City of Redondo Beach v. Padilla ( 2020 )


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  • Filed 3/23/20
    CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION SEVEN
    CITY OF REDONDO BEACH,              B294016
    Plaintiff and Respondent,    (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. BS172218)
    v.
    ALEX PADILLA, as Secretary
    of State, etc.,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
    Los Angeles County, Mitchell L. Beckloff, Judge. Affirmed.
    Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Thomas S. Patterson,
    Senior Assistant Attorney General, Stepan A. Haytayan and
    Jonathan M. Eisenberg, Deputy Attorneys General, for
    Defendants and Appellants.
    Michael W. Webb, City Attorney; Richards, Watson &
    Gershon, Lisa Bond, T. Peter Pierce and Marvin E. Bonilla for
    Plaintiff and Respondent.
    Dennis J. Herrera, San Francisco City Attorney, Yvonne R.
    Meré, Chief of Complex and Affirmative Litigation, Aileen M.
    McGrath, Co-Chief of Appellate Litigation, and Ronald H. Lee,
    Deputy City Attorney, for League of California Cities as Amicus
    Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.
    _________________________________
    In 2015 the California Legislature enacted the California
    Voter Participation Rights Act (Elec. Code, §§ 14050-14057)1
    (VPRA) to remedy the typically low voter turnout in off-cycle local
    elections.2 The VPRA requires political subdivisions in the state
    to consolidate local elections with statewide on-cycle elections if
    the local jurisdiction’s turnout falls at least 25 percent below the
    locality’s average voter turnout in the previous four statewide
    general elections.
    The City of Redondo Beach challenged the VPRA on the
    ground it improperly infringed the plenary authority conferred on
    charter cities by article XI, section 5, of the California
    Constitution to schedule their own elections for local offices. The
    superior court upheld the City’s challenge, issued a writ of
    mandate barring the Secretary of State from enforcing the VPRA
    against the City and declared it unconstitutional as applied to
    charter cities. We affirm the judgment to the extent it restrains
    the Secretary from enforcing the VPRA against the City on the
    1     Statutory references are to this code unless otherwise
    stated.
    2      “Elections that are held at the same time as statewide
    elections are often referred to as ‘on-cycle’ elections, while
    elections held at other times are often referred to as ‘off-cycle’
    elections.” (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses,
    Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 415 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) as amended
    June 23, 2015, p. 5.)
    2
    ground the Legislature failed to clearly provide the VPRA applies
    to charter cities.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    1. The VPRA
    The VPRA was signed into law on September 1, 2015 and
    became operative January 1, 2018. Section 14052,
    subdivision (a), provides that “a political subdivision shall not
    hold an election other than on a statewide election date if holding
    an election on a nonconcurrent date has previously resulted in a
    significant decrease in voter turnout.” A “‘[p]olitical subdivision’”
    is defined as “a geographic area of representation created for the
    provision of government services, including, but not limited to, a
    city, a school district, a community college district, or other
    district organized pursuant to state law.” (§ 14051, subd. (a).)
    “‘Significant decrease in voter turnout’ means the voter turnout
    for a regularly scheduled election in a political subdivision is at
    least 25 percent less than the average voter turnout within that
    political subdivision for the previous four statewide general
    elections.”3 (Id., subd. (b).)
    3     Other provisions permit a political subdivision a respite
    from enforcement if, by the operative date of January 1, 2018, it
    has adopted a plan to consolidate a future election with a
    statewide election no later than the November 8, 2022 statewide
    general election (§ 14052, subd. (b)); authorize the superior court
    to implement appropriate remedies for a violation (§ 14053);
    authorize a voter who resides in the political subdivision to sue to
    enforce the VPRA if the political subdivision has failed to do so
    (§ 14055); and authorize the recovery of reasonable attorney fees
    and costs (§ 14054).
    3
    On July 11, 2017 the Attorney General issued an opinion
    concluding the VPRA applies to charter cities and school districts
    governed by city charter.
    2. The City of Redondo Beach’s Challenge to the VPRA
    The City of Redondo Beach is a charter city. Its charter
    requires all municipal and school board elections to be held on
    “the first Tuesday after the first Monday in March of each
    succeeding odd-numbered year . . . .” School board elections are
    required to be consolidated with municipal elections.
    Notwithstanding these charter provisions, in October 2017 the
    City school board unanimously adopted a resolution rescheduling
    board member elections to the first Tuesday after the first
    Monday in November of each even-numbered year beginning in
    November 2020 to encourage voter participation and to comply
    with the VPRA. The board’s resolution relied on an analysis of
    voter turnout rates that demonstrated “a significant decrease in
    voter turnout in odd-numbered years as compared to statewide
    election dates.”
    The Redondo Beach City Council considered the effect of
    the VPRA at a November 7, 2017 meeting. A memorandum
    prepared by the City Clerk and the City Attorney advised the
    Council there was a question as to the applicability of the VPRA
    to charter cities but acknowledged that the City’s last four local
    off-cycle elections showed at least a 25 percent voter turnout
    decline from the average turnout of the previous four statewide
    general elections. A memorandum from the office of the Los
    Angeles County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk to Redondo
    Beach’s City Clerk compared the estimated costs to the City for
    on-cycle and off-cycle municipal elections: The costs for on-cycle
    general municipal elections (that is, elections consolidated with
    4
    statewide general elections) ranged between $97,000 and
    $111,000, while the projected costs for stand alone, off-cycle
    elections ranged between $588,000 and $593,000.
    Despite these data and the school board’s action, the City
    initiated this lawsuit, filing a petition for writ of mandate under
    Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 and a complaint for
    declaratory relief against the State of California and the
    Secretary of State.4 The City sought a writ of mandate
    prohibiting the Secretary from applying the VPRA to the City;
    injunctive relief precluding the Secretary from enforcing the
    VPRA against the City; and a judicial declaration the VPRA is
    unconstitutional as applied to charter cities.
    3. The Superior Court’s Decision
    The matter was briefed for the court;5 and the League of
    California Cities, an association of cities throughout California,
    4      The City erroneously named the State of California as a
    defendant. A mandamus action contesting the constitutionality
    of a state law is properly brought against the state officer who
    bears the duty of enforcing that law. (American Indian Health &
    Services Corp. v. Kent (2018) 
    24 Cal.App.5th 772
    , 784;
    Covarrubias v. Cohen (2016) 
    3 Cal.App.5th 1229
    , 1231, fn. 3.)
    5      With their briefing, both sides submitted declarations from
    their expert witnesses. The City’s expert, Douglas Johnson,
    Ph.D., runs an election consulting firm that advises jurisdictions
    on redistricting and other election issues. Dr. Johnson opined
    that voter turnout in off-cycle elections sometimes exceeds the
    turnout in on-cycle elections but had never attempted to quantify
    the relationship. He also opined that low voter turnout is
    essentially benign, reflecting the fact that “residents are happy
    with how things are going” and that off-cycle local elections tend
    to “bring out voters who are particularly interested in and aware
    5
    was permitted to file an amicus curiae brief in support of the
    City’s position the VPRA does not apply to charter cities.
    After a hearing the superior court made no specific findings
    but entered judgment in favor of the City and issued a writ of
    of issues in their local jurisdiction.” He also pointed to the
    problem known as “voter roll off,” which refers to the tendency of
    some voters to tire of lengthy ballots and leave them incomplete,
    to the detriment of local races found in the latter part of the
    ballot.
    The Secretary’s expert, Zoltan L. Hajnal, Ph.D., a professor
    of political science at the University of California, San Diego,
    opined that aligning municipal elections with statewide elections
    dramatically increases voter turnout and cited multiple studies
    confirming this effect. Professor Hajnal was the lead author of a
    2002 study sponsored by the Public Policy Institute of California
    that collected and reviewed available voter turnout data and
    concluded that consolidation of local elections with statewide
    elections offered “[t]he first and most important step to increase
    voter participation in city elections.” (Hajnal et al., Municipal
    Elections in California: Turnout, Timing, and Competition (2002)
    p. xi.) Hajnal’s subsequent book, America’s Uneven Democracy:
    Race, Turnout, and Representation in City Politics (Cambridge
    Press 2010), won the American Political Science Association’s
    award for best book on urban politics. Recent studies have
    confirmed Professor Hajnal’s view that the voters in off-cycle
    elections are less representative of the public as a whole than
    those in on-cycle contests. (See Kogan et al., Election Timing,
    Electorate Composition, and Policy Outcomes: Evidence from
    School Districts (2018) 62 Am.J. of Pol. Sci. 637 [finding voters in
    on-cycle elections in California significantly more representative
    of the voting age population in terms of race, income and age
    than voters in off-cycle elections]; Anzia, Timing and Turnout:
    How Off-Cycle Elections Favor Organized Groups (U. Chicago
    Press 2014).)
    6
    mandate prohibiting the Secretary from enforcing the VPRA
    against the City and declared the VPRA unconstitutional as
    applied to charter cities.
    DISCUSSION
    1. Standard of Review
    A writ of mandate “may be issued by any court . . . to
    compel the performance of an act which the law specifically
    enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or to
    compel the admission of a party to the use and enjoyment of a
    right or office to which the party is entitled, and from which the
    party is unlawfully precluded . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085,
    subd. (a).) Mandamus under section 1085 is the appropriate
    vehicle to challenge the constitutionality or validity of statutes or
    other official acts. (See Jolicoeur v. Mihaly (1971) 
    5 Cal.3d 565
    ,
    570, fn. 2 [mandate is the appropriate remedy for compelling a
    public official to act in accordance with the law and challenging
    the constitutionality or validity of a statute].) Because the
    construction and validity of a statute is a question of law, we
    review the superior court’s decision de novo. (Vergara v. State of
    California (2016) 
    246 Cal.App.4th 619
    , 642; accord, Boyer v.
    County of Ventura (2019) 
    33 Cal.App.5th 49
    , 53.)
    2. The Authority of Charter Cities over the Timing of
    Municipal Elections
    California law recognizes two types of cities. A city
    organized under the general law of the Legislature is referred to
    as a general law city. (Gov. Code, § 34102.) A municipality
    organized under a charter, like the City of Redondo Beach, is a
    charter city. (Gov. Code, § 34101.) As the Supreme Court
    explained in State Building & Construction Trades Council of
    7
    California v. City of Vista (2012) 
    54 Cal.4th 547
    , 555 (Vista),
    “Charter cities are specifically authorized by our state
    Constitution to govern themselves, free of state legislative
    intrusion, as to those matters deemed municipal affairs.
    Article XI, section 5, subdivision (a) of the California Constitution
    provides: ‘It shall be competent in any city charter to provide that
    the city governed thereunder may make and enforce all
    ordinances and regulations in respect to municipal affairs, subject
    only to restrictions and limitations provided in their several
    charters and in respect to other matters they shall be subject to
    general laws. City charters adopted pursuant to this Constitution
    shall supersede any existing charter, and with respect to
    municipal affairs shall supersede all laws inconsistent therewith.’”
    (Italics omitted.) Known as the home rule doctrine, the broad
    authority of charter cities was originally “‘enacted upon the
    principle that the municipality itself knew better what it wanted
    and needed than the state at large, and to give that municipality
    the exclusive privilege and right to enact direct legislation which
    would carry out and satisfy its wants and needs.’ [Citation.] The
    provision represents an ‘affirmative constitutional grant to
    charter cities of “all powers appropriate for a municipality to
    possess . . .” and [includes] the important corollary that “so far as
    ‘municipal affairs’ are concerned,” charter cities are “supreme and
    beyond the reach of legislative enactment.”’” (Id. at pp. 555-556;
    see Johnson v. Bradley (1992) 
    4 Cal.4th 389
    , 394-398; California
    Fed. Savings & Loan Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 
    54 Cal.3d 1
    , 12 (CalFed).)
    In Johnson v. Bradley, supra, 4 Cal.4th at page 398 the
    Court elaborated on the constitutional definition of “municipal
    affair”: “Whereas subdivision (a) of article XI, section 5,
    8
    articulates the general principle of self-governance,
    subdivision (b) sets out a nonexclusive list of four ‘core’ categories
    that are, by definition, ‘municipal affairs.’ The first three
    categories of municipal affairs are: (1) regulation, etc., of ‘the city
    police force’; (2) ‘subgovernment in all or part of a city’; and
    (3) ‘conduct of city elections.’ The final category gives charter
    cities exclusive power to regulate the ‘manner’ of electing
    ‘municipal officers.’ It provides, ‘(4) plenary authority is hereby
    granted, subject only to the restrictions of this article, to provide
    [in all city charters for] the manner in which, the method by
    which, the times at which, and the terms for which the several
    municipal officers . . . shall be elected.’” (Italics & fn. omitted.)
    Charter cities’ constitutional authority over municipal
    elections is reflected in statutes governing election timing.
    Section 1000 currently sets forth three “established election
    dates” for elections within the state: “(a) The first Tuesday after
    the first Monday in March of each year[;] (b) The second Tuesday
    of April in each even-numbered year[; and] (c) The first Tuesday
    after the first Monday in November of each year.” Section 1003,
    subdivision (b), however, provides that “[t]his chapter shall not
    apply to the following: . . . (b) Elections held in chartered cities or
    chartered counties in which the charter provisions are
    inconsistent with this chapter,” thus acknowledging and
    preserving the authority of charter cities over election timing.
    The City’s charter is consistent with section 1000, as it
    identifies “the first Tuesday after the first Monday in March of
    each succeeding odd-numbered year” for elections to fill elective
    offices within the City. (Redondo Beach Charter, § 18.) The
    charter further provides, “All elections held under this Charter
    shall be held and conducted in accordance with the provisions of
    9
    the Elections Code of the State of California as the same now
    exists or may hereafter be amended, for the holding of elections
    in general law cities unless such provisions are in conflict with
    the provisions of this Charter or unless an ordinance providing
    for the manner of holding and conducting elections is adopted by
    the City Council.” (Id., § 18.2.)
    If construed to apply to charter cities, the VPRA conflicts
    with the City’s charter, requiring the City to adopt an ordinance
    altering the date of its municipal elections. When a statute
    clearly intended to apply to charter cities appears to conflict with
    a city’s constitutional home rule authority, a court must utilize a
    four-part analytical framework to determine whether the city’s
    authority must cede to the state’s: (1) “whether the city
    ordinance at issue regulates an activity that can be characterized
    as a ‘municipal affair’”; (2) whether there is “‘an actual conflict
    between [local and state law]’”; (3) “whether the state law
    addresses a matter of ‘statewide concern’”; and (4) “whether the
    law is ‘reasonably related to . . . resolution’ of that concern
    [citation] and ‘narrowly tailored’ to avoid unnecessary
    interference in local governance.” (Vista, supra, 54 Cal.4th at
    p. 556, quoting CalFed, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 16-17; accord,
    Marquez v. City of Long Beach (2019) 
    32 Cal.App.5th 552
    , 565.)
    3. The Legislature Has Failed To Demonstrate a Clear
    Intention To Apply the VPRA to Charter Cities
    a. Courts have usually insisted on statutory language
    clearly including charter cities before engaging in the
    CalFed/Vista constitutional analysis
    “‘The first principle of statutory construction requires us to
    interpret the words of the statute themselves, giving them their
    ordinary meaning, and reading them in the context of the statute
    10
    . . . as a whole.’” (People v. Gonzales (2017) 
    2 Cal.5th 858
    , 868.)
    The “plain meaning” rule, however, “does not prohibit a court from
    determining whether the literal meaning of a statute comports
    with its purpose or whether such a construction of one provision is
    consistent with other provisions of the statute. The meaning of a
    statute may not be determined from a single word or sentence; the
    words must be construed in context, and provisions relating to the
    same subject matter must be harmonized to the extent possible.”
    (Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 
    45 Cal.3d 727
    , 735; see Mendoza v.
    Nordstrom, Inc. (2017) 
    2 Cal.5th 1074
    , 1084 [“‘[w]e do not construe
    statutory language in isolation, but rather as a thread in the
    fabric of the entire statutory scheme of which it is a part’”];
    DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara (2012) 
    55 Cal.4th 983
    ,
    992 [if the statutory language is reasonably subject to multiple
    interpretations, a court will consider extrinsic aids, such as “‘“‘the
    legislative history, public policy, contemporaneous administrative
    construction, and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a
    part’”’”].)
    The Secretary contends the plain language of the VPRA,
    which applies to a “political subdivision” defined as “a geographic
    area of representation created for the provision of government
    services, including, but not limited to, a city . . . ,” establishes the
    Legislature’s intent that the VPRA applies to all cities, not just
    general law cities. The Legislature, however, is usually quite
    specific when it intends the term “political subdivision” to include
    charter cities. For instance, the Government Code often specifies
    “charter cities” or “any city” when defining or utilizing the term
    “political subdivision.” (See, e.g., Gov. Code, §§ 53208.5, 53217.5
    & 53060.1 [setting various limits on benefits for “members of the
    legislative bodies of all political subdivisions of the state,
    11
    including charter cities and charter counties”], 8557, 8698, 12650
    & 12424 [“political subdivision” includes “any city, city and
    county [or] county”], 37364, subd. (e) [“[t]he provisions of this
    section shall apply to all cities, including charter cities”].)6
    Likewise, the Supreme Court and courts of appeal have
    often demanded a clearer indication than the use of a general
    6      The City and amicus curiae League of California Cities
    identify several other statutes defining “political subdivision” to
    include charter cities or otherwise specifying their application to
    charter cities. (See, e.g., Pub. Util. Code, §§ 5810 [“political
    subdivision” defined as “a general law city, general law county,
    charter city, charter county, charter city and county”], 21010
    [“political subdivision” defined as “any county, city, city and
    county . . . or other political entity”], 21690.6 [“[t]he provisions of
    this article shall apply to any airport owned or operated by a
    political subdivision, including a charter city”]; Rev. & Tax. Code,
    §§ 30462 [section 30111 prohibits imposition of taxes by “any city,
    charter city, town, county, charter county, city and county, . . . or
    other political subdivision or agency of this state”], 18670,
    subd. (a) [“political subdivision” includes “a city organized under
    a freeholders’ charter”]; Pub. Contract Code, §§ 7203, subd. (c)
    [applies to “a city, charter city, county, charter county, . . . and
    any other political subdivision”], 20671, subd. (b) [defining “public
    entity” as “any city, charter city, city and county, . . . or political
    subdivision of the state”]; Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16117 [“‘City’
    includes a charter city”]; Health & Saf. Code, § 12081, subd. (e)
    [“no city, county, city and county, or other political subdivision of
    this state, including, but not limited to, a chartered city, county,
    or city and county”]; Elec. Code, § 306 [term “city measure”
    includes “any proposed city charter”]; Veh. Code, § 34002,
    subd. (a) [“no state agency, city, city and county, county, or other
    political subdivision of this state, including, but not limited to, a
    chartered city, city and county, or county, shall adopt or enforce
    any ordinance or regulation . . . inconsistent with this division”].)
    12
    term, be it “a political subdivision” or “a city,” before concluding a
    statute is intended to apply to charter cities.7 In Vista, supra,
    54 Cal.4th at page 554 the Supreme Court cited an earlier version
    of the prevailing wage law that “expressly referred to charter
    cities in a provision requiring such cities to pay prevailing wages
    in contracts for street or sewer improvement work.” Similarly, in
    Johnson v. Bradley, supra, 
    4 Cal.4th 389
    , the statute at issue (the
    Political Reform Act of 1974, Gov. Code, §§ 81000-91015)
    7      In fact, the term “political subdivision of the state” has
    been construed to distinguish counties from “municipal
    corporations” with separate and distinct powers and purposes. In
    rejecting a claim that former Civil Code section 3287 applied to
    municipal corporations, the Supreme Court explained in Abbott v.
    City of Los Angeles (1958) 
    50 Cal.2d 438
    , 467-468, “‘A county is a
    governmental agency or political subdivision of the state,
    organized for purposes of exercising some functions of the state
    government, whereas a municipal corporation is an incorporation
    of the inhabitants of a specified region for purposes of local
    government.’ This view was relied upon and reiterated in Otis v.
    City of Los Angeles (1942) 
    52 Cal.App.2d 605
    , 611-612, wherein it
    was decided that actions for declaratory relief under section 1060
    of the Code of Civil Procedure may be maintained against
    municipal corporations. In so deciding the court expressly
    recognized . . . [citations] that section 1060 of the Code of Civil
    Procedure does not authorize the bringing of an action for
    declaratory relief against the state or its political subdivision, but
    declared [citation] that ‘respondents’ contention that the legal
    status of a municipal corporation is akin to that of a county
    cannot be sustained either upon reason or authority.’” (See, e.g.,
    Wat. Code, §§ 83-60 [addressing powers of “[a]ny district,
    municipality, or political subdivision of the State”], 8618
    [addressing power of “[a]ll political subdivisions, agencies of the
    State, and municipal and quasi-municipal corporations” to make
    agreements relating to flood control].)
    13
    contained a provision (Gov. Code, § 82008) expressly defining
    “city” to mean “a general law or a chartered city.” (See also
    Anderson v. City of San Jose (2019) 
    42 Cal.App.5th 683
    , 694 [as
    provided by Gov. Code, § 54221, subd. (a), the Surplus Land Act
    (Gov. Code, §§ 54220-54233) “applies to ‘every city, whether
    organized under general law or by charter’”].) In Marquez v. City
    of Long Beach, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at page 569, this court found
    the minimum wage provisions of certain Industrial Welfare
    Commission’s wage orders apply to charter cities because the
    wage orders used the term “‘any city.’” (See also Baggett v. Gates
    (1982) 
    32 Cal.3d 128
    , 131 [Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of
    Rights Act (Gov. Code, §§ 3300-3311) applies to “any” public safety
    department (Gov. Code, § 3309.5, subd. (a))]; Trader Sports, Inc. v.
    City of San Leandro (2001) 
    93 Cal.App.4th 37
    , 45 ([determining
    provisions of Proposition 62 to be “facially applicable to charter
    cities”; Gov. Code, § 53720, subd. (a), defined “‘local governments’
    for purposes of implementing Proposition 62’s provisions as
    including ‘any county, city, city and county, including a chartered
    city or county’”].)
    Only two recent decisions have not addressed this
    threshold statutory issue: Jauregui v. City of Palmdale (2014)
    
    226 Cal.App.4th 781
     (Jauregui) and City of Huntington Beach v.
    Becerra (2020) 
    44 Cal.App.5th 243
    . In each of those cases, the
    court engaged in the CalFed/Vista constitutional analysis
    without first considering whether the Legislature intended the
    statute to apply to charter cities.8 Their significance for our
    8     Our review of the briefing in those cases confirms that
    neither city made a statutory argument regarding the
    Legislature’s intention and instead focused on the conflict
    14
    decision on this point is therefore quite limited: “[I]t is axiomatic
    that cases are not authority for propositions not considered.”
    (People v. Alvarez (2002) 
    27 Cal.4th 1161
    , 1176; see Johnson v.
    Bradley, 
    supra,
     4 Cal.4th at p. 415 (conc. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).)
    b. The legislative history of the VPRA does not indicate a
    clear intention to include charter cities
    The VPRA does not include a comprehensive definition of
    its intended reach. As introduced by State Senator Benjamin
    Hueso, Senate Bill No. 415 stated, “It is the intent of the
    Legislature to enact legislation to prohibit a political subdivision
    from holding an election on a date other than the date of a
    statewide direct primary election or statewide general election if
    doing so would result in a significant decrease in voter turnout as
    compared to the voter turnout at a statewide election.” (Sen. Bill
    No. 415 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) § 1, as introduced Feb. 25, 2015.)
    An amended version designated the title of the bill and defined
    “political subdivision” as “a geographic area of representation
    created for the provision of government services, including, but
    not limited to, a city, a school district, a community college
    district, or other district organized pursuant to state law.” (Sen.
    Bill No. 415 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 6, 2015.)
    The definition of “political subdivision” remained unchanged
    thereafter and is codified in section 14051, subdivision (a).
    Senate Bill No. 415’s definition of “political subdivision”
    was apparently borrowed from the California Voting Rights Act,
    Elections Code section 14025 et seq. (CVRA), enacted in 2002 to
    prevent political subdivisions from using at-large elections to
    between the respective statutes at issue and the cities’
    constitutional home rule authority.
    15
    dilute the votes of members of a protected class. (See § 14026,
    former subd. (c), added by Stats. 2002, ch. 129, § 1.) Ruling on a
    challenge to the CVRA in Jauregui, supra, 
    226 Cal.App.4th 781
    ,
    Division Five of this court assumed the Legislature intended the
    CVRA to apply to charter cities and evaluated the statute under
    the analytical framework of CalFed and Vista, concluding that
    the dilution of votes of a protected class is a matter of statewide
    concern and does not unnecessarily infringe on the constitutional
    authority of charter cities. (Jauregui, at pp. 795-802.)
    Only two weeks before the introduction of Senate Bill
    No. 415, however, Assemblymember Roger Hernández, a
    co-author of the bill, introduced Assembly Bill No. 277 (2015-2016
    Reg. Sess.), which amended the CVRA’s definition of political
    subdivision to encompass “a geographic area of representation
    created for the provision of government services, including, but
    not limited to, a general law city, general law county, charter city,
    charter county, charter city and county, a school district,
    community college district, or other district organized pursuant to
    state law.” (§ 14026, subd. (c).) Enacted into law (see Stats. 2015,
    ch. 724, § 2), Assembly Bill No. 277 expressly affirmed the
    Legislature’s intent to clarify the CVRA’s application to charter
    cities and counties and to codify the holding in Jauregui. (Sen.
    Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of
    Assem. Bill No. 277 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 7,
    2015, p. 3.)
    The City contends this essentially contemporaneous
    amendment of the CVRA to expressly include charter cities and
    introduction of the VPRA using the original, less specific
    definition of “political subdivision” demonstrate the Legislature
    did not intend the VPRA to apply to charter cities. Otherwise, it
    16
    argues, the Legislature would have utilized the more inclusive
    definition of a political subdivision in the VPRA. (See Scher v.
    Burke (2017) 
    3 Cal.5th 136
    , 144-145 [“[a]s a general rule, when
    the Legislature uses a term in one provision of a statute but
    omits it from another . . . we generally presume that the
    Legislature did so deliberately, in order ‘“to convey a different
    meaning”’”].)
    Indeed, an analogous legislative background led the
    Supreme Court in Ector v. City of Torrance (1973) 
    10 Cal.3d 129
    (Ector) to reject a claim that a state statute barring local agencies
    from requiring employees to live within their jurisdiction
    prevailed over a contrary city charter provision. There, the City
    of Torrance fired an employee when it was discovered he lived
    outside the city. The employee sued for reinstatement citing
    Government Code section 50083, enacted in 1970, which
    provided, “No local agency or district shall require that its
    employees be residents of such local agency or district.”
    Government Code section 50001 defined “‘[l]ocal agency’ as used
    in this division” to mean “county, city, or city and county, unless
    the context otherwise requires.” The Court reasoned the
    definition did not include charter cities because, in the legislative
    session immediately following the adoption of section 50083, the
    Legislature had rejected an attempt in the Assembly to amend
    the definition of “local agency” to expressly include charter cities
    and to limit cities’ constitutional authority to implement
    residency requirements. (Ector, at pp. 133-134.) As the Court
    explained, “We may reasonably infer that by so voting the
    Legislature rejected the very extension of the statute which
    appellant now asks us to adopt under the guise of judicial
    construction. This, of course, we may not do.” (Id. at p. 134.)
    17
    In addition to analyzing this legislative history of
    Government Code section 50083, the Ector Court recognized that
    broadly construing the definition of “local agency” to include a
    charter city would raise a serious constitutional question and
    explained, “We must presume that in adopting section 50083 the
    Legislature intended to enact a valid statute.” (Ector, supra,
    10 Cal.3d at p. 133.) Accordingly, to prevent a conflict with the
    “explicit constitutional authorization” of charter cities to set their
    employees’ qualifications, the Court held the Legislature “meant
    to limit [section 50083’s] reach to general law cities.” (Ibid.; see
    People v. Buza (2018) 
    4 Cal.5th 658
    , 682 [“a statute will be
    interpreted to avoid serious constitutional questions if such an
    interpretation is fairly possible”]; People v. Gutierrez (2014)
    
    58 Cal.4th 1354
    , 1373 [“[w]hen a question of statutory
    interpretation implicates constitutional issues, . . . ‘“[i]f a statute
    is susceptible of two constructions, one of which will render it
    constitutional and the other unconstitutional in whole or in part,
    or raise serious and doubtful constitutional questions, the court
    will adopt the construction which, without doing violence to the
    reasonable meaning of the language used, will render it valid in
    its entirety, or free from doubt as to its constitutionality, even
    though the other construction is equally reasonable”’”]; see also
    Santa Clara County Local Transportation Authority v. Guardino
    (1995) 
    11 Cal.4th 220
    , 230 [courts “‘“will not decide constitutional
    questions where other grounds are available and dispositive of
    the issues of the case”’”].)9
    9     A legislative proposed, voter approved constitutional
    amendment in 1976 revised Article XI, section 10, of the
    Constitution to disallow residency requirements of the sort relied
    on by the City of Torrance.
    18
    In addition to Assembly Bill No. 277, Assemblymember
    Hernández introduced Assembly Bill No. 254 (2015-2016 Reg.
    Sess.) during the same legislative session. That bill sought to
    require cities, school districts, community college districts and
    special districts to hold their general elections in conjunction with
    statewide elections by deleting the off-cycle election dates from
    section 1000, as well as the exemption for charter cities in
    section 1003. Citing the plethora of research (including Professor
    Hajnal’s) showing that consolidation of local elections with
    statewide elections is the single best means of increasing voter
    turnout, the bill declared its intent to apply to every political
    subdivision in the state, including charter cities and counties.
    (See Assem. Bill No. 254 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) as amended
    Mar. 18, 2015, §§ 2-4; Assem. Com. on Elections and
    Redistricting, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 254 (2015-2016 Reg.
    Sess.) as amended March 18, 2015.) On June 1, 2015, however,
    the bill was amended to delete the proposed amendments to
    section 1003, which, in essence, ensured any amendments to
    section 1000 would not apply to charter cities that had adopted
    conflicting election dates in their charters. Ultimately, Governor
    Jerry Brown vetoed this bill, citing the changes to election timing
    already enacted by Senate Bill No. 415. (See Assem. Bill No. 254
    (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) §§ 1-5; Governor’s veto message to Assem.
    on Assem. Bill No. 254 (Oct. 1, 2015) (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.); Off.
    of Assem. Floor Analysis, Governor’s Veto analysis of Assem. Bill
    No. 254 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) as enrolled Sept. 4, 2015, p. 2.)
    But the history of Assembly Bill No. 254 indicates its author
    encountered significant resistance to his proposal to withdraw
    section 1003’s exemption for charter cities and suggests a similar
    struggle would have ensued if there had been an effort to
    19
    expressly include charter cities within the reach of Senate Bill
    No. 415.
    Against this legislative backdrop the Attorney General
    issued an opinion concluding the VPRA could be constitutionally
    applied to charter cities. (100 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 4 (2017).) The
    opinion stated, “As a threshold matter, we find that the
    Legislature intended the Act to apply to charter cities and school
    districts.” (Id. at p. 7.) In support of this conclusion the Attorney
    General relied on the purported plain meaning of “city” and
    “political subdivision,” without confronting the inherent
    ambiguity of those terms. Further, his opinion presumes the
    definition of “political subdivision” was taken from the CVRA, as
    do we, but asserts that definition was found by the Jauregui
    court to include charter cities without addressing the fact that
    the Jauregui court did not actually construe the statute and find
    an intent to include charter cities, but simply proceeded directly
    to the CalFed/Vista constitutional analysis.
    Finally, the Attorney General’s opinion cites the comments
    of Senator Hueso, who indicated his understanding the
    application of the VPRA to charter cities would not violate the
    Constitution. (100 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 7, fn. 30, citing
    Assem. Standing Com. on Elections and Redistricting, Hearing
    (July 1, 2015), testimony of Sen. Ben Hueso [stating his view the
    VPRA does not violate the constitutional rights of charter cities].)
    As amicus curiae League of California Cities points out, “[T]he
    expressions of individual legislators generally are an improper
    basis upon which to discern the intent of the entire Legislature.”
    (People v. Farrell (2002) 
    28 Cal.4th 381
    , 394; see Myers v. Philip
    Morris Companies, Inc. (2002) 
    28 Cal.4th 828
    , 845 [“we have
    repeatedly declined to discern legislative intent from comments
    20
    by a bill’s author because they reflect on the views of a single
    legislator instead of those of the Legislature as a whole”].) More
    telling is the comment on charter cities found in legislative
    analyses of Senate Bill No. 415 that acknowledge that charter
    cities have substantial autonomy over the rules governing the
    election of municipal officers and observes “By potentially
    compelling charter cities to change the dates of their regularly
    scheduled municipal elections, this bill goes to the heart of [that]
    autonomy. . . . This bill does not explicitly address the question
    of whether it is intended to be applicable to charter cities,
    however, so it is unclear whether those cities would be subject to
    a lawsuit under this bill.” (Assem. Floor Analysis, 3d reading
    analysis of Sen. Bill No. 415 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) as amended
    June 23, 2015, at p. 2; Assem. Com. on Elections and
    Redistricting, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 415 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.)
    as amended June 23, 2015, p. 5.)
    This comment, especially when viewed in light of Assembly
    Bill No. 277’s contemporaneous amendment of the CVRA to
    expressly include charter cities, reinforces our view that the
    Legislature deliberately left unresolved the question whether the
    VPRA applies to charter cities, placing on the courts the
    responsibility to divine intent from ambiguous language. Under
    these circumstances, guided by the precept that, when
    reasonable, we will construe a statute to render it free from doubt
    as to its constitutionality, where the Constitution confers plenary
    authority on charter cities to set the timing of their elections, we
    will not infer an intent to contravene that authority without more
    explicit guidance from the Legislature.10
    10    Because we affirm the superior court’s judgment issuing a
    writ of mandate prohibiting the Secretary of State from enforcing
    21
    DISPOSITION
    The judgment of the superior court ordering a peremptory
    writ of mandate is affirmed. The City is to recover its costs on
    appeal.
    PERLUSS, P. J.
    We concur:
    SEGAL, J.
    DILLON, J.*
    the VPRA against the City of Redondo Beach, we do not address
    the court’s declaration that the VPRA is unconstitutional. (See
    Santa Clara County Local Transportation Authority v. Guardino,
    
    supra,
     11 Cal.4th at p. 230.)
    *     Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned
    by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
    California Constitution.
    22