People v. Dhillon CA3 ( 2023 )

Filed 3/23/23 P. v. Dhillon CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, C095702
v. (Super. Ct. No. 21FE005314)
RAVINDEER DHILLON,
Defendant and Appellant.
A jury found defendant Ravindeer Dhillon guilty of felony identity theft, and the
trial court found true allegations that defendant was previously convicted of two strike
offenses. After denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the prior strike allegations under
People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero), the trial court
sentenced defendant to an aggregate four years in state prison.
Defendant now contends (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his
conviction for identity theft, and (2) the trial court erred in ruling that changes to Penal
Code section 13851 enacted by Senate Bill No. 81 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021,
ch. 721, § 1) (Senate Bill 81) do not apply to prior strike offenses.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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Finding no error, we will affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
After responding to a report of a vehicle blocking traffic, California Highway
Patrol Officer Liz Dutton found a black 2013 Mercedes Benz in the road with its flashers
activated and engine running. Defendant was asleep in the driver’s seat and Officer
Dutton saw what appeared to her to be a rifle in the back seat. It was actually a BB gun.
There was a black backpack on the front passenger seat.
Officer Dutton looked inside the backpack where, among other things, she found
five blank checks belonging to Olivehurst Public Utility District along with debit and
credit cards belonging to people other than defendant. Officer Dutton also found a recent
bill of sale for the vehicle made out to defendant and a notebook with the personal
information of numerous individuals.
California Highway Patrol Special Investigations Unit Officer William Mason
conducted a further investigation. Officer Mason observed that the notebook was tabbed
on the right-hand side; each tab corresponded to identifying information for a different
person. There were 38 handwritten profiles that included names, dates of birth, social
security numbers, e-mail addresses, phone numbers, driver’s license numbers, and home
addresses. Ten of those profiles corresponded to personal identifying information for
DMV applicants.
The People charged defendant with the identity theft of 10 or more people
(§ 530.5, subd. (c)(3).) The People further alleged defendant had two prior strike
convictions pursuant to section 667, subdivisions (b) through (i).
At trial, four people testified that the notebook contained their personal identifying
information. They also testified that they do not know defendant and did not give him
permission to possess their information. Officer Mason testified the information
contained in the notebook could be used to open a bank account, a credit card, or a debit
card. The information also could be used to obtain a loan. In addition, the manner in
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which the information was stored allowed defendant quick access to a specific person and
all their identifying information.
The jury found defendant guilty of felony identity theft. The trial court found true
the prior strike allegations. At sentencing, the trial court denied defendant’s Romero
motion:
“Along with the papers and arguments, the Court has considered the constitutional
rights of the defendant, as well as the interests of society as represented by the People.
The Court has also considered various individualized factors relative to the defendant, the
circumstances of the current offense, the nature of the prior strike and convictions, and
the defendant’s other criminal history.
“The Court is mindful of its duty to consider all relevant factors and look at the
totality of the circumstances. The Court is also aware of the recent amendments to Penal
Code Section 1385. In particular, the addition of subdivision “C,” effective January 1 of
this year, by way of [Senate Bill] 81.
“With that backdrop, having considered and weighed all required and relevant
factors, the Court declines to exercise its authority to strike the strikes in this case.”
The court explained its reasons for denying defendant’s motion, and concluded:
“This is not a close call today. [Defendant] clearly does not fall outside the spirit of the
three-strikes law at this time.” The court also rejected “any argument that [Senate Bill]
81’s addition of Penal Code Section 1385[, subdivision] (c) mandatorily applies to
[defendant’s] Romero invitation. [Senate Bill] 81 does not apply to alternative
sentencing schemes.
“As our Supreme Court stated in Romero -- specifically at page 527 -- three-
strikes law is considered an alternative sentencing scheme, not an enhancement.”
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DISCUSSION
I
Defendant contends there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for
identity theft. We disagree.
To determine the sufficiency of the evidence, we ask whether, “ ‘after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v.
Hatch (2000) 22 Cal.4th 260, 272, italics omitted.) We resolve neither credibility issues
nor evidentiary conflicts; we look for substantial evidence. (People v. Ochoa (1993)
6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.) “Moreover, unless the testimony is physically impossible or
inherently improbable, testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a conviction.
[Citation.]” (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181.) “ ‘ “ ‘If the circumstances
reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the
circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding does not
warrant a reversal of the judgment.’ ” ’ [Citations.]” (People v. Casares (2016)
62 Cal.4th 808, 823-824, overruled in part on other grounds as stated in People v. Dalton
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 166, 214.) Thus, reversal is not warranted unless there is no hypothesis
on which there exists substantial evidence to support the conviction. (People v. Bolin
(1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.)
“Every person who, with the intent to defraud, acquires or retains possession of
the personal identifying information, as defined in subdivision (b) of section 530.55, of
10 or more persons,” is guilty of identity theft. (§ 530.5, subd. (c)(3).)
Defendant argues there is insufficient evidence that he intended to use the personal
identifying information he possessed to defraud anyone. But police found defendant
sleeping in his car with the personal identifying information of at least 10 people. The
information was organized and stored in a manner that allowed quick access. It was the
kind of information needed to open bank accounts, apply for credit cards, and apply for
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loans. A jury could reasonably infer based on the volume of information, the type of
information, and the way the information was organized and stored, that defendant
intended to use the information to defraud. The evidence is circumstantial, but direct
evidence of an intent to defraud is not required; indeed, intent is often established by
circumstantial evidence. (See People v. Truong (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 551, 558 [finding
a jury could reasonably infer intent to defraud based on surrounding circumstances].)
The evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s verdict.
II
Defendant argues the amendments to section 1385 made by Senate Bill 81 apply
to prior strike convictions. The People respond that the plain language of the statute
unambiguously applies only to enhancements, and the three strikes law is an alternative
sentencing scheme, not an enhancement. We find the People’s argument more
convincing.
Whether the amendments to section 1385 apply to a prior strike conviction is a
question of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. (People v. Tirado (2022)
12 Cal.5th 688, 694 (Tirado).) To resolve whether defendant’s interpretation of the
statute is correct, “we are guided by familiar canons of statutory construction. ‘[I]n
construing a statute, a court [must] ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to
effectuate the purpose of the law.’ [Citation.] In determining that intent, we first
examine the words of the respective statutes: ‘If there is no ambiguity in the language of
the statute, “then the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said, and the plain
meaning of the language governs.” [Citation.] “Where the statute is clear, courts will not
‘interpret away clear language in favor of an ambiguity that does not exist.’ [Citation.]” ’
[Citation.] If, however, the terms of a statute provide no definitive answer, then courts
may resort to extrinsic sources, including the ostensible objects to be achieved and the
legislative history. [Citation.] ‘We must select the construction that comports most
closely with the apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view to promoting rather than
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defeating the general purpose of the statute, and avoid an interpretation that would lead to
absurd consequences.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Coronado (1995) 12 Cal.4th 145, 151.)
Under section 1385, subdivision (a), the trial court “may, . . . in furtherance of
justice, order an action to be dismissed.” This authority under section 1385,
subdivision (a) includes the power to “strike or vacate an allegation or finding under the
Three Strikes law that a defendant has previously been convicted of a serious and/or
violent felony . . . .” (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 158.)
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill 81 amended section 1385 to add specific
mitigating factors the trial court must consider when deciding whether to strike
enhancements from a defendant’s sentence in the interest of justice. (§ 1385, subd. (c);
People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 674.) Section 1385, subdivision (c) now
provides: “(1) Notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if
it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal of that enhancement is
prohibited by any initiative statute. [¶] (2) In exercising its discretion under this
subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the
defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances . . . are present. Proof of the
presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the
enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger
public safety.” (Italics added.)
Subdivision (c) of section 1385 applies to the dismissal of an enhancement.
(§ 1385, subd. (c)(1).) “Ordinarily words used in a statute are presumed to be used in
accordance with their established legal or technical meaning.” (People v. Carter (1996)
48 Cal.App.4th 1536, 1540.) The term “enhancement” has a well-established technical
meaning in California law. (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 526-527.) “A sentence
enhancement is ‘an additional term of imprisonment added to the base term.’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Jefferson (1999) 21 Cal.4th 86, 101; see also Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th at
p. 695, fn. 9; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.405(5).) It is equally well-established that
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the three strikes law does not provide for an enhancement; it is an alternative sentencing
scheme for the current offense. (Romero, at p. 527; People v. Williams (2014)
227 Cal.App.4th 733, 744.) We presume the Legislature was aware of, and acquiesced
in, this established judicial definition of enhancement as well as the distinction between
an enhancement and an alternative sentencing scheme like the three strikes law. (People
v. Atkins (2001) 25 Cal.4th 76, 89-90.) The Legislature did not define the word
“enhancement” differently in section 1385. Because the statutory language is clear and
unambiguous, we follow its plain meaning and do not consider the legislative history
cited by defendant.2 (People v. Canty (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1266, 1277.) The plain
language of section 1385, subdivision (c) applies only to an enhancement, and a prior
strike is not an enhancement, but part of the three strikes alternative sentencing scheme.
Section 1385, subdivision (c)’s provisions regarding enhancements do not apply to prior
strike conviction allegations.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/S/
MAURO, J.
We concur:
/S/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.
/S/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.
2 If the legislative history reflects a legislative intent different than that expressed in the
plain language of the bill, that is a matter for the Legislature.
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