People v. Ortega CA6 ( 2013 )


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  • Filed 11/13/13 P. v. Ortega CA6
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    THE PEOPLE,                                                          H039218
    (Santa Clara County
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                   Super. Ct. No. C1243946)
    v.
    ANGEL JOHN ORTEGA,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    Defendant Angel John Ortega pleaded no contest to commercial burglary (Pen.
    Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (b))1 and battery (§§ 242, 243, subd. (a)). The trial court
    suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on probation for three years.
    Defendant contends that his probation condition that he stay away from all Lucky, Save
    Mart, and FoodMaxx supermarkets is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. We
    conclude the probation condition must be modified. As modified, the order is affirmed.
    I. Statement of Facts2
    Defendant, who was carrying a backpack, entered a Lucky supermarket located in
    San Jose. Defendant placed several items into the backpack and left the store without
    paying for them. After a loss prevention officer approached defendant and identified
    1
    All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
    2
    The statement of facts is based on the police reports.
    himself, defendant tried to strike the officer with his backpack. The officer then
    attempted to take defendant into custody, but defendant managed to break free from his
    grasp. After defendant tripped, he was apprehended.
    II. Discussion
    At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated: “You cannot go on the premises
    of any Lucky store, Savemart store or Food Maxx store in the State of California or
    you’ll be in violation of probation. That means parking lot and store.” However, the
    minute order states that defendant was ordered to “[s]tay away from the premises of all
    Lucky, Save Mart & Food Maxx Stores in CA at 100 yds.” When there is a discrepancy
    between the minute order and the trial court’s oral pronouncement, the oral
    pronouncement controls. (People v. Farell (2002) 
    28 Cal.4th 381
    , 384, fn. 2.) Thus, we
    will consider defendant’s constitutional challenges to the trial court’s oral pronouncement
    of the probation condition.
    Defendant argues that this probation condition is unconstitutionally overbroad,
    because it infringes on his constitutional right to travel. He also challenges the
    constitutionality of the probation condition on the ground of vagueness. He asserts that
    he could be found in violation of probation by entering a parking lot while he was
    unaware that the named supermarkets were on the premises.3
    “A probation condition that imposes limitations on a person’s constitutional rights
    must closely tailor those limitations to the purpose of the condition to avoid being
    invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad.” (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890.)
    “The essential question in an overbreadth challenge is the closeness of the fit between the
    legitimate purpose of the restriction and the burden it imposes on the defendant’s
    3
    The parties agree that defendant’s failure to object to this probation condition does
    not preclude appellate review of his constitutional claims. (In re Sheena K. (2007) 
    40 Cal.4th 875
    , 885-887 (Sheena K.).)
    2
    constitutional rights—bearing in mind, of course, that perfection in such matters is
    impossible, and that practical necessity will justify some infringement.” (In re E.O.
    (2010) 
    188 Cal.App.4th 1149
    , 1153.) In addition, “[a] probation condition ‘must be
    sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him, and for the court
    to determine whether the condition has been violated,’ if it is to withstand a challenge on
    the ground of vagueness.” (Sheena K., at p. 890.)
    Though “[t]he right of intrastate travel has been recognized as a basic human right
    protected by” the California Constitution (Tobe v. City of Santa Ana (1995) 
    9 Cal.4th 1069
    , 1100), as defendant acknowledges, probation conditions frequently require a
    probationer to stay away from his or her victim. Here, the parent company of the Lucky
    supermarket that was victimized by defendant requested that he be ordered to stay away
    from all Lucky, Save Mart, and FoodMaxx supermarkets. Defendant may exercise his
    right to travel as long as he stays away from the premises of his victim. Thus, to the
    extent that the probation condition prohibits him from entering these stores, it does not
    impermissibly infringe on his constitutional right to travel. However, there is no
    justification to keep defendant away from any business that is attached to the same
    parking lots as the Lucky, Save Mart, and FoodMaxx supermarkets. Accordingly, the
    condition must be modified to delete the reference to the parking lots of these stores.4
    4
    Since the reference to the parking lots is deleted, we need not consider defendant’s
    vagueness argument that the probation condition must include a knowledge requirement.
    3
    III.     Disposition
    The order is modified to state: “You cannot enter any Lucky store, Save Mart
    store, or FoodMaxx store in the State of California.” As modified, the order is affirmed.
    _______________________________
    Mihara, J.
    WE CONCUR:
    ______________________________
    Premo, Acting P. J.
    ______________________________
    Grover, J.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: H039218

Filed Date: 11/13/2013

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021