In re S.S. CA2/5 ( 2021 )


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  • Filed 8/11/21 In re S.S. CA2/5
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
    not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
    has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION FIVE
    In re S.S., a Person Coming                                    B308276
    Under Juvenile Court Law.
    _______________________________                                (Los Angeles County Super.
    LOS ANGELES COUNTY                                              Ct. No. 20CCJP02617A)
    DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
    AND FAMILY SERVICES,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    v.
    A.J.,
    Defendant and Appellant;
    R.S.,
    Respondent.
    APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
    County, Pete R. Navarro, Judge Pro Tem. Affirmed.
    Andrea R. St. Julian, under appointment by the Court of
    Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
    Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
    Assistant County Counsel and David Michael Miller, Deputy
    County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    Linda Puertas, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
    for Respondent.
    The juvenile court in this dependency matter found that, in
    an attempt to gain an advantage in a custody dispute, mother
    A.J. coached her five-year-old daughter S.S. (child) to accuse her
    ex-husband R.S. (father) of physical and sexual abuse. Child was
    declared dependent due to the emotional abuse inflicted by
    mother’s conduct. The dependency court then terminated
    jurisdiction with an award of full legal and physical custody to
    father, with mother to have monitored visitation. Mother
    appeals, arguing the court denied her due process at the
    adjudication hearing and abused its discretion in its disposition
    of the matter. We affirm.1
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    1.     Overview
    Child was born in March 2014. Mother and father
    separated in 2018 and divorced in February 2019. For some time
    after the separation, child lived with mother’s parents in
    Minnesota, by agreement. Father sought, and obtained, weekend
    visits, beginning in June 2019. In the interim, mother married
    W.J. (stepfather). Child returned to California and lived with
    mother, stepfather, and their infant daughter (stepsister).
    Mother and stepfather sought to move the whole family back to
    Minnesota indefinitely.2
    1    Both the Los Angeles County Department of Children and
    Family Services (DCFS) and father are respondents in this
    appeal. Each filed a respondent’s brief.
    2     Mother would testify that she had 71 percent custody and
    that she therefore could have moved child to Minnesota without
    court approval at any time. However, other evidence showed that
    2
    In December 2019, mother commenced a six-month
    campaign of accusing father of sexually and physically abusing
    child, with the apparent goal of terminating father’s custody
    rights. She coached child to accuse father, requiring child to
    participate in a number of forensic interviews and invasive
    physical examinations.
    In May 2020, DCFS filed a petition alleging child was
    dependent due to mother’s emotional abuse and failure to protect.
    (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subds. (b)(1) & (c).) Child was
    detained from mother and placed with father. In September
    2020, the court sustained the allegations at the adjudication
    hearing. The court found true that mother “created a
    detrimental and endangering situation for the child . . . in that
    since December 2019, the mother has made numerous allegations
    of physical abuse and sexual abuse of the child against the child’s
    father . . . . The mother subjected the child to numerous forensic
    examinations, including invasive genital examinations. The
    mother subjected the child to further interviews with social
    workers and law enforcement officers on additional occasions.
    The mother’s allegations of physical abuse and sexual abuse of
    the child by the father remain unsubstantiated. The child has
    been observed by mental health providers to exhibit
    dysregulation and have tantrums in sessions. The detrimental
    and endangering situation established for the child . . . by the
    mother endangers the child’s physical health and safety, and
    places the child[] at risk of physical harm and damage.”
    mother believed she needed court approval to terminate father’s
    custody and visitation rights in order to relocate.
    3
    Jurisdiction was then terminated, with father awarded full
    custody.
    2.    Specific Instances of Mother’s Misconduct
    As mother does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence
    supporting the trial court’s adjudication of dependency, we need
    not detail the course of mother’s numerous allegations against
    father and the lengthy law enforcement investigation
    establishing the charges were unfounded.3 Instead, we briefly
    discuss two of the more egregious incidents and additional
    evidence that mother had coached child to lie about father.
    A.     Blaze Pizza Incident
    On March 13, 2020, child, who was then nearly six years
    old, had a visit with father and father’s relatives at Blaze Pizza.
    3     The allegations were taken seriously by law enforcement
    and DCFS. Not only did they conduct numerous interviews and
    examinations of child, they responded to mother’s claims that
    father took inappropriate photos of child by having the FBI
    perform a full “data dump” on father’s phone, to check whether
    any such photos had been deleted. Nothing untoward was found.
    In addition, when mother first claimed sexual abuse, police
    obtained four pairs of child’s underwear from the family hamper
    and examined them for sperm and father’s DNA. Sperm was
    detected in the crotch of one of the panties, and male DNA was
    detected on the interior and exterior of all four pairs. Father was
    excluded as a contributor of the discovered male DNA. Further
    testing revealed stepfather as a source of non-sperm male DNA
    on the interior and exterior of one pair of the panties. This
    resulted in an amended petition being filed alleging sexual abuse
    against stepfather, and the detention of stepsister from mother
    and stepfather. Mother and stepfather suggested the DNA and
    sperm were the result of cross-contamination in the family
    hamper. At the adjudication hearing, DCFS dismissed the
    allegations against stepfather, and stepsister was returned home.
    4
    After child came home, mother called stepfather and told him
    child was acting erratically and had told her father molested her
    in the bathroom of Blaze Pizza. Stepfather immediately drove to
    the restaurant, where he attempted to obtain surveillance video,
    and called the police.
    Police interviewed mother, who said that after the visit,
    child had a tantrum. According to mother, child took her pants
    and underwear off and told mother that father had “poked” her
    buttocks. Mother saw redness on child’s buttocks and expected
    police to examine child. Police interviewed child, who told police
    she needed to be with mother because “my mommy tells me what
    to say.” Child said mother told her that once father goes to jail,
    they will be able to move to Minnesota, which is where her
    grandparents live and her favorite place to be. When asked what
    happened at Blaze Pizza, child told police that, after everyone
    had finished eating, father took her to the bathroom to wash her
    hands. Inside the bathroom, father took his clothes off and put
    them back on several times. She saw his chest and stomach, but
    not his buttocks or penis. She never took off her pants, nor did
    father touch her. At mother’s request, child was examined by a
    Center for Assault Treatment Services (CATS) nurse. “During
    the interview, [child] did not provide any details regarding
    [mother]’s alleged molestation accusation. [Child] did mention
    that she had a hard time remembering what to say without her
    mother being with her.” (Italics omitted.) While at CATS,
    mother told the police that the judge was going to increase
    father’s visitation if everything was okay, and she had been
    advised by her lawyer to gather as much evidence on father as
    she could to ensure that visitation would not change to father’s
    benefit.
    5
    Three days later, two DCFS social workers went to
    mother’s home for further investigation. A social worker
    interviewed child privately and asked about Blaze Pizza; child
    said she could not remember what happened. When the social
    worker continued asking, “child stated that she couldn’t
    remember and went upstairs to her mother.” When child came
    back downstairs; she said she remembered. She drew a picture of
    father and his relatives and said they were mean people. Before
    child could be questioned further, mother interrupted and said
    child was late for a therapist’s appointment.
    Police obtained the surveillance video from Blaze Pizza. It
    revealed that father took child to the restroom to wash her
    hands. Child was in the restroom for 49 seconds. Father held
    the door open with his foot the entire time. The detective told the
    social worker that he confronted mother after reviewing the video
    and told her there was no evidence that anything occurred.
    Mother responded that other incidents happened a few months
    ago. The detective stated “it appears that mother is making stuff
    up and child is being coached by mother.”
    B.    Father’s April 24 Visit
    The second incident we describe took place the following
    month on April 24, 2020. Father visited child at the home of a
    paternal aunt. By this time, child visitation exchanges were
    taking place in the parking lot of a local police station. Father
    and paternal aunt picked up child at the police station and
    brought her to paternal aunt’s home. They had a pleasant visit,
    and father ended the visit early, returning child to the police
    station parking lot.
    After the exchange, mother walked child into the police
    station, claiming that as soon as she picked child up, child said
    6
    she wanted to speak to an officer. Mother said she did not know
    what child wanted to say to the police, because child did not
    discuss it with her. Police interviewed child, who said father
    spanked her on her buttocks and was mean. She said he hurts
    her, spanks her and takes pictures of her private parts. She said
    he poked her vagina and buttocks with his finger. The officer
    asked how many times, she said “sixty ninety five [sic].” When
    asked when this had happened, child said it was that day. She
    said father tried to kick her on her chest, back, and knees. She
    said she had a bruise on her knee and tried to look for it to show
    the officer, but could not find it. When asked the difference
    between good and bad, she explained that her mother’s side of the
    family is good and her father’s side is bad. After the interview,
    the officer approached mother. Mother asked if child had told the
    officer about paternal aunt hurting child, which the officer
    thought strange, as mother had previously indicated she did not
    know anything child was going to say to the police. Later, while
    the officer spoke with mother, child spoke with a police sergeant
    about her summer plans. She said they plan to move to
    Minnesota after father gets arrested. Child asked if father was
    going to get arrested today or tomorrow.
    Unbeknownst to mother, a DCFS social worker had
    monitored the visit at paternal aunt’s house. Child had not been
    out of view of the social worker at any time – not even to use the
    restroom – and there was no abuse or anything at all concerning.
    Child had been comfortable with father during the visit and
    showed affection towards him, resting her head on his shoulder
    while watching television. Mother had, apparently, fabricated
    everything.
    7
    C.     Other Incidents of Coaching
    At the adjudication hearing, mother took the position that
    although the allegations of abuse were unsubstantiated, child
    had made the allegations herself, and mother had been properly
    protecting her child by reporting child’s serious accusations.
    The fact that child told police, “my mommy tells me what to
    say” following the Blaze Pizza incident was strong evidence that
    the claims of abuse originated with mother, not child. But this
    was not the only time child told someone she had been coached.
    In December 2019, following mother’s first report that father was
    abusing child, child gave a full statement to a DCFS social
    worker, then said she had one last thing to say. She “phrased her
    words in a certain way indicating that Mother had told her these
    things about Father and what was going on in his home.” During
    an April 9, 2020 interview, the DCFS social worker asked child
    why she doesn’t like father; she replied, “I don’t know why I don’t
    like him, who knows what the answer will be.” On April 10,
    2020, child told police that father physically abused her, but did
    not mention sexual abuse. Once the officer was finished
    interviewing child, mother continued to ask child if she had more
    to tell the social worker; child answered, “only if you want me to.”
    A number of police officers and DCFS social workers who
    had interviewed child and taken reports from mother all reached
    the same conclusion: mother had coached child.
    3.     The Adjudication and Disposition Hearings
    Prior to the adjudication hearing, father asked the court to
    require DCFS to assess whether the case could be closed at the
    adjudication hearing with an order awarding custody to father.
    The court directed DCFS to submit that assessment in a last
    minute information.
    8
    On September 15, 2020, DCFS filed its last minute
    information, which recommended declaring child a dependent
    and then terminating jurisdiction, giving father sole legal and
    physical custody. The report stated that mother “continues to
    cause disruption and is unable to maintain healthy
    communication with father for coparenting purposes.” (Italics
    omitted.) Specifically – although not exclusively – father
    reported “that he is having difficulty with the school district and
    logging into the [child’s school] portal as the Mother continues to
    log in and undo all of the changes that . . . he makes.”
    At the adjudication hearing, mother objected to receipt of
    the last minute information as unrelated to jurisdiction. The
    court overruled the objection, indicating it would give the last
    minute information the appropriate weight, if any.
    Mother testified in her own behalf, claiming that she had
    never coached child, but simply reported what child had
    voluntarily disclosed to mother. She testified that stepfather was
    present on one occasion when child disclosed abuse; she specified
    this was “at the hospital.” She conceded that, although
    stepfather had called the police from Blaze Pizza, she had told
    stepfather about child’s allegations.
    Mother generally denied doing anything wrong with the
    school portal but admitted that she did, in fact, change the
    emergency contact information, but only to identify herself and
    her parents as emergency contacts, after father had deleted
    them.
    Mother then called stepfather to testify. DCFS and father
    objected under Evidence Code section 352. The court asked
    mother’s counsel what he intended to elicit that was not already
    in the DCFS reports. Counsel responded that he would ask
    9
    stepfather whether he ever heard mother coaching child and
    whether he heard child make claims “basically, to corroborate
    mother’s version, that it was [child] that made the disclosure of
    being abused.” The court sustained the objection, on the basis
    that stepfather’s testimony would be cumulative of his
    statements already in the DCFS reports.4
    The court took the matter under submission. The following
    day, it held another hearing and adjudicated child a dependent,
    stating: “This case is a case of a parent who has unhealthy
    obsessions who has made multiple police reports in the court’s
    view attempting to manipulate the police into commencing
    criminal charges against the father. It’s riddled with efforts by
    the mother to falsely accuse the father of abuse, and it’s evident
    to the court that this child has been coached.” The court added,
    “The mother has shopped around for therapists to – in order to
    require a third-party report. And the report – and the incident
    which really demonstrates to what extent the mother – steps she
    4     Specifically, after counsel made his offer of proof, the court
    asked, “Isn’t that what’s contained in the reports?” Mother’s
    counsel responded, “Well, if the court’s willing to accept that
    then --.” At that point, the court responded that the testimony
    would be cumulative, so sustained the objection. In its
    respondent’s brief on appeal, DCFS interprets this exchange as
    mother’s counsel indicating a willingness that the court accept
    the statements in the reports in lieu of stepfather’s live
    testimony. In her reply brief, mother responds that the court did
    not allow counsel to complete his sentence, and the court’s ruling
    was not invited. This much is clear: mother at no point
    suggested that stepfather’s testimony would be any different
    from his statements recorded in the DCFS reports. Nor did
    mother seek to cross-examine the social workers regarding the
    contents of the reports.
    10
    will take to make certain that the father’s rights to this child are
    forever severed was the incident at the pizza [restaurant] where
    the video was viewed by the police department, police detectives,
    no basis on their behalf to believe that any such acts occurred.”
    The court characterized mother’s conduct as “reprehensible.”
    Following the court’s ruling on jurisdiction, the parties
    contested disposition. DCFS and father argued for termination of
    jurisdiction with a family law order granting father sole legal and
    physical custody with mother to have monitored visitation only;
    child’s counsel did not separately argue, but submitted on DCFS’s
    recommendation. Mother did not object to terminating
    jurisdiction with a family law order, but requested joint legal and
    physical custody, and unmonitored visitation.
    The court terminated jurisdiction and granted sole legal
    and physical custody to father, with mother to have monitored
    visitation. The court explained that the reason for its custody
    ruling was that mother had shown herself unable to cooperate
    with father and, instead, would go behind father’s back to
    “sabotage the school emergency contact list.”
    Mother filed a timely notice of appeal.
    DISCUSSION
    Mother does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on
    appeal.5 Instead, she identifies two evidentiary rulings – the
    admission of the last minute information and the exclusion of
    stepfather as a witness – and claims they were not only
    erroneous, but constituted a denial of due process, not subject to
    5     In her reply brief mother expressly concedes she does not
    raise a substantial evidence challenge to the jurisdictional or
    dispositional findings. She repeated the concession at oral
    argument.
    11
    harmless error review. She also asserts the court abused its
    discretion in denying her joint physical and legal custody.
    1.     There Was No Error in Admitting the Last Minute
    Information
    On appeal, mother argues the admission of the last minute
    information constituted structural error, because she had not
    received the document a sufficient number of days in advance of
    the hearing. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.690(a)(2) [the social
    study for a disposition hearing must be submitted to the clerk at
    least 48 hours before the disposition hearing, and the clerk must
    make copies available to the parties and attorneys].)
    The last minute information indicated that father claimed
    “that he is having difficulty with the school district and logging
    into the portal as the Mother continues to log in and undo all of
    the changes that . . . he makes.” Mother objected to admission of
    this exhibit on the basis that it did not go to jurisdiction, but
    instead “goes more to the progress and the events that occurred
    after the fact.” Counsel also expressed, “There is some
    information in there that if I had more time, I would refute; but it
    comes after the fact and it doesn’t really relate to jurisdiction[.]”
    The trial court overruled the objection and said it would
    give the last minute information the appropriate weight in
    considering jurisdiction and disposition. However, it does not
    appear that the court relied on the last minute information in its
    jurisdictional finding at all; mother’s interference with the portal
    was relevant only to the court’s ruling on disposition. In that
    respect, mother’s objection that the last minute information
    related only to disposition and not jurisdiction was, in practical
    effect, sustained.
    12
    Mother’s counsel’s statement that “[t]here is some
    information in there that if I had more time, I would refute” was
    neither an objection to the court’s consideration of the
    information at the disposition hearing nor a request for
    continuance.6 There was therefore no error in denying it. Even if
    the court erred in admitting the last minute information, nothing
    in the record or mother’s argument supports mother’s claim that
    she was denied due process. While the complete omission of
    DCFS’s required reports prior to a hearing may rise to the level of
    a due process violation, when the report is prepared and is made
    available in advance of the hearing, deficiencies in the report go
    the weight of the evidence, and will not ordinarily amount to a
    deprivation of procedural due process. (In re Crystal J. (1993)
    
    12 Cal.App.4th 407
    , 413.)
    In the absence of a due process error, any admission of the
    document was harmless as a matter of law. Mother testified that
    father’s representation, as recorded in the last minute
    information, was, for the most part, true. She had logged in to
    the portal to put herself in as child’s mother and her parents as
    child’s emergency contacts. While mother did not admit to
    6      Under California Rules of Court, rule 5.690(a)(2), “[a]
    continuance within statutory time limits must be granted on the
    request of a party who has not been furnished a copy of the social
    study in accordance with this rule.” The parties dispute whether
    a last minute information constitutes a “social study” subject to
    this rule, and whether the notice requirement of the rule was
    satisfied. This dispute is immaterial; mother objected to the
    admission of the last minute information as not relevant to
    jurisdiction; she did not seek a continuance of the disposition
    hearing.
    13
    undoing “all” father’s changes, it was undisputed that she had, in
    fact, logged in and change several of father’s portal entries.
    2.     There Was No Error in Excluding Stepfather’s
    Testimony
    The trial court excluded stepfather’s proffered testimony as
    cumulative. (Evid. Code, § 352 [court may exclude evidence if the
    probative value is substantially outweighed by “the undue
    consumption of time”].) We review the court’s evidentiary rulings
    for abuse of discretion, upsetting the ruling only if the trial court
    exceeded the bounds of reason. (In re Cole C. (2009)
    
    174 Cal.App.4th 900
    , 911.)
    Here, DCFS’s reports, already admitted into evidence,
    reflected a number of interviews with stepfather, in which he
    sided with mother – indicating that she did not coach child and
    that child herself claimed abuse. Mother argues these recorded
    interviews were a poor substitute for stepfather’s live testimony,
    and that he was the one witness who could confirm that mother
    did not coach child.
    Mother greatly overstates the relevance of any testimony
    stepfather could give. Stepfather was not present in the home
    when child allegedly disclosed to mother that father molested her
    in the bathroom at Blaze Pizza, nor was he present in the car in
    the police department parking lot when child allegedly asked to
    speak to police about father’s conduct during the April 24 visit
    that DCFS had monitored. The same is true as to two other
    visits when mother claimed child reported abuse when mother
    picked her up in the police department parking lot. Stepfather’s
    statements, as described in DCFS’s reports, reflect that he
    claimed child behaved erratically when she first returned from
    visits with father in July 2019 and that she eventually disclosed
    14
    physical abuse to him. But stepfather could give no testimony as
    to the vast bulk of the claimed instances of coaching, as he was
    simply not present during the mother/child conversations that led
    to the accusations.
    The court reasonably found that this minimally-relevant
    testimony was outweighed by the consumption of time it would
    take for stepfather to testify, and repeat the statements already
    in evidence.
    This proper application of Evidence Code section 352 does
    not constitute a due process violation. “While a parent in a
    juvenile dependency proceeding has a due process right to a
    meaningful hearing with the opportunity to present evidence
    [citation], parents in dependency proceedings ‘are not entitled to
    full confrontation and cross-examination.’ [Citation.] Due
    process requires a balance. [Citation.] The state’s strong interest
    in prompt and efficient trials permits the nonarbitrary exclusion
    of evidence [citation], such as when the presentation of the
    evidence will ‘necessitate undue consumption of time.’ [Citation.]
    The due process right to present evidence is limited to relevant
    evidence of significant probative value to the issue before the
    court. [Citations.]” (Maricela C. v. Superior Court (1988)
    
    66 Cal.App.4th 1138
    , 1146–1147.)7
    7     Mother cites People v. Reeder (1978) 
    82 Cal.App.3d 543
    , 553
    for the proposition that Evidence Code section 352 must give way
    to the right of the defense to present its case. Reeder was a
    criminal appeal that considered the role of section 352 when the
    evidence was relevant to one codefendant but prejudicial to the
    other codefendant. The answer lay in the proper application of
    rules regarding joinder and severance. Reeder was not a juvenile
    dependency case and had nothing to do with undue consumption
    15
    3.     The Disposition Order Was Within the Court’s
    Discretion
    Finally, mother argues the court abused its discretion by
    awarding father full legal and physical custody and limiting her
    to monitored visits. “We normally review the juvenile court’s
    decision to terminate dependency jurisdiction and to issue a
    custody (or ‘exit’) order pursuant to [Welfare and Institutions
    Code] section 362.4 for abuse of discretion . . . .” (Bridget A. v.
    Superior Court (2007) 
    148 Cal.App.4th 285
    , 300.) We may find
    such abuse only if the court’s determination was unreasonable or
    arbitrary. (In re J.M. (2020) 
    50 Cal.App.5th 833
    , 846.)
    Mother argues, “Given [mother’s] unwavering love for her
    daughter and the history of the loving care that [mother] had
    provided [child], the juvenile court’s decision awarding sole legal
    and physical custody to [father] was an abuse of discretion. [¶]
    For similar reasons, the juvenile court abused its discretion when
    it limited [mother] and [child] to two, two-hour monitored visits
    per week. Limited, monitored visits between [mother] and [child]
    will have the unfortunate effect of straining the loving
    relationship between mother and daughter because the limited
    contact and the constant surveillance will make it difficult for
    [mother] and [child] to interact in a normal, natural, and fully
    loving way. This simply is not in [child]’s best interests.”
    Mother’s one-sided argument fails to address meaningfully
    the evidence supporting the court’s exercise of its discretion.
    of time. The present case has nothing to do with joinder and
    severance of criminal defendants. Cases are not authority for
    propositions not considered. (In re I.S. (2002) 
    103 Cal.App.4th 1193
    , 1198.)
    16
    When mother had unmonitored contact with child, she attempted
    to poison the child against father. In fact, when mother first was
    served with the removal order for child and began packing child’s
    belongings, mother and stepfather continued to speak negatively
    about father in child’s presence, despite the social worker’s
    repeated admonitions not to do so. Mother conceded that she and
    father had been unable to coparent. She admitted that, after
    child had been detained with father, she made changes to child’s
    school information to include herself and her family. That
    mother says she loved child is not the point. Mother emotionally
    abused child by using her as a pawn in her campaign to have
    father unjustly incarcerated as a child molester. The court’s
    conclusion that it was in child’s best interests for her father to
    have sole custody and her visits with mother to be monitored for
    her own emotional and physical well-being was not an abuse of
    discretion.
    DISPOSITION
    The jurisdiction and disposition orders are affirmed.
    RUBIN, P. J.
    WE CONCUR:
    BAKER, J.
    MOOR, J.
    17
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B308276

Filed Date: 8/11/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/11/2021