In re T.K. CA2/1 ( 2021 )


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  • Filed 9/27/21 In re T.K. CA2/1
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
    certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
    certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION ONE
    In re T.K.,                                                       B309054
    a Person Coming Under the                                         (Los Angeles County
    Juvenile Court Law.                                               Super. Ct. No. NJ30152)
    THE PEOPLE,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    v.
    T.K.,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
    Angeles County, John C. Lawson II, Judge. Affirmed.
    Elana Goldstein, under appointment by the Court of
    Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
    Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
    Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
    Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr. and John Yang,
    Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    ____________________
    Juvenile T.K.1 appeals from the juvenile court’s order
    sustaining a Welfare and Institutions Code section 6022 petition
    finding he committed assault by means of force likely to produce
    great bodily injury in violation of Penal Code section 245,
    subdivision (a)(4).
    T.K. argues the juvenile court’s questioning of witnesses
    during the bench trial was prejudicial misconduct. We disagree.
    The juvenile court’s questioning was measured and designed to
    clarify events portrayed on a grainy cellular phone video, which
    shows multiple minors punching or kicking the victim while
    hurling derogatory insults.
    T.K. also contends there was insufficient evidence to
    support the judgment and that his self-defense or defense-of-
    others claim was improperly rejected. T.K.’s assertion that he
    needed to defend himself or his friends is contradicted by the
    victim, his own testimony, and the video. The juvenile court is
    exclusively entrusted with assessing witness credibility and was
    well within its province to reject T.K.’s assertions.
    Accordingly, we affirm.
    1We refer to the minor by his initials to protect personal
    privacy. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.90(b)(4), 8.401(a)(2).)
    2Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the
    Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.
    2
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    A.    The Assault
    On February 10, 2020, Jared L.,3 a student at California
    State University, Long Beach, was riding his bicycle home from
    school when he encountered T.K. and a large group of other
    minors who were also riding on a narrow bike path. As Jared L.
    struggled to get past the group, he was harassed and eventually
    slapped by one of them.
    Jared L. turned around, rode up to the minor who slapped
    him, and bumped his own bicycle into that person’s bicycle,
    saying, “You don’t hit people.” When Jared L. thereafter tried to
    continue his journey home, a member of the group rammed into
    his bicycle from behind, knocking him to the ground.
    Once on the ground, a group of approximately eight minors
    surrounded Jared L. One of them said, “Why are you messing
    around with my homie?” Jared L. replied, “Your homie just hit
    me.” Another member of the group then punched Jared L.
    As more of the group began attacking him, Jared L. began
    flailing his arms in defense. T.K. then grabbed Jared L. by the
    backpack and threw him to the ground.
    The minors then beat and kicked Jared L. At some point,
    they asked where his wallet was. The minors then threw Jared
    L.’s bicycle into the adjacent riverbed. During the attack,
    someone struck Jared L.’s head with a glass bottle, leaving glass
    in his hair and cut wounds.
    3 We refer to the victim by his first name and last initial to
    protect personal privacy. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule
    8.90(b)(4).)
    3
    City of Seal Beach Police Department Officer Benjamin
    Jaispream responded that day. He spoke with Jared L. and took
    photographs of injuries to his face, left arm, and left leg. Nearby,
    Officer Jaispream found a broken beer bottle on the rocks next to
    the riverbed.
    T.K. testified on his own behalf. After the assault began,
    T.K. said he took out his phone to record since he wanted to post
    the fight to social media. “[T]his is going to be a cool clip for my
    edit or whatever,” he testified.
    Once he saw Jared L. pushed to the ground, T.K. testified
    he began to back away, but Jared L. pulled on T.K.’s arm with
    one hand, and on T.K.’s shirt collar with the other. Jared L. then
    punched T.K. on the left side of his body. The punch caused T.K.
    to fall down the embankment.
    T.K. then ascended the embankment and observed Jared L.
    being attacked by the other minors, “[his] friends.” T.K. walked
    up to Jared L. and “push[ed]” him one more time because he was
    punching his friends. T.K. then walked away from the fight and
    rode away.
    In stark contrast with T.K., Jared L. denied punching T.K.
    at any time during the assault or throwing him down the
    embankment.
    B.      The Section 602 Petition and Trial
    The People filed a two-count section 602 petition, alleging
    T.K. committed second degree robbery in violation of Penal Code
    section 211, and assault by means of force likely to produce great
    bodily injury, in violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision
    (a)(4).
    Following a bench trial, the juvenile court declined to make
    a true finding on count 1, but sustained the petition as to count 2
    4
    (declaring that count to be a felony), and placed T.K. on home
    probation.
    T.K. timely appealed.
    DISCUSSION
    A.    The Court’s Questioning Was Proper
    1.    Standard of Review and Applicable Law
    We review a judicial misconduct challenge on a case-by-
    case basis. (People v. Sanders (1995) 
    11 Cal.4th 475
    , 531-532.)
    We first “ ‘ “determine whether the judge’s behavior was so
    prejudicial that it denied [the defendant] a fair, as opposed to a
    perfect, trial” ’ ” and then “make that determination on a case-by-
    case basis, examining the context of the court’s comments and the
    circumstances under which they occurred.” (People v. Abel (2012)
    
    53 Cal.4th 891
    , 914.)
    On the other hand, it must be said that a trial court can
    control the examination of witnesses to ensure the efficient
    “ascertainment of the truth,” and may examine witnesses on its
    own motion. (Evid. Code, § 765, subd. (a); Pen. Code, § 1044.)
    “ ‘[I]t is not merely the right but the duty of a trial judge to see
    that the evidence is fully developed before the trier of fact and to
    assure that ambiguities and conflicts in the evidence are resolved
    insofar as possible.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Mayfield (1997) 
    14 Cal.4th 668
    , 739.) The “court has both the discretion and the
    duty to ask questions of witnesses, provided this is done in an
    effort to elicit material facts or to clarify confusing or unclear
    testimony.” (People v. Cook (2006) 
    39 Cal.4th 566
    , 597.)
    In undertaking an examination, the trial court should be
    careful not to take on the role of either the prosecutor or the
    defense. “The court’s questioning must be ‘ “temperate,
    5
    nonargumentative, and scrupulously fair.” ’ ” (People v. Cook,
    
    supra,
     39 Cal.4th at p. 597; see also People v. Brown (1993) 
    6 Cal.4th 322
    , 333 [a defendant has a due process right to an
    impartial judge]; accord, Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 
    499 U.S. 279
    , 309 [
    111 S.Ct. 1242
    , 
    113 L.Ed.2d 302
    ].)
    2.    The Juvenile Court’s Questioning
    T.K. argues the court committed misconduct by asking
    numerous and detailed questions of the witnesses. In doing so,
    the argument goes, the court improperly aligned itself with the
    prosecution in a way that made the court no longer impartial but
    rather taking on the role and function of the prosecutor. T.K.
    insists the court’s questioning were “not simply clarifying.”
    Instead, the court was evidently unsatisfied with the prosecutor’s
    own examination, and so “stepped into the role of a second
    prosecutor.”
    The first challenged testimony occurred after Jared L. had
    completed his direct and cross-examination. The juvenile court
    asked the prosecutor to play the video from the beginning. T.K.
    specifically complains that the court asked the prosecutor to play
    the video in “few-second increments at a time,” while asking
    Jared L. a series of questions, including who was hitting him,
    why he stood up, and what was happening with Jared L.’s
    backpack. T.K. highlights the following exchanges:
    “The Court: And at this point – what are you trying to do
    at this point?
    “[Jared L.]: Defend myself.
    “The Court: And at this time approximately how many
    strikes or blows are you feeling?
    “[Jared L.]: Right around, like, five or so. Five or six.
    6
    “The Court: And can you tell from what direction they’re
    coming from?
    “[Jared L.]: At the time it felt like every direction.”
    “The Court: What did you say to this person when you
    bumped their wheel?
    “[Jared L.]: I said, ‘You don’t fucking hit people.’
    “The Court: Did you – did the person respond to you?
    “[Jared L.]: No.
    “The Court: When you rode back to that group, did you
    ever punch anybody?
    “[Jared L.]: No.
    “The Court: You ever slap somebody back?
    “[Jared L.]: No.”
    The second examination highlighted by T.K. is his own
    testimony that followed the completion of direct and cross-
    examination. T.K. complains that the juvenile court examined
    T.K. for “six pages” worth of the reporter’s transcript.
    “The Court: . . . So I do see the witness grabs you by the
    arm at that time. You’re indicating that’s you?
    “[T.K.]: Yes.
    “The Court: Why are you so close to him when all this
    started?
    “[T.K.]: I was trying to get a clear video for my social
    media.
    “The Court: And which hand is your camera – your phone
    in?
    “[T.K.]: I’m right-handed, so I was using my right hand.
    “The Court: All right. Counsel, could you play it again
    another 10 seconds[?] [Video plays.] . . . So you see where the
    witness turns around and you’re now out of the screen?
    7
    “[T.K.]: Yes.
    “The Court: Where are you at this point?
    “[T.K.]: I’m falling down the embankment.
    “The Court: You’re falling down the embankment?
    “[T.K.]: Yes.
    “The Court: And did you actually – did you ultimately end
    up on the ground or just stumble?
    “[T.K.]: I – I was rolling on my head and my hip to the
    bottom.”
    “The Court: So that’s you coming back into the screen at
    approximately 13 seconds?
    “[T.K.]: Yes.
    “The Court: 14 seconds? And that’s you pushing him?
    “[T.K.]: Yes.
    “The Court: And so you came from up the embankment.
    You got up, came up the embankment, and then went over and
    pushed him; is that correct?
    “[T.K.]: Yes.”
    3.    Analysis
    We have reviewed the video of the assault, as well as the
    reporter’s transcript on appeal. The jerky, low-resolution video is
    41 seconds long, and portrays multiple minors punching or
    kicking Jared L., while being cheered on with shouts of “Get his
    ass!” clearly audible.
    The juvenile court’s questioning did not result in an
    improper alignment with the prosecution or deny T.K. a fair trial.
    To the contrary, the juvenile court’s questioning was measured,
    clarifying the order of events portrayed by the video, and
    improving the record on appeal. (See People v. Hawkins (1995)
    8
    
    10 Cal.4th 920
    , 947-948 [trial judge may question witnesses to
    clarify the evidence or fill in evidentiary gaps].)
    It also must be plainly stated that no jury was involved;
    this was a court trial where the juvenile judge was the finder of
    fact. Prejudice in the sense of improperly influencing the jury
    has no bearing, and T.K.’s counsel identifies not a single case
    involving prejudicial witness examinations in a bench trial
    setting.4
    B.    The Evidence Was Sufficient and Does Not Support a
    Claim of Self-defense or Defense of Others
    1.    Sufficiency of the Evidence
    In a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
    conviction, we review the entire record in the light most favorable
    4  The three jury trial cases cited in T.K.’s briefing are
    therefore inapposite. In People v. Santana (2000) 
    80 Cal.App.4th 1194
    , the trial court used the prosecutor’s terminology in
    questioning police officers, dwelled on evidence from defense
    witnesses that was adverse to the defendant, and limited defense
    counsel’s cross-examination of witnesses. (Id. at pp. 1207-1209.)
    In People v. Robinson (1960) 
    179 Cal.App.2d 624
    , the trial court
    was described as having engaged in “constant and extensive
    interruptions and activity” such as to create “in the minds of the
    jurors the impression that the court favored the case of the
    People.” (Id. at p. 631.) In People v. Williams (2021) 
    60 Cal.App.5th 191
    , the trial court “interrupted the defense’s cross-
    examination at least a dozen times with its own questions and
    sua sponte objections,” “[asked] follow up questions that appeared
    to minimize potential reliability problems with” the prosecution
    expert’s position, and “did not allow relevant and appropriate
    cross-examination on the scientific reports and studies.” (Id. at
    p. 205.)
    9
    to supporting the judgment to determine whether substantial
    evidence supports the finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
    (People v. Johnson (1980) 
    26 Cal.3d 557
    , 562, 578.) Reversal is
    appropriate only where it appears “that upon no hypothesis
    whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the
    judgment].” (People v. Redmond (1969) 
    71 Cal.2d 745
    , 755.)
    As discussed, T.K. testified Jared L. was the initial
    aggressor in the assault because Jared L.’s left hand made
    contact with his arm. T.K. claimed he was defending himself
    because Jared L. pulled on his arm with one hand and pulled on
    his shirt collar with the other. He then punched T.K. on the left
    side of his body causing him to fall down the embankment.
    Afterwards, T.K. allegedly scrambled up the embankment,
    “walked up to Jared L. and pushed him one time in order to
    defend himself and his friends.” T.K. says he then “pedal[led]
    away to get away from the whole situation.”
    The juvenile court evidently rejected this testimony, and
    T.K.’s version of events is not supported by the video. (See People
    v. Ochoa (1993) 
    6 Cal.4th 1199
    , 1206 [it is the exclusive province
    of the trier of fact to assess the credibility of witnesses and the
    court will not substitute its own evaluation of witness credibility
    for that of the fact finder].)
    2.     Self-defense/Defense of Others
    Someone who reasonably fears infliction of imminent bodily
    injury is allowed to use all force reasonably necessary to prevent
    the harm. (People v. Minifie (1996) 
    13 Cal.4th 1055
    , 1064-1065;
    see Pen. Code, §§ 692, 693.) The reasonableness of the apparent
    danger is evaluated from the viewpoint of a reasonable person in
    the defendant’s position and “[t]he [factfinder] must consider all
    10
    the facts and circumstances it might ‘ “expect[ ] to operate on [the
    defendant’s] mind.” ’ ” (Minifie, 
    supra, at p. 1065
    .)
    “ ‘[W]here the evidence is uncontroverted and establishes
    all of the elements for a finding of self-defense it may be held as a
    matter of law that the [use of force] was justified; however, where
    some of the evidence tends to show a situation in which a [use of
    force] may not be justified then the issue is a question of fact for
    the [factfinder] to determine. . . .’ [Citation.]” (People v. Levitt
    (1984) 
    156 Cal.App.3d 500
    , 509, disapproved on another ground
    in People v. Johnson (2016) 
    62 Cal.4th 600
    , 649, fn. 6.)
    On the other hand, “[w]here the evidence is uncontroverted,
    but reasonable persons could differ on whether the resort to force
    was justified or whether the force resorted to was excessive, then
    the issue is a question of fact for the trier of fact.” (People v.
    Clark (1982) 
    130 Cal.App.3d 371
    , 378-379.) In such cases, “ ‘[t]he
    [factfinder is] not required to accept [the] defendant’s version of
    the [incident].’ [Citation.]” (People v. Bates (1967) 
    256 Cal.App.2d 935
    , 939.)
    T.K.’s claim of self-defense or defense of others is
    specifically contradicted by his own testimony that he pushed
    Jared L., not to defend himself or others, but to stop the group of
    bicyclists from hitting Jared L. further. At that point, however,
    Jared L. was fighting at least four other individuals. A
    reasonable person under such circumstances would not have
    subjectively entertained a belief that there was a need to defend
    the group of bicyclists from Jared L. (See People v. Minifie,
    
    supra,
     13 Cal.4th at p. 1065.)
    T.K. also cannot claim self-defense as a matter of law
    because a member of the group struck the first blow. It is well-
    settled law that someone who initiates a fight cannot thereafter
    11
    claim self-defense unless he made efforts to stop the fighting and
    communicated such efforts. (See, e.g., People v. Hecker (1895)
    
    109 Cal. 451
    , 463-464; CALCRIM No. 3471 [“A person who
    (engages in mutual combat/[or who] starts a fight) has a right to
    self-defense only if: [¶] 1. (He/She) actually and in good faith tried
    to stop fighting; [¶] [AND] [¶] 2. (He/She) indicated . . . that
    (he/she) wanted to stop fighting and that (he/she) had stopped
    fighting. . .”].)
    At the time T.K. pushed Jared L., T.K. had no need to
    defend himself, as he had allegedly just climbed out of the
    embankment and could have walked away. This he did not do.
    Instead, T.K. even mocked Jared L. after pushing him onto the
    rocks.
    DISPOSITION
    The judgment is affirmed.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
    CRANDALL, J.*
    We concur:
    CHANEY, J.                     BENDIX, Acting P. J.
    *Judge of the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court,
    assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
    the California Constitution.
    12