In re A.M. CA2/5 ( 2021 )


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  • Filed 9/27/21 In re A.M. CA2/5
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
    not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
    has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION FIVE
    In re A.M., a Person Coming                                  B309090
    Under the Juvenile Court Law.                                (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No.
    17CCJP01782C)
    LOS ANGELES COUNTY
    DEPARTMENT OF
    CHILDREN AND FAMILY
    SERVICES,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    v.
    AMANDA M.,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
    Angeles County, Akemi Arakaki, Judge. Affirmed.
    Lori Siegel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
    Defendant and Appellant.
    Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
    Assistant County Counsel, Tracey Dodds, Principal Deputy
    County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    _________________________________
    I.     INTRODUCTION
    Amanda M., mother of now two-year-old A.M., appeals from
    the juvenile court’s order denying her reunification services with
    the child.1 We affirm.
    II.   BACKGROUND
    A.    Mother’s Failure to Reunify with Child’s Half Siblings
    On November 14, 2017, the Los Angeles County
    Department of Children and Family Services (Department) filed
    a Welfare and Institutions Code section 3002 petition alleging
    mother had physically abused the child’s older half siblings M.S.
    and A.M.-S. by striking them with a belt and brush and
    threatening to smash their heads against a wall. Mother also
    struck M.S.’s stomach and arm with her fist. The petition further
    alleged mother had mental and emotional problems, failed to
    1     The child’s father, R.B., is not a party to this appeal.
    2     All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
    Institutions Code.
    2
    take her psychiatric medication as prescribed, and had been
    involuntarily hospitalized on three occasions for the evaluation
    and treatment of her psychiatric condition. The juvenile court
    sustained the petition.
    At the February 22, 2018, disposition hearing, the juvenile
    court ordered the Department to provide mother with
    reunification services including individual counseling that
    addressed “‘mother’s lengthy and unresolved history of resistance
    to consistent mental health and psychiatric and therapeutic
    treatments[,]’ . . . participating in current psychiatric treatment[,]
    and compliance with [a] prescribed psychotropic medication
    regimen.”
    For the 12-month review hearing on January 9, 2019, the
    Department reported that mother had been referred to all court-
    ordered services. She had not, however, been able to stabilize her
    mental health. Between March and May 2018, she had several
    psychiatric hospitalizations. She had not complied with her
    mental health services and refused to cooperate with her regional
    center services. On February 20, 2019, the juvenile court
    terminated mother’s family reunification services due to her
    noncompliance with her case plan.
    On or about June 4, 2019, the Department received a five-
    day referral stating that mother had failed to reunify with two
    children and had just given birth to the child. Mother had
    received limited prenatal care during her pregnancy. She
    reported that she was homeless and had given up her apartment
    because she wanted a place safe from father with whom she had
    a history of domestic violence.
    3
    B.    Dependency Proceedings
    After the child was born, she was placed on respiratory
    support in the neonatal intensive care unit at the hospital. On
    June 5, 2019, the child’s doctor informed a social worker that
    mother had been aggressive, argumentative, and accusatory with
    the hospital staff. Mother was placed on a section 5150 hold due
    to her aggressive behavior. Mother insisted that she be allowed
    to take the child “‘home’” that day despite being told that the
    child was not medically ready for discharge. The doctor indicated
    that mother and the child might be released from the hospital the
    next day. On June 6, 2019, the Department detained the child.
    Mother was released from the section 5150 hold on
    June 8, 2019. Mother’s behavioral discharge summary stated
    that she “‘was very delusional, and was thinking that people were
    trying to steal [the child]. She made some bizarre comment about
    how the [l]abor and delivery nurses were molesting [the child].
    She is no longer psychotic and has cleared up drastically with her
    Thorazine and Haldol that she received.’” Mother was diagnosed
    with schizoaffective disorder and discharged with no medication.
    On June 10, 2019, the Department filed a section 300
    petition alleging the child was at risk of harm because mother
    had physically abused the child’s half siblings. The half siblings
    were receiving permanent placement services. The petition
    further alleged that mother had a history of mental and
    emotional problems that included a diagnosis of bipolar disorder,
    schizoaffective disorder, borderline intellectual functioning,
    depression, psychosis and suicidal ideation, delusional thoughts,
    paranoid behavior, and being a danger to others. On five
    occasions, mother had been hospitalized for the evaluation and
    4
    treatment of her psychiatric condition, including shortly after the
    child’s birth. Mother failed to take her psychotropic medication
    as prescribed or to participate regularly in mental health
    counseling.
    At the June 11, 2019, detention hearing, the juvenile court
    found there were no reasonable means to protect the child
    without removing her from the parents’ physical custody.
    In its July 12, 2019, Jurisdiction/Disposition Report, the
    Department recommended, pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision
    (b)(10), that mother not receive reunification services.
    On July 24, 2019, the Department filed a first amended
    section 300 petition that included a new count alleging the child
    was at risk due to father’s history of mental and emotional health
    problems and a new count alleging mother’s and father’s history
    of domestic violence placed the child at risk.
    In a Supplemental Report filed on July 26, 2019, a social
    worker reported that mother denied that she had a history of
    mental and emotional problems, had been diagnosed with several
    mental health conditions, or had been hospitalized. As to the
    allegations in the petition, mother stated, “‘Not true. None of it.
    I have proof on paper. I have a doctor’s note showing I don’t need
    medication.’”
    The social worker asked mother about her recent
    psychiatric hospitalization. Mother responded, “‘My mom didn’t
    want nothing to do with me and she said to go the police and tell
    them to take care of you, so I did that. My mom disowned me,
    and now doesn’t want nothing to do with me. That tells you what
    kind of person she is.’”
    In an August 16, 2019, Last Minute Information for the
    Court, the Department reported that during an August 12, 2019,
    5
    visit with the child mother “appeared paranoid and seemed to be
    talking to people that were not there, and cussing and yelling at
    some imaginary people.” The visitation monitor was able to calm
    down mother, “who then began singing a song to the [child].”
    In a December 6, 2019, Last Minute Information for the
    Court, the Department reported that mother had completed the
    Skillful Parenting course at El Monte-Rosemead Adult School on
    October 8, 2019. A dependency investigator contacted the school
    to determine the nature of the program. According to the
    receptionist, the program was self-directed and not teacher-
    directed. The Department did not consider the Skillful Parenting
    course an appropriate parenting instruction course. Because of
    mother’s significant mental illness, she required a parenting
    class that included both facilitator-led instruction and group
    discussion.
    On December 3, 2019, mother informed the social worker
    that she was not attending individual therapy. When the social
    worker asked mother about her medication compliance, mother
    stated that she was taking Abilify as her psychiatrist prescribed.
    The social worker asked to see mother’s medication. Mother
    produced an empty prescription bottle for an Abilify generic that
    had no lid. The social worker asked why the bottle was empty
    and mother did not have an answer. The medication was issued
    on October 23, 2019. The social worker opined that if mother
    were medication compliant and given a 30-day supply, mother
    would have run out of medication on or about November 23, 2019.
    On December 5, 2019, the social worker spoke with
    mother’s visitation monitor. Among other things, the monitor
    reported that mother talked to the child “obsessively” during
    visits—“‘She doesn’t stop. Her mind wanders. Sometimes she
    6
    doesn’t make sense or says something that she contradicts in the
    next sentence. She told me she couldn’t stay because she is very
    busy, then she said she has nothing to do. I’m not a doctor, and I
    don’t know if she’s been diagnosed, but she does have some kind
    of mental illness, in my opinion.’” The monitor opined, “‘She
    really does love the [child], but she is not capable of caring for
    her.’”
    In a January 17, 2020, Last Minute Information for the
    Court, the Department reported that the social worker provided
    mother with new parenting class referrals on December 3, 2019.
    When the social worker asked mother about individual therapy,
    mother stated she would continue to go at the place where she
    got her medication. To date, mother had not provided evidence
    that she had participated in individual counseling or appropriate
    parenting classes.
    At the January 17, 2020, adjudication hearing, the juvenile
    court sustained the first amended petition as alleged.
    In a Last Minute Information for the Court dated
    February 7, 2020, the Department reported that mother was not
    compliant with the case plan. On February 5, 2020, mother
    informed the dependency investigator that she had not started a
    new parenting class, was not attending individual therapy, and
    was not taking any medication.
    On February 5, 2020, the social worker spoke with mother’s
    visitation monitor. She reported that mother visited the child
    consistently and was loving and caring toward the child but was
    not “‘cognitively . . . there.’” The monitor had “great concerns”
    about mother’s mental health. During visits, mother displayed
    “sudden mood changes, impulsivity, paranoia, explosive outbursts
    of anger directed at . . . father, perserveration, and incessant
    7
    speech that [was] most often incoherent and tangential.”
    Although mother had never hurt the child, she occasionally
    displayed age-inappropriate expectations of the child and her
    development. For example, although the child was not ready for
    solid food, mother talked about feeding her hamburgers.
    In a March 30, 2020, Last Minute Information for the
    Court, the Department reported that the social worker referred
    mother to Akoko Nan parenting classes. The social worker had
    asked mother about her medication and therapy, but mother did
    not respond. The social worker scheduled two meetings with
    mother to see her medications, but mother did not show up for
    the meetings.
    In a Last Minute Information for the Court for the
    continued disposition hearing on September 17, 2020, the
    Department reported that mother told the social worker that she
    had finished parenting classes with Vicky Gonzalez at the El
    Monte Adult School. She was waiting to take additional
    parenting classes, but everything was closed due to COVID-19.
    Mother received mental health treatment at the Antelope Valley
    Mental Health Clinic. Mother stated that she talked to a
    therapist every month. Mother had an appointment with her
    psychiatrist in November.
    According to the child’s caregiver, there had not been a
    scheduled visit in over a year. Mother occasionally saw the child
    when the child visited her grandmother and other relatives.
    Mother had a baby sometime between June 2019 and
    September 2020. The social worker spoke with the baby’s
    caregiver. Asked if mother spoke about her mental health or
    medication, the baby’s caregiver responded, “‘She says she won’t
    take any medication. She says, “They think I’m crazy, but I’m
    8
    not crazy. There’s nothing wrong with me.” She talks about the
    government and the rules they want her to abide by—why does
    the system take away children when the parents haven’t done
    anything wrong. She thinks she hasn’t done anything wrong—
    with any of her kids that have been taken away.’”
    In a Last Minute Information for the Court filed
    September 23, 2020, the Department reported that a dependency
    investigator had spoken with Ms. Gonzalez who confirmed
    mother’s completion of the Skillful Parenting course at the El
    Monte-Rosemead Adult School on October 8, 2019. Asked how
    mother had done in the program, Ms. Gonzalez replied, “‘She
    struggled a lot. A lot, a lot. I spent a lot of time with her. Other
    students would come in and pick up the material and leave.
    [Mother] came and stayed there to work on the material with me.
    Her scores were low, so I would read it to her and explain things
    to her. I think she struggled with the academic part. She had a
    lot of re-doing to do. Sometimes she lost a packet. Sometimes
    she would write on the packets—you’re not supposed to write on
    the packet. She had trouble transferring her answers to the
    answer sheet, so I just told her to go ahead and write the answers
    on the packet.’”
    The social worker asked Ms. Gonzalez if she had observed
    any mental health issues. She responded, “‘I know, I know. Her
    mental health issues are obvious.’”
    At the September 25, 2020, disposition hearing, mother told
    the juvenile court she could not help that her children had been
    taken, but she had focused on herself and her children. She had
    done everything the court asked her to do—she had taken a
    parenting class, she went to therapy, and she was willing to
    follow the court’s order concerning medication.
    9
    The juvenile court declared the child to be a dependent of
    the court and ordered that mother would not receive reunification
    services pursuant to section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(10) and
    (b)(11). It stated, “I appreciate some efforts that are being made
    by [mother]. I recognize that. I recognize that there are some
    efforts being made, but I also recognize the statements of the
    collaterals with regard to the current circumstance, the ongoing
    issues, and the fact that they have yet to be appropriately
    addressed.”
    III.   DISCUSSION
    A.    Section 361.5, Subdivision (b)
    Mother contends the juvenile court did not expressly find
    that clear and convincing evidence supported bypass of
    reunification services under section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(10)
    and (b)(11) and substantial evidence did not support an implied
    bypass finding. Substantial evidence supported the court’s
    implied finding.
    1.    Standard of Review
    “When reviewing a finding that a fact has been proved by
    clear and convincing evidence, the question before the appellate
    court is whether the record as a whole contains substantial
    evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it
    highly probable that the fact was true. In conducting its review,
    the court must view the record in the light most favorable to the
    prevailing party below and give appropriate deference to how the
    10
    trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses,
    resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable
    inferences from the evidence.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 
    9 Cal.5th 989
    , 1011–1012.)
    2.    Analysis
    “Reunification services must be provided to the mother and
    statutorily presumed father of children who have been removed
    from their parents’ custody, unless a statutory exception applies.
    (. . . § 361.5, subd. (a).) The statutory exceptions are contained in
    subdivision (b) of section 361.5, which provides that
    ‘[r]eunification services need not be provided’ if the court finds ‘by
    clear and convincing evidence’ that any of 17 enumerated bypass
    provisions apply. [Citation.]” (In re A.E. (2019) 
    38 Cal.App.5th 1124
    , 1141.)
    Under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10), reunification
    services need not be provided when the juvenile court finds by
    clear and convincing evidence: “That the court ordered
    termination of reunification services for any siblings or half
    siblings of the child because the parent or guardian failed to
    reunify with the sibling or half sibling after the sibling or half
    sibling had been removed from that parent or guardian pursuant
    to [s]ection 361 and that parent or guardian is the same parent or
    guardian described in subdivision (a) and that, according to the
    findings of the court, this parent or guardian has not
    subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that
    led to removal of the sibling or half sibling of that child from that
    parent or guardian.”
    11
    Under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(11), reunification
    services need not be provided when the juvenile court finds by
    clear and convincing evidence: “That the parental rights of a
    parent over any sibling or half sibling of the child had been
    permanently severed, and this parent is the same parent
    described in subdivision (a), and that, according to the findings of
    the court, this parent has not subsequently made a reasonable
    effort to treat the problems that led to removal of the sibling or
    half sibling of that child from the parent.”
    “[S]ection 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) has two prongs or
    requirements: (1) the parent previously failed to reunify with a
    sibling of the child; and (2) the parent failed to make reasonable
    efforts to correct the problem that led to the sibling being
    removed from the parent’s custody.” (Cheryl P. v. Superior Court
    (2006) 
    139 Cal.App.4th 87
    , 96.) Similarly, section 361.5,
    subdivision (b)(11) has two prongs: (1) parental rights were
    severed as to the child’s sibling or half sibling; and (2) the parent
    failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the problem that led
    to removal of the sibling or half sibling from the parent’s custody.
    (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(11).)
    “The reasonable effort requirement focuses on the extent of
    a parent’s efforts, not whether he or she has attained ‘a certain
    level of progress.’ [Citation.] ‘To be reasonable, the parent’s
    efforts must be more than “lackadaisical or half-hearted.”’
    [Citations.] However, ‘[t]he “reasonable effort to treat” standard
    “is not synonymous with ‘cure.’”’ [Citation.] [¶] We do not read
    the ‘reasonable effort’ language in the bypass provisions to mean
    that any effort by a parent, even if clearly genuine, to address the
    problems leading to removal will constitute a reasonable effort
    and as such render these provisions inapplicable. It is certainly
    12
    appropriate for the juvenile court to consider the duration, extent
    and context of the parent’s efforts, as well as any other factors
    relating to the quality and quantity of those efforts, when
    evaluating the effort for reasonableness. And while the degree of
    progress is not the focus of the inquiry, a parent’s progress, or
    lack of progress, both in the short and long term, may be
    considered to the extent it bears on the reasonableness of the
    effort made. [¶] Simply stated, although success alone is not the
    sole measure of reasonableness, the measure of success achieved
    is properly considered a factor in the juvenile court’s
    determination of whether an effort qualifies as reasonable.” (R.T.
    v. Superior Court (2012) 
    202 Cal.App.4th 908
    , 914–915 (R.T.)
    Mother concedes the Department established the first
    prongs of section 361.5, subdivisions (d)(10) and (d)(11)—i.e., that
    the juvenile court previously terminated reunification services as
    to the child’s half siblings and terminated mother’s parental
    rights to them. She argues instead that the Department failed to
    establish the second prong—i.e., that she failed to make
    reasonable efforts to treat the problems that led to the removal of
    the half siblings. There was substantial evidence that mother did
    not make reasonable efforts to treat her mental and emotional
    problems.3
    Mother’s problems that led to the removal of the child’s half
    siblings in 2017 included her mental and emotional problems,
    3      Because we hold that substantial evidence supported the
    court’s implicit finding that mother did not make reasonable
    efforts to treat the mental and emotional health problems that
    led to the removal of the half siblings, we do not address its
    implicit finding that mother did not make reasonable efforts to
    address her physical abuse of the half siblings.
    13
    failure to take her psychiatric medication as prescribed, and
    involuntarily hospitalizations for the evaluation and treatment of
    her psychiatric condition. As part of its disposition order, the
    juvenile court ordered the Department to provide mother with
    reunification services including individual counseling that
    addressed “‘mother’s lengthy and unresolved history of resistance
    to consistent mental health and psychiatric and therapeutic
    treatments[,]’ . . . participating in current psychiatric treatment[,]
    and compliance with [a] prescribed psychotropic medication
    regimen.”
    The Department reported for the 12-month review hearing
    for the child’s half siblings, on January 9, 2019, that mother had
    been referred to all court-ordered services, but had been unable
    to stabilize her mental health. Between March and May 2018,
    she had several psychiatric hospitalizations, had not complied
    with her mental health services, and refused to cooperate with
    her regional center services.
    Some six months later, in June 2019, just after the child’s
    birth, mother was placed on a section 5150 psychiatric hold after
    she displayed delusional and aggressive behavior at the hospital.
    About six weeks later, at the end of July 2019, mother
    denied to a social worker that she had a history of mental and
    emotional problems, had been diagnosed with several mental
    health conditions, or had been hospitalized. She stated the
    allegations in the amended section 300 petition were “‘[n]ot true.
    None of it. I have proof on paper. I have a doctor’s note showing
    I don’t need medication.’” She claimed her section 5150
    psychiatric hospitalization after the child’s birth had something
    to do with her mother disowning her and telling her to have the
    police take care of her.
    14
    A few weeks later, during an August 12, 2019, visit with
    the child, mother “appeared paranoid and seemed to be talking to
    people that were not there, and cussing and yelling at some
    imaginary people.”
    About four months later, on December 3, 2019, mother told
    the social worker that she was not attending individual therapy.
    Although mother claimed to be medication compliant, her
    prescription bottle was empty and she could not explain why.
    As of February 5, 2020, two months later, mother was not
    case compliant. She had not started a new parenting class, was
    not attending individual therapy, and was not taking any
    medication.
    In March 2020, the social worker scheduled two meetings
    with mother to check on her medications. Mother did not show
    up for either meeting.
    As reported in the Department’s September 17, 2020, Last
    Minute Information for the Court, mother denied to her new
    baby’s caregiver that she had mental health problems and stated
    that she would not take any medication.
    At the disposition hearing, the juvenile court admitted
    mother’s medication records from Antelope Valley Mental Health
    Clinic that showed prescriptions from August 17, 2016, to
    December 31, 2018, and a record from the Los Angeles County
    Department of Mental Health that showed appointments for
    unspecified reasons from March 11, 2020, to August 18, 2020.
    Although that evidence indicated some past and recent efforts to
    address mother’s mental and emotional problems, they were
    insufficient in the context of the other evidence presented to the
    juvenile court, to demonstrate reasonable efforts. (R.T., supra,
    202 Cal.App.4th at pp. 914–915.)
    15
    B.    Best Interest of the Child
    Mother contends that if we hold the juvenile court properly
    found she did not make reasonable efforts to address the
    problems that led to the removal of the child’s half siblings, then
    the court abused its discretion in denying her reunification
    services as they were in the child’s best interest. We disagree.
    1.    Standard of Review
    “‘“A juvenile court has broad discretion when determining
    whether . . . reunification services would be in the best interests
    of the child under section 361.5, subdivision (c). [Citation.] An
    appellate court will reverse that determination only if the
    juvenile court abuses its discretion.”’” (In re A.E., supra, 38
    Cal.App.5th at pp. 1140–1141.)
    2.    Analysis
    If a juvenile court finds that a parent is described by a
    bypass provision in section 361.5, subdivision (b), it “shall not
    order reunification for a parent . . . unless the court finds, by
    clear and convincing evidence, that reunification is in the best
    interest of the child.” (§ 361.5, subd. (c)(2).) “Section 361.5,
    subdivision (c) enables a parent to obtain reunification services
    notwithstanding section 361.5[, subdivisions (b)(10) and (b)(11)]
    where the parent demonstrates reunification is in the child’s best
    interest by offering evidence of, among other things, his or her
    current ability to parent. To determine whether reunification is
    in the child’s best interest, the court considers the parent’s
    16
    current efforts, fitness, and history; the seriousness of the
    problem that led to the dependency; the strength of the parent-
    child and caretaker-child bonds; and the child’s need for stability
    and continuity. [Citation.] A best interest finding requires a
    likelihood reunification services will succeed; in other words,
    ‘some “reasonable basis to conclude” that reunification is possible
    . . . .’ [Citation.]” (In re Allison J. (2010) 
    190 Cal.App.4th 1106
    ,
    1116.)
    The record does not contain substantial evidence that
    continued reunification services for mother were in the child’s
    best interest. As set forth above, mother has significant long-
    term mental and emotional problems which she has, at times,
    denied. Consistent with her denials, mother has a continuing
    history of failing to take prescribed medications. The record does
    not suggest a “current ability to parent” or “a likelihood
    reunification services will succeed.” (In re Allison J., supra, 190
    Cal.App.4th at p. 1116.) Accordingly, the juvenile court’s implicit
    finding that continued reunification services for mother were not
    in the child’s best interest was not an abuse of discretion. (In re
    A.E., supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1140–1141.)
    17
    IV.     DISPOSITION
    The order is affirmed.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    KIM, J.
    We concur:
    RUBIN, P. J.
    MOOR, J.
    18
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B309090

Filed Date: 9/27/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 9/27/2021