21st Capital Corp. v. Onodi Tooling & Engineering Co. CA2/3 ( 2015 )


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  • Filed 10/13/15 21st Capital Corp. v. Onodi Tooling & Engineering Co. CA2/3
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION THREE
    21ST CAPITAL CORPORATION,                                            B252080
    Plaintiff and Appellant,                                    (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. BC469275)
    v.
    ONODI TOOLING & ENGINEERING
    COMPANY,
    Defendant and Respondent.
    APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
    Teresa Sanchez-Gordon, Judge. Affirmed.
    Law Offices of Martin F. Goldman and Martin F. Goldman for Plaintiff and
    Appellant.
    Khan Law Office and Amman A. Khan for Defendant and Respondent.
    _________________________
    INTRODUCTION
    Plaintiff and appellant 21st Capital Corporation, a factoring company, advanced
    money to nonparty Motor City in exchange for an assignment of Motor City’s accounts
    receivable, including the account of defendant and respondent Onodi Tooling &
    Engineering Company. When Onodi failed to pay invoices it contended were
    fraudulently created by Motor City, 21st Capital sued Onodi, claiming 21st Capital was a
    holder in due course of the accounts receivable and that Onodi had waived its defenses to
    payment, under California’s Uniform Commercial Code.1 After a bench trial, the trial
    court found in Onodi’s favor, specifically crediting Onodi’s evidence and finding 21st
    Capital’s computer evidence unreliable. On appeal, 21st Capital contends, in a
    misapplication of the standard of review, that there is substantial evidence to support
    judgment in its favor. Because substantial evidence supports the judgment in Onodi’s
    favor, we affirm.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
    I.      Factual background.
    Onodi builds parts for the United States military. Under a master solicitation
    agreement, Prosperity Invest, Inc., doing business as Motor City (Motor City), agreed to
    paint those parts for Onodi. The relationship between Motor City and Onodi worked this
    way: Onodi would issue a purchase order and send the part to be painted to Motor City.
    Motor City painted the part and returned it to Onodi. Onodi inspected the painted part,
    and, if it was properly done, paid Motor City’s invoice.
    1
    All undesignated statutory references are to the California Uniform Commercial
    Code.
    2
    Onodi filed a motion to strike files from 21st Capital’s memory stick, submitted on
    appeal on February 13, 2015. To the extent the memory stick contains matters not
    admitted into evidence in the trial below, the motion is granted. We have considered
    only those matters admitted into evidence.
    2
    In January 2008, Motor City entered into an accounts receivable factoring
    agreement with 21st Capital under which 21st Capital advanced money to Motor City.3
    In exchange, Motor City assigned Onodi’s accounts receivable to 21st Capital.4
    To service its clients, 21st Capital created a website that allows clients to create
    invoices online using a template.5 Clients (e.g., Motor City) can store information in a
    “line items database.”6 Before a client can create invoices, it must create a customer,
    which includes information about who is authorized to approve invoices. When a client
    such as Motor City creates an invoice, the invoice is sent or “released” to the account
    debtor (e.g., Onodi) for approval.7 When an invoice is sent to the account debtor, the
    debtor logs into 21st Capital’s website and approves or rejects or takes no action on the
    invoice. The online invoice contains a link or a window to an invoice confirmation
    agreement, stating that the account debtor “agrees not to assert any CLAIM or DEFENSE
    against Factoring Company, the assignee, that it may have against [Motor City] (UCC
    9403 and 9404), except for the allowed deduction.”
    When Motor City entered into the factoring agreement with 21st Capital, Motor
    City helped “set up” the financing arrangements between 21st Capital and Onodi. Chris
    Marshall and Jesus Calvo from Motor City “took our [Onodi’s] information, our e-mail,
    that stuff down, and they set the whole account up.” Renee Sharp was the person at
    3
    21st Capital targeted small businesses that were “undercapitalized and without the
    necessary internal capital to handle orders from their own customers.”
    4
    This type of tripartite relationship is known as “factoring.”
    5
    The company is “basically paperless.”
    6
    Alternatively, clients can create their invoices offline but give 21st Capital access
    to their Quickbooks.
    7
    Although the invoice is from Motor City, the invoice form has 21st Capital in the
    corner.
    3
    Onodi initially authorized to approve invoices and to pay invoices.8 Motor City later
    identified, on July 30, 2010, Mike Rempert to approve and to pay invoices. When an
    invoice arrived from 21st Capital, Sharp would confirm with Rempert that Motor City
    had properly painted the part. An invoice would not be approved unless Rempert
    determined that the service was rendered and the appropriate documentation was
    received. “If everything was good,” Sharp or Rempert clicked the “approved” box on the
    computer invoice.
    When an invoice was approved, the following language box was added to the
    invoice: “THIS IS A PRE-APPROVED INVOICE. Mike Rempert, an authorized
    agent of your organization, has agreed that this invoice is valid and will be paid in full to
    21st Capital Corp. and not to your Vendor, pursuant to a binding internet agreement.
    Type the following into the address box of your web browser (e.g., Internet Explorer or
    Firefox) to view/print the agreement:
    https://www.21stcapital.com/jinvoice/approval/receipt.jspx?invoiceld=72939
    This invoice was created online at the 21st Capital Corp website: http://www.21st
    capital.com/ and factored by your vendor, Prosperity Invest, Inc.” But if an invoice
    was rejected, an e-mail was sent to the client informing it of the rejection. If an invoice
    was rejected or if no action was taken on it, it did not just disappear from 21st Capital’s
    website. Neither Onodi nor Motor City could remove an invoice once it was released
    from the website.
    In approximately February 2011, Onodi began receiving problematic invoices
    from Motor City for work never authorized by Onodi or performed by Motor City. Some
    invoices, for example, referred to nine-digit purchase order numbers, although Onodi
    used five-digit purchase order numbers; the invoices were for high amounts that Onodi
    never billed;9 and they contained incorrect part numbers. When these problems arose
    8
    To get into 21st Capital’s website, someone would need a username, password and
    secure link. The secure link can be cut and pasted into a browser.
    9
    A painter like Motor City, for example, would never have an invoice for an
    amount as high as $25,000.
    4
    with the invoices, Rempert did not click the “approve” or “reject” button on 21st
    Capital’s website. Sharp also did not authorize payment for the invoices.
    Instead, Onodi called Motor City. Marshall, Motor City’s president, assured
    Onodi he would take care of the problem. Marshall apologized for the situation and said
    he would do anything he could to pay off the debt. Marshall admitted that someone from
    Motor City was sending fake invoices.10
    Jack Ford, 21st Capital’s president, became aware there was a problem with the
    Onodi account in May 2011, when Sharp informed 21st Capital that some of the invoices
    did not belong to Onodi. Ford discovered that some payment checks purporting to be
    from Onodi were different than those Onodi generally used to pay invoices.11 Some
    payments were made by cashier’s checks, which Onodi did not use. Onodi paid invoices
    with company checks. 21st Capital stipulated that Motor City issued cashier’s checks
    that were credited to Onodi’s account.
    Notwithstanding that some of the invoices billed to Onodi were fraudulent, 21st
    Capital maintained that Onodi had approved the invoices and waived any defense to
    them. Specifically, over the course of Motor City’s and 21st Capital’s relationship,
    Motor City submitted 2,088 invoices to 21st Capital in connection with Onodi.
    According to Ford, Onodi rejected none but failed to pay 84 open invoices totaling
    $273,460.56. To substantiate its claim that Onodi approved all invoices, including the
    fraudulent ones, 21st Capital produced computer forensic data, including “summary of
    actions” pages containing statements that Rempert approved the challenged invoices.
    David Clark also testified that he wrote the software, including code, and managed
    the website for 21st Capital.12 Postgre S.Q.L. is a database system that allows companies
    10
    John Onodi, Onodi’s owner, told Marshall that Onodi could no longer do business
    with Motor City. Mr. Onodi reported Marshall to the police.
    11
    Payment checks were sent to 21st Capital’s “lockbox” at Wells Fargo Bank. 21st
    Capital did not have access to that lockbox but an image of the check was emailed to the
    company.
    12
    Clark worked out of his house in Texas.
    5
    to track and maintain large amounts of data. The database captures whether invoices are
    approved. When the “agree” button is clicked on an invoice, 21st Capital’s software
    captures the data on the form. The invoice confirmation agreement is also stored. A
    courtesy e-mail is sent to 21st Capital’s client notifying it of the approval.
    Onodi, however, disputed the credibility of 21st Capital’s computer evidence.
    Onodi’s engineer, Paul Chenier, has a post bachelor’s degree in computer science. He
    reviewed data that 21st Capital made available in Dropbox. He found the summary of
    actions pages produced by 21st Capital insufficient to show that Rempert approved the
    challenged invoices because “that’s not real electronic data. That’s just text that’s been
    printed out of somewhere. I could print that out in WordPerfect or in Word or through
    my own laptop at home if I needed to.” Chenier ran queries in 21st Capital’s program
    database but did not find any “approve or rejects to invoices.” There was no data
    “captured on a session I.D. through a web browser saying that a person actually approved
    an invoice at a specific time, with their login and password.” He found no evidence
    Rempert approved the fraudulent invoices or “clicked on any invoices.” Indeed, Ford,
    21st Capital’s president, testified that when someone clicks an “ ‘approve’ ” or
    “ ‘reject’ ” button (known as a radio button), “[n]o data is collected from any radio button
    anywhere on the internet.”
    If 21st Capital’s program had been written correctly, 21st Capital could have
    provided electronic evidence to substantiate its claim that Rempert clicked “approve.”
    That data could have been captured in an electronic database, which could have been run
    in court. A problem Chenier saw was that 21st Capital used “open source code”13 and
    made changes, sometimes on a weekly basis, to its program code without testing or
    validating those changes. A large percentage of the open source code was “grabbed from
    several different sources on the internet” and only a small percentage of the code was
    13
    Open source code is “basically, a group of people on the internet, and they’re kind
    of anonymous people that work together to create, you know, a particular program or
    develop some software together through, you know, collaborating on the internet, and
    you have no idea who these people are.”
    6
    custom. Open source code is problematic because anonymous people on the internet
    design it, and “holes” are not fixed by vendor updates. Notifications that there are issues
    with the code may not go out.
    Although Ford testified that he put 21st Capital’s Postgre S.Q.L. database in
    Dropbox to share with Onodi, Chenier merely saw a “dump of data” concerning Onodi
    invoices; it was only a “portion of the live database.” It did not include data of Rempert
    clicking “approve” to accept the fraudulent invoices.
    John Onodi, the company’s owner, makes legal and financial decisions for the
    company. Sharp and Rempert were not authorized to sign contracts for the company,
    although they could issue purchase orders.
    II.    Procedural background.
    On September 9, 2011, 21st Capital sued Onodi for breach of contract, money had
    and received, and open book account. After a bench trial, the trial court issued its
    statement of decision finding for Onodi. The court found that Motor City inputted false
    information into 21st Capital’s website, which generated false invoices to Onodi. Onodi,
    however, did not sign, authenticate or accept the fraudulent invoices. Instead, Onodi
    contacted Motor City, and it assured Onodi the problem would be taken care of. Motor
    City was able to keep its “fraudulent invoicing scheme in operation” by paying some of
    the false invoices itself and “ ‘self-authenticating’ ” the invoices.
    Although 21st Capital “produced printouts of its data logs from its website to
    support its claim that someone from Onodi authenticated the invoices and agreed to a
    waiver of all defenses,” the trial court found that “21st Capital’s digital data lacked
    reliability” and that its website was “vulnerable to considerable manipulation by Motor
    City.” The court found credible Rempert’s testimony that he “never clicked ‘I agree’ on
    the fraudulent invoices.”
    The trial court thus concluded that 21st Capital was not a holder in due course of
    the challenged invoices and that 21st Capital was not a third party beneficiary of the
    invoices and invoice confirmation agreements. The court credited Onodi’s evidence it
    did not approve those disputed invoices. In addition to its conclusion that no agreement
    7
    existed between 21st Capital and Onodi containing assignment and waiver of defenses
    clauses, the court found that no waiver of defenses under the Commercial Code “would
    obtain here, because any agreement to pay the disputed invoices would have been
    induced by fraud” and that “there is no consideration to support the disputed invoices
    because Motor City did nothing to earn payment under the invoices it assigned to 21st
    Capital.”
    The trial court further concluded that 21st Capital was not a holder in due course
    of the false invoices because it participated in the underlying transaction by creating the
    invoices, issuing the disputed notices and agreements from its website, sending notices to
    customers requiring authentication of the invoices, and performing accounts receivable
    and collection functions. In any event, Rempert and Sharp lacked actual or ostensible
    authority to waive Onodi’s defenses to payment.
    Judgment was entered on August 5, 2013.
    DISCUSSION
    21st Capital contends that substantial evidence established it was a holder in due
    course of the unpaid invoices and Onodi was obligated to pay them, because Onodi
    waived all defenses under section 9403. This contention is based on a misunderstanding
    and misapplication of the substantial evidence standard of review, and we therefore reject
    it.
    When an appellate court reviews a statement of decision issued after a bench trial,
    the trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed under the substantial evidence standard, and
    the trial court’s resolution of a question of law is subject to independent review. (Brewer
    v. Murphy (2008) 
    161 Cal. App. 4th 928
    , 935.) We uphold the trial court’s findings of fact
    if there is substantial evidence to support the findings, even if other evidence would
    support a contrary finding. (Ibid.; Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 
    150 Cal. App. 3d 870
    , 874;
    Romero v. Eustace (1950) 
    101 Cal. App. 2d 253
    , 254 [“When there is substantial evidence,
    although conflicting, that sustains the judgment an appellate court will not substitute its
    evaluation of the evidence or its opinion as to the credibility of the witnesses for that of
    the trial court”].) Although “[t]he rule that the amount of credit to be given to the
    8
    positive testimony of a witness is solely a question for the trial court is not applicable in a
    case in which the testimony, in the light of the undisputed facts, is so inherently
    improbable and impossible of belief as in effect to constitute no evidence at all,” “[i]n
    order that the court may be justified in disregarding evidence as being inherently
    improbable and unbelievable there must exist a physical impossibility of its being true or
    its falsity must be apparent without resort to inferences or deductions.” (Romero, at
    p. 254.) In evaluating the support for a finding, we view the evidence in the light most
    favorable to the prevailing party, giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference and
    resolving all conflicts in its favor. (Brewer, at p. 935.) We may not reweigh the evidence
    and are bound by the trial court’s credibility determinations. (Axis Surplus Ins. Co. v.
    Reinoso (2012) 
    208 Cal. App. 4th 181
    , 189; James B. v. Superior Court (1995)
    
    35 Cal. App. 4th 1014
    , 1021.) Appellant 21st Capital bears the burden of demonstrating
    that the record does not contain sufficient evidence to sustain a challenged finding of fact.
    (Boeken v. Philip Morris, Inc. (2005) 
    127 Cal. App. 4th 1640
    , 1658.)
    This standard of review thus requires us to consider whether substantial evidence
    supports the trial court’s judgment that 21st Capital was not a holder in due course of the
    invoices under section 9403, not whether there is substantial evidence to support a
    contrary conclusion, as 21st Capital contends. Section 9403 governs the rights of an
    assignee who meets the section’s requirements, and it allows enforcement of a waiver of
    defenses clause. (Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota, N.A. v. B.C.B.U. (2006) 
    143 Cal. App. 4th 493
    , 499.) The section is designed to put the assignee in a position that is no better and
    no worse than that of a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument. (Ibid.) The
    section thus provides that an agreement between an account debtor (Onodi) and an
    assignor (Motor City) not to assert against an assignee (21st Capital) “any claim or
    defense that the account debtor may have against the assignor is enforceable by an
    assignee that takes an assignment that satisfies all of the following conditions: [¶] (1) It
    is taken for value. [¶] (2) It is taken in good faith. [¶] (3) It is taken without notice of a
    claim of a property or possessory right to the property assigned. [¶] (4) It is taken
    without notice of a defense or claim in recoupment of the type that may be asserted
    9
    against a person entitled to enforce a negotiable instrument under subdivision (a) of
    Section 3305.”14 (§ 9403, subd. (b).) Subdivision (b) “does not apply to defenses of a
    type that may be asserted against a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument under
    subdivision (b) of Section 3305.” (§ 9403, subd. (c).) Thus, while simple contract
    defenses, such as a failure of consideration, may not be asserted against holders in due
    course, defenses based on infancy, duress, lack of legal capacity or illegality, fraud in the
    inducement, or discharge in insolvency proceedings may be asserted. (§ 3305; Wells
    Fargo Bank Minnesota, N.A., at pp. 501, 503, 504; Equico Lessors, Inc. v. Mines (1978)
    
    84 Cal. App. 3d 374
    , 377.)
    The trial court found section 9403 inapplicable, because Onodi did not enter into
    an agreement either assigning the challenged invoices to 21st Capital or agreeing not to
    assert against the assignee 21st Capital defenses to the challenged invoices. The court
    expressly found Onodi’s witnesses credible and found 21st Capital’s “digital data” not
    credible: that data, the court said, “lacked reliability,” citing, among other things, that
    21st Capital’s website was developed from “ ‘open source’ ” code available on the
    internet and that Clark made untested changes to the software on a weekly basis.
    Substantial evidence supports these findings. The master solicitation agreement
    between Motor City and Onodi did not contain an assignment clause or waiver of
    defenses against any potential assignee. Rather, the assignment clause and waiver of
    defenses were in the individual invoices and invoice confirmation agreements, which
    stated that the account debtor agreed “not to assert any CLAIM or DEFENSE against
    Factoring Company, the assignee, that it may have against [Motor City] (UCC Sections
    9403 and 9404), except for the allowed deduction.” When Onodi received such an online
    invoice from Motor City, Onodi’s designated approver (either Sharp or Rempert) would
    review it, and, if the service had been provided, would approve and “authenticate” it by
    clicking the “agree” button.
    14
    A waiver of defenses or claims is sometimes referred to as a “ ‘ “hell or high
    water” ’ ” clause. (Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota, 
    N.A., supra
    , 143 Cal.App.4th at
    p. 500.)
    10
    Onodi, however, did not approve the fraudulent invoices or authenticate the
    invoice confirmation agreements for them. Sharp testified that she did not approve the
    fraudulent invoices. Rempert testified that he did not approve the fraudulent invoices or
    click “agree” to any of the challenged invoices. Onodi’s engineer, Chenier, reviewed the
    database provided by 21st Capital and found no evidence that Rempert clicked the
    “agree” button as to the fraudulent invoices. Ford, 21st Capital’s president, himself
    testified that when someone clicks an “approve” or “reject” button (known as a radio
    button), “[n]o data is collected from any radio button anywhere on the internet.” Chenier
    further suggested that some of 21st Capital’s “data” could have been simply reproduced
    by a word processer. He also questioned the vulnerability of 21st Capital’s website,
    raising an inference that Motor City, which had set up Onodi’s online account, could
    have accessed the website and approved the fraudulent invoices by using Onodi’s account
    information. That Motor City was guilty of subterfuge was established by its payment of
    some of its own invoices, in an attempt to hide its fraudulent scheme from 21st Capital
    and/or Onodi.
    True, 21st Capital produced evidence to the contrary. 21st Capital introduced
    exhibits, for example, showing that Rempert did approve the fraudulent invoices. Clark
    explained that 21st Capital’s software captured approvals and rejections of invoices.
    “Summary of Actions” documents showed the history for each invoice, including when
    Onodi approved it. “Summary of Actions” documents, for example, showed that
    Rempert approved a fraudulent invoice on May 19, 2011 at 10:32:30 a.m. This approval
    was substantiated by 21st Capital’s “contact history,” which showed that Rempert logged
    into 21st Capital’s system just a minute before, at 10:31:05 a.m.
    The standard of review, however, dictates how we must treat such contrary
    evidence on appeal: we do not reweigh the evidence or make credibility determinations.
    (Brewer v. 
    Murphy, supra
    , 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 935.) 21st Capital’s arguments amount
    to nothing more than a request that we do what the standard of review forbids. That there
    is evidence to support a conclusion other than the one the trial court reached is irrelevant
    11
    where, as here, substantial evidence supports the judgment the trial court in fact reached;
    namely, Onodi did not authenticate or approve the challenged invoices.15
    Based on that conclusion, the trial court also found that Onodi had therefore not
    waived defenses to the invoices, including ones based on failure of consideration and
    fraud. Substantial evidence also supports the court’s conclusion that Onodi had
    established those defenses. Sharp and Rempert testified that the challenged invoices
    were for work never performed by Motor City; some challenged invoices referenced
    incorrect nine-digit purchase order numbers and were for amounts Onodi never billed;
    Marshall at Motor City admitted to Onodi that invoices were incorrect and promised to
    correct the problem; and Motor City paid some of its own invoices in an attempt to
    conceal its wrongdoing.16
    15
    21st Capital asserts that Onodi did not dispute it “authenticated” 39 unpaid
    invoices totaling $15,085.56. It is unclear to what 21st Capital is referring and 21st
    Capital does not cite to the record to substantiate this assertion. We therefore reject any
    claim that judgment should have, at a minimum, been entered in that amount.
    16
    Because substantial evidence supports the trial court’s judgment that Onodi did
    not enter into an assignment agreement and waive defenses to the fraudulent invoices, we
    need not address other issues resolved in the statement of decision; for example,
    Rempert’s and Sharp’s apparent and ostensible authority to enter into contracts on behalf
    of Onodi and whether 21st Capital was not a holder in due course because of its close
    connection to the underlying transactions between Motor City and Onodi.
    12
    DISPOSITION
    The judgment is affirmed. Defendant and respondent Onodi’s motion to strike
    files on the memory stick is granted, as set forth in this opinion. Onodi is to recover its
    costs on appeal.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    ALDRICH, J.
    We concur:
    EDMON, P. J.
    LAVIN, J.
    13
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B252080

Filed Date: 10/13/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021