack of credibility was a reasonable assessment of defendant’s
    testimony at trial and was confirmed by defendant’s subsequent admission
    that he lied during his trial testimony. Moreover, as is typical at most
    resentencing hearings, section 1170.91, subdivision (b)(2) expressly directs
    that the sentencing judge determine the petition if available. (See Peracchi v.
    Superior Court. (2003) 
    30 Cal.4th 1245
    , 1254 [“Because of the significance of
    the trial record and the court's observations at trial, the usual procedure is
    for the person who served as the trial judge to preside at the sentencing
    hearing, and this procedure generally is followed in the situation where
    resentencing is to occur following remand.”].) “The trial court is considered to
    be in the best position to conduct the resentencing hearing. The preference
    for a judge who is well informed about the case serves the interests of both
    parties, and an alternative practice would impose heavy burdens on scarce
    judicial resources.” (Ibid.) Nothing in the record suggests the court was
    6
    unwilling or unable to properly weigh defendant’s credibility at the time of
    the hearing on his resentencing petition.
    B. Abuse of Discretion
    Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his
    petition for resentencing. He argues that (1) the trial court’s finding that the
    links between defendant’s PTSD and his military service is tenuous is not
    supported by the evidence; (2) the court improperly required that there be a
    “causal connection” between the PTSD and the commitment offenses; (3) the
    court improperly relied on the fact that he did not mention his PTSD or his
    mental health to the probation officer in connection with the original
    sentencing; (4) the trial court’s finding that he exhibited no credible remorse
    for his conduct is not supported by the record; (5) the trial court failed to
    consider post-sentencing mitigating factors demonstrating his rehabilitation;
    and (6) the sentence imposed remains excessive given the above mitigating
    factors. We disagree.
    Contrary to defendant’s argument, the court did not require that
    defendant establish a causal connection between defendant’s PTSD and the
    commitment offenses. To the contrary, the court’s order expressly
    acknowledges that section 1170.91 “does not require a showing that
    petitioner actually had a qualifying condition at the time the commitment
    offense was committed or that the qualifying condition had any causal
    connection to the commitment offense. Instead, petitioner’s only burden is to
    demonstrate that he may currently have a qualifying condition and that the
    qualifying condition may be the result of petitioner’s military service.”
    Consistent with the above, the court acknowledged that defendant’s PTSD
    may be military related. The court concluded, however, that “the role that
    [defendant’s] military service plays in his current PTSD (and his PTSD
    7
    symptoms) is minor compared to other stressors that petitioner has
    experienced after leaving the military, such as failed marriages, employment
    difficulties, financial difficulties, and adapting to prison life (particularly as a
    former law enforcement officer).” We understand the court to have reasoned
    that to the extent that defendant was currently suffering from military-
    related PTSD, that factor in mitigation was not particularly significant as
    compared to his anxiety and depression caused by other stressors. The court’s
    characterization of the connection between defendant’s current PTSD
    symptoms and his military service as tenuous is consistent with the results of
    the clinical examination performed by the Department of Veterans Affairs
    which reads, “Based on review of records, results from the CAPS-5, and
    clinical interview, veteran meets full criteria for a diagnosis of PTSD that
    more likely than not is related to his reported trauma event experienced in
    Korea. It appears that prior to his last failed marriage and financial
    hardship, there were stressors related to his work environment that may
    have likely aggravated his pre-existing avoidant behaviors that following
    military services was minimal as evidenced by his ability to perform at his
    job tasks and continue to maintain and/or increase rank.”
    The court’s consideration of the absence of a “causal connection”
    between defendant’s PTSD and the commitment offenses and his failure to
    raise his mental health issues at his sentencing hearing in 2010 was not an
    abuse of discretion. “The trial court's sentencing discretion must be exercised
    in a manner that is not arbitrary and capricious, that is consistent with the
    letter and spirit of the law, and that is based upon an ‘individualized
    consideration of the offense, the offender, and the public interest.’ ” (People v.
    Sandoval (2007) 
    41 Cal.4th 825
    , 847.) How defendant’s PTSD impacted his
    commission of the offenses, if at all, is a relevant factor and properly
    8
    considered by the court. To the extent the court considered defendant’s
    failure to raise “any mental health issue to the probation officer during the
    2010 presentence interview,” it did so in support of its conclusion that
    defendant “did not believe that mental health issues played any significant
    role in the reason petitioner committed the offenses between 2007 and 2009.”
    The court did not, as defendant suggests, independently rely on “on the fact
    that appellant did not mention his PTSD or his mental health to the
    probation officer in connection with the original sentencing as a reason for
    denying the petition.” (Italics added.)
    Contrary to defendant’s argument, the court did not fail to consider
    defendant’s post-sentencing statement of contrition and his purported “great
    strides in rehabilitation and in becoming a productive member of society.” In
    support of his argument, defendant cites the letter and evaluation report
    submitted in 2019 by the C.D.C.R. recommending resentencing under section
    1170, subdivision (d). The report indicates that defendant has had no
    disciplinary actions filed against him while in custody and lists his
    participation in several self-help activities. The report also includes
    defendant’s letter to the court, in which he states that he is “ashamed” of his
    past actions and his failure to take responsibility for the crimes he
    committed. The court directly addressed the C.D.C.R.’s letter and related
    evidence in the order denying the section 1170.91 petition: “The court notes
    that the C.D.C.R. previously recommended a . . . section 1170(d) recall.
    However, this court does not believe that recommendation necessarily weighs
    in favor of a . . . section 1170.91 recall since the C.D.C.R. has its own
    motivations and reasons for recommending a . . . section 1170(d) recall.
    Furthermore, this court declined to recall the sentence upon the C.D.C.R.’s
    recall recommendation.” Although the court did not expressly so state, the
    9
    reasonable conclusion drawn from the court’s order is that the court
    determined that defendant’s post-sentence progress did not outweigh the
    aggravating factors identified by the court.
    Finally, in reviewing the denial of a section 1170.91 petition, this court
    has no occasion to consider whether the previously imposed sentence is
    excessive.
    Disposition
    The order denying the petition for resentencing under Penal Code
    section 1170.91 is affirmed.
    POLLAK, P. J.
    WE CONCUR:
    BROWN, J.
    GOLDMAN, J.
    10