People v. Campbell CA2/3 ( 2020 )


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  • Filed 12/24/20 P. v. Campbell CA2/3
    See concurring opinion
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
    not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
    has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION THREE
    THE PEOPLE,                                                   B302318
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                           (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. MA067879)
    v.
    ELMER CAMPBELL,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
    Los Angeles County, Charles A. Chung, Judge. Reversed.
    Jennifer A. Gambale, under appointment by the Court of
    Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
    Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
    Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
    Attorney General, Stephanie C. Brenan, Blythe Leszkay and
    Toni R. Johns Estaville, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
    and Respondent.
    ——————————
    Elmer Campbell appeals from an order denying his petition
    to have his conviction for possessing marijuana in prison reduced
    or dismissed under the Control, Regulate and Tax Adult Use of
    Marijuana Act (the act) (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec.
    (Nov. 8, 2016) Prop. 64, § 1, p. 178 ). We reverse.
    BACKGROUND
    In 2016, Campbell pleaded nolo contendere to possessing
    contraband marijuana in jail (Pen. Code, § 4573.6, subd. (a)). The
    trial court sentenced him to three years in prison. Later that
    year, the electorate passed the act, which generally reduced
    marijuana-related crimes to misdemeanors. In 2019, Campbell
    petitioned to have his conviction redesignated and dismissed
    under Health and Safety Code section 11361.8,1 which was added
    by the act. The trial court, after noting a split of authority
    regarding whether section 11361.8 applies to convictions of Penal
    Code section 4573.6, denied the petition. Campbell thus appeals,
    contending that the act applies to convictions of Penal Code
    section 4573.6.
    DISCUSSION
    Penal Code section 4573.6, subdivision (a), provides that
    any person who knowingly possesses in prison any controlled
    substance, the possession of which is prohibited by division 10 of
    the Health and Safety Code, is guilty of a felony. As pertinent
    here, the act decriminalized possessing less than 28.5 grams of
    marijuana for people 21 years of age or older. (§ 11362.1,
    subd. (a).) A person currently serving a sentence for a conviction
    1 All
    further statutory references are to the Health and
    Safety Code unless otherwise indicated.
    2
    who would not have been guilty of an offense or who would be
    guilty of a lesser offense under the act may petition for recall or
    dismissal of the sentence. (§ 11361.8, subd. (a).) Here, Campbell
    possessed 0.1 grams of marijuana. He therefore contends he is
    entitled to have his conviction recalled or dismissed under the
    act, as he pleaded guilty to possessing less than 28.5 grams of
    marijuana in prison.
    Appellate courts are split on whether the act applies to
    Campbell’s crime of possessing cannabis in a correctional facility,
    and the issue is pending review in the California Supreme Court.
    (See, e.g., People v. Raybon (2019) 
    36 Cal.App.5th 111
    , review
    granted Aug. 21, 2019, S256978 (Raybon); People v. Whalum
    (2020) 
    50 Cal.App.5th 1
    , review granted, Aug. 12, 2020, S262935;
    People v. Herrera (2020) 
    52 Cal.App.5th 982
    , review granted
    Oct. 14, 2020, S264339.)
    Several courts have found that the act does not apply to a
    conviction of Penal Code section 4573.6. (See, e.g., People v. Perry
    (2019) 
    32 Cal.App.5th 885
    ; People v. Herrera, supra,
    
    52 Cal.App.5th 982
    .) In reaching that conclusion, they rely on
    the carve-out provision in section 11362.45, which provides that
    section 11362.1 “does not amend, repeal, affect, restrict, or
    preempt” laws “pertaining to smoking or ingesting cannabis or
    cannabis products” in a facility under the jurisdiction of the
    Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (§ 11362.45,
    subd. (d), italics added). Perry, at pages 891 to 892, broadly
    interpreted “ ‘pertaining to’ ” to include possessing cannabis,
    saying it would be “hard pressed to conclude that possession of
    cannabis is unrelated to smoking or ingesting the substance.”
    The court also rejected the defendant’s argument that
    Penal Code section 4573.6 no longer applies to an adult who
    3
    possesses not more than 28.5 grams of cannabis in prison
    “because the offense is defined by reference to ‘controlled
    substances, the possession of which is prohibited by Division 10,’
    and Proposition 64, by its amendment of . . . section 11357,
    eliminated the prohibition against such possession that
    previously existed in division 10.” (People v. Perry, supra,
    32 Cal.App.5th at p. 893.) The court found that this argument
    rendered meaningless the carve-out provision’s statement that
    the act did not “ ‘amend, repeal, affect, restrict, or preempt’ ” laws
    pertaining to smoking or ingesting cannabis in correctional
    facilities. (Id. at p. 894.) Rather, cannabis “remains a controlled
    substance under division 10. Under the Health and Safety Code
    provisions affected by Proposition 64, all of which are part of
    division 10, cannabis possession is prohibited in a number of
    specific circumstances and its possession or use in penal
    institutions is excluded from the initiative’s affirmative
    legalization provision.” (Perry, at p. 896.)
    Raybon, supra, 
    36 Cal.App.5th 111
     disagreed with Perry
    and concluded that possessing less than an ounce of marijuana in
    prison is no longer a felony per the act. Raybon, at pages 121 to
    122, interpreted section 11362.45’s carve-out provision more
    restrictively. That is, laws pertaining to smoking or ingesting
    cannabis in a penal facility (§ 11362.45, subd. (d)) do not include
    possessing cannabis under Penal Code section 4573.6. The court
    said, “The purpose of the language is to describe the vast array of
    means of consumption and consumption, not possession, is the
    act the voters determined should remain criminalized if the user
    is in prison. We agree with defendants that consumption can be
    achieved in ways not strictly involving smoking or ingesting, such
    as inhaled as a nonburning vapor or applied topically such that it
    4
    is absorbed through the skin. By including the language
    ‘pertaining to smoking and ingesting,’ the drafters allowed for
    these various forms of consumption in prison to remain
    unlawful.” (Raybon, at p. 122.)
    We need not delve deeply into this dispute, as the Supreme
    Court will resolve it. Pending resolution of the issue, we will
    follow Raybon, finding its statutory analysis compelling, and
    reverse the order denying Campbell’s petition.
    DISPOSITION
    The order is reversed.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
    DHANIDINA, J.
    I concur:
    LAVIN, Acting P. J.
    5
    EGERTON, J., Concurring.
    I agree with my colleagues that—pending guidance from
    our Supreme Court—the reasoning of People v. Raybon (2019)
    
    36 Cal.App.5th 111
    , review granted Aug. 21, 2019, S256978—
    is more persuasive than the cases that have reached the opposite
    conclusion. I write to add two observations. First, propositions
    often are poorly drafted. Proposition 64 is a good example. Who
    knows what “pertaining to smoking or ingesting cannabis or
    cannabis products” is supposed to mean? As the courts that have
    disagreed with Raybon note, a person must “possess” cannabis
    in order to smoke or ingest it. On the other hand, as the Raybon
    court points out, had the authors of Proposition 64 wanted to
    include “possessing” with “smoking” and “ingesting,” they could
    have done so. (Raybon, at p. 121.) This sloppiness in drafting
    is unfortunate, as the presence of a controlled substance like
    cannabis in prison plainly is problematic.
    Finally, the amount of cannabis that Campbell possessed
    in this case was one-tenth of a gram. That is about the weight
    of one-tenth of a small paper clip or a plastic cap on a pen, or
    one twenty-fifth of a penny. ( [as of Dec. 22, 2020], archived at .) While the validity of Campbell’s plea is not
    before us, a violation of Penal Code section 4573.6 requires that
    the controlled substance “was a usable amount.” (CALCRIM
    No. 2748.)
    EGERTON, J.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B302318

Filed Date: 12/24/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/24/2020