Dae v. Traver ( 2021 )


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  • Filed 9/27/21; see dissenting opinion
    CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION TWO
    IAN C. DAE,                                   B305834
    Plaintiff and Appellant,              (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No.
    v.                                    18STPB06832)
    ROBERT TRAVER, as Trustee, etc.,
    Defendant and Respondent.
    APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
    Los Angeles County. Brenda J. Penny, Judge. Affirmed.
    Murtaugh Treglia Stern & Deily, John P. Deily and Devin
    Murtaugh for Plaintiff and Appellant.
    Jeffer Mangels Butler and Mitchell, Susan Allison and Neil
    C. Erickson for Defendant and Respondent.
    _________________________________
    Ian C. Dae (Dae) appeals from an order denying his motion
    to strike a probate court petition under the anti-SLAPP statute.
    (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16.) 1 Respondent Robert Traver (Robert)
    filed the petition in his capacity as trustee of a family trust. 2
    Robert’s petition alleged that Dae violated a “no contest” clause
    in the trust by filing a previous petition challenging Robert’s
    actions as trustee.
    The parties agree that Robert’s petition (the No Contest
    Petition) arose from protected petitioning activity under Code of
    Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (e)(1). Thus, under
    subdivision (b)(1) of that statute, to defeat Dae’s motion Robert
    was required to show a probability that he would prevail on his
    No Contest Petition.
    The trial court found that Robert made such a showing.
    We agree.
    Dae’s petition broadly challenged Robert’s conduct in
    setting up a financial structure that Robert claimed was designed
    to avoid estate taxes. If Robert’s claim is true, Dae’s petition
    would implicate the no contest provision by seeking to “impair”
    provisions in the trust giving Robert the authority to manage
    trust assets.
    Dae also challenged his own removal as a beneficiary.
    Whether that more specific challenge amounts to a “contest” for
    purposes of the trust’s no contest clause depends upon the
    1 “ ‘ “SLAPP” is an acronym for “strategic lawsuit against
    public participation.” ’ ” (Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter (2019)
    
    7 Cal.5th 781
    , 785, fn. 1.)
    Other than Dae, we use first names because some family
    2
    members have the same surname. No disrespect is intended.
    2
    trustors’ intent. Robert provided sufficient evidence of the
    trustors’ intent to allow a change of beneficiary to make a prima
    facie showing of probability of prevailing on Robert’s contention
    that Dae’s claims are a “contest.” Our conclusion is limited to the
    context in which it arises—an anti-SLAPP motion. We express
    no opinion on how the probate court should ultimately rule on
    Robert’s petition.
    BACKGROUND 3
    1.     The Family Trust
    Erin and Jean Walsh (the Trustors), a married couple,
    established a family trust in 1994 (Family Trust). Jean had three
    children from a prior marriage—Joan, William, and Robert. Erin
    had no children.
    Joan had one child—Dae. William had no children. Robert
    has three children.
    The Family Trust provided that, when one of the Trustors
    died, the assets of the Family Trust would be divided into a
    Survivor’s Trust, a Residuary Trust, and a generation skipping
    trust for the grandchildren. The Survivor’s Trust was to be
    funded with the community property interest of the surviving
    trustor and was revocable during the surviving trustor’s lifetime.
    Aside from some specific bequests and the funding of the
    generation skipping trust (which is not at issue here), the
    remainder of the deceased trustor’s community property interest
    was to fund the Residuary Trust. The Residuary Trust was
    irrevocable.
    3We summarize the facts in the light most favorable to
    Robert, the party opposing the anti-SLAPP motion. (Murray v.
    Tran (2020) 
    55 Cal.App.5th 10
    , 16.)
    3
    The Family Trust designated the surviving trustor and
    Robert as the trustees of the Residuary Trust. Those trustees
    were given the “same powers and duties” as the original Trustors
    of the Family Trust, which included the authority to “grant, sell,
    assign, convey, exchange, convert, manage, . . . invest, reinvest,
    loan, or reloan” trust property and to “borrow money for any trust
    purpose upon such terms and conditions as may be determined
    by the trustees, and to obligate the trust property for the
    repayment of money so borrowed.” The trustees were also
    generally given “all powers that are necessary or convenient to
    make fully effective the purposes of the trust.”
    During his or her lifetime, the surviving trustor was
    entitled to the “entire net income” of the Residuary Trust as well
    as those sums from principal that the trustees “may deem
    necessary for the reasonable support, care, and maintenance of
    the surviving trustor.” Upon the death of the surviving trustor,
    the assets of the Residuary Trust were to be divided equally
    among Jean’s three children, if then living. If any child was not
    then alive, that child’s share was to be distributed to the child’s
    issue “by right of representation.” If no issue of that child was
    then living, the child’s share was to be divided between the other
    children’s shares.
    2.     The No Contest Clause
    The Family Trust included a no contest provision (No
    Contest Clause). Among other things, the No Contest Clause
    provided that any beneficiary who attacked “any of the provisions
    of this declaration of trust” or sought to “impair any of the
    provisions of . . . this declaration of trust” would take nothing
    “from either of the trustors’ estates or any trust created by this
    declaration of trust.”
    4
    3.    Subsequent Estate Planning
    Erin died in 1995. Under the terms of the Family Trust,
    upon his death the Residuary Trust was funded and became
    irrevocable.
    William died in 2006 without any issue. William’s share of
    the Residuary Trust therefore was to be split between Joan’s and
    Robert’s share.
    After Erin’s death, Jean and Robert became the trustees of
    the Residuary Trust, which was initially funded with about
    $16 million in assets. Jean and Robert established a complex
    financial structure using the assets of the Residuary Trust that
    Robert claims was for the purpose of avoiding estate taxes and
    Dae claims was designed to disinherit him. Only the broad
    outlines of this structure are necessary to decide the issues on
    appeal, and we therefore summarize it only generally.
    In 2011, Jean and Robert set up two trusts, reflecting the
    two remaining children’s interests in the Residuary Trust—the
    2011 Gibb Trust (Gibb was Joan’s last name) and the 2011
    Traver Trust (collectively, the 2011 Trusts). Using a loan from
    the Royal Bank of Canada secured by the Residuary Trust’s
    assets, Robert and Jean purchased life insurance on the lives of
    Joan and Robert by paying a premium of $7.5 million for each
    policy. The policies initially provided death benefits of $16.2
    million for Joan and $15.2 million for Robert. The 2011 Gibb
    Trust owned the policy on Joan’s life, and the 2011 Traver Trust
    owned the policy on Robert’s life.
    In what Robert calls a “split dollar” arrangement, a series
    of agreements gave the Residuary Trust an interest in the life
    insurance policies in return for the Residuary Trust’s financing of
    5
    the premiums for those policies. 4 The Residuary Trust’s interest
    (the Receivables) was equal to the greater of: (1) the amount of
    the premiums, or (2) the cash value of the policies at the time of
    the insured’s death.
    Jean and Robert later established two other trusts—the
    2014 Gibb Trust and the 2014 Traver Trust (collectively, the 2014
    Trusts). Those two trusts purchased the Receivables from the
    Residuary Trust for the sums of $674,900 (by the 2014 Gibb
    Trust) and $626,400 (by the 2014 Traver Trust). With the
    approval of a “trust protector” for the 2011 trusts, the 2014 Gibb
    Trust and the 2014 Traver Trust also acquired the assets of the
    2011 Gibb Trust and the 2011 Traver Trust, respectively. The
    net effect of these transactions was to provide the 2014 Trusts
    with the bulk of the assets of the Residuary Trust.
    Under the original terms of the 2014 Gibb Trust, Joan was
    the lifetime beneficiary and her issue (i.e., Dae) was the
    remainder beneficiary. However, the terms of the trust gave
    Joan a power of appointment to designate the remainder
    4 A “split-dollar” life insurance arrangement has been
    described as “any arrangement between an owner and a
    nonowner of a life insurance contract, where either party pays
    any portion of the premiums (including payment by means of a
    loan secured by the life insurance contract) and at least one of the
    parties is entitled to recover, either conditionally or
    unconditionally, all or any portion of those premiums (and
    recovery is to be made from or secured by proceeds from the life
    insurance contract).” (Estate of Cahill v. Comm’r (2018) 
    115 T.C.M. (CCH) 1463
     [
    T.C. Memo 2018-84
     at p. *12, 
    2018 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 86
     at p. **11].) We refer to the financial
    arrangement involving the Residuary Trust assets as the “Split
    Dollar Trust Arrangement.”
    6
    beneficiaries. On August 5, 2015, Joan exercised that power,
    directing the assets of the 2014 Gibb Trust to various charities
    and to Robert and his children rather than to Dae.
    Robert testified that the purpose of the Split Dollar Trust
    Arrangement was to minimize estate taxes and that it
    accomplished that goal. He also testified that he and Jean set up
    the arrangement with the advice and counsel of financial and
    legal advisors.
    Joan died on July 12, 2016. Jean died three months later,
    on October 15, 2106.
    4.     Probate Court Proceedings
    In October 2018, Dae filed a verified petition to “settle the
    accounts,” to “confirm trust assets and trust debts,” and to
    “compel redress of a breach of trust and to compel the trustee to
    provide information regarding the trust administration.” Dae
    filed a supplemental verified petition in March 2019. (We refer to
    both petitions collectively as Dae’s Petition.)
    Dae’s Petition (described in more detail below) alleged that
    Robert breached his fiduciary duties to the Family Trust by
    engaging in the transactions underlying the Split Dollar Trust
    Arrangement and by using Residuary Trust assets to benefit
    himself and his family while depriving Dae of his interest in the
    trust.
    Robert filed responses and objections to Dae’s initial
    petition and to the supplemental petition. On June 10, 2019,
    Robert also filed his own petition “for order and instructions
    regarding [Dae’s] violations of no contest clauses” (No Contest
    Petition). The No Contest Petition sought a declaration that
    Dae’s Petition constituted a “contest” in violation of the Family
    7
    Trust’s No Contest Clause, and requested a ruling deeming all of
    Dae’s interest in the Family Trust to be forfeited.
    Dae responded to that petition with his anti-SLAPP
    motion, which sought an order striking the entire No Contest
    Petition. The motion alleged that the No Contest Petition sought
    to impose liability on Dae as a result of Dae’s protected
    petitioning activity. The motion also alleged that Robert “cannot
    meet his resulting burden of demonstrating a likelihood of
    success on the merits of his [No Contest] Petition because . . .
    Dae’s Petition only challenges certain acts of borrowing and trust
    administration by [Robert], which had the effect of changing the
    beneficiaries of the irrevocable Residuary Trust, enriching
    [Robert] at the expense of . . . Dae.” Robert filed an opposition,
    which included his own declaration.
    The probate court denied the motion. The court observed
    that, even under the “minimal merit” standard applicable to anti-
    SLAPP motions, “the arguments and evidence presented by the
    parties calls into question the propriety of the various Residuary
    Trust transactions at issue.” The court noted that Joan’s
    beneficial interest in the Residuary Trust “was contingent on her
    not predeceasing Jean,” and “[o]therwise, Joan’s interest was to
    go to [Dae].” The court also noted that “[t]here does not appear to
    be any provision in the Family Trust allowing Joan to alter
    beneficiaries of the irrevocable Residuary Trust.”
    However, the probate court also noted Robert’s testimony
    that “all these transactions were done at ‘arms-length’ under the
    guidance of financial advisers and independent appraisers.” The
    court concluded that, “when this aspect is considered with the
    intention of reducing tax liability and expenses . . . , it is possibly
    conceivable that Robert and Joan’s actions were within their
    8
    discretion as trustees as outlined by the Family Trust. In turn,
    [Dae’s] petition challenging these actions would contest their
    powers under the Family Trust.” The court therefore ruled that
    “Robert has shown enough, for purposes of this Motion, to show
    the ‘minimal merit’ required to survive an anti-SLAPP motion.”
    DISCUSSION
    1.     The Anti-SLAPP Procedure
    Analysis of an anti-SLAPP motion is a two-step process. In
    the first step, “the moving defendant bears the burden of
    identifying all allegations of protected activity, and the claims for
    relief supported by them.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 
    1 Cal.5th 376
    ,
    396 (Baral).) At this stage, the defendant must make a
    “threshold showing” that the challenged claims arise from
    protected activity, which is defined in Code of Civil Procedure
    section 425.16, subdivision (e). (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 
    37 Cal.4th 1048
    , 1056.)
    Second, if the defendant makes such a showing, the
    “burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that each
    challenged claim based on protected activity is legally sufficient
    and factually substantiated.” (Baral, 1 Cal.5th at p. 396.)
    Without resolving evidentiary conflicts, the court determines
    “whether the plaintiff’s showing, if accepted by the trier of fact,
    would be sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment.” (Ibid.) The
    plaintiff’s showing must be based upon admissible evidence.
    (HMS Capital, Inc. v. Lawyers Title Co. (2004) 
    118 Cal.App.4th 204
    , 212.) Thus, the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis is a
    “summary-judgment-like procedure at an early stage of the
    litigation.” (Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 
    35 Cal.4th 180
    , 192.) In this step, a plaintiff “need only establish
    that his or her claim has ‘minimal merit’ [citation] to avoid being
    9
    stricken as a SLAPP.” (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif
    (2006) 
    39 Cal.4th 260
    , 291, quoting Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 
    29 Cal.4th 82
    , 89.) A plaintiff prevails in the second step by
    demonstrating that “ ‘the complaint is both legally sufficient and
    supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a
    favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is
    credited.’ ” (Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester (2002) 
    28 Cal.4th 811
    , 821, quoting Matson v. Dvorak (1995) 
    40 Cal.App.4th 539
    , 548.)
    Here, the parties agree that Robert’s No Contest Petition
    arose from Dae’s protected litigation conduct under the first step
    of the anti-SLAPP analysis. Thus, we need consider only
    whether Robert provided sufficient evidence to show a likelihood
    of success on his No Contest Petition in the second step of the
    anti-SLAPP procedure. In doing so, we employ a de novo
    standard of review. (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State
    University (2017) 
    2 Cal.5th 1057
    , 1067.)
    2.     The Law Concerning No Contest Provisions
    No contest clauses respect the intent of a donor by
    “discouraging litigation by persons whose expectations are
    frustrated by the donative scheme of the instrument.” (Donkin v.
    Donkin (2013) 
    58 Cal.4th 412
    , 422 (Donkin).) However, that
    interest is in tension with the policy of “avoiding forfeitures and
    promoting full access of the courts to all relevant information
    concerning the validity and effect of a will, trust, or other
    instrument.” (Ibid.)
    The common law of California traditionally balanced these
    interests by enforcing no contest clauses so long as they were
    “ ‘not prohibited by some law or opposed to public policy.’ ”
    (Donkin, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 422, quoting In re Estate of
    10
    Kitchen (1923) 
    192 Cal. 384
    , 388.) No contest clauses were also
    strictly construed. (Kitchen, at pp. 389–390.)
    The Legislature began codifying the law concerning no
    contest clauses in 1989. (Donkin, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 422.)
    The general rule was that, unless a statute provided otherwise,
    “a no contest clause is enforceable against a beneficiary who
    brings a contest within the terms of the no contest clause.”
    (Former Prob. Code, § 21303, added by Stats. 1989, ch. 544, § 19,
    p. 1825, and repealed by Stats. 1990, ch. 79, § 13, p. 463,
    operative July 1, 1991.) 5 However, the Legislature also
    explained that the statutes governing no contest provisions were
    “not intended as a complete codification of the law governing
    enforcement of a no contest clause” and that the “common law
    governs enforcement of a no contest clause to the extent this part
    does not apply.” (Former § 21301.)
    The statutory scheme thereafter became increasingly
    complex as the Legislature added amendments identifying
    particular types of actions “against which a no contest clause was
    not enforceable.” (Donkin, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 423.) In 2008
    the Legislature simplified the statutory scheme (effective in
    2010) “by more narrowly defining the types of challenges that
    could be subject to a no contest clause.” (Key v. Tyler (2019) 
    34 Cal.App.5th 505
    , 516 (Key).) “Under current law, a no contest
    clause is enforceable against a ‘direct contest that is brought
    5 Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the
    Probate Code. Because this case involves the application of prior
    law, we hereafter identify statutory provisions that have since
    been repealed or amended by referring to them simply as
    “former” statutes without including detailed information about
    their effective dates.
    11
    without probable cause.’ ” (Id. at p. 517, quoting § 21311,
    subd. (a)(1).)
    The Residuary Trust became irrevocable in 1995 when Erin
    died. Thus, the parties agree that the no contest law prior to
    2010 applies here. (See § 21315.)
    3.     Robert Met His Burden to Show that His No
    Contest Petition Has “Minimal Merit”
    A.    Dae’s Petition broadly challenged the
    trustees’ conduct
    Dae argues that his Petition does not challenge the terms of
    the Family Trust. He agrees that Robert, “as trustee, had broad
    powers to enter into transactions concerning the [Family] Trust’s
    assets.” Dae claims that his Petition “merely challenges the
    manner in which [Robert] has used those powers to take [Dae’s]
    inheritance for himself.”
    Dae’s filings in the probate court suggest otherwise.
    Rather than simply targeting the specific act that decreased his
    inheritance—i.e., Joan’s exercise of her power of appointment to
    exclude Dae as a beneficiary of the 2014 Gibb Trust—Dae’s
    Petition took aim at the trustee’s entire Split Dollar Trust
    Arrangement.
    Dae’s Petition specifically challenged his removal as a
    beneficiary of the trusts that Jean established for the life
    insurance proceeds (which Dae’s Petition called the “irrevocable
    life insurance trust or trusts” or “ ‘ILITS’ ”). Dae alleged that he
    “could have easily been made a proportionate beneficiary under
    the ILITS but was intentionally not made so by [Robert] and
    [Robert’s family] and others designing the ILITS that put
    [Robert] in a breach of his fiduciary duties owed under the
    Residuary Trust to [Dae] as a beneficiary.”
    12
    However, Dae’s Petition also went further in alleging that
    the trustees’ decision to purchase the insurance policies on the
    lives of Joan and Robert in the first place was outside their
    authority. Dae’s Petition characterized Jean’s interest in the
    Residuary Trust as a “life estate of the income and a limited right
    to invade principal,” which was treated for tax purposes as
    “Qualified Terminal Interest Property.” Dae’s Petition then
    discussed the facts concerning the $15 million loan from the
    Royal Bank to pay the premiums on the insurance policies for
    Joan and Robert and asked, “Why would the Residuary Trust
    spend $15,000,000 in carrying out its purpose as a Qualified
    Terminal Interest Property (hereinafter the ‘QTIP’) Trust?”
    Dae’s Petition answered this question by alleging that “all the
    payments made by the Residuary Trust related to the
    $15,000,000 borrowing from Royal Bank were really related to
    the personal activity of Jean Walsh and not for carrying out the
    purpose of the QTIP.”
    Dae’s Petition also challenged the trustee’s authority to
    transfer the Receivables from the Residuary Trust to the 2014
    Gibb Trust and the 2014 Traver Trust. Dae’s Petition alleged
    that the Residuary Trust received inadequate consideration for
    that transfer and claimed that the transaction “was just a
    shifting of what is really a loss by Jean . . . and her Survivor’s
    Trust to the Residuary Trust.” Dae claimed that the “payment of
    interest costs and all of the other related costs” associated with
    the Royal Bank loan should be “payable to the Residuary Trust”
    from the Survivor’s Trust.
    It is undisputed that the Split Dollar Trust Arrangement,
    including the purchase of insurance on Joan’s life through the
    loan from the Royal Bank, resulted in a payment of $16.2 million
    13
    to the 2014 Gibb Trust after Joan’s death. Thus, in return for a
    policy payment of $7.5 million, the 2014 Gibb Trust received
    more than twice that amount free of federal estate tax. Had Joan
    not excluded Dae as a beneficiary of the 2014 Gibb Trust, Dae
    would have received the substantial benefit of this arrangement.
    By attacking the trustees’ decision to establish the Split
    Dollar Trust Arrangement, Dae’s Petition appears to challenge
    their authority to manage the principal of the Residuary Trust
    for the benefit of the trust beneficiaries. As mentioned, the
    Family Trust gave the trustees the authority to invest, loan,
    convey, and hypothecate trust property. Thus, Dae’s Petition
    arguably sought to “impair” trust provisions which expressly
    granted powers that the trustees exercised in setting up the Split
    Dollar Trust Arrangement.
    A challenge to investment decisions that a trust expressly
    empowers a trustee to make can amount to a contest. In Hearst
    v. Ganzi (2006) 
    145 Cal.App.4th 1195
     (Hearst), income
    beneficiaries of a trust sought a ruling that their proposed
    petition would not violate the trust’s no contest clause. 6 The
    petition alleged that the trustees breached their fiduciary duties
    by decisions that reduced the dividends the income beneficiaries
    received. The probate court concluded that the proposed petition
    6 The beneficiaries made their request under a former
    statute establishing a “safe harbor” proceeding to obtain a ruling
    declaring whether a particular petition would violate an
    instrument’s no contest clause before that petition was actually
    filed. (Hearst, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 1202; see former
    section 21320; Funsten v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2016) 
    2 Cal.App.5th 959
    , 974 [safe harbor procedure no longer available
    after statutory revisions in 2010].)
    14
    would violate the trust’s no contest clause, and the Court of
    Appeal affirmed. (Id. at pp. 1199–1200.)
    The trust instrument in Hearst provided the trustees with
    the authority to hold assets regardless of the income they
    produced and to decide what was income and what was the
    principal of the trust. (Hearst, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at pp.
    1201–1202.) The trustees were also given explicit authority to
    treat income and remainder beneficiaries differently. (Id. at
    p. 1214.) The Court of Appeal held that the income beneficiaries’
    attempt to increase their dividends would contest the provisions
    of the trust by interfering with the trustee’s business decisions
    and their discretion to decide what was income and what was
    principal. (Id. at pp. 1210–1212.)
    Dae’s Petition similarly seeks to limit the discretion of the
    Family Trust’s trustees by challenging their use of trust assets to
    purchase life insurance and to fund other trusts with the
    proceeds. It is undisputed that the Split Dollar Trust
    Arrangement avoided estate taxes, which was within the scope of
    the trustee’s authority.
    Dae cannot avoid the consequences of his broad challenge
    to the trustee’s discretion by belatedly narrowing his focus only to
    the specific conduct that directly resulted in his loss of a
    beneficiary interest. The purpose of no contest clauses is to
    discourage litigation that challenges the intent of the donor.
    (Donkin, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 422.) A pleading that initiates
    such litigation can violate a no contest clause even if its
    allegations are later withdrawn.
    For example, in Schwartz v. Schwartz (2008) 
    167 Cal.App.4th 733
    , the court held that a petition seeking a
    particular distribution from an inter vivos trust violated a no
    15
    contest clause even though the petitioner withdrew the petition
    several months later. The court reasoned that the petitioner
    “used the mechanisms of the court” to challenge the decedent’s
    intent, compelling the respondent to respond and the court to
    hold hearings. (Id. at p. 745.) The court concluded that
    permitting the petitioner to “escape the consequences” of his
    petition by withdrawing the contest would defeat the purpose of
    the no contest clause. (Ibid.) 7
    Here, Dae’s Petition initiated litigation, causing Robert to
    file responses and to file his separate No Contest Petition. The
    No Contest Petition in turn spawned proceedings on Dae’s anti-
    SLAPP motion. Dae may not now escape the consequences of his
    original allegations by recasting his Petition as a narrow
    challenge only to the particular actions that removed him as a
    beneficiary of the 2014 Gibb Trust.
    B.    Robert provided sufficient evidence
    showing that Dae’s challenge to his own
    disinheritance was a contest
    Based upon the current record, it is also possible that Dae’s
    specific challenge to his removal as a beneficiary of the 2014 Gibb
    7  Under current law a “ ‘Contest’ ” is triggered by “a
    pleading filed with the court by a beneficiary.” (§ 21310, subd.
    (a).) In discussing the proposed 2008 changes to the no contest
    statutes, the California Law Revision Commission explained that
    a contest was defined this way because “[m]any of the harms that
    can result from litigation occur early in a contest (e.g.,
    reputational harm to the transferor or beneficiaries, acrimony
    between beneficiaries, and pressure to settle with a dissatisfied
    beneficiary).” (Recommendation: Revision of No Contest Clause
    Statute (Jan. 2008) 37 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (2007)
    p. 391.)
    16
    Trust would subvert the Trustors’ intent. One of the two original
    Trustors of the Family Trust—Jean—established the 2014 Gibb
    Trust, which included the provision giving Jean’s daughter Joan
    the power to appoint the persons who would receive the assets of
    that trust upon Joan’s death. It is that provision that permitted
    Joan to exclude Dae from the remainder beneficiaries who would
    inherit those assets. Thus, Jean was a key participant in the
    conduct that allegedly led to Dae’s disinheritance.
    In his declaration, Robert testified that, following Erin’s
    death, “Jean occasionally expressed to me a desire to engage in
    additional estate planning activities in order to further the
    purposes of the Family Trust to pass as much of her estate to her
    children as possible and minimize estate taxes.” Robert also
    testified that, “[a]s Erin had no children, the goal of the Family
    Trust was to ensure that the Walsh Estate would pass efficiently
    to Jean’s children with minimal estate tax impact.”
    The provisions of the Family Trust also suggest that the
    primary goal of that trust was to leave as much money as
    possible to Jean’s children. The Family Trust designated the
    surviving trustor (i.e., Jean) as an income beneficiary of the
    Residuary Trust, with the Residuary Trust property to be
    distributed to Jean’s three children in equal shares upon the
    surviving trustor’s death. Only if one or more of those children
    predeceased the surviving trustor was the property of the
    Residuary Trust to be distributed to the deceased child’s issue “by
    right of representation.”
    Thus, under the original terms of the Family Trust, if Joan
    had outlived Jean (instead of dying three months earlier, as
    actually happened), Joan would have inherited her portion of the
    Residuary Trust property and would have been free to do with
    17
    that property what she wanted—including giving it away or
    bequeathing it to persons other than Dae. It is highly conceivable
    that, in executing the Family Trust, Erin and Jean expected that
    Jean’s children would outlive them and therefore would be free to
    dispose of their Residuary Trust property as they wished once
    they inherited it. The provision for inheritance by right of
    representation in the event a child predeceased the surviving
    Trustor could simply have reflected an intent to maintain equal
    treatment of all of Jean’s children and their families rather than
    specifically to provide a benefit to the Trustor’s grandchildren
    from the Residuary Trust. 8 If the Trustors had intended to
    ensure a benefit to the grandchildren from that trust, they could
    have included provisions in the trust instrument guaranteeing
    the grandchildren’s inheritance regardless of when the
    grandchildren’s parents died. 9
    8As mentioned, the grandchildren already were
    guaranteed some inheritance through the generation skipping
    trust.
    9 Of course, as the trial court pointed out, under the
    express terms of the trust instrument Dae’s interest became fixed
    once his mother Joan died before Jean. The Trustors could have
    included a provision permitting Joan (and Jean’s other children)
    to designate the beneficiaries of their portion of the Residuary
    Trust property in the event that they predeceased the surviving
    Trustor, but they did not do so. We do not purport to reach any
    ultimate resolution of these issues concerning the Trustors’
    intent, which may depend upon extrinsic evidence. On this
    appeal from an anti-SLAPP motion, we decide only that Robert
    has made the minimal showing necessary to support his claim
    that Dae’s Petition amounted to a contest.
    18
    This evidence supports a reasonable inference that the
    Trustors expected, and intended, the property of the Residuary
    Trust to pass to Jean’s children to use and distribute as they
    chose. If that inference is credited (as we must do in ruling on an
    anti-SLAPP motion), Jean’s conduct in establishing a trust giving
    Joan the power to appoint beneficiaries, and Jean’s and Robert’s
    conduct in permitting the transfer of the Residuary Trust’s assets
    into that trust, may have been fully in accord with the Trustors’
    original intent. Accordingly, Dae’s Petition challenging that
    conduct could amount to a contest.
    We emphasize that we do not now decide that Dae’s
    Petition amounted to a “contest” for purposes of the No Contest
    Clause. Whether there has been a contest within the meaning of
    a particular no contest clause depends upon the individual
    circumstances of the case and the language of the particular
    instrument. (Burch v. George (1994) 
    7 Cal.4th 246
    , 254–255.)
    “ ‘[T]he answer cannot be sought in a vacuum, but must be
    gleaned from a consideration of the purposes that the [testator]
    sought to attain’ ” by the instrument in question. (Id. at p. 255,
    quoting Estate of Kazian (1976) 
    59 Cal.App.3d 797
    , 802.)
    Extrinsic evidence may exist that bears upon the proper
    interpretation of the trusts here, including evidence of the
    Trustors’ intent. (See Burch, at p. 254 [the interpretation of trust
    language is a question of law “unless interpretation turns on the
    credibility of extrinsic evidence or a conflict therein”].) On this
    appeal, we decide only that Robert has provided sufficient
    evidence that there was a contest to defeat Dae’s anti-SLAPP
    motion. We leave for the trial court to consider the merits of
    Robert’s no contest claim at a hearing on a fully developed record
    following discovery.
    19
    C.     The evidence is sufficient for Robert to
    proceed on a claim that Dae’s Petition was
    frivolous
    Citing Estate of Ferber (1998) 
    66 Cal.App.4th 244
     (Ferber),
    Dae argues that to establish that the breach of fiduciary duty
    claims in Dae’s Petition triggered the No Contest Clause, Robert
    will need to prove that those claims were frivolous. 10 Dae further
    argues that this burden must be taken into consideration in
    determining whether Robert has demonstrated the minimal
    merit necessary to proceed on his No Contest Petition.
    In Ferber, the court considered a no contest provision in a
    will that purported to disinherit any beneficiary who “objects in
    any manner to any action taken or proposed to be taken” by the
    executor or “unsuccessfully requests the removal of any person
    acting as an executor.” (Ferber, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 248.)
    A beneficiary sought a ruling under the safe harbor provision of
    the prior law that objections to an accounting and a petition to
    remove the executor would not violate the no contest clause. (Id.
    at pp. 248–249.) The court held that those claims would violate
    the no contest clause, but that the clause was unenforceable to
    the extent it purported to punish the beneficiary’s nonfrivolous
    breach of fiduciary claims. (Id. at pp. 250, 255.) The court
    concluded that this standard struck an appropriate balance
    between the competing public policies of permitting beneficiaries
    10 Ferber was decided prior to legislative changes to the no
    contest statutes in 2001, and prior to the Legislature’s major
    revisions to the no contest law in 2010 discussed above. The
    parties agree that Ferber was decided under the law that is
    applicable to this case.
    20
    to challenge fiduciary malfeasance and discouraging litigation
    that challenges a testator’s intent. (Id. at pp. 254–255.)
    Robert argues that the frivolousness standard the court
    adopted in Ferber does not apply to the claims that Dae asserts.
    Robert argues that Ferber is distinguishable because the court in
    that case considered the enforceability of a no contest clause that
    was overbroad in purporting to prohibit any claim challenging
    fiduciary conduct. Robert points out that, in this case, Dae has
    never claimed that the No Contest Clause is unenforceable.
    This ground for distinguishing Ferber is unpersuasive. The
    policy considerations that the court considered in Ferber reach
    more broadly than Robert suggests. The competing policies of
    discouraging litigation challenging a testator’s intent and
    permitting beneficiaries to remedy fiduciary misconduct are at
    play whenever a no contest provision is interpreted to punish a
    particular fiduciary duty claim. Under the court’s reasoning in
    Ferber, a no contest clause is overbroad whenever it imposes a
    forfeiture for bringing a claim that should be permitted as a
    matter of public policy. If the No Contest Clause in this case is
    interpreted to penalize a fiduciary duty claim that public policy
    would permit Dae to raise, it would be overbroad under the
    court’s reasoning in Ferber.
    There are other persuasive reasons to follow Ferber here.
    First, subsequent cases have adopted Ferber’s reasoning. (See
    Fazzi v. Klein (2010) 
    190 Cal.App.4th 1280
    , 1289 (Fazzi)
    [following Ferber in concluding that a no contest clause could not
    apply to a nonfrivolous action to remove a trustee for cause];
    Tunstall v. Wells (2006) 
    144 Cal.App.4th 554
    , 561 [citing Ferber
    for the proposition that “ ‘[b]eneficiaries must be free to raise
    public policy issues so the court may address them’ ”], quoting
    21
    Ferber, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 252; Hearst, supra, 145
    Cal.App.4th at p. 1213 [citing Ferber at p. 253 for the proposition
    that “[n]o contest clauses that purport to insulate executors
    completely from vigilant beneficiaries violate the public policy
    behind court supervision”].)
    Second, subsequent legislative actions validated Ferber’s
    concern for protecting fiduciary duty claims from the threat of
    forfeiture. Following the decision in Ferber, “the Legislature
    went one step further and banned the enforcement of a no contest
    clause against any action to remove a fiduciary.” (Fazzi, supra,
    190 Cal.App.4th at p. 1289, fn. 5.) It did so by adopting former
    section 21305. Former section 21305, subdivision (b), among
    other changes, declared that a pleading “ ‘(6) . . . challenging the
    exercise of fiduciary power’ ” does not violate a no contest clause
    “ ‘as a matter of public policy.’ ” (Ibid.; former § 21305, subd. (b).)
    That statute applied only to instruments that became irrevocable
    on or after January 1, 2001, and therefore does not directly apply
    here. (Ibid.; former § 21305, subd. (d); Hermanson v. Hermanson
    (2003) 
    108 Cal.App.4th 441
    , 445.) However, the legislative
    change was based on a public policy to permit claims of fiduciary
    misconduct that challenge a trustee’s failure to carry out the
    terms of a trust. (See Donkin, supra, 58 Cal.4th at pp. 436–438.)
    In making that change, the Legislature concluded that this public
    policy was significant enough to establish broad protection for
    fiduciary duty claims despite a no contest clause.
    Finally, Dae’s Petition is based on the theory that Robert
    engaged in self-dealing. It challenges Robert’s alleged conduct in
    permitting, or arranging, the transfer of Residuary Trust assets
    into the 2014 Gibb Trust for the purpose of allowing Joan to give
    Robert’s children a portion of the inheritance that otherwise
    22
    would have gone to Dae. If true, this conduct could constitute a
    violation of Robert’s duty “not to use or deal with trust property
    for the trustee’s own profit or for any other purpose unconnected
    with the trust, nor to take part in any transaction in which the
    trustee has an interest adverse to the beneficiary.” (§ 16004,
    subd. (a).) That would be malfeasance of a kind that concerned
    the court in Ferber.
    Thus, we agree with Dae that, for Robert to prevail on his
    No Contest Petition, Robert will ultimately need to prove both
    that Dae’s Petition was a contest under the No Contest Clause
    and that at least one of the claims in Dae’s Petition was
    frivolous. 11
    However, Robert need not prove that claim now. Robert’s
    burden in responding to Dae’s anti-SLAPP motion was not to
    prove all the elements of his claim, but only to show that his No
    Contest Petition has “minimal merit.” This means that Robert
    need only provide evidence that, if credited, is sufficient to show
    that one or more of the challenges in Dae’s Petition is frivolous.
    11 The analysis of whether a petition violates a no contest
    clause may differ by claim. (See Fazzi, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at
    pp. 1288–1289 [separately analyzing claims in a petition seeking
    to remove a trustee and to disqualify a successor trustee].) As
    discussed above, Dae’s Petition contains numerous allegations
    and different claims, including at least the claims that (1) the
    $15 million obligation of the Residuary Trust incurred to
    purchase the life insurance policies was an improper personal
    expense and should be repaid by Robert or the Survivor’s Trust;
    (2) the 2014 Trusts paid inadequate consideration to acquire the
    Receivables from the Residuary Trust; and (3) Robert breached
    his fiduciary duties by orchestrating the funding of the 2014 Gibb
    Trust to benefit his family at Dae’s expense.
    23
    (Cf. Key, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at pp. 531–539 [to prevail in the
    second step of an anti-SLAPP motion, proponent of a no contest
    petition was required to provide sufficient evidence showing that
    the respondent contested a trust without probable cause].)
    Robert has made such a showing.
    As discussed above, Robert provided evidence that, with
    expert advice and counsel, he and Jean established the Split
    Dollar Trust Arrangement for the purpose of minimizing estate
    taxes to increase the assets available to beneficiaries. If this is
    true, Dae’s broad challenge to the Split Dollar Trust
    Arrangement would clearly implicate the No Contest Clause by
    “impair[ing]” the administration of the Trust. That would be
    sufficient for Robert to succeed on his No Contest Petition,
    causing forfeiture of Dae’s beneficial interest. Robert has
    therefore shown a probability of success on his No Contest
    Petition sufficient to meet the “minimal merit” test. 12
    12  At this stage of the proceedings, we also cannot foreclose
    the possibility that Robert might ultimately prove Dae’s more
    specific challenge to his own removal as a beneficiary is frivolous.
    As discussed above, that challenge is predicated on Robert’s
    conduct in permitting the establishment and funding of the 2014
    Gibb Trust that enabled Joan to direct the disposition of her
    share of the Residuary Trust before Joan had actually received
    that share. Whether that conduct was consistent with the terms
    of the Family Trust depends upon the Trustors’ intent with
    respect to Jean’s children and grandchildren, which in turn may
    depend upon extrinsic evidence. While the current record does
    not show that Dae’s challenge to his own disinheritance was
    frivolous, evidence might develop that would make the continued
    pursuit of that theory unreasonable.
    24
    DISPOSITION
    The trial court’s order is affirmed. Respondent Robert
    Traver is entitled to his costs on appeal.
    CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.
    LUI, P. J.
    I concur:
    CHAVEZ, J.
    25
    Dae v. Traver, B305834
    ASHMANN-GERST, J., Dissenting.
    I conclude that the trial court should have granted the anti-
    SLAPP motion 1 filed by Ian C. Dae (Dae) to strike the no contest
    petition filed by Robert Traver (Robert) 2 in his capacity as trustee
    of the Erin J. Walsh and Jean L. Walsh Family Trust (Family
    Trust) because he failed to demonstrate a probability of
    prevailing on his claims.
    The majority, in contrast, concludes that Robert submitted
    sufficient evidence to suggest that Dae filed a contest because:
    (1) it is conceivable that he never had an irrevocable remainder
    interest in the Residuary Trust; (2) the cotrustees had the power
    to purchase the life insurance policies and transfer the
    receivables to the 2014 Gibb Trust and the 2014 Traver Trust as
    part of their estate planning; and (3) by contesting his de facto
    disinheritance from the Residuary Trust and the cotrustees’
    estate planning decisions, Dae is contesting the terms of the
    1     The anti-SLAPP statute provides that “[a] cause of action
    against a person arising from any act of that person in
    furtherance of the person’s right of petition . . . shall be subject to
    a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the
    plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the
    plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16,
    subd. (b).) “SLAPP” is an acronym for “strategic lawsuit against
    public participation.” (Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter (2019) 
    7 Cal.5th 781
    , 785, fn. 1.)
    2     Because multiple people connected to the Family Trust
    share various last names, we refer to some by their first names.
    No disrespect is intended.
    Family Trust and the powers of the cotrustees. Also, the majority
    concludes that the evidence suggests that Dae’s claims are
    frivolous.
    For the reasons discussed below, I disagree.
    I. Dae had an Irrevocable Remainder Interest in the
    Residuary Trust.
    Whether Dae had an irrevocable remainder interest in the
    Residuary Trust requires interpretation of its terms.
    Interpretation of a trust presents a question of law unless it
    turns on the competence or credibility of extrinsic evidence, or on
    a conflict in that evidence. (Ike v. Doolittle (1998) 
    61 Cal.App.4th 51
    , 73 (Ike).) The intent of the trustor controls. (Ibid.) “[I]t is
    proper for the trial court in the first instance and the appellate
    court on de novo review to consider the circumstances under
    which the document was made so that the court may be placed in
    the position of the testator or trustor whose language it is
    interpreting, in order to determine whether the terms of the
    document are clear and definite, or ambiguous in some respect.”
    (Ibid.) “An ambiguity in a written instrument exists when, in
    light of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the
    instrument, ‘“the written language is fairly susceptible of two or
    more constructions.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 74.)
    “Where a trust instrument contains some expression of the
    trustor’s intention, but as a result of a drafting error that
    expression is made ambiguous, a trial court may admit and
    consider extrinsic evidence . . . to resolve the ambiguity and give
    effect to the trustor’s intention as expressed in the trust
    instrument. [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
    The Family Trust specified: “After the death of one of the
    trustors, The Grandchildrens’ Trusts[] and The Residuary Trust
    2
    in each case shall be irrevocable and the surviving trustor shall
    not have the right to make additions to said trusts, or the right to
    change, alter, modify, or revoke said trusts in any manner
    whatsoever.” The Residuary Trust established that “[d]uring the
    lifetime of the surviving trustor, the trustees shall pay to, or for
    the benefit of, the surviving trustor, the entire net income of The
    Residuary Trust.” It also provided that “[u]pon the death of the
    surviving trustor, the trust property shall be divided into three
    equal shares which shall be distributed as follows: [¶] . . . [¶]
    [3] One share shall be distributed to Joan Traver Dae [(Joan)] if
    she [is] then [] living. If [Joan] is not then living, said share shall
    be distributed to her issue by right of representation.”
    The trust terms are unambiguous. As Joan’s son, Dae had
    an irrevocable remainder interest in her share of the Residuary
    Trust if she predeceased Jean L. Walsh (Jean). It is impossible to
    read the trust as allowing Joan to decide that her share should be
    distributed to some other person or persons.
    The majority suggests that the trust terms are ambiguous
    and could be construed as permitting Jean’s children to disinherit
    their issue when viewed through the lens of the following
    extrinsic evidence: “One of the two original Trustors of the
    Family Trust—Jean—established the 2014 Gibb Trust, which
    included the provision giving Jean’s daughter Joan the power to
    appoint the persons who would receive the assets of that trust
    upon Joan’s death.” (Maj. Opn., at p. 17.) Robert declared that
    “[a]s Erin [J. Walsh (Erin)] had no children, the goal of the
    Family Trust was to ensure that the Walsh Estate would pass
    efficiently to Jean’s children[.]” (Ibid.) “The Family Trust
    designated the surviving trustor (i.e., Jean) as an income
    beneficiary of the Residuary Trust, with the Residuary Trust
    3
    property to be distributed to Jean’s three children in equal shares
    upon the surviving trustor’s death. Only if one or more of those
    children predeceased the surviving trustor was the property of
    the Residuary Trust to be distributed to the deceased child’s issue
    ‘by right of representation.’” (Ibid.) “[U]nder the original terms
    of the Family Trust, if Joan had outlived Jean (instead of dying
    three months earlier, as actually happened), Joan would have
    inherited her portion of the Residuary Trust property and would
    have been free to do with that property what she wanted—
    including giving it away or bequeathing it to persons other than
    Dae.” (Maj. Opn., at pp. 17–18.)
    The majority concludes that the “provisions of the Family
    Trust . . . suggest that the primary goal of that trust was to leave
    as much money as possible to Jean’s children.” (Maj. Opn., at
    p. 17.) It also concludes that “[t]he provision for inheritance by
    right of representation in the event a child predeceased the
    surviving Trustor could simply have reflected an intent to
    maintain equal treatment of all of Jean’s children and their
    families rather than specifically to provide a benefit to the
    Trustor’s grandchildren from the Residuary Trust. If the
    Trustors had intended to ensure a benefit to the grandchildren
    from that trust, they could have included provisions in the trust
    instrument guaranteeing the grandchildren’s inheritance
    regardless of when the grandchildren’s parents died.” (Maj. Opn.,
    at p. 18, fns. omitted.) Per the majority, “This evidence supports
    a reasonable inference that the Trustors expected, and intended,
    the property of the Residuary Trust to pass to Jean’s children to
    use and distribute as they chose. If that inference is credited
    . . . , Jean’s conduct in establishing a trust giving Joan the power
    to appoint beneficiaries, and Jean’s and Robert’s conduct in
    4
    permitting the transfer of the Residuary Trust’s assets into that
    trust, may have been fully in accord with the Trustors’ original
    intent. Accordingly, Dae’s Petition challenging that conduct
    could amount to a contest.” (Maj. Opn., at p. 19.)
    The problem with this analysis is that none of the evidence
    suggests that the phrase “said share shall be distributed to
    [Joan’s] issue by right of representation” contains words used by
    the trustors in a specialized way. For example, there is no
    evidence that the word “shall” was intended to mean may, or that
    the word “issue” was intended to mean any person of Joan’s
    choosing. (Estate of Dye (2001) 
    92 Cal.App.4th 966
    , 977 [evidence
    did not create an ambiguity in a will because it failed “to raise a
    semantically plausible alternative candidate of meaning”].) I
    therefore decline to interpret the language “shall be distributed
    to [Joan’s] issue” as meaning “shall be distributed as Joan
    specifies.”
    The majority suggests that we can interpret the Family
    Trust by looking at the primary goal of the trustors and their
    presumption about who would outlive who. I cannot concur. The
    court in Estate of Canfield (1967) 
    256 Cal.App.2d 647
    , 654
    explained—in the context of a will—that “[t]he fact that fate, as it
    often does, thereafter proved [a] decedent to have been mistaken
    in [assuming who would outlive who] does not authorize a trial or
    appellate court to rewrite a will under the guise of construing it
    to determine what the testator might have intended if he had
    survived to a later date and had written it in the light of
    subsequent developments.” (Ibid.) This observation applies with
    equal force here.
    Ultimately, the underpinning of the majority’s holding is
    found in its summation. “Robert provided sufficient evidence of
    5
    the trustor’s intent to allow a change of beneficiary,” this
    “conclusion is limited to the context in which it arises—an anti-
    SLAPP motion,” and the majority expresses “no opinion on how
    the probate court should ultimately rule on Robert’s petition.”
    (Maj. Opn., at p. 3.) Once this summation is unpacked, several
    significant points are revealed. The majority does not apply the
    rules of document interpretation to conclude that the language of
    the trust is reasonably susceptible to the interpretation that the
    remainder beneficiaries could be changed. Rather, it concludes
    that the evidence of the trustors’ intent offered by Robert was
    enough, by itself, to prove the potential meaning of the trust in
    the anti-SLAPP context. The implications thereby endorsed by
    the majority are: The rules of document interpretation as applied
    to trusts are suspended and/or relaxed for parties who are
    resisting anti-SLAPP motions. Moreover, if a party resisting an
    anti-SLAPP motion has an opinion regarding the meaning of a
    trust, that opinion must be accepted even if it is directly contrary
    to the plain language of the trust.
    The language of the anti-SLAPP statute provides no room
    for the majority’s interpretation. In Jay v. Mahaffey (2013) 
    218 Cal.App.4th 1522
    , 1537 (Jay), the defendants argued that when
    the statute states that “the court shall consider the pleadings,
    and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon
    which the liability or defense is based” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16,
    subd. (b)(2)), it means that a court must “consider all evidence
    submitted.” (Jay, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 1537.) In
    rejecting this argument, the court recognized that “the statute
    neither suggests nor states that normal rules of evidence and
    procedure do not apply to anti-SLAPP motions[.]” (Ibid.) I
    conclude that the normal rules of evidence and procedure were
    6
    applicable here, i.e., we must adhere to the rules of document
    interpretation related to trusts when deciding if Robert’s petition
    had minimal merit. Allowing a defendant to survive an anti-
    SLAPP motion if he or she has not shown an ability to prevail on
    a later motion or at trial is directly contrary to the stated purpose
    of the anti-SLAPP statute: to allow special motions to strike
    meritless actions and thereby curb the effect of lawsuits “brought
    primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of
    freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances.”
    (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (a).)
    To the degree the majority intimates that a court can
    modify the Family Trust, I see it differently.
    A trial court has the equitable power to modify an
    irrevocable trust, but only in exceptional circumstances. (Ike,
    supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at pp. 79–82.) The modification must be
    necessary to accomplish the purpose of the trustors as expressed
    in the trust instrument. (Id. at p. 80; Stewart v. Towse (1988)
    
    203 Cal.App.3d 425
    , 428.)
    In Adams v. Cook (1940) 
    15 Cal.2d 352
     (Adams), investors
    placed real property into a trust to be sold by a date certain at a
    fixed price. (Id. at pp. 354, 360.) Any lease of the property had to
    be subject to its sale. “It was the intent of the trustors that the
    unit holders or beneficiaries under the trust should secure the
    largest return on their investment.” (Id. at p. 360.) After oil was
    discovered on the property, and after the oil was allegedly being
    drained by numerous wells drilled on adjacent property, the
    beneficiaries asked the probate court to allow the trustee to
    execute an oil lease free of the restrictions as to sale. The trial
    court granted the relief, finding that if the trustee could not
    execute an oil lease, the property would become worthless. Our
    7
    Supreme Court affirmed. (Id. at p. 363.) It noted that “a court of
    equity has the power to change the method of administering a
    trust estate[] when it is shown that such a change is necessary to
    prevent loss or destruction of the trust property[.]” (Id. at p. 358.)
    It explained that “the rule against courts modifying the terms of
    a contract . . . does not apply to declarations of trust, where the
    primary purpose of the trust would not be accomplished by a
    strict adherence to the terms of the declaration of trust[,] and
    that when it is made to appear in a court of equity . . . that the
    benefits and advantages which the trustors desired to confer
    upon the beneficiaries would not accrue to them by ‘a slavish
    adherence to the terms of the trust,’ the courts may modify the
    terms of the trust to accomplish the real intent and purpose of
    the trustors.” (Id. at p. 361.)
    “It is only under peculiar circumstances, such as those
    exemplified in [Adams], that a court has the power to modify an
    active trust. [Citations.]” (Moxley v. Title Ins. & Trust Co. (1946)
    
    27 Cal.2d 457
    , 468.) One such circumstance is when a drafting
    error defeats the trustor’s intentions. (Bilafer v. Bilafer (2008)
    
    161 Cal.App.4th 363
    , 369.)
    The case at bar does not present an exceptional or peculiar
    circumstance in which a court is empowered to modify the
    Residuary Trust. There is no expression in the Family Trust that
    Joan could decide to change whether her issue take her share
    under the Residuary Trust if she predeceased the survivor of Erin
    or Jean. There was no drafting error in the Family Trust. A
    modification is not necessary to preserve the value of the trust
    property, as in Adams. In any event, the point is moot because
    Robert did not file a petition asking the probate court to modify
    the Family Trust.
    8
    II. Dae did not File a Contest.
    Whether there has been a contest within the meaning of a
    no contest clause depends upon the circumstances and the
    language used. A court must consider the purposes that the
    trustor sought to obtain by the provisions of his or her trust.
    (Estate of Strader (2003) 
    107 Cal.App.4th 996
    , 1002–1003.)
    Consequently, a contest has been construed to mean an attempt
    to thwart a testator’s intent. (Burch v. George (1994) 
    7 Cal.4th 246
    , 262–263.)
    The intent of trustors—Erin and Jean—can be gleaned
    from the unambiguous terms of the Family Trust. They intended
    for Jean’s issue to receive her share of the Residuary Trust if she
    predeceased the surviving trustor. Dae’s petition is designed to
    enforce that intent, an intent that was thwarted when Jean and
    Robert breached their fiduciary duty to Dae by removing a large
    percentage of the assets from the Residuary Trust and placing
    the right to receive life insurance proceeds upon the death of
    Joan into a trust that failed to preserve Dae’s irrevocable
    remainder interest. 3 The Family Trust never authorized the
    3     “Among the duties of the trustee is the duty to administer
    the trust and to manage trust property ‘with the care, skill,
    prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing
    that a prudent person acting in a like capacity and familiar with
    such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of like
    character and with like aims to accomplish the purposes of the
    trust as determined from the trust instrument.’ [Citation.]”
    (Estate of Gump (1991) 
    1 Cal.App.4th 582
    , 596 [citing Prob. Code,
    § 16040, subd. (a)].) “The trustee has a duty to administer the
    trust solely in the interest of the beneficiaries.” (Prob. Code,
    § 16002, subd. (a).) With respect to Dae, the cotrustees breached
    these duties. As a result, he was improperly cheated out of
    millions of dollars.
    9
    cotrustees to alter, revoke or modify Dae’s interest. For these
    reasons, I conclude that any challenge to the revocation of his
    interest (and the steps leading up to it) cannot be construed as a
    contest.
    The majority suggests that if Dae wanted to avoid a
    contest, he should have focused his petition solely on his
    exclusion from the 2014 Gibb Trust. I part ways with the
    majority on this point. While the majority suggests that each
    decision made by the cotrustees must be viewed in a vacuum
    when courts are deciding if there is a contest, I conclude that the
    decisions must be viewed together and judged by the result that
    they achieved.
    Schwartz v. Schwartz (2008) 
    167 Cal.App.4th 733
     does not
    compel a contrary conclusion. It merely held that withdrawing a
    petition that amounts to a contest does not save a party from the
    penalty of a no contest clause. (Id. at pp. 744–746.) It does not
    hold that a no contest clause is triggered when a wronged
    beneficiary alleges a deprivation that took multiple steps and an
    interim step was legitimate.
    My analysis is bolstered by Robert’s declaration. He
    declared that Jean and he entered the split-dollar arrangements
    to minimize estate taxes based on the advice of financial advisors
    and legal counsel. He did not, however, specify how those
    arrangements minimized taxes, nor did he state whether all or
    only some of the steps leading up to the transfer of the insurance
    receivables into the 2014 Traver Trust and 2014 Gibb Trust were
    10
    necessary for the stated goal. 4 I can only assume that all the
    steps were necessary, including the creation of the 2014 Traver
    Trust and the 2014 Gibb Trust. In other words, they all had a
    common goal. Those trusts did not preserve Dae’s irrevocable
    remainder interest in Joan’s share of the Residuary Trust
    following Jean’s death. If that is true, then every step the
    cotrustees took must be viewed as interrelated steps in a scheme
    designed to achieve a goal that thwarted the terms of the
    Residuary Trust. While the cotrustees were granted the power to
    “borrow money for any trust purpose,” their decision to borrow
    money to pay for the life insurance policies was not for a trust
    purpose because it ended up serving the interests of Robert’s
    family at the expense of Dae.
    My point is reinforced by the power of appointment in the
    2014 Gibb Trust. Joan was not able to give her share away to
    anyone she chose. Her power could be exercised only in favor of
    “[Jean’s] issue, and qualified charitable organizations[.]” In other
    words, the cotrustees created a trust with a power of
    appointment that, if exercised, was highly likely to benefit
    Robert, his children, or both because—other than Dae—they were
    Jean’s only remaining issue.
    The trial court thought it was relevant that Jean and he
    received financial and legal advice before entering the split-dollar
    arrangements. But there is no “professional advice defense” to
    4      Robert declared that following Joan’s death, the 2014 Gibb
    Trust received $16.2 million free of federal estate tax. I presume
    this is accurate. The point of noting that Robert did not explain
    whether all or some of the steps taken were necessary for tax
    planning purposes is this: he has rendered the courts unable to
    properly judge the purpose of each of those steps.
    11
    breach of fiduciary duty. In other words, a fiduciary does not
    have license to breach his or her duty just because a professional
    advised the course of action.
    Robert suggests that all the blame for Dae being
    disinherited falls on the shoulders of Joan. This is an attempt at
    misdirection, and it fails. Robert and Jean gave Joan the power
    to disinherit Dae. That was a violation of their fiduciary duties
    that should not be excused.
    III. Even if Dae Filed a Contest, it was Not Frivolous.
    As announced by the majority, the reasoning of Estate of
    Ferber (1998) 
    66 Cal.App.4th 244
     indicates that a no contest
    clause is overbroad when it imposes a forfeiture for bringing a
    nonfrivolous claim of fiduciary misconduct. In this case, it is
    undeniable that Jean and Robert breached their fiduciary duty to
    Dae by engaging in estate planning that operated to exclude him
    rather than include him. Dae’s petition is not totally and
    completely without merit (Code Civ. Proc., § 128.5, subd. (b)(2))
    and cannot be labeled as frivolous. After all, millions of dollars
    that should have gone to Dae pursuant to the unambiguous
    terms of the Residuary Trust ended up going to Robert and his
    family.
    IV. Conclusion.
    Robert failed to provide sufficient evidence demonstrating
    that his no contest petition had minimal merit. I would reverse
    and remand with directions to the trial court to grant Dae’s anti-
    SLAPP motion. He should not have to incur the expense of
    defending against unmeritorious allegations that are seeking to
    12
    punish him for exercising his right of petition under our state and
    federal Constitutions.
    __________________________, J.
    ASHMANN-GERST
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