Marriage of Minkovitch CA2/5 ( 2020 )


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  • Filed 10/16/20 Marriage of Minkovitch CA2/5
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
    not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
    has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION FIVE
    In re the Marriage of LINA and                               B297022, B300374,
    YAN MINKOVITCH.                                              B301994
    (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. BD630832)
    LINA MINKOVITCH,
    Respondent,
    v.
    YAN MINKOVITCH,
    Appellant.
    APPEALS from a judgment and postjudgment orders of the
    Superior Court of Los Angeles County, John A. Slawson and
    Helen Zukin, Judges. Affirmed in part and dismissed in part.
    Yan Minkovitch, self-represented litigant, for Appellant.
    No appearance for Respondent.
    __________________________
    I. INTRODUCTION
    In this consolidated appeal, appellant Yan Minkovitch
    (husband) challenges a judgment of dissolution and several
    postjudgment orders. In case number B297022, husband
    contends that the trial court erred in: allocating the parties’
    former home (residence) to Lina Minkovich (wife); allocating a
    tax liability solely to husband; and calculating husband’s income
    for purposes of child support. In case number B300374, husband
    challenges the court’s denial of his postjudgment motion to
    “clarify” an earlier order and the court’s denial of his motion to
    set aside the judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
    section 473, subdivision (b). Finally, in case number B301994,
    husband challenges the court’s denial of his motion to modify the
    custody order. We will dismiss the appeal from the order denying
    the motion for clarification. We otherwise affirm.
    2
    II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    A.    Dissolution Petition
    Husband and wife married on April 6, 2007, and had two
    daughters together. They separated on November 17, 2015. On
    November 20, 2015, wife petitioned for dissolution of marriage.
    B.    Judge Tamzarian’s August 9, 2016, Order
    On June 24, 2016, following the sale of the residence, wife
    filed a request for an order allowing immediate distribution of the
    sales proceeds from the escrow account.
    On August 9, 2016, Judge Armen Tamzarian ordered,
    among other things, that:
    “[Wife] may withdraw $10,000 from the escrow account and
    h[a]lf for deposit. If [husband] is more than 5 days late on any
    support payment, [wife’]s counsel may withdraw the support
    amount. [Wife’s] counsel is to immediately notify [husband] in
    writing and reflect the remaining balance in the account.”
    C.    Dissolution Trial
    The dissolution trial commenced on November 15, 2018,
    before Judge John A. Slawson. It concluded on
    December 19, 2018.
    On April 2, 2019, Judge Slawson issued the judgment of
    dissolution. Among other things, the court granted the parties
    joint custody of the children. The court also ordered husband to
    pay child support.
    3
    D.    Husband’s Notice of Appeal and Subsequent Motions
    On April 15, 2019, husband filed three documents with the
    trial court. First, he filed a notice of appeal from the
    April 2, 2019, judgment.
    Second, he filed a request for order, specifically, “FOR
    CLARIFICATION OF THE COURT’S ORDER OF 8/9/2016,
    MADE BY [JUDGE] ARMEN TAMZARIAN.”
    Third, he filed a request for relief from the judgment of
    dissolution pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473,
    subdivision (b).
    Husband’s request for clarification was assigned to Judge
    Helen Zukin, who conducted a hearing on the request on
    May 15, 2019. Judge Zukin denied husband’s request.
    On May 30, 2019, Judge Slawson heard the motion for
    relief from judgment. The court concluded that it did not have
    jurisdiction to rule on the motion and on July 2, 2019, denied it.
    On August 29, 2019, husband filed notices of appeal,
    purporting to appeal from the May 15, 2019, and July 2, 2019,
    orders.
    E.    Request for Modification of Child Custody and Visitation
    On June 24, 2019, husband filed a request to modify the
    child custody order.
    On September 11, 2019, Judge Zukin, following a hearing,
    denied husband’s request for modification.
    On October 18, 2019, husband filed a notice of appeal.
    4
    III. DISCUSSION
    A.    Appeal of Judgment of Dissolution
    1.    Background
    During the marriage, in February 2013, husband and wife
    purchased the residence. Husband, who was, among other
    things, a real estate agent, acted as the agent for the purchase.
    On or about February 15, 2013, the sellers transferred the
    residence by grant deed to wife, “a married woman, as her sole
    and separate property.” At around the same time, husband
    signed a quitclaim (interspousal deed), transferring his interest
    in the residence to wife, as her sole and separate property.1
    In explaining why the transaction had been structured in
    this manner, husband testified that he wanted to apply the
    commission he earned from the transaction to the down payment
    for the residence but would be unable to do so if he were “part of
    the purchase.” As to the reason for the interspousal transfer,
    husband testified: “[A]t the time I was working through my tax
    issues. So in order to not cloud the title with my tax issues, I
    quitclaimed my interest off until I could resolve those tax issues.”
    Husband’s “tax issues” included a $195,000 debt that he
    owed to the IRS for his failure to pay taxes for the years 2010 and
    1     We recite the facts based on husband’s testimony at trial,
    which was that these documents were signed at around the same
    time. The actual deeds are not part of the record on appeal.
    Later, husband’s counsel contended (contrary to the testimonial
    evidence) that the interspousal deed was executed prior to the
    grant deed, which contention the court rejected.
    5
    2011.2 During the course of their marriage, wife and husband
    did not file joint tax returns and the IRS sought to recover the tax
    debt from husband only. The IRS placed a lien on the residence.
    Husband had also failed to pay taxes for years 2002 to
    2006, prior to the marriage. The lien on the residence, however,
    was based only on husband’s failure to pay taxes for 2010 and
    2011.
    Husband and wife maintained separate bank accounts
    during their marriage. In 2018, wife earned $50,835.69 in wages
    and had no other source of income. Wife regularly took out cash,
    or “payday loans,” in order to pay her monthly bills.
    Husband worked as a loan officer and real estate agent for
    a company called Mortgage Mavens, for which he received
    commissions, as reflected in Form 1099s. In addition, husband
    controlled various other companies. Husband earned income
    through both wages and commissions, as reflected in W-2s and
    Form 1099s, which husband submitted for review by the court.
    Husband’s Form 1099s showed the following earnings for the
    following years: $182,613 for 2012, $236,544 for 2013, and
    $173,817 for 2015.3
    The trial court made certain findings, which it incorporated
    into its judgment of dissolution. As relevant here, the court
    concluded that the residence belonged to wife as her separate
    2     Although wife’s counsel proffered that husband owed over
    $142,000 in taxes, a notice of levy that is part of the record in
    case number B301994 reflects that the total amount due, as of
    August 9, 2016, was $195,286.02.
    3     The parties referred to a Form 1099 for 2014 but did not
    state on the record husband’s earnings for that year.
    6
    property. The court further found that “[husband] had
    experience, education, and history such that he was
    knowledgeable on the interspousal transfer deed and its
    consequences.”
    The trial court found that the community debts exceeded
    community assets. Therefore, the court exercised its discretion
    under Family Code4 section 2622, subdivision (b) to allocate the
    tax liability to husband only. It stated, “In exercising its
    equitable abilities under the statute, the Court [finds] that it
    would be completely inequitable to burden [wife] with a debt that
    the [IRS] is pursuing against [husband] and not even pursuing
    against [wife].”
    Finally, the trial court calculated the parties’ income based
    on their submitted W-2s and, in husband’s case, also his Form
    1099s. The court calculated wife’s income to be $72,000 and
    husband’s income to be $80,000, comprised of $21,600 from
    employee wages and $58,400 from self-employment. Husband’s
    counsel agreed with the court’s calculations. Further, husband
    did not object after the court stated: “Let’s take our time and
    make sure we’re right. But you both [counsel for husband and
    counsel for wife] have agreed. So I’m going to blame it back on
    you if there’s an error there somewhere.”
    When the trial court asked the parties their positions on its
    tentative decision to order husband to pay $131 monthly in child
    support, husband’s counsel stated: “My client submits on that.
    We agree with the tentative.” Husband added, “Yes, sir.”
    4    Further statutory references are to the Family Code unless
    otherwise indicated.
    7
    2.    Legal Analysis
    On appeal, husband challenges the judgment of dissolution,
    contending that the court erred in: (1) finding that the residence
    was wife’s separate property, (2) allocating the tax liability solely
    to him, and (3) calculating husband’s income for purposes of child
    support.
    “The trial court is generally required to ‘divide the
    community estate of the parties equally.’ (§ 2550.) In satisfying
    this mandate, ‘the court must distribute both the assets and the
    obligations of the community so that the residual assets awarded
    to each party after the deduction of the obligations are equal.’
    [Citations.]” (In re Marriage of Walrath (1998) 
    17 Cal.4th 907
    ,
    924.)
    As a general rule, property acquired by spouses during
    marriage, including earnings, is community property. (In re
    Marriage of Bonds (2000) 
    24 Cal.4th 1
    , 12; see § 760; see also In
    re Brace (2020) 
    9 Cal.5th 903
    , 914–915 [Evid. Code, § 662’s title
    presumption does not apply if it conflicts with § 760].) As an
    exception to the general rule, “[m]arried persons may, through a
    transfer or an agreement, transmute—that is, change—the
    character of property from community to separate or from
    separate to community. ([ ] § 850.) A transmutation of property,
    however, ‘is not valid unless made in writing by an express
    declaration that is made, joined in, consented to, or accepted by
    the spouse whose interest in the property is adversely affected.’
    ([§§ 850,] 852, subd. (a).) To satisfy the requirement of an
    ‘express declaration,’ a writing signed by the adversely affected
    spouse must expressly state that the character or ownership of
    the property at issue is being changed.” (In re Marriage of Valli
    8
    (2014) 
    58 Cal.4th 1396
    , 1400.) Further, “[i]f one spouse secures
    an advantage from the transaction, a statutory presumption
    arises under section 721 that the advantaged spouse exercised
    undue influence and the transaction will be set aside.” (In re
    Marriage of Mathews (2005) 
    133 Cal.App.4th 624
    , 628–629.) The
    presumption, however, is rebutted if the advantaged spouse can
    demonstrate that the disadvantaged spouse acted freely and
    voluntarily, with “‘“‘“full knowledge of all the facts, and with a
    complete understanding of the effect of ” the transaction.’”’
    [Citation.]” (Lintz v. Lintz (2014) 
    222 Cal.App.4th 1346
    , 1353.)
    “‘To the extent that community debts exceed total
    community and quasi-community assets, the excess of debt shall
    be assigned as the court deems just and equitable, taking into
    account factors such as the parties’ relative ability to pay.’
    (§ 2622, subd. (b).)” (In re Marriage of Walrath, supra, 17 Cal.4th
    at p. 924.)
    We review the trial court’s findings on the characterization
    of assets for substantial evidence. (In re Marriage of Fink (1979)
    
    25 Cal.3d 877
    , 887; In re Marriage of Campi (2013) 
    212 Cal.App.4th 1565
    , 1572.) “But de novo review is appropriate
    where resolution of ‘the issue of the characterization to be given
    (as separate or community property) . . . requires a critical
    consideration, in a factual context, of legal principles and their
    underlying values, the determination in question amounts to the
    resolution of a mixed question of law and fact that is
    predominantly one of law.’ (In re Marriage of Davis (2004) 
    120 Cal.App.4th 1007
    , 1015 . . . , citing In re Marriage of Lehman[
    (1998)] 18 Cal.4th [169,] 184.)” (In re Marriage of Rossin (2009)
    
    172 Cal.App.4th 725
    , 734.)
    9
    We review the court’s assignment of debt under section
    2622, subdivision (b) for abuse of discretion. (See In re Marriage
    of Vanderbeek (1986) 
    177 Cal.App.3d 224
    , 234.)
    a.    Residence
    Husband does not dispute that the interspousal transfer
    deed is a writing signed by him. Instead, he contends that the
    trial court erred in allocating the residence to wife as her
    separate property because it failed to consider the statutory
    presumption of undue influence5 and its finding that the
    residence was wife’s separate property therefore was not
    supported by substantial evidence. We disagree.
    First, “[w]e presume the trial court knew and properly
    applied the law absent evidence to the contrary.” (McDermott
    Will & Emery LLP v. Superior Court (2017) 
    10 Cal.App.5th 1083
    ,
    1103.) Thus, even if the court had not referred to the
    presumption of undue influence, we could presume that the court
    applied it. But, here, the court stated that husband “had
    experience, education, and history such that he was
    knowledgeable on the interspousal transfer deed and its
    consequences,” which was an implicit finding that wife had
    rebutted the presumption of undue influence. That finding was
    supported by evidence that husband was a real estate agent and
    loan officer. Further, far from claiming that he was ignorant of
    the ramifications of either the grant deed or the interspousal
    deed, he testified that he had structured the transaction to
    5     Husband concedes that his counsel failed to raise this
    argument before the trial court. We will exercise our discretion
    to consider the matter.
    10
    transfer title to wife, in order to obtain a commission to which he
    would not otherwise be entitled and to avoid encumbering the
    residence with his tax liability. Thus, there was sufficient
    evidence that husband acted freely and voluntarily, indeed,
    strategically, with “‘“‘“full knowledge of all the facts, and with a
    complete understanding of the effect of” the transaction.’’’’”
    (Lintz v. Lintz, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 1353.)
    b.    Tax Liability
    We next consider husband’s contention that the trial court
    erred in allocating the tax liability solely to him. We see no
    abuse of discretion in the court’s conclusion that the equities
    supported such an allocation. Despite his high earnings,
    husband for many years did not pay any taxes. Indeed, husband
    had a long history, predating his marriage, of avoiding tax
    payments. Further, husband and wife maintained separate bank
    accounts during the marriage and wife frequently took out
    payday loans to pay her monthly expenses, which suggested that
    she did not enjoy the benefits of husband’s tax avoidance.
    Finally, husband had a history of earning higher income than did
    wife, which supported a finding that he was better able to repay
    the tax debt. (See In re Marriage of Vanderbeek, supra, 177
    Cal.App.3d at p. 235.)
    11
    c.    Imputation of Income for Child Support
    Finally, we conclude that husband has waived any
    challenge to the trial court’s calculation of his income. Not only
    did husband fail to object to the court’s calculation of income, he
    expressly submitted to the court’s tentative order that he pay
    $131 monthly in child support. (In re Marriage of Calcaterra &
    Badakhsh (2005) 
    132 Cal.App.4th 28
    , 37 [“‘[T]to conserve judicial
    resources, any errors [to the calculation of income] must be
    brought to the trial court’s attention at the trial level while the
    [theoretical] error can still be expeditiously corrected’”].)
    B.    May 15, 2019, Order Denying Request for Clarification
    1.    Background
    As discussed above, on August 9, 2016, Judge Tamzarian
    issued an order, which stated, in part: “[Wife] may withdraw
    $10,000 from the escrow account and h[a]lf for deposit. If
    [husband] is more than 5 days late on any support payment,
    [wife’s] counsel may withdraw the support amount. [Wife’s]
    counsel is to immediately notify [husband] in writing and reflect
    the remaining balance in the account.” There is no reporter’s
    transcript, settled statement, or agreed statement of the hearing
    in the record. Wife subsequently withdrew $10,000 from escrow
    (first $10,000 withdrawal).
    During the course of the dissolution trial, the trial court
    found that husband owed $19,565 in child support arrearages.
    Husband sought certain credits against this amount. Husband’s
    counsel requested a $10,000 credit for funds that wife had
    12
    withdrawn from escrow pursuant to the parties’ March 9, 2017,
    stipulation (second $10,000 withdrawal). Husband’s counsel
    expressly distinguished the second $10,000 withdrawal, which
    she referred to as “the additional 10,000,” from the first $10,000
    withdrawal. The parties disputed whether the March 9, 2017,
    stipulation permitted reallocation of the second $10,000
    withdrawal. The court referred to Judge Tamzarian the issue of
    whether the second $10,000 withdrawal was subject to
    reallocation.6
    Husband’s counsel then requested a $10,000 credit for the
    first $10,000 withdrawal. The court denied that request, noting
    that because the residence was wife’s separate property, any
    money that she withdrew from the proceeds of its sale should not
    be credited against husband’s child support arrearages. The
    court’s judgment specified that “the $10,000 drawn from the
    escrow account containing proceeds from the sale of [the
    residence] . . . pursuant to Court Order of August 9, 2016 subject
    to reallocation, was drawn from [wife’s] separate property funds,
    and as such, does not constitute a child support payment made by
    [husband].” The court added that it “reserve[d] for Judge . . .
    Tamzarian to determine” whether the second $10,000 withdrawal
    “is subject to reallocation.”
    On April 15, 2019, husband filed a request “FOR
    CLARIFICATION OF THE COURT’S ORDER OF 8/9/2016,
    MADE BY [JUDGE] ARMEN TAMZARIAN.” Husband asserted
    that during the dissolution trial, Judge Slawson “had some
    trouble determining whether or not the funds so expended were
    proper[l]y allocated to defray [husband’s] support obligations.”
    6     The court preliminarily credited the second $10,000 against
    the arrearages.
    13
    Husband requested that the first $10,000 withdrawal be credited
    against his arrearages.
    The matter was reassigned to Judge Helen Zukin, who, on
    May 15, 2019, held a hearing on husband’s request. After
    reviewing the dissolution trial transcript and the judgment,
    Judge Zukin denied husband’s request for clarification. That
    same day, the court issued a minute order denying husband’s
    request.
    2.    Legal Analysis
    “The right to appeal is wholly statutory.” (Dana Point Safe
    Harbor Collective v. Superior Court (2010) 
    51 Cal.4th 1
    , 5.)
    Husband contends that Judge Zukin’s order denying his request
    for clarification is appealable pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
    section 904.1, subdivision (a)(2).7 We disagree.
    “Although Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1,
    subdivision (a)(2) makes appealable ‘an order made after a
    judgment made appealable by paragraph (1),’ this does not
    literally mean that any order after a previous judgment is
    appealable.” (In re Marriage of Ellis (2002) 
    101 Cal.App.4th 400
    ,
    403.) Specifically, “‘[t]o be appealable, a postjudgment order
    must satisfy two additional requirements . . . . [¶] The first
    requirement . . . is that the issues raised by the appeal from the
    order must be different from those arising from an appeal from
    the judgment . . . . [¶] The second requirement . . . is that “the
    7     In his brief, husband asserted the order was appealable
    pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 904.2. We presume
    this was an unintentional error, as that section applies to appeals
    from limited civil cases.
    14
    order must either affect the judgment or relate to it by enforcing
    it or staying its execution.”’” (In re Marriage of Corona (2009)
    
    172 Cal.App.4th 1205
    , 1217.) The May 15, 2019, order does not
    satisfy the first requirement.
    The issues raised by husband from the May 15, 2019, order
    are not different from those he raised in connection with the
    dissolution judgment, namely, his challenge of the trial court’s
    designation of the residence as separate property such that
    husband was not entitled to a credit for the first $10,000
    withdrawal. The May 15, 2019, order therefore is not an
    appealable postjudgment order. (In re Marriage of Corona,
    supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1217.) In any event, even if we were
    to consider the merits of husband’s appeal, we would reject it as
    husband was not entitled to any purported “clarification.”
    C.    July 2, 2019, Order Denying Motion for Relief
    Husband next contends that the trial court erred in
    denying his motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Code of
    Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b).
    1.    Background
    As discussed, on April 15, 2019, husband filed a motion for
    relief from judgment.
    On May 30, 2019, Judge Slawson heard the motion and
    concluded that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the
    motion because of the pending appeal from the judgment.
    15
    On July 2, 2019, Judge Slawson issued his “Findings And
    Order After Hearing,” which denied husband’s motion for lack of
    jurisdiction.
    2.    Legal Analysis
    Husband’s contention that his filing of a notice of appeal
    did not divest the trial court of jurisdiction to consider his motion
    is meritless. (See Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005)
    
    35 Cal.4th 180
    , 198 [“[Code of Civil Procedure] section 916, as a
    matter of logic and policy, divests the trial court of jurisdiction
    over the subject matter on appeal—i.e., jurisdiction in its
    fundamental sense”]; Kroger Co. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd.
    (2012) 
    210 Cal.App.4th 952
    , 959 [appeal is perfected when notice
    of appeal is filed].) The court correctly concluded that it lacked
    jurisdiction to consider defendant’s motion.
    D.    Order Denying Request for Modification of Child Custody
    Order
    1.    Background
    On June 24, 2019, husband filed a request to modify the
    child custody order to grant him sole legal and physical custody of
    the children. Husband contended that wife: medicated, that is,
    vaccinated, the children without notice; discussed the divorce
    proceedings with the children and solicited information from
    them; asked the children to lie to a doctor, who had been
    appointed by the trial court for purposes of the dissolution
    proceeding; interfered with the children’s therapy by purportedly
    16
    not cooperating with husband regarding an agreed therapist;
    disparaged husband to the children, including using derogatory
    language; failed to protect the children from “many, many, insect
    bites”; lived with the children in a one-bedroom apartment, where
    the youngest child did not have her own bed, and instead shared
    a bed with wife; “cavalierly” cancelled the children’s medical
    insurance, which was subsequently reinstated; and did not help
    the children with their studies, with their grades being “very
    low.”
    Husband supported his request with his own declaration
    and over a hundred pages of exhibits, including communications
    between husband and wife on Talking Parents. On
    August 19, 2019, husband submitted a supplemental declaration
    attaching purported transcripts of telephone calls between and
    among wife, husband, and the children. One of the conversations
    was identified as having occurred on April 15, 2019. The other
    conversations were not identified by date. He also attached
    updated Talking Parents communications, husband’s purported
    “log” detailing wife’s actions beginning in 2015, medical records of
    doctor visits for the children from 2016 and 2017, wife’s cell
    phone records from 2016, screenshots of texts from 2016,
    communications with prosecutors from 2015 and 2016,
    communications between husband’s prior counsel and wife’s
    counsel from 2016 and 2017, reports of monitored visits with the
    children from 2015, police records from 2016, and discovery
    requests from 2016.
    Wife opposed the request for modification. She declared
    that she had advised husband of the annual physical check-up,
    during which one of the daughters received three vaccinations.
    She attached a copy of the Talking Parents message advising
    17
    husband of the upcoming yearly checkup. She agreed that the
    daughters had mosquito bites and that she now lived in a one-
    bedroom apartment, but declared that each daughter had a
    separate bed in a shared bedroom and that when she had custody
    of the daughters, she slept in the living room. She explained that
    husband had never been to wife’s home and thus did not know its
    setup. She denied husband’s other allegations, stating that she
    helped the girls with their homework.
    Wife requested that the trial court impose sanctions
    pursuant to section 271 and submitted her counsel’s declaration
    in support. Wife’s counsel declared that during the course of
    these proceedings, husband had filed approximately 40 requests
    for orders, including multiple requests to modify custody and
    support, all of which were denied. Counsel also explained that
    husband had filed additional civil actions against wife, wife’s
    friends, and wife’s counsel. Counsel detailed the time she and
    her colleague had spent opposing husband’s most recent request
    for modification and requested $4,650 in attorney fees.
    On September 11, 2019, Judge Zukin conducted a hearing
    on husband’s request for modification. She asked husband, who
    was self-represented, what he contended to be the material
    change in circumstances that supported his request for
    modification. Husband responded that wife was now “living in a
    smaller apartment where . . . one of our children does not have
    her own bed.”
    After noting that wife had declared that both daughters
    had their own bed, the trial court asked wife, “Does [daughter]
    sleep in her own bed?”
    Wife responded, “Yes she does. Both of them do.”
    18
    Husband proffered that this was “a false statement, and I
    would actually like to—that’s a completely false statement, and
    I’ll be able to prove that up during my examination.”
    The trial court responded: “We’ve dealt with these issues
    before. Go on. What else is new, other than the bed?”
    Husband responded, without evidentiary support, that the
    children were getting lower grades and that wife had moved
    farther away from her work and the children’s school, and “ha[d]
    less time with the kids, leaving the kids, you know—leaving the
    kids unattended and un—not only unattended, but unavailable to
    do homework with them and various other things. [¶] So
    although I understand you wanting to be brief, I wanted to call
    [wife] to the stand in order to ask her some questions in order to
    clarify my position via her testimony.”
    The trial court denied husband’s request to examine wife,
    but permitted husband to continue his testimony, during which
    he repeated many of the statements in his request for
    modification. At the conclusion of husband’s testimony and
    argument, the court again denied his request to cross-examine
    wife.
    Next, the trial court asked wife a number of questions. For
    instance, the court asked whether wife had left the children
    unattended. Wife responded that she had not. Further, wife
    explained that she had been living in the smaller one-bedroom
    apartment for two and a half years and that she had moved into
    it prior to the court’s entry of the judgment of dissolution.
    The court again asked wife about the sleeping
    arrangements. Wife repeated that the girls slept in the single
    bedroom and wife slept in the living room on the couch.
    19
    The court then asked wife to respond to husband’s
    allegation that she had medicated the children. Wife explained
    that she had advised husband about the doctor’s appointment
    and that during the appointment, daughter had received a
    vaccination that was required to attend school.
    The court then permitted husband to respond. Husband
    reminded the court that he had submitted transcripts of wife’s
    telephone calls with the daughters. He also explained why he
    believed he needed to sue various people, including wife’s counsel.
    Finally, he stated his belief, based on his daughter’s statements
    to him, that wife slept with younger daughter “99 percent of the
    time.” Husband did not dispute wife’s testimony that she had
    moved prior to the entry of judgment or that he had never been
    inside her apartment.
    After hearing the testimony, the court stated that it had
    reviewed the entire file, the submitted declarations, and the
    exhibits. The court stated that it found “a number of [husband’s]
    complaints regarding [wife’s] parenting” not to be credible. The
    court further observed that the exhibits demonstrated that
    husband had inappropriately used Talking Parents to threaten
    wife with litigation and to advance his litigation strategy. Even
    assuming that the children were struggling in school, the court
    concluded that husband was partially at fault as he had engaged
    in excessive litigation and involved the children in litigation. The
    court denied husband’s request for modification, concluding that
    there was no material change in circumstances since the time of
    the 2019 judgment.
    The trial court next considered wife’s motion for sanctions.
    It concluded that “this was an unnecessary motion. [T]here is a
    history in this litigation of over litigation on the part of
    20
    [husband].” The court therefore awarded wife $2,500 in attorney
    fees as a sanction.
    2.    Legal Analysis
    Husband contends that the trial court erred “by failing to
    state on the record or in writing the reasons for its denial of [his]
    right to introduce the live testimony of the other party during the
    hearing.” We find no prejudicial error.
    We disagree with husband’s characterization of the trial
    court’s ruling as one denying him the opportunity to introduce
    “live testimony.” The court considered the live sworn testimony
    of both husband and wife. (Cf. In re Marriage of Swain (2018) 
    21 Cal.App.5th 830
    , 837, 841 [finding reversible error when trial
    court modified spousal support order based solely on declaration
    of ex-wife, who did not appear at the hearing].) Thus, husband’s
    argument, properly construed, is that the court limited his ability
    to cross-examine wife, in violation of Evidence Code section 773.
    We will assume, without expressly deciding, that the court erred
    in prohibiting husband from cross-examining wife.
    Husband has failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced
    by any assumed error. (See In re Marriage of Goddard (2004) 
    33 Cal.4th 49
    , 56 [generally, most procedural errors will not be
    reversed absent a showing of prejudice]; see also Diaz v. Carcamo
    (2011) 
    51 Cal.4th 1148
    , 1161 [“To establish prejudice, a party
    must show ‘a reasonable probability that in the absence of the
    error, a result more favorable to [it] would have been reached’”].)
    Husband never explained in the trial court what he expected to
    elicit from cross-examination, proffering only that such
    examination would “clarify [his] position.” On appeal, husband
    21
    contends that the court should have stricken wife’s testimony and
    declaration, and had it done so, it would have granted husband’s
    request because his exhibits “support[ed] all of his factual
    allegations.” We disagree. Most of husband’s exhibits related to
    conduct that predated the entry of judgment. Further, there was
    no admissible evidence to support his allegations that daughter
    did not sleep in her own bed or that wife did not pay sufficient
    attention to the daughters. Husband cited only his daughter’s
    hearsay statement that she did not usually sleep in her bed and
    did not introduce any evidence to support his allegation that his
    wife did not spend sufficient time with the daughters.8 On this
    record, husband cannot demonstrate that but for the court’s
    assumed error, it was reasonably probable that the court would
    have found a “‘significant change of circumstances’” and modified
    the child custody arrangement in his favor. (See In re Marriage
    of Brown & Yana (2006) 
    37 Cal.4th 947
    , 956; In re Marriage of
    McKean (2019) 
    41 Cal.App.5th 1083
    , 1089.)
    8     In his declaration, husband alleged that wife “does not ever
    work with the girls on their schoolwork,” and at the hearing, he
    alleged that wife left the girls unattended. Neither allegation
    was supported by admissible evidence.
    22
    IV. DISPOSITION
    The appeal from the May 15, 2019, order is dismissed. The
    April 2, 2019, judgment, the July 2, 2019, order denying
    appellant’s motion for relief from judgment, and the
    September 11, 2019, order denying appellant’s request for
    modification are affirmed. Because respondent did not appear,
    no costs are awarded.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
    KIM, J.
    We concur:
    RUBIN, P. J.
    BAKER, J.
    23
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B297022

Filed Date: 10/16/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/17/2020