In re Trevon M. CA5 ( 2013 )


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  • Filed 12/4/13 In re Trevon M. CA5
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    In re TREVON M., a Person Coming Under the
    Juvenile Court Law.
    THE PEOPLE,                                                                                F066539
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                             (Super. Ct. No. JL003509)
    v.
    OPINION
    TREVON M.,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    THE COURT*
    APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Merced County. David W.
    Moranda, Judge.
    Arthur L. Bowie, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
    Appellant.
    Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
    General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Kathleen A. McKenna and
    Sarah J. Jacobs, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    -ooOoo-
    *Before Levy, Acting P.J., Detjen, J. and Peña, J.
    INTRODUCTION
    On appeal following adjudication of a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602,
    subdivision (a) petition, Trevon M. contends there is insufficient credible evidence to
    sustain the juvenile court’s finding that he committed residential burglary. We will
    affirm.
    PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    In a petition filed November 28, 2012, the Merced County District Attorney
    alleged Trevon committed the following violations: count 1—first degree burglary (Pen.
    Code,1 § 459); count 2—receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)); and count 3—
    violating a prior court order, juvenile probation (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 777, subd. (a)).2
    Trevon denied the allegations.
    Following contested proceedings held December 20 and 21, 2012, the juvenile
    court found counts 1, 2, and 3 as alleged in the petition to be true beyond a reasonable
    doubt.
    At disposition on January 8, 2013, the court ordered, inter alia, that Trevon be
    committed to Bear Creek Academy’s long-term program for a period not to exceed one
    year. This appeal followed.
    FACTUAL BACKGROUND
    On November 26, 2012, Juan Penate left his home in Merced to run errands. He
    ensured all doors and windows were closed and locked before he left that morning as he
    had been the victim of a burglary just a month or so prior. Forty-five minutes to an hour
    later, he returned. Penate entered through the front door and then heard a “noise and
    stumbling.” As he was walking toward the kitchen, two or three individuals jumped out
    1All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
    2Previous petitions were noted to have been filed on March 2, 2010, July 14, 2010,
    January 19, 2011, June 7, 2011, November 15, 2011, and September 10, 2012. The probation
    officer’s report noted the following: “This is the minor’s eleventh appearance before the court
    and twenty second referral to this department.”
    2.
    and Penate was pushed down. As he got up, Penate saw the individuals running out of
    the house and into his backyard. Penate testified that he believed Trevon was the
    individual who pushed him down because “[h]e was the last one I saw running,” and
    Penate could not identify the others because all he “saw was their backs.” He was not
    certain however.
    Penate called 911 as he followed the individuals outside. His dogs were barking
    in the backyard and he looked over the fence into the yard of the home next door. Penate
    made eye contact with Trevon as Trevon was about to enter a side garage door of the
    vacant home next door. Penate yelled at him. Trevon disappeared through the door into
    the garage. Penate expected the individuals to exit the house next door through the front,
    however, he heard noises that led him to believe they were jumping the fence behind the
    home. The police arrived in response to his 911 call about three to four minutes later.
    Penate’s home had been ransacked. He identified a number of items missing from
    the home, including cell phones, jewelry, and a PlayStation 2. He also noted other
    property had been moved from one location to another within the home. A bathroom
    window was open and its screen removed.
    Detective Owen Johnson of the Merced Police Department was monitoring radio
    traffic on November 26, 2012, and heard the call about a possible residential burglary in
    progress with a subject running from the scene. Johnson responded to the address and
    received a description of the suspect from Officer Peter Lee. That description matched
    the description of a young man Johnson had previously arrested for residential burglary,
    Trevon M., who lived nearby.
    After confirming Trevon was still on probation, Johnson and his partner Detective
    Rodriguez responded to the minor’s residence. As they approached the front door,
    Johnson noted it was standing open about two to three inches. Johnson knocked and
    announced their presence by shouting, “Merced Police Department, hello, hello, Merced
    Police Department” and “Trevon, are you in there, Trevon?” After waiting a few
    3.
    moments and receiving no response, Johnson pushed the door open and he and Rodriguez
    entered the home.
    After clearing the kitchen area past the living room, the detectives proceeded
    down a hallway, passing a few bedrooms. In the third bedroom, Johnson encountered
    Trevon’s stepfather, sound asleep. After Mr. M. awoke and Johnson identified himself
    and explained they were looking for Trevon, the group headed back toward the front of
    the home. In a front bedroom, Johnson found Trevon hiding in a closet. He was
    crouched down into a ball; when the closet door was opened, Trevon lunged out and ran
    to the other side of the room. Eventually he was detained.
    In the same room where Trevon was hiding, various belongings of Penate were
    found. They included cell phones, rings, coins, and game controllers. Trevon was then
    arrested.
    DISCUSSION
    Trevon argues the evidence was insufficient to sustain the juvenile court’s true
    finding that he committed the crime of residential burglary because there was no
    evidence he had been in the victim’s home. The victim did not observe Trevon to be one
    of the individuals he encountered when he returned home. Rather, the victim only saw
    him at the property located next door. As a result, Trevon maintains the juvenile court’s
    finding is insufficient to establish that he entered the residence with the intent to commit
    a theft or felony therein.
    The Applicable Legal Standards
    The crime of burglary is defined, in pertinent part, as follows: “Every person who
    enters any house … with intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony is guilty of
    burglary.” (§ 459.) The crime of burglary and the identification of the perpetrator are
    often established entirely by circumstantial evidence. (People v. Bradford (1997) 
    15 Cal. 4th 1229
    , 1329; see also People v. Hinson (1969) 
    269 Cal. App. 2d 573
    , 577-579
    [substantial evidence defendant committed a burglary where witness identified him as the
    4.
    man she had seen crouching in front of broken store window and then fleeing from scene
    after he noticed her].)
    When an appeal challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a juvenile
    court judgment sustaining the allegations of a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602
    petition, we must apply the same standard of review applicable to any claim by a criminal
    defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support a judgment of conviction
    on appeal.
    “Under this standard, the critical inquiry is ‘whether, after reviewing the
    evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of
    fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
    reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.] An appellate court ‘must review the whole
    record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine
    whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is
    reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact
    could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citations.]
    [¶] In reviewing the evidence adduced at trial, our perspective must favor
    the judgment. [Citations.] ‘… The test on appeal is whether there is
    substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the trier of fact; it is not
    whether guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.]’” (In re
    Ryan N. (2001) 
    92 Cal. App. 4th 1359
    , 1371-1372.)
    “‘It is axiomatic that an appellate court defers to the trier of fact on
    such determinations, and has no power to judge the effect or value of, or to
    weigh the evidence; to consider the credibility of witnesses; or to resolve
    conflicts in, or make inferences or deductions from the evidence. We
    review a cold record and, unlike a trial court, have no opportunity to
    observe the appearance and demeanor of the witnesses. [Citation.] “Issues
    of fact and credibility are questions for the trial court.” [Citations.] It is
    not an appellate court’s function, in short, to redetermine the facts.
    [Citation.] Under the substantial evidence rule, we ‘must accept the
    evidence most favorable to the order as true and discard the unfavorable
    evidence as not having sufficient verity to be accepted by the trier of fact.’
    [Citation.]” (In re S.A. (2010) 
    182 Cal. App. 4th 1128
    , 1140.)
    “‘“[T]he standard of review is the same in cases in which the People
    rely mainly on circumstantial evidence. [Citation.] ‘Although it is the duty
    of the jury to acquit a defendant if it finds that circumstantial evidence is
    susceptible of two interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other
    innocence [citations], it is the jury, not the appellate court which must be
    convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. “‘If the
    5.
    circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of
    the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be
    reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the
    judgment.’” [Citations.]’ [Citation.] ‘“Circumstantial evidence may be
    sufficient to connect a defendant with the crime and to prove his guilt
    beyond a reasonable doubt.”’” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Jones
    (2013) 
    57 Cal. 4th 899
    , 960-961.)
    The Juvenile Court’s Ruling
    After considering the arguments of counsel, the juvenile court found as follows:
    “[THE COURT:] … I do find that as to count 1 the burglary in the
    first degree, … I do find that the minor is guilty of that, find that offense is
    true, find it was proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
    “The close proximity of the items, the time which I think was only
    five minutes is what Detective Johnson said, the identification by the victim
    who I thought was an excellent witness, was very good, so I do find count 1
    is true.”
    Later, the court stated, “Truly beyond all doubt I find that he committed the burglary.”
    Our Analysis
    Juan Penate’s testimony regarding the individuals he encountered in his home
    amounts to circumstantial evidence that Trevon was one of those individuals.
    While it is true Penate was not certain Trevon was the individual who knocked
    him down inside the house before fleeing, Penate testified on direct examination that he
    believed Trevon to be one of those individuals because “[h]e was the last one that
    [Penate] saw running” away. Penate got up to follow the individuals outside, calling the
    police as he did so. Once in his backyard, where his dogs were barking, Penate looked
    over the fence separating his home from the vacant home next door. It was then that he
    made eye contact with Trevon who was about to enter a side door of that home’s garage.
    On cross-examination, Penate admitted he did not see Trevon leave his home and travel
    to the house next door, but he did testify this series of events happened within “[f]ive to
    six seconds” and “[i]t was all very fast.” The police arrived a few moments later.
    Although the evidence that Trevon was inside Penate’s residence is circumstantial
    because Penate was not certain of his identification until he made eye contact with him,
    6.
    only a very brief period of time was at issue. In other words, from the time Penate was
    surprised by individuals confronting him inside his home and knocking him down, to the
    time he looked over the fence separating his home from the home next door and making
    eye contact with Trevon, Penate estimated five to six seconds had elapsed. Therefore,
    even if Penate’s testimony on direct examination cannot be said to place Trevon inside
    his home, his testimony on both direct and cross-examination places Trevon in the
    neighboring yard mere seconds later. Trevon is then seen entering the garage of that
    home, and Penate heard individuals “jumping the fence” behind the home. When a
    person is shown to be in possession of recently stolen property, only slight evidence of
    corroboration is sufficient to support the conviction for burglary. (See People v. Gamble
    (1994) 
    22 Cal. App. 4th 446
    , 453.) It is therefore reasonable to infer Trevon was among
    the individuals who had been inside the Penate residence, and he was following the other
    individuals as they made their escape.
    The trial court found the victim’s testimony to be credible and we defer to those
    findings. (In re 
    S.A., supra
    , 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 1140.) Moreover, while the evidence
    concerning Trevon’s presence inside the victim’s home was circumstantial, it was of such
    value that it reasonably justified the juvenile court’s findings. (People v. 
    Jones, supra
    , 57
    Cal.4th at p. 961.) Therefore, considering all of the evidence, and viewing it in the light
    most favorable to the prosecution, we find a rational trier of fact could have found the
    essential elements of the crime of residential burglary were met. (In re Ryan 
    N., supra
    ,
    92 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1371-1372.) This court concludes there is sufficient and
    substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s true finding as to the crime of
    burglary.
    DISPOSITION
    The judgment is affirmed.
    7.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: F066539

Filed Date: 12/4/2013

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021