Quinn v. LPL Financial LLC ( 2023 )

Filed 5/10/23
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
JOHN QUINN, B313414
Plaintiff and Appellant, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 20STCV06589
v.
LPL FINANCIAL LLC,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, David Sotelo, Judge. Affirmed.
Clapp & Lauinger and James F. Clapp; Wynne Law Firm
and Edward J. Wynne for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Seyfarth Shaw, Jon D. Meer and Paul J. Leaf for Defendant
and Respondent.
____________________
As a matter of constitutional law, we uphold a statute that
retroactively governs worker classification. Statutory citations
are to the Labor Code.
I
Distinguishing between employees and independent
contractors has been a challenge for a long time.
In a 1944 case about Los Angeles “newsboys,” the Supreme
Court of the United States reviewed the “long and tortuous
history” behind a then-reigning test, which was notoriously
uncertain in application. (Board v. Hearst Publications (1944)
322 U.S. 111, 113, 120.) The Supreme Court bemoaned this
uncertainty: “Few problems in the law have given greater
variety of application and conflict in results than the cases
arising in the borderland between what is clearly an employer-
employee relationship and what is clearly one of independent,
entrepreneurial dealing.” (Id. at p. 121, italics added.)
The California Supreme Court also has struggled to map
this borderland. Striving to mark precise boundaries, our high
court has surveyed this terrain time and again. (E.g., Empire
Star Mines Co. v. Cal. Employment Com. (1946) 28 Cal.2d 33,
43–46 [miners]; S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dept. of Industrial
Relations (1989) 48 Cal.3d 341, 349–360 (Borello) [cucumber
harvesters]; Martinez v. Combs (2010) 49 Cal.4th 35, 49–77
[strawberry workers]; Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc.
(2014) 59 Cal.4th 522, 530–540 [newspaper delivery].)
These efforts were not conclusive.
In 2018, the court tried again in Dynamex Operations West,
Inc. v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 903 (Dynamex).
Today, Dynamex stands as governing law in some respects.
In other ways, however, it merely intensified a whirlpool: the
year it issued, Dynamex sparked varied responses, which are
continuing. The dust has yet to settle completely.
What was Dynamex?
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Delivery drivers said they were employees of Dynamex,
which had, they alleged, violated a state wage order governing
their employment. Dynamex countered that the wage order did
not apply because its drivers were independent contractors
rather than employees. The court held, for claims arising under
wage orders, a so-called ABC test would govern. The opinion
limited its review to wage orders and expressed no view about
other employment claims. (Dynamex, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 916
& fn. 5, 924–925, 942; see also id. at pp. 925–926 & fns. 8–9, 952–
953 [recounting origin, nature, and variety of wage orders].)
Dynamex replaced one multifactor test with another. The
new ABC test was that a worker would be considered an
employee under the wage order unless the company satisfied
factors the opinion identified as Part A, Part B, and Part C:
hence, the ABC test. (Dynamex, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 955–963.)
The court was concerned employers were misclassifying
employees as independent contractors. The court adopted the
ABC test with the “basic objective” of securing at least minimal
wages and “a subsistence standard of living” for workers. (Id. at
pp. 913, 952, 955–957, 964.)
Plaintiff John Quinn likes Dynamex’s ABC test and wants
it to govern his case.
The 2018 Dynamex decision was not the last word in this
long-running conversation.
That same year, legislators introduced a bill targeting
Dynamex. This bill, known as Assembly Bill 5 (AB 5), passed in
2019 and took effect in 2020. (Stats. 2019, ch. 296 (2019-2020
Reg. Sess.); Lab. Code, § 2775, subd. (b)(1); see American Society
of Journalists and Authors, Inc. v. Bonta (9th Cir. 2021) 15 F.4th
954, 957–959 (American Society) [describing AB 5].)
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AB 5 simultaneously codified, broadened, and narrowed
Dynamex. It codified Dynamex by stating the ABC test in a
statute. (See Stats. 2019, ch. 296, § 1(a) & (d).) The bill
broadened Dynamex in two ways: by extending its reach beyond
wage orders and by empowering prosecutors to enforce the rule.
And it narrowed Dynamex by creating a range of exemptions to
the ABC test. (See §§ 2775, subd. (b)(1), 2776–2784, 2786.) A
different test, the “Borello test,” would govern the exceptions.
(See §§ 2775, subd. (b)(3), 2783.)
AB 5 did not settle everything, either. The Legislature
returned to the field by enacting AB 170 (Stats. 2019, ch. 415,
§ 1) and then AB 2257 (Stats. 2020, ch. 38, § 2). Both statutes
created new exemptions from the ABC test.
Nor was the Legislature the only theater of action. On
October 29, 2019, a group proposed Proposition 22, which took
aim at an aspect of Dynamex and AB 5. In November 2020,
voters approved Proposition 22 and thereby modified the
landscape in various respects. (See Castellanos v. State of Cal.
(2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 131, 142–145 (Castellanos) [describing
Proposition 22].)
There also were developments in the judicial arena.
One California court enjoined the operation of Proposition
22; a later, higher, and divided court reversed much of the
injunction. (See Castellanos, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at pp. 146–
212.)
A Ninth Circuit opinion upheld the constitutionality of
AB 5, but a later Ninth Circuit decision went a different
direction. (Compare American Society, supra, 15 F.4th at p. 966
[“section 2778 permissibly subjects workers in different fields to
different rules”] with Olson v. State of Cal. (9th Cir. 2023) 62
4
F.4th 1206, 1219 (Olson) [“Plaintiffs plausibly alleged that A.B.
5, as amended, violates the Equal Protection Clause for those
engaged in app-based ride-hailing and delivery services”].)
Quinn set sail on this stormy sea. In February 2020—after
the enactment of AB 5 and the filing of Proposition 22 but before
the effective date of AB 2257—Quinn filed suit against LPL
Financial LLC under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA).
Quinn and LPL stipulated to facts and sought summary
adjudication of the fulcrum issue. The stipulated facts are
concise, as follows (omitting paragraphs and related lettering):
“[The new statute] codified and clarified the ‘ABC Test’ for
independent contractor classification adopted in Dynamex [ ].
[The statute] also included multiple exemptions to the ‘ABC
Test,’ including, but not limited to, an exemption for ‘securities
broker-dealer[s] or investment adviser[s] or their agents and
representatives that are registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission or the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority.’ [Citation.] For those occupations, [the new statute]
rejects the ‘ABC Test’ in favor of the ‘Common Law Control Test’
set forth in [Borello]. The legal requirements differ for
determining independent contractor classification, depending on
whether the facts are governed by the ‘ABC Test’ or the ‘Borello
Test.’ LPL is a registered broker-dealer and registered
investment adviser registered with Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority, Inc. (‘FINRA’) and the Securities Exchange
Commission. At all times relevant to this action, Quinn and all
allegedly aggrieved individuals for purposes of this action (the
‘Financial Professionals’) were ‘securities broker-dealer[s] or
investment adviser[s] or their agents and representatives that
are registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission or
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the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority[.]’ Thus, the
Financial Professionals affiliated with LPL fall within the
statutory exemption to the ‘ABC Test’.”
There is one more stipulated fact: “The Parties agree that,
on its face, Labor Code § 2750.3(i)(2) makes the exemption set
forth in § 2750.3(b)(4) retroactive, such that it would cover the
entire proposed PAGA period in this action. However, Quinn
claims both of those sections are unconstitutional and thus
unenforceable. LPL claims both of those sections are
constitutional and thus enforceable.”
The parties did not stipulate to the results of these two
tests—the ABC test versus the Borello test. There is no
stipulation Quinn is an employee under one test or an
independent contractor under another. Rather the dispute is
about how a court should make that determination. This
controversy is over means, not ends. Whether Quinn was an
employee or an independent contractor is, as yet, unknown.
LPL moved for summary adjudication. The pertinent
stipulated issues were whether the statutory exemption for
securities broker-dealers and investment advisors, and its
retroactive application, are constitutional. The trial court upheld
the statute as constitutional. Quinn appealed.
II
The challenged provisions are constitutional.
The pertinent statute is as follows. Section 2775 identifies
Dynamex and Borello by case citations and states the ABC test
shall govern the Labor Code. (§ 2775, subds. (a) & (b).) Section
2783 states the holding in Dynamex does not apply to a list of
defined occupations; instead, people in those occupations are
governed by Borello. One of the defined exceptions is for
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securities broker-dealers or investment advisers or their agents
and representatives that are registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission or the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority. (§ 2783, subd. (d)(1).) Section 2785 makes this
exemption retroactive. (§ 2785, subd. (b).)
We independently review constitutional questions.
A
Equal protection is the ground for Quinn’s first challenge.
He says the statute violates equal protection by applying the
ABC test to others but not to him.
We apply federal law. Neither party suggests state and
federal law have different equal protection tests. It does appear,
for this issue, that California state courts embrace the federal
test. (Cf. Warden v. State Bar (1999) 21 Cal.4th 628, 648, fn. 12
(Warden) [“under both the federal and state equal protection
clauses, the rational relationship test remains a restrained,
deferential standard”]; see also People v. Chatman (2018)
4 Cal.5th 277, 287, 288; Conservatorship of Eric B. (2022) 12
Cal.5th 1085, 1113 [when urged to use California’s state equal
protection clause “to articulate a unique set of state law specific
principles, we’ve declined”] (conc. opn. of Kruger, J.).)
Quinn’s challenge requires a return to basics.
Reigning equal protection analysis remains, in significant
measure, a reaction to the universally-acknowledged
constitutional error in Lochner v. New York (1905) 198 U.S. 45(Lochner). Indeed, “[t]he spectre of Lochner has loomed over
most important constitutional decisions, whether they uphold or
invalidate governmental practices.” (Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy
(1987) 87 Colum. L.Rev. 873, 873.)
What, exactly, was the hated Lochner—this candidate for
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“the most widely reviled decision of the last hundred years”?
(Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong? (2003) 70 U.Chi. L.Rev. 373,
373, see also ibid. [“Lochner is one of the great anti-precedents of
the twentieth century. You have to reject Lochner if you want to
be in the mainstream of American constitutional law today.”].)
Lochner overturned, on federal constitutional grounds, a
state regulation capping bakers’ work weeks at 60 hours. The
Lochner majority posed the question this way: “Is this a fair,
reasonable, and appropriate exercise of the police power of the
state, or is it an unreasonable, unnecessary, and arbitrary
interference with the right of the individual to his personal
liberty, or to enter into those contracts in relation to labor which
may seem to him appropriate or necessary for the support of
himself and his family?” The Lochner majority ruled the 60-hour
cap was the latter and struck it down. (Lochner, supra, 198 U.S.
at pp. 46–52, 56, 64.)
In a timeless dissent, Justice Holmes wrote:
“This case is decided upon an economic theory which a
large part of the country does not entertain. If it were a question
whether I agreed with that theory, I should desire to study it
further and long before making up my mind. But I do not
conceive that to be my duty, because I strongly believe that my
agreement or disagreement has nothing to do with the right of a
majority to embody their opinions in law. It is settled by various
decisions of this court that state constitutions and state laws may
regulate life in many ways which we as legislators might think as
injudicious, or if you like as tyrannical, as this, and which,
equally with this, interfere with the liberty to contract. . . . Some
of these laws embody convictions or prejudices which judges are
likely to share. Some may not. But a Constitution is not
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intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of
paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the state or
of laissez faire. It is made for people of fundamentally differing
views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions natural
and familiar, or novel, and even shocking, ought not to conclude
our judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying
them conflict with the Constitution of the United States.”
(Lochner, supra, 198 U.S. at pp. 75–76 (dis. opn. of Holmes, J.).)
Future Supreme Courts resoundingly agreed with Holmes.
Praising him, a later Supreme Court wrote, “it is up to
legislatures, not courts, to decide on the wisdom and utility of
legislation. There was a time when the Due Process Clause was
used by this Court to strike down laws which were thought
unreasonable, that is, unwise or incompatible with some
particular economic or social philosophy. . . . This intrusion by
the judiciary into the realm of legislative value judgments was
strongly objected to at the time, particularly by Mr. Justice
Holmes . . . . The doctrine that prevailed in Lochner . . . and like
cases—that due process authorizes courts to hold laws
unconstitutional when they believe the legislature has acted
unwisely—has long since been discarded. We have returned to
the original constitutional proposition that courts do not
substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of
legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws. As this Court
stated in a unanimous opinion in 1941, ‘We are not concerned . . .
with the wisdom, need, or appropriateness of the legislation.’
[Citation.] Legislative bodies have broad scope to experiment
with economic problems, and this Court does not sit to subject
the state to an intolerable supervision hostile to the basic
principles of our government and wholly beyond the protection
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which the general clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was
intended to secure. . . . Nor is the statute’s exception . . . a denial
of equal protection . . . .” (Ferguson v. Skrupa (1963) 372 U.S.
726, 729–732, internal quotation marks and citations omitted
(Skrupa); see also Williamson v. Lee Optical (1955) 348 U.S. 483,
488 (Williamson); Dandridge v. Williams (1970) 397 U.S. 471,
484.)
This renunciation of Lochner endured. (E.g., Santa Monica
Beach, Ltd. v. Superior Ct. (1999) 19 Cal.4th 952, 970 [citing
Skrupa]; Briggs v. Brown (2017) 3 Cal.5th 808, 828 [same].)
Unless a suspect classification or some other basis triggers
heightened scrutiny, modern equal protection analysis applies
the rational basis test: “It is enough that there is an evil at hand
for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular
legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.”
(Williamson, supra, 348 U.S. at p. 488.)
“[A] statutory classification that neither proceeds along
suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights
must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any
reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational
basis for the classification.” (Warden, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 644,
italics added.) The constitutional inquiry ends if there are
plausible reasons for the classification. (Ibid.)
This law has a rational basis. “Financial professionals,” as
Quinn’s stipulation described them, are professionals. A
legislature rationally could believe professionals like Quinn, who
ask people to trust them with wealth and finances, have more
skill and bargaining power than the average worker, and
therefore are less vulnerable to exploitation by misclassification
as independent contractors. (Cf. Dynamex, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p.
10
952 [wage statutes are premised on the generalization workers
have less bargaining power than employers]; see also Stats. 2019,
ch. 296, § 1(c) & (e) [legislative findings showing AB 5, like
Dynamex, aims to alleviate misclassification and exploitation].)
Professionals with superior bargaining power may need
less protection in the marketplace than others. A labor
regulation treating financial professionals differently from others
is rational.
Quinn agrees the rational basis test governs, but he would
apply it in a nondeferential way. This approach recapitulates the
error of Lochner.
For instance, Quinn argues all workers need the protection
of the ABC test. This policy question is for the Legislature,
which decided a different test should govern many professions.
Quinn faults the legislation for failing to state the rational
basis for the challenged exemption in its text or legislative
history. This demand for a legislative recital is unfounded. Any
reasonably conceivable rationale suffices. (Warden, supra, 21
Cal.4th at pp. 641 & 644.)
Quinn argues the statutory exemptions resulted from
lobbying efforts. If this were the test, a supposedly deferential
inquiry would doom much and possibly all legislation.
Quinn maintains the registration aspect of the exemption
creates a nonsensically narrow classification. He claims other
licensed workers in the financial world fall outside of the
exemption because they are unregistered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission or the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority and therefore operate under the ABC test. In one
sentence of his opening brief, Quinn lists loan officers, certified
financial planners, financial examiners, market research
11
analysts, and chartered wealth managers. He suggests these
licensed financial workers are interchangeable for purposes of
the statute, but only registered financial workers like him are
exempted from the ABC test, and this discrimination deprives
him of equal protection.
Quinn’s attack is not deferential. Legislation may
recognize different categories of people within a larger
classification who present varying degrees of risk of harm, and
properly may limit a regulation to those classes for whom the
need for regulation is thought to be more important. (Warden,
supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 644.)
“Evils in the same field may be of different dimensions and
proportions, requiring different remedies. Or so the legislature
may think. [Citation.] Or the reform may take one step at a
time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems
most acute to the legislative mind.” (Williamson, supra, 348 U.S.
at p. 489.)
Defining classes of people subject to legal requirements
inevitably places those with almost equally strong claims on the
other side of the line. Whether the line could or should have been
drawn differently is a matter for legislative, not judicial,
consideration. (Warden, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 645.) Problems
of government may justify or require rough accommodations, and
even illogical and unscientific ones. (Kasler v. Lockyer (2000) 23
Cal.4th 472, 487.)
In another thrust, Quinn faults the trial court for offering
no evidence to support its analysis. Again, this misunderstands
the deference of rational-basis review. A legislative choice is not
subject to courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational
speculation unsupported by empirical data. (Warden, supra, 21
12
Cal.4th at p. 650.)
In short, the trial court was right to defend this statute
against Quinn’s equal protection attack.
In so holding, we join with Whitlach v. Premier Valley Inc.
(2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 673, 706–708, which concerned real estate
agents, and American Society, supra, 15 F.4th at pages 964–966,
which involved freelance writers and photographers. These
equal protection analyses support our holding.
A different recent decision, Olson, has no application here.
The Olson decision seemed to make one legislator’s statement a
basis for doubting a law. (See Olson, supra, 64 F.4th at pp.
1219–1220.) For support, Olson cited U.S. Department of
Agriculture v. Moreno (1973) 413 U.S. 528, 534 & 538, which
invalidated a food stamp exemption designed to cut off aid to
“hippies” and “hippie communes.” (Id. at p. 534.) That
legislation was unconstitutional because it was “wholly without
any rational basis.” (Id. at p. 538.) Quinn’s case is different: it is
rational to think people licensed to work as financial
professionals by the Securities and Exchange Commission or the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority have more skill and
bargaining power than the average worker and do not need a
new classification test.
In sum, this statute does not violate equal protection.
B
Due process is the basis for Quinn’s second challenge.
Quinn argues the 2019 legislation, by making the challenged
exemption retroactive, violated his right to due process because
its retroactivity deprived him of a vested right.
Recall the pertinent exemption specifies the key
determination for these financial professionals shall be governed
13
by the Borello test rather than the ABC test. The statute makes
this rule retroactive. Quinn says this retroactivity is
unconstitutional.
Quinn’s opening brief cites no precedent giving him a
“vested right” to a particular legal test or presumption. Courts
and legislatures routinely change or modify legal tests. For
courts, this is the method of the common law: continual and
incremental legal adjustments to newly-encountered fact
patterns—adjustments that then stand as precedents for the
future. Absent precedent, Quinn’s challenge lacks an
authoritative footing. (Cf. Graczyk v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals
Bd. (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 997, 1006 [“[A]pplicant’s inchoate
right to benefits under the workers’ compensation law is wholly
statutory and had not been reduced to final judgment before the
Legislature’s [later statute] . . . clarifying the employee status of
athletes. Hence, applicant did not have a vested right, and his
constitutional objection has no bearing on the issue.”].)
The decisions Quinn does cite do not cover his situation.
Roberts v. Wehmeyer (1923) 191 Cal. 601, 603 concerned vested
rights to an interest in a house. In re Marriage of Bouquet (1976)
16 Cal.3d 583, 586 and footnotes 1 and 2 (Bouquet) concerned
vested rights to “earnings and accumulations.” In re Marriage of
Buol (1985) 39 Cal.3d 751, 755, 757 (Buol) was about vested
rights to a house held as separate property.
None of these cases is authority for a constitutionally
vested right in anything as ephemeral as a legal test or
presumption.
Even less helpful to Quinn is his citation of Campbell v.
Holt (1885) 115 U.S. 620, 628 [“We certainly do not understand
that a right to defeat a just debt by the statute of limitations is a
14
vested right, so as to be beyond legislative power in a proper
case.”].
Quinn claims he gained vested rights as an employee at the
time he worked for LPL, particularly the right to employer
reimbursement of his business expenses. This claim begs the
question: was Quinn an employee or an independent contractor?
No legal test—Borello or ABC or some other—has determined
Quinn’s status. The trial court never made this determination.
Quinn’s briefs do not ask us to undertake this analysis, and we
do not. Whether Quinn had rights as an employee depends on
whether he was an employee, and that question remains open.
Other cases Quinn cites do not engage constitutional law at
all. Cortez v. Purolator (2000) 23 Cal.4th 163, 173–178 (Cortez)
held that unlawfully withheld wages may be recovered as
restitution in cases arising under California’s unfair competition
statutes. Quinn’s case does not involve these statutes. Cortez, in
passing, did cite Loehr v. Ventura County Community College
District (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 1071, 1080 (Loehr) and in a
parenthetical description of that case quoted a sentence from it
describing earned wages as “vested” rights. (Cortez, supra, 23
Cal.4th. at p. 178.) But the word “vested” assumes different
meanings in different contexts. (Bouquet, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p.
591 fn. 7.) Neither Cortez nor Loehr dealt with constitutional
law.
Given this absence of binding constitutional authority, we
do not extend constitutional doctrine to cover Quinn’s case.
Two reasons counsel special caution.
First, Quinn gives us no constitutional logic supporting his
proposal to invade legislative authority. Why should Quinn be
able to freeze a shifting legal landscape at a moment he selects
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for personal tactical advantage? Generally speaking, the
doctrine of “vested rights” protects certain “settled” expectations.
(Tribe, American Constitutional Law (1978) pp. 456–457 & fn.
10.) But objectively, Quinn’s fleeting expectations could not have
counted as “settled” during this interval of rapid legal
development. (Cf. California Trucking Assn. v. Su (9th Cir. 2018)
903 F.3d 953, 959 fn. 4 [“Dynamex did not purport to replace the
Borello standard in every instance where a worker must be
classified as either an independent contractor or an employee for
purposes of enforcing California’s labor protections.”].)
Second, unlike the situation with equal protection law,
there may be a large divergence between state and federal
substantive due process doctrines. (Compare Buol, supra, 39
Cal.3d at pp. 758–760 [no mention of rational basis test] with
2 Rotunda and Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law-
Substance and Procedure, (2022) § 15.9(a)(iv) [“The Supreme
Court [of the United States], in a series of cases that spanned
two-thirds of the twentieth century, established the principle
that retroactive legislation will violate due process only if the
legislation does not have a rational relationship to a legitimate
government interest.” Italics added.]; cf. Note, The Variable
Quality of a Vested Right (1925) 34 Yale L.J. 303, 309 [“But
whatever theory be adopted, the difficulty that causes such a
volume of disagreement . . . is the chameleon character of the
term ‘property right’ or ‘vested right’: the fact that it is not an
absolute standard, but a variant which each man, layman,
legislator, and judge, determines individually out of his own
background.”].)
The parties do not identify a justification for this apparent
doctrinal incongruity. We are not aware of a stated rationale for
16
the doctrinal divergence, if indeed there is one today.
It is a grave thing for unelected judges to strike down the
work of elected representatives. Earlier we quoted Holmes’s
statement about the right of a majority to embody its opinions in
law. Where no binding authority compels us, this
countermajoritarian difficulty restrains us.
These reasons lead us respectfully to decline to follow a
federal opinion on which Quinn relies. (See Hall v. Cultural Care
USA (N.D.Cal. July 22, 2022, 3:21-CV-00926-WHO) 2022 WL
2905353, at *4–*5, modified on reconsideration (Aug. 31, 2022),
2022 WL 3974258 (Hall).) The Hall decision cited Buol, Cortez,
and Loehr as authority for declaring section 2785 a violation of
due process. (Id. at p. *4.) We have explained how these cases do
not support the result Quinn seeks.
DISPOSITION
We affirm the summary adjudication and resulting
stipulated judgment. We award costs to LPL Financial LLC.
WILEY, J.
We concur:
GRIMES, Acting P. J.
VIRAMONTES, J.
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