Martin v. My Car Agent CA4/3 ( 2014 )


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  • Filed 4/24/14 Martin v. My Car Agent CA4/3
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION THREE
    DAWN MARTIN,
    Plaintiff and Appellant,                                          G048985
    v.                                                            (Super. Ct. No. 30-2011-00526774)
    MY CAR AGENT,                                                          OPINION
    Defendant and Respondent.
    Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Derek W.
    Hunt, Judge. Dismissed.
    Liberty & Associates, Louis A. Liberty and Ian Otto for Plaintiff and
    Appellant.
    Law Offices of Christopher P. Ruiz and Christopher P. Ruiz for Defendant
    and Respondent.
    *               *               *
    Plaintiff Dawn Martin appeals from an order awarding her a reduced
    amount of attorney fees. Because the order is nonappealable, we dismiss the appeal.
    FACTS
    Plaintiff sued defendant My Car Agent for violating the Automobile Sales
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    Finance Act (Civ. Code, § 2981 et seq.) and other causes of action. The parties
    subsequently entered into a settlement agreement, whereby defendant would pay plaintiff
    $11,000 and release her from any obligations under the sales contract, and plaintiff would
    dismiss her complaint with prejudice. The parties agreed to bear their own attorney fees,
    except as provided in section V of the settlement agreement. Section V provided that the
    parties would meet and try to resolve plaintiff’s claim for attorney fees; however, if they
    were unable to reach a resolution, then plaintiff would file a motion for attorney fees with
    the court, but plaintiff would be deemed the prevailing party on her Automobile Sales
    Finance Act claim only.
    Plaintiff filed a motion with the court for around $262,000 in attorney fees.
    Defendant opposed plaintiff’s motion, arguing it violated the settlement agreement and
    that the amount of fees requested was excessive, unreasonable, and unsupported. In
    plaintiff’s reply to defendant’s opposition, she argued her motion should be granted in its
    entirety because she had recovered all that she sought in her lawsuit.
    On July 11, 2013, the court granted plaintiff’s motion, but reduced the
    amount of attorney fees to $32,581.
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    Plaintiff also named another defendant who is not a party to this appeal.
    References in this opinion to “defendant” refer to My Car Agent.
    2
    DISCUSSION
    Although plaintiff’s opening brief states she appeals from the court’s July
    11, 2013 ruling, her counsel filed a notice of appeal (on the Judicial Council of California
    form) and (1) left blank the section for the challenged ruling’s date, and (2) checked the
    box for a postjudgment order, even though the record contains no judgment.
    Because the issue of nonappealability is jurisdictional, we requested
    supplemental letter briefs from the parties on the issues of whether the attorney fee order
    is appealable when the record on appeal does not contain a final judgment and whether
    the appeal should be dismissed. (Gov. Code, § 68081.) In plaintiff’s supplemental letter
    brief, she acknowledges that “there is no final judgment dismissing the case,” but
    nonetheless requests that we move forward with the appeal.
    Under the “one final judgment rule,” an appeal may be taken from a final
    judgment “that ‘“terminates the proceeding in the lower court by completely disposing of
    the matter in controversy.”’” (In re Daniel K. (1998) 
    61 Cal. App. 4th 661
    , 671; Code
    Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(1).) Orders are appealable if they have been expressly
    designated by statute as appealable orders. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(2) - (13).)
    “[A] reviewing court is ‘without jurisdiction to consider an appeal from a nonappealable
    order, and has the duty to dismiss such an appeal upon its own motion.’” (In re Mario C.
    (2004) 
    124 Cal. App. 4th 1303
    , 1307; Jennings v. Marralle (1994) 
    8 Cal. 4th 121
    , 126.)
    “[T]he question whether an order is appealable goes to the jurisdiction of an appellate
    court, which is not a matter of shades of grey but rather of black or white.” (Farwell v.
    Sunset Mesa Property Owners Assn., Inc. (2008) 
    163 Cal. App. 4th 1545
    , 1550.)
    Accordingly, this appeal must be dismissed.
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    DISPOSITION
    We dismiss the appeal. Defendant shall recover its costs on appeal.
    IKOLA, J.
    WE CONCUR:
    RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P. J.
    ARONSON, J.
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Document Info

Docket Number: G048985

Filed Date: 4/24/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021