In re M.C. CA4/2 ( 2022 )

Filed 9/2/22 In re M.C. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re M.C. et al., Persons Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, E078112
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. RIJ1600617)
v. OPINION
A.C.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Cheryl C. Murphy, Judge.
Affirmed.
Elizabeth C. Alexander, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Teresa K.B. Beecham, County Counsel, and Prabhath Shettigar, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Lauren K. Johnson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for M.C. and J.C.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
A.C. (Father) appeals the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders.
We affirm.
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In August 2021, the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (the
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Department) filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition on behalf of
Father’s six-year-old child, M.C., and his five-year-old child, J.C. The petition alleged
Father and Mother (who is not a party to this appeal) failed to protect M.C. and J.C. (§
300, subd. (b)(1)).
The petition contained eight specific allegations (b-1 through b-8) concerning
Father, Mother, or both of them. The first allegation (b-1) stated that Father failed to
appropriately supervise the children, who had to walk to school alone, because Father
was asleep. The allegation also said that while Father was asleep, J.C. played on the
couch, resulting in her falling and hitting herself on the table, which caused her to sustain
marks and bruises to her face. The second allegation (b-2) stated that Father neglected
J.C.’s medical needs, J.C. appeared malnourished, and she reported being hungry while in
his care. Father also delayed in following up on J.C.’s physician’s recommendation to
increase J.C.’s calorie intake. The third allegation (b-3) alleged that Father neglected the
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All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
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children’s safety in July 2021 in that his home had a “strong smell of marijuana,” clutter
and dirty laundry in the hallway, and a four-inch knife on the living room table. The
fourth allegation (b-4) stated that Father had a history of marijuana and
methamphetamine use, and had tested positive for marijuana in July 2021. Allegations b-
5, b-6, and b-8 concerned Mother only. Allegation b-7, however, stated that both parents
had a history with the Department due to substantiated allegations of general neglect,
domestic violence, and substance abuse. The Department later filed an amended petition,
but there were no changes to the (b)(1) allegations.
After several continuances, the juvenile court held a contested jurisdictional
hearing in November 2021. The Department submitted on its reports and
recommendations filed before the hearing. The minors’ counsel suggested that additional
language and allegations should be added to the petition. Counsel provided the proposed
language to the juvenile court and the parties. Father’s counsel indicated she was
prepared to begin the hearing. After the social worker testified, the juvenile court closed
the matter to evidence and continued the hearing for argument.
At the beginning of the continued contested jurisdictional hearing, the minors’
counsel stated she intended to argue to amend the allegations in the amended petition to
conform to the proof presented. Father’s counsel indicated that she was “ready to argue
the allegations.”
After hearing argument from counsel for Mother, Father, and the minors, the
juvenile court found true the allegations in the amended petition as modified. The
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juvenile court modified the language in allegation b-1 to remove the language about J.C.
falling, adding that “various explanations were provided” to explain the “marks and
bruises to her face.” The court also revised allegation b-5, which stated J.C. “was
observed to have five scratches . . . about four inches . . . in length on her chest on or
about July 13, 2021. Both parents identified the other parent as the individual who
inflicted those scratches.”
The juvenile court then added and found true three new (b)(1) allegations.
Allegation b-9 stated, “While in the care of the father, the minor, [J.C.], sustained marks
and bruises to her face. And the father, stepmother, minor, and minor’s sibling provided
different explanations for the injuries that occurred on or about June 7, 2021.” Allegation
b-10 stated, “There is a history of physical discipline in the home of the father, and that
the father previously admitted to spanking the minor multiple times on her bare bottom
for defecating on herself. In the 2019 [Child Abuse and Neglect (CAN)] exam indicated
that the minor had bruises, pattern, scars, and a fingernail injury concerning for inflicted
trauma.” Allegation b-11 stated, “On July 13, 2021, the minor, [J.C.], while at school did
not wish to return home with her father. Appeared nervous. Her hands were shaking.
And the child repeatedly said that she did not want to return home because her dad would
smack her, and it hurt. The child stated that every time they come, her father pow pows
her.”
The juvenile court then adjudged M.C. and J.C. dependents of the court. The
court ordered physical custody to be retained by Father and Mother, but found that it was
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in the children’s best interest for Mother to have primary custody while Father would
have alternating weekend custody. Father timely appealed.
III.
DISCUSSION
Father argues the allegations the juvenile court added to the petition and found
true should be reversed on due process grounds and that the true findings on allegations
b-1 and b-5 should be reversed for insufficient evidence. He also contends all of the
jurisdictional and dispositional orders should be reversed because there was no risk of
harm to the children. Finally, he argues the court abused its discretion by awarding
Mother primary custody. We reject Father’s contentions and affirm.
A. Father’s Appeal Is Justiciable
The Department and minors’ counsel argue Father’s appeal of the juvenile court’s
jurisdictional findings should be dismissed as moot because he does not challenge the
jurisdictional findings concerning Mother, which are sufficient to support the juvenile
court’s jurisdiction. Father, on the other hand, argues his appeal is justiciable and that we
should exercise our discretion to reach the merits because the jurisdictional findings
“affected” the juvenile court’s dispositional findings and orders and will “certainly
impact” future dependency and family court proceedings.
“As a general rule, a single jurisdictional finding supported by substantial
evidence is sufficient to support jurisdiction and render moot a challenge to the other
findings.” (In re M.W. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1452.) When, as here, an
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appealing parent does not challenge the jurisdictional findings concerning the other
parent, we still retain discretion to consider the merits of the parent’s appeal if the
findings “(1) serve[] as the basis for dispositional orders that are also challenged on
appeal [citation]; (2) could be prejudicial to the appellant or could potentially impact the
current or future dependency proceedings [citations]; or (3) ‘could have other
consequences for [the appellant], beyond jurisdiction’ [citation].” (In re Drake M. (2012)
211 Cal.App.4th 754, 762-763.) Courts have exercised this discretion in cases when the
parent’s appeal, if successful, would eliminate all jurisdictional findings against that
parent and potentially affect the juvenile court’s subsequent orders. (See, e.g., In re
Christopher M. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1316-1317; In re Quentin H. (2014) 230
Cal.App.4th 608, 613; In re Drake M., supra, at pp. 762-763.)
Father contends the first and second exceptions apply here. As to the second,
Father broadly claims the jurisdictional findings, if upheld, will negatively affect him in
future dependency and family law proceedings. But he fails to assert “a single specific
legal or practical consequence” that could result from the jurisdictional findings “within
or outside the dependency proceedings.” (In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1493.)
We therefore decline to exercise our discretion to reach the merits of Father’s appeal on
this basis. (See ibid.)
Father next argues we should review the jurisdictional findings concerning him
because they led the juvenile court to grant primary physical custody of M.C. and J.C. to
Mother. Because the jurisdictional findings “‘serve[] as the basis’” for this challenged
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dispositional order, we exercise our discretion to address the jurisdictional findings
concerning Father. (See In re D.M. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 634, 639.)
B. Due Process Challenge
Father argues the amendments to allegations b-1 and b-5 and the entirety of
allegations b-9, b-10, and b-11 should be reversed because the juvenile court added them
and found them true in violation of his due process rights. In Father’s view, the juvenile
court violated his due process right to notice and an opportunity to be heard. Father
forfeited his due process challenge by failing to assert it in the juvenile court. (In re
Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 221-222; In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287,
1293.)
C. Allegations b-1 and b-5
Father contends substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s true
findings on allegation b-1 and b-5. We disagree.
“‘In reviewing the jurisdictional findings and the disposition, we look to see if
substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports them. [Citation.] In
making this determination, we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to
support the findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the light
most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and
credibility are the province of the trial court.’” (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633.)
“To be sufficient to sustain a juvenile dependency petition the evidence must be
‘“reasonable, credible, and of solid value”’ such that the court reasonably could find the
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child to be a dependent of the court. . . . . [Citation.]” (In re R.M. (2009) 175
Cal.App.4th 986, 988.) Father bears “the burden of showing there is no evidence of a
sufficiently substantial nature to support the findings or orders.” (In re E.E. (2020) 49
Cal.App.5th 195, 206.)
As for allegation b-1, Father does not challenge the juvenile court’s true finding
that he neglected the health and safety of the children in that he fails to provide the
children with appropriate supervision as the children have walked to school by
themselves due to the father sleeping. He challenges only the second part of the
allegation, which states that while he was sleeping the child, J.C. sustained marks and
bruises to her face, and various explanations were provided for the injuries. In Father’s
view, the juvenile court erred in finding this portion of the allegation true because
sufficient evidence showed that J.C.’s injuries were accidental.
We review the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings for substantial evidence. (In
re R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 633.) If substantial evidence supports them, we must
affirm. (Ibid.) We may not reverse simply because the evidence supports a different
finding (e.g., that J.C.’s injuries were accidental). (Ibid.)
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s true finding on allegation b-1.
The social worker stated in a jurisdiction/disposition report that, according to an
interview with Father, J.C. suffered scrapes and bruises on her face as a result of falling
while Father was asleep. Consistent with that report, the social worker testified at the
contested jurisdictional hearing that Father told her that J.C. fell off the couch and hit
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herself while Father was asleep. Substantial evidence thus supports the juvenile court’s
finding true allegation b-1’s statement that J.C. suffered injuries while Father was asleep.
(See In re Marriage of Fregoso & Hernandez (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 698, 703 [“The
testimony of one witness, even that of a party, may constitute substantial evidence.”].)
J.C., M.C., Father, and Father’s girlfriend gave conflicting explanations for J.C.’s
injuries. J.C. said M.C. scratched her and hit her, but later recanted. Father said J.C. told
him that she hit her face while playing with M.C., but then Father and his girlfriend later
said J.C. hurt herself while at school. M.C. initially denied knowing that J.C. injured
herself, but later said that J.C. hit her head on the table. Substantial evidence thus
supports the juvenile court’s finding true allegation b-1’s statement that “various
explanations were provided as to [J.C.’s] injuries.”
Allegation b-5 states that J.C. “was observed to have five scratches . . . about four
inches . . . in length on her chest on or about July 13, 2021” and that “[b]oth parents
identified the other parent as the one who inflicted the scratches.” Substantial evidence
supports the juvenile court’s finding the allegation true.
It is undisputed that, on July 13, 2021, J.C. went to daycare with Father and had
five, four-inch-long scratch marks on her chest. Father argues the juvenile court erred in
failing to find Mother caused the scratches “contrary to [the] overwhelming evidence that
she was culpable for the injuries.” Although J.C. said Mother had scratched her, Mother
denied doing so and claimed Father had coerced J.C. into blaming her injuries on Mother.
Father denied causing the scratches and blamed Mother. Substantial evidence thus
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supports the juvenile court’s finding that “[b]oth parents identified the other parent as the
[one] who inflicted [the] scratches.”
D. Risk of Harm
Father contends the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional findings must
be reversed because there was no risk of harm to J.C. and M.C. at the time of the
contested jurisdictional hearing. We disagree.
A jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (b) requires “‘(1) neglectful
conduct by the parent in one of the specified forms; (2) causation; and (3) “serious
physical harm or illness” to the [minor], or a “substantial risk” of such harm or illness.’”
(In re Savannah M. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1396.) The third element “effectively
requires a showing that at the time of the jurisdictional hearing the child is at substantial
risk of serious physical harm in the future (e.g., evidence showing a substantial risk that
past physical harm will reoccur).” (Ibid.) To establish a defined risk of harm at the time
of the jurisdiction hearing, there must be “‘some reason beyond mere speculation to
believe the alleged conduct will recur.’” (In re D.L. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1142, 1146.)
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that there was a
substantial risk of harm to J.C. and M.C. at the time of the jurisdiction hearing. Both
children suffered recurring, sometimes unexplained injuries while in their parents’ care in
the months before the hearing.
In November 2019, both children had bruises on their bodies. J.C. said Father hit
her because she defecated in her pants. Father asserted he “might” have hit her too hard
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because she “‘shit all over herself.’” A few months later, Father admitted that he used
inappropriate physical discipline on both children.
J.C. appeared malnourished and underweight in June 2021, just four months
before the jurisdiction hearing. When the social worker interviewed J.C. at school in July
2021, J.C. reported that she did not always have enough to eat at Father’s house.
Although Father has been attending to his children’s health needs and J.C.’s health had
improved, the fact that J.C. appeared underfed in the months before the jurisdictional
hearing supported the juvenile court’s assertion of jurisdiction.
When the social worker asked J.C. asked if she wanted to go home to her Father’s
house, she appeared nervous and shaking. J.C. told the social worker that she was afraid
to return to Father’s care. She said that “‘daddy will smack me, and it hurts’” and that
“‘Every time they come, daddy pow pows me.’”
Around the same time, Father acknowledged that his girlfriend had lied to the
social worker in June 2021 about the cause of some of J.C.’s injuries. The girlfriend said
J.C. got hurt at school, but J.C. and Father said she got hurt at home.
In early July 2021, Father claimed his arm was in a cast because he walked
through a door. J.C. and M.C., however, said Father hurt his arm by punching the
kitchen counter. During this same time, the children walked themselves to school because
Father was asleep. And while visiting Father’s home, the social worker had observed a
strong smell of marijuana and a four-inch knife on the living room table where J.C. and
M.C. could grab it.
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From this evidence, the juvenile court could reasonably find that J.C. and M.C.
remained at a substantial risk of serious harm. Substantial evidence thus supports the
juvenile court’s challenged jurisdictional/dispositional findings.
E. Primary Custody
Father contends the juvenile court erred by awarding primary custody of J.C. and
M.C. to Mother. We disagree.
The juvenile court may award primary custody to one parent if the court finds that
it is in the best interest of the child. (See In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317.)
We will not reverse a custody determination unless the juvenile court clearly abused its
discretion. (Ibid.)
The juvenile court here reasonably found that awarding primary custody of J.C.
and M.C. to Mother was in their best interests. Both children expressed fear about
returning to Father’s care, but had never expressed fear about returning to Mother’s care.
J.C. stated that Father frequently “pow pows” her, and Father admitted that he had used
inappropriate corporal discipline. Both children had sustained several injuries while in
Father’s care, yet he appeared to be “unaware” of what had happened.
On this record, the juvenile court reasonably found that awarding primary custody
to Mother was appropriate and in the children’s best interests. The juvenile court did not
abuse its discretion in making that decision.
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IV.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON
Acting P. J.
We concur:
FIELDS
J.
RAPHAEL
J.
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