In re J.P. CA2/5 ( 2022 )


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  • Filed 10/20/22 In re J.P. CA2/5
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
    opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
    8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
    purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION FIVE
    In re J.P., a Person Coming Under                               B318631
    the Juvenile Court Law.
    ___________________________________                             (Los Angeles County
    LOS ANGELES COUNTY                                              Super. Ct. No.
    DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN                                          19CCJP06772B)
    AND FAMILY SERVICES,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    v.
    JOE P.,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
    County, Debra Archuleta, Judge. Conditionally reversed and
    remanded with directions.
    Annie Greenleaf, under appointment by the Court of
    Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
    Dawyn R. Harrison, Acting County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
    Assistant County Counsel, and Kimberly Roura, Senior Deputy
    County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    Ann-Marissa Cook for the Minor.
    __________________________________
    Joe P. (Father) appeals from a juvenile court order
    terminating his parental rights over J.P. (Minor) pursuant to
    Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Father contends
    the juvenile court erred when it found the Los Angeles County
    Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) satisfied its
    obligations under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and
    related California law. Father, DCFS, and Minor have stipulated
    to a conditional reversal and remand to the juvenile court to
    permit compliance with ICWA and related California law. We
    accept the parties’ stipulation.
    Our ability to accept a stipulated reversal and remand in
    the dependency context is discussed in In re Rashad H. (2000) 
    78 Cal.App.4th 376
    . The present case involves reversible error
    because the parties agree, and we concur, there was
    noncompliance with federal ICWA regulations and related
    California law. Specifically, the record indicates maternal
    relatives (including the maternal grandmother) were present in
    court at the initial detention hearing but were not asked whether
    they had reason to know Minor was an Indian child. (
    25 C.F.R. § 23.107
    (a) [state courts must ask “each participant” in
    child custody proceedings whether they know or have reason to
    know that the child is an Indian child]; Welf. & Inst. Code,
    § 224.2, subd. (c) [“At the first appearance in court of each party,
    2
    the court shall ask each participant present in the hearing
    whether the participant knows or has reason to know that the
    child is an Indian child”].)
    Because this case would be subject to reversal to permit
    compliance with ICWA-related law absent the parties’
    stipulation, a stipulated remand advances the interests identified
    by Code of Civil Procedure section 128, subdivision (a)(8). That is
    to say, we find the interests of non-parties and the public are not
    adversely affected by our acceptance of the stipulation and the
    remand will not erode public trust or reduce the incentive for
    pretrial settlement. (See In re Rashad H., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th
    at 379-382; Union Bank of California v. Braille Inst. of America,
    Inc. (2001) 
    92 Cal.App.4th 1324
    , 1329-1330.)
    DISPOSITION
    The order terminating parental rights is conditionally
    reversed and the cause is remanded solely for further proceedings
    required by this opinion. The juvenile court is directed to
    reappoint counsel for Father and either (a) hold a hearing to
    permit the court itself to question the maternal grandmother,
    and any other available maternal relatives of which DCFS is
    aware, about whether Minor is an Indian child; or (b) direct the
    Department to question the maternal grandmother and any other
    available maternal relatives of which DCFS is aware about
    whether Minor is an Indian child and to thereafter submit a
    report to the court documenting the relatives’ responses. Nothing
    in our disposition precludes the juvenile court from ordering
    additional inquiry of others having an interest in Minor if the
    court deems it advisable.
    3
    If the aforementioned inquiry results in information
    indicating there is reason to know Minor is an Indian child, the
    juvenile court shall proceed in accordance with ICWA and related
    California law. If the aforementioned inquiry does not result in
    information indicating there is reason to know Minor is an Indian
    child, the court’s order terminating parental rights shall be
    reinstated.
    The remittitur shall issue forthwith.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    BAKER, J.
    We concur:
    RUBIN, P. J.
    KIM, J.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B318631

Filed Date: 10/20/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/20/2022