People v. Harris CA2/5 ( 2021 )


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  • Filed 3/23/21 P. v. Harris CA2/5
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
    opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
    8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
    purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION FIVE
    THE PEOPLE,                                               B299405
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                         (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. YA095119)
    v.
    TREVEON DESHAWN HARRIS,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
    Angeles County, Alan B. Honeycutt, Judge. Affirmed.
    Marilee Marshall, under appointment by the Court of
    Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
    Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
    Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
    Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy
    Attorney General, and Kathy S. Pomerantz, Deputy Attorney
    General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    A jury convicted defendant and appellant Treveon
    Deshawn Harris (defendant) of the premeditated murder of Alex
    Anene (Alex). Defendant moved for a new trial, arguing
    ineffective assistance of counsel (he believed his lawyer should
    have called a crime scene reconstruction expert to testify) and
    newly discovered evidence (opinion testimony as summarized in a
    post-trial report prepared by that same expert). The trial court
    denied the new trial motion and the only issue we are asked to
    decide is whether that was reversible error.
    I. BACKGROUND
    Alex lived in an apartment with his elderly mother Monica
    Anene (Monica). Monica went to bed around midnight on April
    20, 2016, and Alex stayed up to finish doing his laundry and
    packing for an early morning flight to Nigeria.
    Not long after Monica fell asleep, she awoke to the sound of
    gunfire; three shots, a pause, then six more shots. Monica got out
    of bed and did not see Alex in the apartment. She was not
    initially worried, but after a while, she became concerned and
    unsuccessfully tried to reach him on his cell phone. Police
    activity at the apartment building ensued, and officers soon came
    to Monica’s door and told her Alex had been shot and killed in the
    building’s laundry room, which also housed the apartment
    building’s mailboxes.
    The laundry room is on the apartment building’s lowest
    level. It is a narrow, roughly rectangular space running from
    west to east (approximately 18 feet long) and divided into two
    distinct areas: a hallway in the western portion (approximately
    12 feet long and four feet wide) with two rows of tenant mailboxes
    along one wall, and an alcove in the eastern portion with two
    2
    washers and one dryer. Alex’s body was found in the hallway
    with his head and torso under the mailboxes and his legs angled
    toward the north wall. A trail of blood led away from the laundry
    room, through the apartment building’s garage, up the driveway,
    and out onto the street.
    Police investigation of Alex’s killing turned up witnesses
    and physical evidence incriminating defendant. One of Alex’s
    neighbors lived with defendant’s ex-girlfriend in an apartment
    over the laundry room. On the night in question, defendant
    knocked on the neighbor’s door looking for his ex-girlfriend. After
    the neighbor told defendant his ex-girlfriend was not there, he
    “instantly got attitude” and became “upset” and “agitated.” A
    short time after the neighbor closed her apartment door (“a
    couple of seconds to a couple of minutes” later) the neighbor
    heard at least five gunshots. In addition, when the authorities
    processed evidence recovered at the crime scene, they found
    defendant’s DNA in two samples of blood found inside the
    laundry room and on pieces of a broken metal bracelet defendant
    was known to wear that was found on the floor of the laundry
    room. The police also performed DNA testing on the blood trail
    leading away from the scene of the crime; it too was a
    probabilistic match to defendant.
    Later police investigation revealed defendant sought
    medical treatment for a gunshot wound just 15 minutes after he
    knocked on the neighbor’s door at the apartment building where
    Alex lived. At approximately 2:00 a.m. on the night in question,
    defendant went to a nearby hospital with a gunshot wound to his
    left arm, but he left without receiving treatment. Later that
    morning, however, defendant sought and received treatment for
    3
    his injury at another hospital. Defendant did not contact the
    authorities to report he had been shot.
    Police obtained a warrant to search defendant’s residence
    and recovered a partially full box of .40 caliber ammunition. The
    caliber of these bullets matched the caliber of nine expended
    cartridges and bullet fragments found by the police in the
    laundry room where Alex was killed. A forensic examination of
    the expended cartridges recovered from the murder scene
    determined they were all fired from the same weapon.
    The police arrested defendant and the Los Angeles County
    District Attorney charged him with murdering Alex. At trial, in
    addition to presenting the aforementioned physical evidence and
    witness testimony, the prosecution introduced call records and
    text messages recovered from defendant’s cell phone (even though
    defendant attempted to delete the messages). Beginning the
    afternoon before the murder, defendant called his ex-girlfriend
    several times but she did not answer. In response, he texted her:
    “You answer your mother fucking phone when I call.”1 A few
    hours later, he tried calling her again, and again she did not
    answer; he then sent another text message: “Don’t I answer
    when you call?”2 When she sent him a text reply a few minutes
    later, he responded with another message: “Acknowledge me
    then. Let me know something bitch. If something happened to
    1
    As read to the jury by the prosecutor. The actual text
    message was as follows: “U ANSWER YO M.F. FONE WEN I
    CALK.”
    2
    As read to the jury by the prosecutor. The actual text
    message was as follows: “DON’T I ANSWER WEN U CALL?”
    4
    you out here, you know imma go crazy.”3 After that, in the three
    hours that preceded defendant’s appearance at the neighbor’s
    apartment door, defendant texted his ex-girlfriend once and
    called her seven times without receiving a response.
    The prosecution also presented autopsy-related testimony
    and testimony from a firearms criminalist who examined the
    crime scene. A medical examiner testified Alex was shot six
    times: once in the right thigh, twice in the left thigh, once in the
    right hand, and twice in the head (these two were the fatal
    shots). The firearms criminalist testified Alex was shot in the
    head while lying on the floor underneath the tenants’ mailboxes.
    The criminalist opined all of the shots were fired in a downward
    direction from west to east, that is, from the area near the
    entrance to the laundry room toward the alcove where the two
    washers and dryer were located.
    Defendant did not put on a defense case at trial. But
    defendant’s attorney did successfully offer exhibits into evidence
    during the prosecution’s case, including a video of the path from
    the neighbor’s apartment down the stairs to the laundry room
    and some of defendant’s medical records.
    During closing argument, the prosecutor theorized
    defendant arrived at the neighbor’s apartment “enraged” by his
    ex-girlfriend’s failure to answer his calls in the hours
    immediately preceding the murder and then, finding her not at
    home, killed Alex in an execution-style murder. Relying on the
    3
    As read to the jury by the prosecutor. The actual text
    message was as follows: “ECNOLAGE ME THEN[.] LET ME
    KNO SUMTHIN[,] BITCH[.] IF SUMTHIN HAPPEN TOO U
    OUT HERE[,] U KNO I’MA GKO CRAZY.”
    5
    physical evidence, the prosecutor contended Alex must have
    snatched at defendant’s left hand, which caused defendant’s
    bracelet to break, caused defendant to shoot himself in the left
    arm, and resulted in the gunshot to Alex’s right hand. The
    prosecution dismissed the defense’s apparent theory—that there
    must have been another, unidentified shooter who killed Alex—
    because in the confined space of the laundry room it would have
    been difficult if not impossible for a third-party shooter standing
    near the entrance and firing toward the alcove to shoot around
    defendant and hit Alex.
    As anticipated, the defense argued there was another
    shooter who intended to kill defendant, succeeded in shooting
    him in the arm, and unintentionally shot and killed Alex. To
    support this theory, defendant’s trial attorney directed the jury’s
    attention to medical testimony and records regarding the absence
    of any soot or stippling marks around defendant’s gunshot
    wound, which, in counsel’s view, meant the shot must have been
    fired from some distance away and could not have been self-
    inflicted. Defendant’s attorney also argued defendant’s bracelet
    was not torn from his wrist by Alex but shot off by the
    unidentified third-party shooter.
    After less than an hour of deliberation, the jury found
    defendant guilty of first degree murder. The jury also found true
    an associated personal use of a firearm enhancement (Pen. Code,4
    § 12022.53, subd. (d)).
    Before sentencing, defendant retained new counsel and
    filed a motion for a new trial that is the focus of this appeal. The
    4
    Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
    Penal Code.
    6
    new trial motion chiefly argued defendant’s former attorney (who
    we will call the trial attorney) provided constitutionally
    ineffective assistance in failing to call Bryan Burnett (Burnett), a
    previously appointed expert for the defense who purportedly had
    “conclusive evidence” of defendant’s innocence. Attached as an
    exhibit to the motion was a 23-page report Burnett prepared
    after the jury’s guilty verdict.
    The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the new trial
    motion; defendant’s trial attorney and Burnett both testified.
    Defendant’s trial attorney had received, at the time of trial, a
    shorter seven-page report from Burnett opining defendant’s
    bracelet was likely shot off defendant’s wrist. Trial counsel
    testified he ultimately decided not to call Burnett because, on
    balance, he thought he was a “loose cannon” whose testimony
    would hinder, not help, the defense.
    Among other things that gave him pause, defendant’s trial
    attorney found Burnett’s belief that there were two guns involved
    in the crime problematic. Trial counsel testified he tried to
    explain to Mr. Burnett “repeatedly” that the presence of a second
    gun would not help—and would actually hurt—defendant’s case
    because there was no physical evidence supporting such a theory
    (such as expended cartridges or bullets from a gun other than a
    .40 caliber Smith and Wesson firearm) and because the jury
    would likely conclude any second gun (in addition to a gun used
    by the assumed third-party shooter) would have been in
    defendant’s hand, not Alex’s. Defendant’s trial attorney also
    consulted with another crime scene reconstructionist who
    disagreed with Burnett’s findings, and this reinforced the
    attorney’s view that it would be unwise to call Burnett to have
    him testify to his “second gun” theory. Defendant’s trial attorney
    7
    also considered the favorable testimony he had been able to elicit
    from the prosecution’s experts. The deciding factor for
    defendant’s trial attorney in deciding not to call Burnett,
    however, was the revelation that he had been professionally
    disciplined.5 Defendant’s trial attorney consulted with a
    supervisor in his office and the supervisor concurred with his
    decision not to put Burnett on the witness stand.
    When it was Burnett’s turn to testify during the new trial
    motion hearing, he opined his findings about the bracelet in his
    shorter, first report provided to defendant’s trial attorney were
    exculpatory because they refuted the prosecution’s theory that
    Alex pulled the bracelet from defendant’s wrist and, derivatively,
    the theory that there had been a struggle between Alex and
    defendant. Burnett also testified his second, longer report
    completed after trial was also exculpatory because it showed
    defendant “was a victim, not an assailant,” who happened to be
    “in the wrong place at the wrong time.”
    Among other things, Burnett opined Alex was shot in the
    legs by a third party outside of the laundry room because the leg
    wounds were “through and through” and there were no
    corresponding defects in the walls of the room from bullet strikes.
    Burnett testified the evidence supporting his opinion—prior
    bleeding by Alex and bullet strikes on the floor of the laundry
    room—was likely obscured by the massive blood pool near Alex’s
    5
    Although it had been explained to him at the time,
    defendant’s trial attorney could not recall the exact nature of the
    professional discipline suffered by Burnett. During his direct
    examination, Burnett denied his accreditation had been taken
    away.
    8
    body. Under questioning from the trial court, however, Burnett
    conceded his opinion about the blood pool concealing theory was
    rendered without any scientific basis.
    Burnett further opined defendant was not Alex’s murderer
    due to the nature of defendant’s arm wound, which he
    characterized as a hit from a ricocheting bullet. Under
    questioning from the trial court and defendant’s new attorney,
    Burnett acknowledged he was not a pathologist and conceded
    that his opinion about how an unjacketed bullet travels inside a
    human body was based primarily on his “case experience” (prior
    to opening his consulting business, he had worked for five years
    as a trainee in a private crime lab).
    The trial court denied the motion for a new trial. The court
    found trial counsel made a reasonable decision not to call Burnett
    after making a “detailed” assessment of the value of his
    testimony and in light of the fact the prosecution had essentially
    conceded at trial it was possible the bracelet had been shot off
    rather than pulled off by Alex, which meant the information was
    before the jury even without Burnett’s testimony. As for
    defendant’s new evidence argument, i.e., the opinions expressed
    in the longer report Burnett produced post-trial, the court found
    the report based on “pure[ ] speculation” and, as such, insufficient
    to warrant a new trial.
    The trial court sentenced defendant to 50 years to life in
    state prison and this appeal ensued.
    II. DISCUSSION
    As we will go on to explain at greater length, the trial court
    correctly denied defendant’s new trial motion. Defendant’s trial
    attorney made a reasonable—we could even say wise—tactical
    9
    decision not to call Burnett after considering his background and
    proposed testimony and concluding he would not help (and might
    even hurt) defendant’s case. The so-called new evidence in
    Burnett’s post-trial report, for some of the same reasons, also
    does not suffice to establish the trial court abused its discretion
    in denying defendant’s motion for new trial.
    A.      Defendant’s Trial Counsel Was Not Constitutionally
    Ineffective
    A trial court has “authority to grant a new trial on the
    ground of inadequate representation of counsel,” even though it is
    not one of the enumerated grounds in the statutory provision
    (§ 1181) for ordering a new trial. (People v. Fosselman (1983) 
    33 Cal. 3d 572
    , 577-578; People v. Callahan (2004) 
    124 Cal. App. 4th 198
    , 209.)
    “‘[A] defendant claiming a violation of the federal
    constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel must satisfy
    a two-pronged showing: that counsel’s performance was deficient,
    and that the defendant was prejudiced, that is, there is a
    reasonable probability the outcome would have been different
    were it not for the deficient performance.’ [Citations.]” (People v.
    Woodruff (2018) 
    5 Cal. 5th 697
    , 736.)
    In determining whether counsel’s performance was
    deficient, we consider whether “‘“‘counsel’s representation fell
    below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing
    professional norms.’”’” (People v. Johnson (2016) 
    62 Cal. 4th 600
    ,
    653.) We “‘defer[ ] to counsel’s reasonable tactical decisions’ and
    presume that ‘counsel acted within the wide range of reasonable
    professional assistance.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Arredondo (2019)
    
    8 Cal. 5th 694
    , 711.) Decisions about what witnesses to call are
    10
    “matters of trial tactics and strategy which a reviewing court
    generally may not second guess.” (People v. Mitcham (1992) 
    1 Cal. 4th 1027
    , 1059; accord, People v. Bolin (1998) 
    18 Cal. 4th 297
    ,
    334 [deciding whether to call certain witnesses is a matter of trial
    tactics, unless that decision results from an unreasonable failure
    to investigate].)
    The trial court correctly concluded there was no
    performance falling below prevailing professional norms here.
    Defendant’s trial attorney evaluated the value of Burnett’s
    testimony to the defense in light of several factors including
    favorable testimony regarding defendant’s bracelet that was
    obtained from the prosecution’s witnesses, Burnett’s persistence
    in promoting a theory that counsel found unsupported and
    unhelpful, and the professional discipline Burnett suffered, which
    would undermine the persuasiveness of his opinions. These
    considerations alone provide a sound basis for making a
    reasonable tactical decision to forgo calling an expert witness.
    But counsel did more and consulted with (1) another defense
    expert who faulted Burnett’s findings and (2) another, more
    senior attorney who concurred with the decision not to call
    Burnett to testify. On this record, it is not even close: defendant’s
    trial attorney made a reasonable tactical decision that we will not
    second guess. (People v. 
    Mitcham, supra
    , 1 Cal.4th at 1059.)
    B.    The Trial Court Correctly Concluded Burnett’s Post-
    Trial Expert Report Was Not Newly Discovered
    Evidence Warranting Retrial
    A new trial should be granted based on newly discovered
    evidence only if the evidence is “material to the defendant” and
    the defendant “could not, with reasonable diligence, have
    11
    discovered and produced [the evidence] at the trial.” (§ 1181,
    subd. (8).)
    “In ruling on a motion for new trial based on newly
    discovered evidence, the trial court considers the following
    factors: ‘“1. That the evidence, and not merely its materiality, be
    newly discovered; 2. That the evidence be not cumulative merely;
    3. That it be such as to render a different result probable on a
    retrial of the cause; 4. That the party could not with reasonable
    diligence have discovered and produced it at the trial; and 5. That
    these facts be shown by the best evidence of which the case
    admits.”’ [Citations.]” (People v. Delgado (1993) 
    5 Cal. 4th 312
    ,
    328.) “‘[T]he trial court may consider the credibility as well as
    materiality of the evidence in its determination [of] whether
    introduction of the evidence in a new trial would render a
    different result reasonably probable.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at 329.)
    Our review is for abuse of discretion. (Id. at 328.)
    Three of the aforementioned factors establish there was no
    abuse of discretion in denying defendant’s new trial motion. The
    evidence, i.e., Burnett’s opinions in his longer post-trial report,
    could have been discovered and produced at trial: Burnett was
    the defense’s appointed expert, he consulted at significant length
    with defense counsel before trial, and all of his opinions
    expressed in his post-trial report concerned physical evidence
    available at the time of trial. The purported newly discovered
    evidence was also largely cumulative because the defense was
    able to argue at trial—relying on points developed during the
    prosecution’s case—that the bracelet was shot off defendant’s
    arm (not pulled off during a struggle with Alex). And the claimed
    newly discovered evidence was not so significant as to make a
    different result probable on a retrial. Burnett’s conclusions were
    12
    informed by speculation and analysis outside his core area of
    expertise, the jury likely would have discounted his opinions
    anyway when it learned of the professional discipline he suffered,
    and the import of his conclusions paled in comparison to the
    other strong evidence in the case: defendant’s DNA at the scene,
    his upset demeanor before the shooting, and the ammunition
    discovered during the search of his residence that matched the
    caliber of the ammunition used in the shooting (which was
    determined to have come from a single firearm).
    13
    DISPOSITION
    The judgment is affirmed.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    BAKER, J.
    We concur:
    RUBIN, P. J.
    KIM, J.
    14
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B299405

Filed Date: 3/23/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 3/24/2021