Marriage of Bolla CA2/8 ( 2020 )


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  • Filed 9/23/20 Marriage of Bolla CA2/8
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
    not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
    has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION EIGHT
    In re Marriage of GIOVANNI and                                   B295415
    BRENDA BOLLA.
    ________________________________                                 (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. LD075245)
    GIOVANNI BEN BOLLA,
    Appellant,
    v.
    BRENDA BOLLA,
    Respondent.
    APPEAL from order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
    County, Theresa M. Traber, Judge. Affirmed.
    Giovanni Ben Bolla, in pro. per., for Appellant.
    Brenda Bolla, in pro. per., for Respondent.
    _________________________
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
    A.    Background Information
    The parties, Giovanni and Brenda, were married
    September 27, 2010. Six years later, on December 5, 2016,
    Giovanni filed a petition for dissolution of his marriage to
    Brenda.2 Brenda filed a response on December 22, 2016.
    On May 10, 2017, the trial court granted a Domestic
    Violence Restraining Order (DVRO) protecting Brenda against
    Giovanni; we have no moving paperwork or any responsive or
    reply pleadings filed in connection with Brenda’s request. It
    appears the court held hearings on the request for the DVRO on
    March 22 and May 10, 2017, before issuing the DVRO; the record
    on appeal does not include the reporter’s transcript of these
    hearings.
    The DVRO included the following orders: Giovanni shall
    not “[h]arass, attack, strike, threaten, . . . disturb the peace” of
    Brenda. Giovanni shall not “[c]ontact [Brenda], either directly or
    indirectly, by any means” except for brief and peaceful contact
    1     The clerk’s transcript provided by appellant Giovanni does
    not include many pleadings and evidence necessary for our
    review—including but not limited to Brenda’s request to renew
    the domestic violence restraining order (the operative motion),
    Brenda’s original request for domestic violence restraining order,
    and any responsive pleadings filed by Giovanni in opposition.
    Giovanni also failed to provide a reporter’s transcript of the June
    11 and 20, 2018, hearings on the underlying request for renewal.
    Thus, our understanding of the factual and procedural
    background is limited.
    2    Because the parties share the same last name, we refer to
    them by their first names to avoid confusion.
    2
    required for court-ordered visitation of their son and daughter,
    currently 12 and nine years old, respectively. Giovanni was
    ordered to stay away from Brenda, her home, workplace, school,
    and car. The DVRO also included child custody and visitation
    orders, awarding sole legal and physical custody of the children
    to Brenda, and setting unmonitored visitation for Giovanni.
    The DVRO was set to expire after one year, on May 10,
    2018.
    B.    Underlying Action
    On April 18, 2018, Brenda filed a request to renew the
    DVRO that was set to expire in a few weeks. The record on
    appeal does not include a complete copy of Brenda’s request—
    which is the operative underlying motion. We were, however,
    provided with Giovanni’s opposition to Brenda’s request.
    Giovanni “categorically den[ied] all of [Brenda]’s allegations” and
    alleged he “did not violate . . . any court order or restraining
    order.”
    In his opposition, Giovanni describes the acts of abuse
    Brenda alleged in connection with the original request for a
    DVRO. Two incidents had occurred in February 2017, one of
    which resulted in summoning the police. According to Giovanni,
    Brenda accused him of “yelling and screaming, grabbing books
    out of her hand, and pushing her when she tried to get her
    belongings back”; in another incident Giovanni “was accused of
    making threats to [Brenda]’s attorney.” Giovanni said he was
    also “accused of making threats” to go after Brenda for Social
    Security fraud.
    3
    Giovanni’s opposition also purports to describe the
    allegations Brenda set forth as the basis for renewing the DVRO
    against him. Brenda alleged he violated the DVRO by “dropping
    off mail” at Brenda’s residence and “by continuing to send her
    mail through her kids.” We also learn from Giovanni’s pleadings
    that Brenda had requested the court renew the DVRO
    (previously for a one-year period) for a period of five years.
    From the minute orders filed July 10, 2018 and September
    7, 2018, we glean the following:
    The trial court held a hearing on Brenda’s request to renew
    the DVRO on June 11, 2018. The court tentatively ruled Brenda
    had met her burden of demonstrating that Giovanni “violated the
    DVRO by delivering documents that criticized and disparaged
    [Brenda] to her mother and the children’s caregiver and that
    [Brenda] had shown both a subjective and objective apprehension
    of future abuse.” In response to an argument by Giovanni that
    the court’s ruling violated the First Amendment, the trial court
    ordered the parties to “brief the issue of whether it was
    consistent with the First Amendment for the [c]ourt to find that
    [Giovanni] violated the DVRO and/or engaged in domestic
    violence by conveying his filed declaration to third parties.” The
    court set a briefing schedule on “the First Amendment
    implications raised” by Brenda’s contention. Giovanni provided
    us with his supplemental briefing, but not Brenda’s.
    On September 7, 2018, the trial court ruled: “An
    examination of the evidence and findings on which the original
    DVRO was grounded provides support for the conclusion that
    there is a reasonable risk of future abuse.” The trial court
    alluded to the past incidents that were the bases for the original
    DVRO: Giovanni “verbally abused and physically shoved
    4
    [Brenda], engaged in loud, abusive tirades against [Brenda] in
    front of the parties’ children, threatened her, and used
    manipulative and belligerent tactics to exercise financial control
    over [Brenda]. On one occasion, [Giovanni] assaulted the parties’
    son and, on another, he refused to disclose the children’s
    whereabouts to [Brenda] in an effort to torment [her].”
    In the September 7, 2018 minute order, the trial court
    provided its analysis of the factors set forth in Ritchie v. Konrad
    (2004) 
    115 Cal. App. 4th 1275
    . The court evaluated whether
    changed circumstances made future abuse more or less likely.
    Giovanni had argued he had “moved on in his life, is engaged to
    another woman, and is besieged with health problems . . .
    forc[ing] him to use a cane.” The court found while “the outward
    aspects of [Giovanni]’s life ostensibly undermine the likelihood of
    future abuse, the nature of his misconduct following the issuance
    of the initial DVRO . . . was apparently undertaken during the
    time period when [he] was already involved with his fiancée.” The
    trial court found Giovanni’s changed circumstances had not
    actually lessened the likelihood of further abuse. The trial court
    was “serious[ly] concern[ed]” that Giovanni “involved his children
    in this harassment . . . by enlisting his daughter to make a secret
    delivery of documents to [Brenda]’s mother at [Brenda]’s own
    home. These serious violations of the DVRO provide forceful
    support in favor of renewing the DVRO
    The trial court granted Brenda’s request to renew the
    DVRO for a period of five years.
    Giovanni timely appealed.
    5
    DISCUSSION
    We review an order granting or renewing a domestic
    violence restraining order for abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage
    of Nadkarni (2009) 
    173 Cal. App. 4th 1483
    , 1495.)
    We are mindful Giovanni is representing himself on appeal;
    however, he “is to be treated like any other party and is entitled
    to the same, but no greater consideration than other litigants and
    attorneys.” (Barton v. New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc.
    (1996) 
    43 Cal. App. 4th 1200
    , 1210.)
    We are unable to address the somewhat unintelligible
    points raised in Giovanni’s opening brief because the briefing
    fails to pass muster in various ways. Accordingly, we affirm the
    trial court’s judgment.
    I.    Giovanni failed to provide citations to the record.
    “An appellant must support his argument in the briefs by
    appropriate references to the record, which includes providing
    exact page citation. [Citations.]” (Byars v. SCME Mortgage
    Bankers, Inc. (2003) 
    109 Cal. App. 4th 1134
    , 1140.) An appellant’s
    brief must “[s]upport any reference to a matter in the record by a
    citation to the volume and page number of the record where the
    matter appears.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).)
    Indeed, “[i]t is axiomatic that an appellant must support all
    statements of fact in his [or her] briefs with citations to the
    record.” (Pierotti v. Torian (2000) 
    81 Cal. App. 4th 17
    , 29.)
    When a party fails to provide a single citation to the record
    on appeal to support his or her arguments, we may properly
    disregard the brief and treat the unsupported issues and/or
    contentions as waived or forfeited. (Lonely Maiden Productions,
    LLC v. GoldenTree Asset Management, LP (2011)
    
    201 Cal. App. 4th 368
    , 384; Alki Partners, LP v. DB Fund Services,
    6
    LLC (2016) 
    4 Cal. App. 5th 574
    , 589.) “We look askance at this
    practice of stating what purports to be facts—and not
    unimportant facts—without support in the record. This is a
    violation of the rules . . . with the consequence that such
    assertions will, at a minimum, be disregarded. [Citation.]”
    (Liberty National Enterprises, LP v. Chicago Title Ins. Co. (2011)
    
    194 Cal. App. 4th 839
    , 846.)
    Giovanni’s opening brief is devoid of any citation to the
    record. His opening brief contains four and one-half pages of
    what he refers to as “statement of case arguments” and it is the
    only part of his brief where he includes any factual history.
    However, it is written in the formatting style of a declaration
    (i.e., “I, Giovanni Ben Bolla, born on July 23, 1948, filed for
    divorce . . . .”), with no citations to the clerk’s transcript.
    Giovanni did not provide any background about the incidents of
    past abuse that are the bases for the original DVRO, nor did he
    provide adequate information about the incidents Brenda relied
    on in requesting a five-year renewal of the DVRO. His somewhat
    unintelligible brief, which appears to include cut-and-paste
    pleadings from the trial court record, includes arguments that do
    not make sense without relevant factual history to enable us to
    understand the context.
    Giovanni is obligated to support his arguments on appeal
    by adequately raising and briefing them with citations to the
    record and supporting authority (Mark Tanner Construction, Inc.
    v. HUB Internat. Ins. Services, Inc. (2014) 
    224 Cal. App. 4th 574
    ,
    583); he failed to do so in his opening brief. For that reason
    alone, we have authority to affirm the lower court’s order.
    7
    II.   Giovanni failed to provide an adequate record
    demonstrating error by the trial court.
    Even if Giovanni’s brief contained citations to the record,
    those citations are only as useful as the record to which they
    refer, and here, the record provided by Giovanni is inadequate to
    begin with.
    “[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that
    a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and
    the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the
    record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court
    committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.”
    (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 
    5 Cal. 5th 594
    , 608–609.) “ ‘All
    intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on
    matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be
    affirmatively shown.’ ” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970)
    
    2 Cal. 3d 557
    , 564.) To overcome this presumption, an appellant
    must provide a record that allows for meaningful review of the
    challenged order. (Foust v. San Jose Construction Co., Inc. (2011)
    
    198 Cal. App. 4th 181
    , 187.) Failure to provide an adequate record
    requires that the issue be resolved against the appellant. (Maria
    P. v. Riles (1987) 
    43 Cal. 3d 1281
    , 1295; see Oliveira v. Kiesler
    (2012) 
    206 Cal. App. 4th 1349
    , 1362.)
    At a minimum, the record on appeal is missing the
    following key materials: Brenda’s request to renew the domestic
    violence restraining order (the operative motion), the original
    request for domestic violence restraining order, responsive
    pleadings filed by Giovanni in opposition, and the two
    supplemental briefs filed by Brenda on the First Amendment
    issue. Giovanni also failed to provide a reporter’s transcript of
    the hearings of June 11 and July 20, 2018, on the underlying
    request for renewal, as well as a reporter’s transcript of the
    8
    hearings on the original DVRO request on March 22 and May 10,
    2017.
    Without providing us with the moving pleadings from the
    initial DVRO request and all evidence submitted (including
    testimony elicited during the hearings of March 22 and May 10,
    2017), we are left in the dark as to what incidents took place that
    lead the court to issue the initial DVRO against Giovanni for a
    one-year period.
    Similarly, as already noted, Giovanni did not include as
    part of the clerk’s transcript on appeal pleadings, declarations, or
    exhibits filed by Brenda in connection with the renewal of the
    DVRO. The court held two hearings in connection with the
    renewal request, on June 11 and July 10, 2018; without the
    transcripts to these proceedings, we do not have a record of the
    testimony (if any) of the parties and witnesses, the arguments
    presented, and findings made by the court. This precludes us
    from effectively reviewing the court’s order to determine whether
    there was an abuse of discretion.
    In the absence of cogent arguments based on specific record
    citations and without the missing relevant documentation,
    pleadings, and exhibits from the underlying trial court case, we
    must presume the trial court’s order is correct. In light of these
    egregious violations of basic appellate norms, we affirm the
    judgement without discussing the merits.
    9
    DISPOSITION
    The order is affirmed. Respondent Brenda Bolla is to
    recover her costs on appeal.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    STRATTON, J.
    We concur:
    BIGELOW, P. J.
    WILEY, J.
    10
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B295415

Filed Date: 9/24/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 9/24/2020