People v. VanVleck , 2 Cal. App. 5th 355 ( 2016 )

Filed 8/11/16
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D069893
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. CA264780)
v.
KYLE WARREN VANVLECK
Defendant and Respondent.
THE PEOPLE D069894
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. CA 264781)
v.
JEREMY KLUESNER,
Defendant and Respondent.
CONSOLIDATED APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego
County, Daniel F. Link, Judge. Reversed.
Jan I. Goldsmith, City Attorney, John C. Hemmerling, Assistant City Attorney,
and Michael L. Ficken, Deputy City Attorney, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Law Offices of C. Bradley Patton and C. Bradley Patton for Defendant and
Respondent Kyle Warren VanVleck.
Leslie Legal Group and Sean F. Leslie for Defendant and Respondent Jeremy
Kluesner.
Bonnie M. Dumanis, District Attorney, James E. Atkins and Harrison C. Kennedy,
Deputy District Attorneys for San Diego County District Attorney, as Amicus Curiae on
behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.
These consolidated appeals raise the issue of whether Vehicle Code section 23640
(section 23640) prohibits military diversion pursuant to Penal Code section 1001.80
(military diversion statute) for defendants charged with driving under the influence
offenses.1 We conclude military diversion is not available for defendants charged with
driving under the influence offenses in violation of sections 23152 and 23153.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The People charged Kyle Warren VanVleck with misdemeanor violations of
driving under the influence of alcohol and driving while having a measurable blood
alcohol content of 0.08 percent or more (§ 23152, subds. (a), (b)). He moved to be placed
in a military diversion program pursuant to the military diversion statute, which provides
for pretrial diversion where the defendant: (1) is charged with a misdemeanor; (2) "was,
or currently is, a member of the United States military;" and (3) "may be suffering from
sexual trauma, traumatic brain injury, post-traumatic stress disorder, substance abuse, or
mental health problems as a result of his or her military service." (Pen. Code, § 1001.80,
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Vehicle Code.
2
subd. (a)(1)-(2).) VanVleck claimed he was on active duty in the United States Marine
Corps and suffered from an alcohol use disorder of moderate severity as a result of his
military service.
The People opposed diversion, arguing section 23640 prohibits diversion in all
driving under the influence cases. The superior court granted VanVleck's motion and
suspended proceedings for the diversion term of two years.
The People charged Jeremy Bryan Kluesner with three misdemeanors: driving
under the influence of alcohol (§ 23152, subd. (a)), driving while having a measurable
blood alcohol content of 0.08 percent or more (§ 23152, subd. (b)), and driving without a
valid license (§ 12500, subd. (a)). Kluesner claimed he was a veteran of the United
States Army and suffered from posttraumatic stress disorder, traumatic brain injury, and
alcohol abuse as a result of his military service. He moved to be placed in a diversion
program pursuant to the military diversion statute. Over the People's opposition, the
superior court granted Kluesner's motion and suspended proceedings for the diversion
term of two years.
The People appealed both decisions to the appellate division of the superior court.
Pursuant to Rule 8.1005(a)(1) of the California Rules of Court, the appellate division of
the superior court certified the cases for transfer to this court "to secure uniformity of
decision and settle an important question of law." We ordered the cases transferred to
this court for hearing and decision and subsequently consolidated them.
We granted the San Diego County District Attorney's applications to file amicus
briefs in both cases.
3
DISCUSSION
I. Requests for Judicial Notice
VanVleck and Kluesner requested we take judicial notice of two items from the
legislative history of Senate Bill No. 1227, the bill that added the military diversion
statute to the Penal Code. (Sen. Bill No. 1227 (2013-2014 Reg. Sess.).) Specifically,
they request we take judicial notice of: (1) Senate Floor Analyses, dated August 21,
2014, and (2) a bill analysis from the Assembly Committee on Appropriations for a
hearing on August 6, 2014. We grant the unopposed requests for judicial notice. (People
v. Cruz (1996) 13 Cal. 4th 764, 780, fn. 9; People v. Lamb (1999) 76 Cal. App. 4th 664,
680 ["Legislative committee reports and analyses generally have been found appropriate
items of consideration in determining legislative intent."].)
VanVleck also requests we take judicial notice of a superior court progress report
for the military diversion program in San Diego County. VanVleck argues judicial notice
is mandatory pursuant to Evidence Code section 451, subdivision (f), which provides the
court shall take judicial notice of "[f]acts and propositions of generalized knowledge that
are so universally known that they cannot reasonably be the subject of dispute." The
facts and propositions within the superior court progress report do not satisfy the
requirements of Evidence Code section 451, subdivision (f). Further, "[w]hile courts may
notice official acts and public records, 'we do not take judicial notice of the truth of all
matters stated therein.' " (Mangini v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1994) 7 Cal. 4th 1057,
1063 [declining to take judicial notice of a report of the United States Surgeon General
and report to the California Department of Health Services regarding tobacco use and
4
prevention]; see Ragland v. U.S. Bank National Assn. (2012) 209 Cal. App. 4th 182, 193-
194 [declining to take judicial notice of the contents of an audit report prepared by the
Office of the Inspector General of the United States Department of Treasury].)
Accordingly, we deny VanVleck's request for judicial notice of the superior court's
progress report on the military diversion program in San Diego County.
II. Section 23640
"In 1981, … the Legislature made extensive statutory changes and additions to the
Vehicle Code in response to growing public concern about intoxicated drivers.
[Citation.] The legislation was designed to make it more difficult for those committing
such offenses to avoid conviction and to increase the penalties consequent upon such a
conviction." (People v. Duncan (1990) 216 Cal. App. 3d 1621, 1628 (Duncan).) Section
23640 (formerly section 23202), enacted at that time, provided:
"In any case in which a person is charged with a violation of Section
23152 or 23153, prior to acquittal or conviction, the court shall
neither suspend nor stay the proceedings for the purpose of allowing
the accused person to attend or participate, nor shall the court
consider dismissal of or entertain a motion to dismiss the
proceedings because the accused person attends or participates
during that suspension, in any one or more education, training, or
treatment programs, including, but not limited to, a driver
improvement program, a treatment program for persons who are
habitual users of alcohol or other alcoholism program, a program
designed to offer alcohol services to problem drinkers, an alcohol or
drug education program, or a treatment program for persons who are
habitual users of drugs or other drug-related program." (§ 23640,
subd. (a), italics added.)
Section 23600 (formerly section 23206) imposes a similar postconviction restraint
and "provides that no person convicted of a [section 23152 or 23153] offense may be
5
absolved from spending the minimum time in confinement." (Duncan, supra, at p. 1628;
§ 23600, subd. (c).)2 "The unambiguous intent of [sections 23640 and 23600] is to
prohibit pre- or postconviction stays or suspensions of proceedings to allow a defendant
charged with driving under the influence to be diverted into a treatment program and
avoid spending the statutorily mandated minimum time in confinement or paying the
statutorily imposed minimum fine upon conviction." (People v. Darnell (1990) 224
Cal. App. 3d 806, 810.)
III. Military Diversion Statute
In 2014, the Legislature proposed Senate Bill No. 1227 to add the military
diversion statute to the Penal Code. The purpose of the original version of the bill was to
"create a diversion program for veterans who commit misdemeanors or jail felonies and
who are suffering from service-related trauma." (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Rep. on
Sen. Bill No. 1227 (2013-2014 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Feb. 20, 2014.) According to
the bill's author, many of California's two million military veterans suffer from service
related trauma and "some veterans find themselves entangled in the criminal justice
system." (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1227 (2013-2014 Reg.
Session) as introduced Feb. 20, 2014.) The author noted the well-established benefits of
diversion programs, including reducing recidivism and incarceration costs. (Ibid.)
2 All further references to sections 23202 and 23206 are to the renumbered sections
23640 and 23600, respectively. (See Legis. Counsel's Dig., Sen. Bill No. 1186, 6 Stats.
1998 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) Summary Dig., p. 43 [Effective July 1, 1999, Sen. Bill No.
1186 "reorganize[d] specified provisions relating to … driving while under the influence
offenses without making any substantive changes to those provisions."].)
6
The bill set forth that existing law provides for "deferred entry of judgment for
specified drug offenses" (Pen. Code, § 1000 et seq.), "permits a court to create a 'Back on
Track' deferred entry of judgment reentry program for first time non-violent drug
offenders" (Pen. Code, § 100.8 et seq.), "provides for diversion of non-DUI misdemeanor
offenses" (Pen. Code, § 1001.50 et seq.), and "provides for diversion of misdemeanors
when the defendant is a person with cognitive disabilities" (Pen. Code, § 1001.20 et seq.).
Senate Bill No. 1227, in turn, authorized the court to place an eligible current or former
member of the military in a diversion program and to postpone prosecution, temporarily
or permanently, of a misdemeanor or jail felony. (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis
of Sen. Bill No. 1227 (2013-2014 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Feb. 20, 2014.) If the court
found the defendant was not performing satisfactorily in the program or not benefiting
from the treatment and services provided under the program, it could end diversion and
resume criminal proceedings. (Ibid.)
The California District Attorneys Association opposed the bill unless it was
amended to exclude jail felonies from eligibility for the diversion program. (Sen. Com.
on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1227 (2013-2014 Reg. Sess.) as introduced
Feb. 20, 2014.) In response, the bill was amended to exclude jail felonies and apply to
misdemeanors only. (Assem. Com. on Appropriations, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 1227
(2013-2014 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 4, 2014.)
The Governor approved the amended bill in September 2014, and the military
diversion statute became effective January 1, 2015. (Stats. 2014, ch. 658, § 1.) As
enacted, the military diversion statute "appl[ies] whenever a case is before a court on an
7
accusatory pleading alleging the commission of a misdemeanor offense," and the
defendant is or was a member of the United States military suffering from service-related
trauma, substance abuse, or mental health problems. (Pen. Code, § 1001.80, subd. (a)(1)-
(2).)
IV. Conflict Between the Military Diversion Statute and Vehicle Code
A. General Legal Principles
"Statutory construction is a question of law we decide de novo. [Citation.] Our
primary objective in interpreting a statute is to determine and give effect to the
underlying legislative intent. [Citation.] Intent is determined foremost by the plain
meaning of the statutory language. If the language is clear and unambiguous, there is no
need for judicial construction. When the language is reasonably susceptible of more than
one meaning, it is proper to examine a variety of extrinsic aids in an effort to discern the
intended meaning. We may consider, for example, the statutory scheme, the apparent
purposes underlying the statute and the presence (or absence) of instructive legislative
history." (City of Brentwood v. Central Valley Regional Water Quality Control Bd.
(2004) 123 Cal. App. 4th 714, 722.)
" ' "A court must, where reasonably possible, harmonize statutes, reconcile
seeming inconsistencies in them, and construe them to give force and effect to all of their
provisions. [Citations.] This rule applies although one of the statutes involved deals
generally with a subject and another relates specifically to particular aspects of the
subject." [Citation.] Thus, when " 'two codes are to be construed, they "must be
regarded as blending into each other and forming a single statute." [Citation.]
8
Accordingly, they "must be read together and so construed as to give effect, when
possible, to all the provisions thereof." ' " ' " (State Dept. of Public Health v. Superior
Court (2015) 60 Cal. 4th 940, 955.)
B. Analysis
This case requires us to resolve an apparent conflict between the military diversion
statute and section 23640. The People argue section 23640 prohibits diversion for all
driving under the influence offenses and the military diversion statute does not create an
exception to that rule. VanVleck and Kluesner argue the military diversion statute
supersedes section 23640's prohibition on diversion. The parties each rely on the plain
meaning of the military diversion statute, legislative history, and rules of statutory
interpretation, but reach different results. We reconcile the conflict and conclude the
military diversion statute does not create an exception to section 23640.
1. Plain Language and Legislative History
Read on its own, the military diversion statute applies "whenever a case is before a
court on an accusatory pleading alleging the commission of a misdemeanor offense."
(Pen. Code, § 1001.80, subd. (a), italics added.) However, that statute conflicts with the
plain language of section 23640, subdivision (a), which prohibits diversion "[i]n any case
in which a person is charged with a violation of Section 23152 or 23153," pertaining to
driving under the influence offenses.
VanVleck and Kluesner argue the legislative history of the military diversion
statute supports their position that it applies to all misdemeanors because opponents of
Senate Bill No. 1227 raised an objection to the inclusion of jail felonies, but not to any
9
misdemeanor covered by the statute. Further, in response to the objection, the
Legislature amended Senate Bill No. 1227 to exclude jail felonies and "did not place any
restrictions on which misdemeanor charges qualify for diversion." While the Legislature
did not specifically include or exclude driving under the influence misdemeanors from
military diversion, we presume the Legislature was aware of preexisting legal authority
and decisional interpretations, and enacted the military diversion statute with that in
mind. (People v. Hernandez (1988) 46 Cal. 3d 194, 201.)
At the time the Legislature enacted the military diversion statute, the court had
previously considered a similar conflict between section 23640 and Penal Code section
1001.21, providing for diversion for defendants with cognitive developmental disabilities.
(People v. Weatherill (1989) 215 Cal. App. 3d 1569 (Weatherill).) Like the statute at issue
in this case, the diversion statute for defendants with cognitive developmental disabilities
stated it applied to any eligible defendant charged with a misdemeanor offense. (Pen.
Code, § 1001.21, subd. (b).) In Weatherill, the court looked at the plain language of
section 23640 and found its "apparent meaning is that all driving-under-the-influence
defendants, without exception, shall have their guilt or innocence determined without
delay and without diversion and those found guilty shall be timely sentenced."
(Weatherill, supra, at p. 1573.) Based on the defendant's argument that the Legislature
intended to allow diversion for persons with cognitive developmental disabilities, the
court engaged in a detailed discussion of section 23640's legislative history. (Weatherill,
at pp. 1574-1577.)
10
The Weatherill court noted the public strongly supported section 23640 and the
" '[c]elerity and certainty of punishment' " it provided. (Weatherill, supra, 215
Cal.App.3d at p. 1575.) At the time the Legislature proposed section 23640, pretrial
diversion programs had proliferated. (Id. at p. 1576.) "It was to bar such diverse and
voluminous diversion programs that section [23640] was included in [Assembly Bill No.]
541." (Ibid.) Accordingly, in enacting section 23640, the Legislature "did not overlook a
major loophole to certainty of punishment, viz., pretrial diversion." (Id. at p. 1575.) The
Weatherill court concluded the legislative history of section 23640 supported the statute's
plain meaning that diversion did not apply, without exception, to defendants charged with
driving under the influence offenses. (Id. at p. 1577.)
In this case, the plain language of military diversion statute does not state whether
it creates an exception to section 23640 and authorizes diversion for defendants charged
with driving under the influence offenses. Further, the legislative history of that statute
does not mention or resolve the conflict with section 23640's ban on diversion for driving
under the influence offenses. However, we presume the Legislature was aware of the
Weatherill decision and its interpretation of section 23640 when it enacted the military
diversion statute. (People v. Hernandez, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 201.) Had the Legislature
intended to depart from the conclusion in Weatherill and create an exception to section
23640, it could have easily done so by stating the military diversion statute authorizes
pretrial diversion for defendants charged with violations of sections 23152 and 23153.
11
2. Application of Rules of Statutory Construction
While the parties generally agree on the rules of statutory construction, they
disagree regarding their application. VanVleck and Kluesner argue the military diversion
statute eliminated any bar on eligibility for diversion for current and former military
members charged with driving under the influence offenses because that statute was
enacted after section 23640. They also argue the military diversion statute prevails over
section 23640 because it is more specific in that it applies only to current and former
military members whereas section 23640 applies generally.
The People, on the other hand, contend section 23640 bars diversion because its
subject matter of driving under the influence diversion is more specific than general
misdemeanor diversion under the military diversion statute. Further, the People argue,
the rule that specific statutes control over general ones takes precedence over the rule that
later-enacted statutes control over older ones. We agree with the People.
" 'If conflicting statutes cannot be reconciled, later enactments supersede earlier
ones [citation], and more specific provisions take precedence over more general ones
[citation].' [Citation.] But when these two rules are in conflict, the rule that specific
provisions take precedence over more general ones trumps the rule that later-enacted
statutes have precedence." (State Dept. of Public Health v. Superior Court, supra, 60
Cal.4th at p. 960; see Miller v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal. 4th 883, 895.)
As the court explained in Weatherill, "[t]he referent of 'general' and 'specific' is
subject matter." (Weatherill, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at p. 1578.) While VanVleck and
Kluesner urge us to look at the classes of people covered by the two statutes at issue to
12
find the military diversion statute is more specific, we must look to the subject matter of
the statutes. Like the cognitive developmental disability diversion statute at issue in
Weatherill, the subject matter of the military diversion statute in this case is misdemeanor
diversion. (Ibid.) "By contrast, the subject matter of section [23640] is driving-under-
the-influence-diversion. It applies to a single type of conduct and comprehends only two
offenses, sections 23152 and 23153. Section [23640] is a specific statute and controls, to
the extent of their inconsistency, the general statute, Penal Code section [1001.80]."
(Ibid.)
Although the military diversion statute was enacted 23 years after section 23640,
the rule that the more specific statute controls over a general one prevails over the rule
that the later-enacted statute controls. Thus, pursuant to section 23640, current and
former military members charged with driving under the influence offenses in violation
of section 23152 and 23153 are ineligible for diversion.3
3. Other Misdemeanor Diversion Statutes
In its amicus brief, the San Diego County District Attorney notes other defendants
contending the military diversion statute applies to driving under the influences offenses
have argued if the Legislature intended to deny them diversion, it would have specifically
denied that right within the military diversion statute, just as it did in Penal Code sections
3 While we believe that the statutory analysis compels this result, if the Legislature
intended for the military diversion statute to apply to driving under the influence
offenses, it should make that intention clear by amending the statute to expressly allow
for diversion in those cases. (See Williams v. Los Angeles Metro. Transit Auth. (1968) 68
Cal. 2d 599, 611 ["If the Legislature in its wisdom believes the law should be otherwise, it
may make the change by express statutory amendment."].)
13
1001.2, subdivision (a), and 1001.51, subdivision (b), pertaining to misdemeanor
diversion. In order to address this argument, we must look at the history of Penal Code
sections 1001.2 and 1001.51.
Penal Code sections 1001.2 and 1001.51 were enacted to negate an earlier opinion
from the Attorney General's Office that concluded the Legislature had preempted the
field of diversion, leaving no authority to local jurisdictions to create diversion programs.
(Davis v. Municipal Court (1988) 46 Cal. 3d 64, 74-75 (Davis).) The Legislature wanted
to make clear it did not intend to preempt the pretrial diversion field (Pen. Code, § 1001)
and provided a " 'model' misdemeanor diversion program with legislatively prescribed
eligibility criteria ([Pen. Code,] § 1001.51, subds. (a) and (c))." (Davis, supra, 46 Cal.3d
at p. 75.) In enacting these statutes, the Legislature also specifically confirmed
misdemeanor diversion does not apply to defendants charged with driving under the
influence offenses. (Pen. Code, §§ 1001.2, subd. (a), 1001.51, subd. (b).) The purpose of
doing so was "to avoid the risk of implied repeal" of section 23640. (Weatherill, supra,
215 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1579-1580.)
As we previously explained, when the Legislature created the military diversion
statute, it was aware of the Weatherill decision. Like the military diversion statute, the
diversion statute for defendants with cognitive developmental disabilities at issue in
Weatherill did not specifically prohibit diversion for driving under the influence offenses.
(Pen. Code, § 1001.21.) Regardless of the specific exemptions for driving under the
influence offenses in Penal Code sections 1001.2 and 1001.51 and failure of the
Legislature to include similar language in the cognitive developmental disability
14
diversion statute, the Weatherill court concluded section 23640 bars diversion for all
driving under the influence offenses. (Weatherill, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1579-
1580.)
Consistent with Weatherill, we conclude the Legislature's specific exclusion of
driving under the influence offenses in Penal Code sections 1001.2 and 1001.51, but not
in the military diversion statute, does not support a conclusion the Legislature intended
for the military diversion statute to supersede section 23640's bar on diversion. Given the
Weatherill decision, the Legislature could have specifically permitted military diversion
for driving under the influence offenses had it intended to do so. Given that it did not,
section 23640 continues to bar diversion for driving under the influence charges.
DISPOSITION
The orders are reversed.
MCCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
HUFFMAN, J.
HALLER, J.
15