People v. Sais CA4/1 ( 2014 )

Filed 12/17/14 P. v. Sais CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D064683
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCE329197)
JORGE ARTURO SAIS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Evan P.
Kirvin, Judge. Reversed.
Cynthia Grimm, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, William M. Wood, Marvin E.
Mizell and Junichi Semitsu, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
A jury convicted Jorge Arturo Sais of one count of receiving a stolen vehicle (Pen.
Code, § 496d).1 Sais additionally admitted having five prior prison commitment
convictions (Pen. Code, § 667.5). The court imposed an aggregate sentence of seven
years, with two years to be served in county jail and five years to be served on probation.
Sais appeals, contending there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction.
We agree and reverse the judgment.
BACKGROUND
Marcus Summa owned a Saturn. The car had minor scratches on the body, the
seats were old, and there was some damage to the roof. It did not have a stereo. The car
was stolen while it was parked in front of Summa's mechanic's home awaiting minor
repairs.
A deputy sheriff located the car approximately a month after it was stolen. The
outside of the car was dusty and the door was unlocked. Inside, the door cover was
damaged, the driver's seat was ripped, and the fabric on the ceiling was torn completely
off. A flashlight, the spare tire, and a small container used to hold keys or a cell phone
were missing. There was a cigarette butt in the center tray and there were ashes scattered
throughout the center console area where the gearshift was located. There was a hole in
the ignition and the vehicle could only be started using a screwdriver. Although the
vehicle was operational, the engine made an awful sound and had to be replaced.
1 The jury could not reach a verdict on a second count of the same offense. The
court dismissed the charge at the People's request.
2
Sais lived two and a half to three miles from where the deputy found Summa's
vehicle. Sais's DNA matched the DNA of the major contributor to a DNA mixture found
on the cigarette in the vehicle. Sais did not have Summa's permission to possess the
vehicle.
DISCUSSION
A conviction for receiving stolen property requires the People to prove: (1) the
property was stolen; (2) the defendant knew the property was stolen; and (3) the
defendant had possession of the property. (In re Anthony J. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 718,
728 (Anthony J.); People v. Land (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 220, 223 (Land).) Sais does not
dispute the sufficiency of the evidence to support the first and second elements. Rather,
he contends there is insufficient evidence to support the third element.
In evaluating this contention, " 'we review the whole record to determine whether
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime . . . beyond
a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] The record must disclose substantial evidence to support
the verdict—i.e., evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
[Citation.] In applying this test, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury
could reasonably have deduced from the evidence. [Citation.] "Conflicts and even
testimony [that] is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a
judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the
credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination
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depends. [Citation.] We resolve neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts; we
look for substantial evidence. [Citation.]" [Citation.] A reversal for insufficient
evidence "is unwarranted unless it appears 'that upon no hypothesis whatever is there
sufficient substantial evidence to support' " the jury's verdict.' " (People v. Manibusan
(2013) 58 Cal.4th 40, 87.)
The possession required for a receiving stolen property conviction may be actual
or constructive, and need not be exclusive. The key question is whether the defendant
acquired a measure of dominion or control over the stolen property. (Anthony J., supra,
117 Cal.App.4th at p. 728; Land, supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at pp. 223-224.) Dominion and
control " ' "cannot be inferred from mere presence or access. Something more must be
shown to support inferring these elements. Of course, the necessary additional
circumstances may, in some fact contexts, be rather slight. [Citations.] It is clear,
however, that some additional fact is essential." ' " (Anthony J., at p. 728; Land, at
p. 225.)
Here, the only evidence connecting Sais to the stolen car was his DNA found on a
cigarette butt in the car and his residence within a few miles of where the vehicle was
recovered. While this evidence may be sufficient to infer he was present in or had access
to the stolen car, this evidence is not by itself sufficient to infer he exercised dominion
and control over the stolen car. (See People v. Myles (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 423, 429
[evidence defendant was a passenger in a car and was found standing close to the trunk,
which contained stolen goods, insufficient to infer possession of the stolen property ];
People v. Zyduck (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 334, 336 [evidence defendant was a passenger
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in a car with a stolen chainsaw in the back seat insufficient to infer possession of the
stolen property].) Accordingly, we conclude there is insufficient evidence to support his
conviction for receiving a stolen vehicle.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed.
MCCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
O'ROURKE, J.
AARON, J.
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