Palomar Health v. Super. Ct. CA4/1 ( 2020 )


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  • Filed 8/28/20 Palomar Health v. Super. Ct. CA4/1
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION ONE
    STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    PALOMAR HEALTH,                                                 D077802
    Petitioner,                                            (San Diego County Super. Ct.
    No. 37-2020-00014034-CU-WT-
    v.                                                     CTL)
    THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN
    DIEGO COUNTY,
    Respondent;
    TERRI WIEDRE,
    Real Party in Interest.
    ORIGINAL PORCEEDING in mandate. Katherine A. Bacal, Judge.
    Petition granted.
    Fisher & Phillips and David E. Amaya, Megan E. Walker, and Kevonna
    Ahmad for petitioner.
    No appearance for respondent.
    Shegerian and Associates and Carney Shegerian for real party in
    interest.
    Palomar Health petitions for a writ commanding the superior court to
    grant a motion to disqualify the judge assigned to the civil action filed
    against it and others by Terri Wiedre. We grant the petition.
    BACKGROUND
    Wiedre sued Palomar Health and others in superior court for damages
    for employment discrimination, wrongful discharge, and other torts. The
    case was assigned for all purposes to a judge. On July 28, 2020, as its first
    appearance in the action, Palomar Health filed a motion to disqualify the
    judge (also called a peremptory challenge). (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.6.) The
    motion was in the form prescribed by statute (id., § 170.6, subd. (a)(6)), listed
    Palomar Health as the entity making the motion, checked the box for a party,
    and was signed under penalty of perjury by Palomar Health’s attorney, David
    E. Amaya. On July 29, the judge denied the motion because the “declaration
    [was] not signed by declarant (Palomar Health).” On July 31, Amaya
    submitted a second form motion to disqualify the judge, listing himself as the
    entity making the motion, checking the box for an attorney, and signing the
    form under penalty of perjury. The judge denied the motion and wrote on
    the order, “only one motion per side & untimely.”
    Palomar Health promptly petitioned this court for a writ directing the
    superior court to vacate the order denying the July 31 motion and to enter a
    new order granting it and requested a stay of further proceedings in the
    superior court until this court ruled on the petition. (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.3,
    subd. (d).) We granted the stay, notified the parties that we were considering
    issuing a peremptory writ in the first instance, and invited Wiedre to file a
    response to the petition. (Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 
    36 Cal.3d 171
    , 178-180.) Wiedre responded that she did not oppose the relief
    that Palomar had requested.
    2
    DISCUSSION
    The superior court erred by denying as untimely the July 31 motion to
    disqualify. When a civil action has been assigned to a judge for all purposes,
    a defendant or an attorney representing the defendant may file a motion to
    disqualify the judge within 15 days of the defendant’s first appearance in the
    action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.6, subd. (a)(2).) The July 31 motion, filed
    three days after Palomar Health first appeared in the action, was therefore
    timely.
    The superior court also erred by denying the July 31 motion as an
    impermissible second motion by the same side. “In actions or special
    proceedings where there may be more than one plaintiff or similar party
    or more than one defendant or similar party appearing in the action or
    special proceeding, only one motion for each side may be made in any one
    action or special proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.6, subd. (a)(4), italics
    added.) Earlier in the same paragraph, the quoted statute refers to a “duly
    presented” motion, which “without any further act or proof” requires
    reassignment of the case to a different judge. (Ibid.) The purpose of the one-
    motion-per-side rule is to prevent “abuse[] by parties seeking to delay trial or
    to obtain a favorable judge” by filing successive disqualification motions.
    (Johnson v. Superior Court (1958) 
    50 Cal.2d 693
    , 697; accord, The Home Ins.
    Co. v. Superior Court (2005) 
    34 Cal.4th 1025
    , 1032.) Therefore, the limit of
    one motion per side is not met until a motion results in the disqualification of
    the assigned judge. (See Stephens v. Superior Court (2002) 
    96 Cal.App.4th 54
    , 62 [“By enacting section 170.6, the Legislature guaranteed litigants the
    right to automatically disqualify a judge based solely on a good faith belief in
    prejudice”].) Palomar Health’s first motion, filed on July 28 as its first
    appearance in the underlying action, did not result in the disqualification of
    3
    the assigned judge; it was denied for a perceived procedural defect. The
    second motion, filed three days later by Palomar Health’s attorney, was
    therefore not barred by the one-motion-per-side rule.
    Where, as here, “a party timely files, in proper form, a motion to
    disqualify a judge based upon [Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6], the
    trial court is bound to accept the disqualification without further inquiry.”
    (The Home Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 
    supra,
     34 Cal.4th at p. 1032.) To
    correct the superior court’s error in refusing to do so, a peremptory writ in the
    first instance is appropriate. There are no material facts in dispute, the
    applicable law is settled, Palomar Health is clearly entitled to relief,
    disqualification issues require prompt resolution, and no useful purpose
    would be served by plenary consideration of the issue. (Code Civ. Proc.,
    § 1088; Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 
    19 Cal.4th 1232
    , 1240-1241; Frisk v.
    Superior Court (2011) 
    200 Cal.App.4th 402
    , 416.)
    4
    DISPOSITION
    Let a writ issue commanding respondent, immediately upon receipt of
    the writ, to vacate its order denying the July 31, 2020 motion to disqualify
    (peremptory challenge) and to enter a new order granting the motion. The
    stay previously issued by this court will dissolve upon finality of this opinion.
    The parties will bear their own costs. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
    8.493(a)(1)(B).)
    AARON, J.
    WE CONCUR:
    BENKE, Acting P. J.
    IRION, J.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: D077802

Filed Date: 8/28/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/28/2020