Marriage of Adams CA4/1 ( 2015 )

Filed 6/12/15 Marriage of Adams CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re the Marriage of JOSEPHINE
ADAMS and CHARLES ADAMS.
D065890
JOSEPHINE ALLEN,
Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. DN146892)
v.
CHARLES ADAMS,
Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Michael D.
Washington, Judge. Affirmed.
Steven S. Kondo for Respondent.
Charles Adams, in pro. per., for Appellant.
Charles Adams (Charles) filed a postjudgment motion requesting the family court
to order his former home sold and appoint an elisor to sign the necessary documents on
behalf of his former spouse, Josephine Allen (Josephine). After a hearing, the court
denied the motion. Charles appeals. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Because the appellate record is devoid of many of the background facts, our
factual summary is necessarily limited.
Charles and Josephine were previously married. In 2007 or 2008, the marriage
was dissolved and final judgment was entered. In a prior proceeding, the court had
awarded each party one-half of their family residence (Property) and required Charles to
pay $600 in monthly child support for their daughter. The parties then continued living
together and both paid the mortgage on the Property, but Charles did not pay the required
child support.
In July 2009, Charles signed a quitclaim deed transferring his rights in the
Property to Josephine. Two years later, the parties both moved from the Property, and
Josephine rented the Property to third parties. In about 2013, Josephine moved back into
the house.
In December 2013, Charles filed a motion in the family court requesting that the
court order the Property "be listed for sale and any proceeds be split 50/50 . . ." and
appoint an elisor to sign documents necessary "to effect the listing and sale of the
community property." In support, Charles filed his declaration stating the court had
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previously ordered the property sold.1 Charles acknowledged he had signed the
quitclaim deed transferring the Property to Josephine in 2009, but said the parties
intended the quitclaim deed to be only temporary, and that Josephine had promised to
reconvey the Property. He said he signed the deed in 2009 because he needed surgery
and Josephine was concerned the hospital could place a lien on the Property.
Josephine filed an opposing declaration, denying that she had agreed to reconvey
the property. Charles did not designate the declaration as part of the appellate record.
On February 4, 2014, Josephine and Charles appeared at court for a hearing on the
petition. They declined to stipulate to a court commissioner, and the case was assigned to
Superior Court Judge Michael Washington for all purposes. On that date, Judge
Washington held a hearing on Charles's petition. At the outset of the hearing, both
parties were sworn as witnesses and both had the opportunity to present facts supporting
their positions. Josephine was represented by counsel, and Charles was self-represented.
During Charles's presentation, he presented the following facts regarding the
Property. After the separation and dissolution judgment, the parties both lived at the
Property with their 16-year-old daughter. In 2009, Charles suffered a major foot injury,
and the hospital requested that he use his home as collateral for payment of the needed
surgery. In response, Josephine told Charles to quitclaim the property to her to avoid any
liens being placed on the Property. Josephine said she would reconvey the property after
the medical bills were "cleared." Charles agreed to do so, and signed the quitclaim deed.
1 Charles did not file any supporting documentation showing a sale had been
ordered, nor have we found any such documentation in the appellate record.
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But the next year, in early 2010, when Charles asked Josephine to reconvey the property,
she refused and said Charles had given up his rights to the home. Two years later, in
June 2011, the parties moved to separate locations and Josephine rented the Property to
third parties. Josephine "has since remarried and moved back into the [Property]."
In response to the court's questions, Charles acknowledged that he signed the
quitclaim deed in 2009 and, at the time he signed it, he knew it was a quitclaim deed. But
he said he was "manipulat[ed]" into signing the deed because he needed foot surgery and
the hospital required him to provide collateral before it would perform the surgery.
When the court inquired why he would sign away title to the home if collateral was
required, Charles responded that Josephine told him to deed the home over to her to avoid
liens on the property. Charles said that Josephine told him, " '[a]fter you get past these
bills or whatever, then I will sign it back over to you' " and she "assured" him she would
reconvey the property to him. Charles also said that because of his foot injury he was
"under . . . a stressful situation . . . [and that is the] reason why I signed over the home, I
didn't do it voluntarily because I would have been out."
When the court asked for documentary evidence supporting his claims, Charles
responded: "[o]nly thing that I have is her verbal [assurance]." Charles said: "[W]e just
had a verbal . . . . Everything was verbal, your Honor, for the most part because . . . we
were already living in the home . . . ." At one point during the hearing Charles said he
did not know he was going to "need" supporting documents at the hearing, but then later
reconfirmed he did not have any supporting evidence because the agreement was "verbal
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. . . when somebody tells you, from eye to eye, 'I will sign this back over. I would never
do that to you. I know that's your house.' "
Charles also testified that in 2010 he decided to "let it go" and allow Josephine to
keep the home if she removed his name from the underlying loan. But she refused to do
so. Charles acknowledged that the house is "under water," but said that a short sale
would allow them to "get rid of it" and be finished with the loan.
Josephine did not testify at the hearing, but relied on her declaration and her
counsel's arguments. As summarized by her counsel, in her declaration Josephine denied
that she had agreed to deed the property back to Charles. She stated that until 2009, both
parties paid mortgage payments. But in 2009 Charles stopped making these payments
when he injured his foot. According to Josephine, the parties agreed that Charles would
sign a quitclaim deed to Josephine in exchange for Josephine's agreement to allow him to
continue living at the home without making the mortgage payments and her agreement
not to enforce his outstanding child support obligations. Additionally, Josephine
presented evidence that the amount owed on the secured promissory note was greater
than the market value of the property.
After considering the evidence, the court found Charles failed to meet his burden
to show he did not intend to permanently transfer title when he signed the quitclaim deed.
The court reasoned that Charles had failed to present any documentary evidence
supporting his claim and his credibility was suspect because he waited more than three
years after Josephine refused to retransfer the property to bring his claim to court. The
court stated: "[T]here [is] a properly legally executed quitclaim deed signed by [Charles
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and Josephine] back in 2009," and "I don't find that there was any fraud that took place at
the time that . . . induced [Charles] to sign that document. And as a result, I find that he
gave up his interest in the property [and therefore] I can't grant [Charles's] request to sell
the property because I find [he no longer has] an interest in it." The court rejected
Charles's claim that he had been under a mental or health disability precluding him from
understanding what he was doing when he signed the quitclaim deed.
The court later entered an order stating:
"It is undisputed [Charles] signed the Quitclaim Deed, transferring
title to [Josephine], and at the time, he knew he was signing a
Quitclaim Deed, transferring title to Petitioner; [¶] There was
insufficient evidence presented for the court to find fraud and to
overcome the presumption of title; and [¶] Therefore [Charles] gave
up his interest in the [Property] . . . , and has no interest in the
[Property]. [¶] THEREFORE, . . . [¶] [Charles's] requests to list the
residence for sale and to appoint an elisor are denied."
DISCUSSION
I. Appellate Principles
A fundamental rule of appellate review is that an appealed judgment is presumed
correct. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) " 'All intendments and
presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and
error must be affirmatively shown.' " (Ibid.; see In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51
Cal.3d 1130, 1133.) If the judgment or order is correct on any theory, the appellate court
will affirm it. (Estate of Beard (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 753, 776-777.)
To overcome this presumption, "a party challenging a judgment has the burden of
showing reversible error by an adequate record." (Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564,
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574; see Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1140-1141.) In doing so, an
appellant must provide supporting citations to the factual record. (See Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C); City of Lincoln v. Barringer (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1211,
1239.) An appellant must also "support each point by argument and, if possible, by
citation of authority." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).)
An appeal is not a second trial. The role of an appellate court is to determine
whether any error occurred, and if so whether that error was prejudicial to the defendant.
Absent a prejudicial error, a Court of Appeal cannot remand a matter for a new hearing,
even if the appellant believes he or she could prevail if given a second chance. (See
Aguayo v. Amaro (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1109; Paterno v. State of California
(1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68, 106.)
Additionally, when reviewing an appellate record, a Court of Appeal cannot
reweigh the evidence. (Schild v. Rubin (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 755, 762.) We are
required to "resolve all factual conflicts and questions of credibility in favor of the
prevailing party and indulge in all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the
finding of the trial court if it is supported by substantial evidence which is reasonable,
credible and of solid value." (Ibid.) An appellate court " ' "must presume that the record
contains evidence to support every finding of fact . . . ." ' [Citations.] It is the appellant's
burden . . . to identify and establish deficiencies in the evidence. [Citation.] This burden
is a 'daunting' one." (Huong Que, Inc. v. Luu (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 400, 409.)
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II. Legal Principles Governing Quitclaim Deed
A quitclaim deed passes title from the grantor to the grantee. (City of Manhattan
Beach v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 232, 239.) After the conveyance, the grantor
no longer is an owner of the property. (Ibid.) A quitclaim deed creates a presumption
that the title was conveyed to the grantee. (Evid. Code, § 662; In re Marriage of
Broderick (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 489, 496.) A party seeking to rebut this presumption
must present clear and convincing evidence that the deed was not intended to convey
title. (Ibid.) The issue of whether the evidence is sufficient to overcome the presumption
is a factual question for the trial court whose determination will not be overturned on
appeal if supported by sufficient evidence. (In re Marriage of Ruelas (2007) 154
Cal.App.4th 339, 345; In re Marriage of Broderick, supra, 209 Cal.App.3d at p. 496.)
Although different presumptions may apply in transactions between husband and
wife (see In re Marriage of Haines (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 277, 294), when Charles
signed the quitclaim deed, the parties were no longer married and a final dissolution
judgment had been entered. Thus, Evidence Code section 662's general title presumption
applies here.
III. Analysis
Charles concedes he signed the quitclaim deed conveying title of the Property to
Josephine. This created a presumption that Josephine held sole title to the Property.
(Evid. Code, § 662.) The court made a factual finding that Charles did not meet his
burden to rebut this presumption. The court found the evidence did not support Charles's
claim that he signed the quitclaim deed under false pretenses or as a result of fraud.
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Charles does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's finding.
Instead, he raises several procedural issues. As explained below, none of these
contentions support a reversal in this case.
Charles first contends he "feels" the court erred because the matter should have
been heard by a court commissioner. He says, "The court may have made an error as the
case was changed from a family law summary proceeding [before Commissioner Patti
Ratekin] concerning the divorce decree . . . into a full trial [before Judge Washington]
concerning the right of title deed thr[ough] quitclaim."
This contention does not show reversible error. The record affirmatively shows
the parties declined to have the matter heard by a commissioner, and instead requested
that it be heard by a trial judge. Additionally, the record does not show Charles raised
any objection to Judge Washington presiding over the matter. Moreover, there is no
possible prejudice resulting from the fact that a superior court judge heard the matter
instead of a family law commissioner. At the evidentiary hearing, the court gave Charles
substantial time to explain his contentions and present any evidence supporting those
contentions. The court asked numerous questions, seeking to ensure that it understood
the basis for Charles's claim and repeatedly asked whether Charles had any evidence to
support his claim. The same evidence rules and proof burdens would have applied before
the court commissioner. On this record, Charles's challenge to the trial procedure is
without merit.
Charles next contends he was prevented from presenting evidence in support of his
claim because he was given "misleading information." However, he does not cite to any
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facts supporting this contention. Instead, he states—without providing any record
citations—that individuals in a legal referral service and a family court facilitator's office
told him he did not need evidence to support his claims, and that "all the documents he
would need in court to present his case would be the divorce judgment from 2008."
This factual assertion is not properly before us. Matters raised for the first time on
appeal cannot support a basis for reversing the judgment. (See Knapp v. Newport Beach
(1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 669, 679; see also Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc.
(1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 3; 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Appeal, § 337,
p. 387.) If Charles believed he had been given improper advice regarding the need to
provide evidence at the hearing, he was required to raise this issue with the trial court at
the time of the hearing. There is no indication he did so. Moreover, even assuming he
had raised this issue in the court below, the record does not show the individuals who
purportedly gave him this advice were aware that Charles had signed a quitclaim deed in
favor of his former wife.
Charles additionally argues that he was "hurt" by the court's order because he is no
longer a coowner of the Property. However, to obtain a reversal of a court order on
appeal, it is not enough to show a court order detrimentally impacted a party's interests.
Rather, the appellant must show the court erred and that this error prejudiced the
appellant's rights. In his appeal, Charles did not show any trial court error. Thus, the fact
that the court's refusal to invalidate the quitclaim deed placed him at a financial
disadvantage does not serve as a basis for reversal. Charles's claimed financial
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disadvantage was not caused by a court error. It was caused by his decision to execute
and deliver the quitclaim deed.
Charles states he would "like to return to the Superior court, and be able to present
the case with proper representation, and all necessary evidence to support his case."
However, this court has no power to reverse the judgment and remand the case absent a
showing of error and that the error caused a miscarriage of justice. Charles has not
identified any error committed by the court, nor does he claim that he was wrongfully
prevented from submitting evidence at the hearing or from being represented by counsel.
As the moving party, Charles had the burden of proof and the burden to produce
sufficient evidence to support his request that the court order the Property sold. A party
must present all available evidence at the time of the hearing. A party is not entitled to
present some evidence, and then seek a reversal on appeal by stating that he or she would
like a second chance to present additional evidence. Orders and judgments are final
absent a showing of reversible error.
IV. Charles's Motion To Augment Record
Nine months after the Clerk's Transcript was filed and several months after
appellate briefing was complete, Charles moved to augment the record with a deed of
trust purportedly signed by the parties on July 21, 2009. We deny the motion as
untimely. Augmentation requests "made after a reasonable time has expired from
receiving the [appellate] record . . . will be denied absent a strong showing of unusual or
unavoidable circumstances giving rise to the delay." (People v. Preslie (1977) 70
Cal.App.3d 486, 492.) Charles provided no reasonable explanation for the delay.
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Moreover, even if the request was timely, the deed of trust is not a proper subject
of augmentation because it was not offered in the proceedings below, nor did Charles rely
on this document to support his arguments in the trial court. A document can be properly
augmented to the appellate record only if the item was filed or lodged in the superior
court during the challenged proceedings. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1)(A); see
Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc., supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 444, fn. 3
["Augmentation does not function to supplement the record with materials not before the
trial court."].)
DISPOSITION
Order affirmed. Appellant to bear respondent's costs on appeal.
HALLER, J.
WE CONCUR:
MCCONNELL, P. J.
BENKE, J.
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