In re A.S. CA2/3 ( 2020 )


Menu:
  • Filed 11/19/20 In re A.S. CA2/3
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
    not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
    has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION THREE
    In re A.S., a Person Coming                                   B301424
    Under the Juvenile Court Law.
    LOS ANGELES COUNTY                                            (Los Angeles County
    DEPARTMENT OF                                                 Super. Ct.
    CHILDREN AND FAMILY                                           No. 19CCJP04659A)
    SERVICES,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    v.
    QUINCY S.,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
    Angeles County, Lisa A. Brackelmanns, Judge Pro Tempore.
    Affirmed.
    Elizabeth C. Alexander, under appointment by the Court of
    Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
    Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kristine P. Miles,
    Assistant County Counsel, and Jessica S. Mitchell, Deputy
    County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    _____________________
    Quincy S. (father) appeals from the order of the juvenile
    court taking jurisdiction over his teenaged daughter, A.S. Father
    contends that the evidence does not support the finding A.S. is a
    dependent of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code1
    section 300, subdivision (b)(1). We affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    Father and mother never married and were not in a
    relationship when the Department of Children and Family
    Services (DCFS) received a referral about A.S.
    The child, who lives with mother, has an on and off
    relationship with father and had not seen him in three months
    when the incident occurred in May 2019. That day, A.S. was at
    the paternal grandmother’s house playing cards with paternal
    aunt when father arrived. A.S. refused to speak to father causing
    him to become upset that she was being disrespectful. The two
    exchanged words and then father “popped” his daughter in the
    mouth at least twice. Panicked, paternal aunt called mother to
    pick A.S. up.
    A.S. and paternal aunt were present when mother arrived.
    Paternal aunt described father as “looking for a fight.” Mother
    told father “not to put his fucking hands on my daughter,” to
    which father replied, “you’re not going to tell me what to do. I’ll
    beat your ass.” Father pushed mother and she stumbled
    1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
    Institutions Code.
    2
    backwards but pushed father back. The two began to fight. He
    hit her on the side of the face with his fist around the temple and
    cheek. She hit him back with a knife. A.S. sustained a cut on her
    finger when she tried to stop her parents’ violence. Paternal
    grandmother told them to leave and so mother and A.S., who was
    crying, got into the car. Father then kicked the car’s sideview
    mirror off. A.S. confirmed these events and later told paternal
    aunt that if father had “just left us alone this wouldn’t have
    happened.” Father sustained lacerations and stab wounds.
    DCFS filed a petition under section 300, subdivisions (a)
    and (b)(1) alleging father’s physical abuse of A.S. (counts a-1 and
    b-) and domestic violence (counts a-2 and b-2). The juvenile court
    removed A.S. from her parents. DCFS placed her with maternal
    grandmother.
    After the detention, mother was cooperative and visited the
    child daily. She reported having experienced domestic violence in
    the past with father. In the worst incident, the two fought
    physically when mother was seven months pregnant with A.S.
    Father went to jail.
    N.G., the mother of father’s oldest child, C.S., reported that
    in the past father and N.G. engaged in domestic violence. They
    were each arrested once for fighting. N.G. sought a restraining
    order against father once to mollify C.S.’s school because father
    had become angry when C.S. did not want him to pick her up
    “and threw some things around at the school.”
    A.S. did not wish to have visits with father.
    Mother stipulated to the petition’s allegations. The
    juvenile court sustained the petition as amended finding true the
    allegations in all counts as to mother and in counts b-1 (physical
    abuse of A.S.), and a-2 and b-2 (domestic violence) as to father.
    3
    (§ 300, subds. (a) & (b)(1).) The court removed the child from her
    parents’ custody and ordered reunification services. Father
    appealed.
    DISCUSSION
    Father contends the evidence does not support the order
    sustaining the count alleging domestic violence under
    subdivision (b)(1) of section 3002 because the admitted violence
    between father and mother was “an isolated incident that was
    not likely to continue,” where the last and only prior incident was
    15 years earlier and where mother started it.
    Section 300, subdivision (b)(1) invokes the jurisdiction of
    the juvenile court and describes a child who either “has suffered,
    or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious
    physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of
    his or her parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect
    the child.” (Italics added.) The “use of the disjunctive ‘or’
    demonstrates that a showing of prior abuse and harm is
    2  The juvenile court sustained count b-2 that alleged: “The
    child A[.]S[.]’s mother, . . . and father . . . have a history of
    engaging in violent altercations in the presence of the child. On
    05/25/19, the father struck the mother’s face with the father’s
    fists and pushed the mother to the ground. The mother pushed,
    struck and stabbed the father’s back and neck with a knife
    inflicting three puncture wounds to the father’s back which
    required 13 stitches and a superficial wound to the father’s neck.
    The father kicked the mother’s vehicle and broke the rearview
    mirror while the child was inside the vehicle. On a prior
    occasion, the father struck and pushed the mother. The
    parents[’] violent conduct endangers the child’s physical health
    and safety, and places the child at risk of serious physical harm,
    damage and danger.”
    4
    sufficient, standing alone, to establish dependency jurisdiction
    under these subdivisions.” (In re J.K. (2009) 
    174 Cal.App.4th 1426
    , 1435, fn. omitted.) If the jurisdictional allegations are
    based solely on risk to the child, that risk must be shown to exist
    at the time of the jurisdictional hearing. (In re Isabella F. (2014)
    
    226 Cal.App.4th 128
    , 140.)
    “[D]omestic violence in the same household where children
    are living . . . is a failure to protect [the children] from the
    substantial risk of encountering the violence and suffering
    serious physical harm or illness from it.” (In re Heather A. (1996)
    
    52 Cal.App.4th 183
    , 194.) Children can be “put in a position of
    physical danger from [spousal] violence” because, “for example,
    they could wander into the room where it was occurring and be
    accidentally hit by a thrown object, by a fist, arm, foot or leg.”
    (Ibid.; accord, In re E.B. (2010) 
    184 Cal.App.4th 568
    , 575–576.)
    We review the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings for
    substantial evidence. (In re M.R. (2017) 
    8 Cal.App.5th 101
    , 108.)
    Here, the evidence was more than sufficient to support the
    juvenile court’s domestic violence finding in count b-2. A.S. has
    already suffered harm. The entire fight took place in front of the
    child. She was cut when she tried to stop the fight. And she was
    crying in the car when father kicked the sideview mirror off.
    Moreover, past “ ‘violent behavior in a relationship is ‘the
    best predictor of future violence.’ Studies demonstrate that once
    violence occurs in a relationship, the use of force will reoccur in
    63% of those relationships. . . . Even if a batterer moves on to
    another relationship, he will continue to use physical force as a
    means of controlling his new partner.’ ” (In re E.B., supra,
    184 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.) A.S. knows that father is violent with
    women. N.G. confirmed that father fought with her and was
    5
    arrested for it. Then he moved on to a violent relationship with
    mother and hit her while she was seven months’ pregnant with
    A.S. Father even hit A.S. multiple times Father’s attempts to
    recast the evidence and downplay his role by blaming mother is
    unavailing. Father is pugnacious. He was “ ‘looking for a fight’ ”
    and threatened to “beat [mother’s] ass’ ” that day. He threw
    things around at C.S.’s school. Violence in front of a child is still
    violence and father has demonstrated a long history of engaging
    in violence with women, including his own daughter, which is a
    good predictor of risk of harm to A.S.3
    DISPOSITION
    The order is affirmed.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
    DHANIDINA, J.
    We concur:
    EDMON, P. J.             EGERTON, J.
    3 As we affirm the order taking jurisdiction over A.S. based
    on father’s conduct under count b-2, we need not address the
    merits of father’s challenge to counts b-1 and a-1. “As long as
    there is one unassailable jurisdictional finding, it is immaterial
    that another might be inappropriate.” (In re Ashley B. (2011) 
    202 Cal.App.4th 968
    , 979.)
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B301424

Filed Date: 11/19/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/19/2020