C.S. v. Gentry CA4/1 ( 2023 )

Filed 5/16/23 C.S. v. Gentry CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
C.S., a Minor, etc. D079741
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2019-
00005115-CU-PO-CTL)
KAREN GENTRY,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Kenneth J. Medel, Judge. Affirmed.
Kirby & Kirby, Michael L. Kirby, Jason M. Kirby, and Heather W.
Schallhorn for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Bonnie R. Moss & Associates; Karen D. Wood & Associates, and
Elizabeth MacKinnon for Defendant and Respondent.
I
INTRODUCTION
This negligence lawsuit arises out of an incident in which a seven-year-
old minor, appellant C.S., was bitten and seriously injured by a pet dog on a
public beach. C.S., acting by and through his guardian ad litem, sued the
owner of the dog as well as respondent Karen Gentry, who accompanied the
dog owner and her pet dog to the beach where the incident occurred. The
trial court granted Gentry’s motion for summary judgment, finding she owed
no legal duty of care to C.S. We agree with the trial court. Therefore, we
affirm the judgment in favor of Gentry.
II
BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
In May 2018, Nada Hamouda, an adult, adopted a two- or three-year-
old dog named Gunnie from an animal shelter in Michigan where she lived.
Gunnie was a type of a pit bull called American Bully. About two or three
months after the adoption, Hamouda travelled with Gunnie to San Diego so
she could enroll in a medical treatment program in the area.
At the time, Gentry was dating Hamouda’s father and the two of them
lived together in Gentry’s home in Poway. After Hamouda came to San
Diego, she and Gunnie stayed with her father and Gentry in Gentry’s home.
During their stay, Hamouda walked, fed, and cared for Gunnie. Gentry never
walked Gunnie, fed him, or took him to the veterinarian.
The dog bite forming the basis of this action occurred five weeks after
Hamouda and Gunnie came to San Diego. That day, Hamouda, Hamouda’s
father, Gentry, and a friend drove with Gunnie to a public beach in
Hamouda’s father’s car. While they were at the beach, Gunnie was kept on a
leash, though he was not muzzled. Gunnie sat on or near the group’s beach
blanket and laid underneath a beach umbrella. Hamouda also walked
Gunnie and played with him near the water.
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Another group of beachgoers sat 20 or 30 feet away from them. The
group included seven-year-old C.S., C.S.’s father, C.S.’s sibling, and two other
adults. C.S. played with toys and went back and forth between the water and
the group’s beach blanket. According to Hamouda and Gentry, C.S. also
approached Gunnie several times over the course of the afternoon, which
scared Gunnie and caused him to shake and hide from the child. Hamouda
and Gentry claimed they repeatedly warned C.S. to stay away to avoid
scaring Gunnie, but C.S. kept coming close to them.
At some point in the afternoon, Gentry and Hamouda’s father went on
a walk while Hamouda stayed behind with Gunnie. About one or two hours
later, while Gentry and Hamouda’s father were still on their beach walk,
Gunnie bit C.S. on his arm. C.S. received prompt medical attention, but the
bite wound on his arm was serious and required more than a dozen stitches.
Hamouda’s father drove his companions and Gunnie back to Gentry’s
home where Gunnie was placed on bite quarantine for 10 days. Soon after,
the San Diego Humane Society issued a letter of intent to declare Gunnie a
dangerous dog within the meaning of San Diego County Code section 62.602.
A dangerous dog declaration requires the owner to euthanize the dog or
comply with various mandates including microchipping the dog, displaying
warning signs at the owner’s residence, muzzling the dog while in public, and
carrying tens of thousands of dollars in home liability insurance. Hamouda
elected to have Gunnie euthanized. Gunnie was put down and Hamouda left
Gentry’s home a few days later.
B. Procedural Background
C.S., by and through his guardian ad litem, filed a complaint against
Hamouda and Gentry for ordinary negligence and strict liability (under the
common law and Civil Code section 3342). The complaint requested
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compensatory damages according to proof. Gentry filed an answer generally
denying the allegations of the complaint.
After a year of discovery and other pretrial proceedings, Gentry moved
for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication. She
argued she was entitled to dismissal of the ordinary negligence cause of
action because she owed no legal duty of care to C.S. In particular, she
asserted she did not owe C.S. a duty because she did not own or care for
Gunnie, the dog bite occurred at a public beach away from her residence, she
was not physically present when the dog bite occurred, and she had no prior
knowledge that Gunnie had aggressive or violent tendencies. Similarly, she
argued she was not strictly liable for the dog bite because she was not
Gunnie’s owner, keeper, or custodian.
C.S. filed an opposition arguing Gentry owed him a legal duty of care
because every person, in the exercise of his or her activities, has a duty to use
reasonable care for the safety of others. He asserted the legal duty of care
was not subject to an exception because the kind of harm he suffered was
foreseeable and Gentry could have prevented the injury by removing Gunnie
from the beach or warning C.S.’s adult companions about the threat Gunnie
posed. Finally, C.S. argued Gentry was strictly liable because she possessed
and/or controlled Gunnie by permitting Hamouda and Gunnie to stay in her
home.
After a hearing, the trial court granted Gentry’s motion for summary
judgment. With respect to the negligence cause of action, the court reasoned
Gentry owed no legal duty of care to C.S. because the undisputed material
facts showed Gentry did not own Gunnie, she was unaware Gunnie had
violent or dangerous propensities, the dog bite happened on a public beach
away from her residence, and she was not physically present when the dog
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bite occurred. Similarly, the court found C.S. could not prevail on his strict
liability cause of action because Gentry did not own or care for Gunnie and
she had no knowledge he had violent or dangerous tendencies.
C.S. appeals the ensuing judgment in favor of Gentry and challenges
the summary judgment ruling as to the negligence cause of action, but not
the strict liability cause of action.1
III
DISCUSSION
The question presented in this case is whether a person who
accompanies an adult owner of a pet dog and his or her pet dog to a public
space (Gentry) owes a legal duty of care to members of the public (C.S.) to
take reasonable measures to ensure the dog does not bite or otherwise harm
them. The trial court found no such duty exists, and we agree.
A. Summary Judgment Standards
“[G]enerally, from commencement to conclusion, the party moving for
summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable
issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
... There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would
allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party
opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.”
1 In their appellate briefs, both parties make unsupported statements
about the procedural posture of C.S.’s lawsuit against codefendant Hamouda.
“ ‘Any statement in a brief concerning matters in the appellate record—
whether factual or procedural and no matter where in the brief the reference
to the record occurs—must be supported by a citation to the record.’ [Citation.]
We have the discretion to disregard contentions unsupported by proper page
cites to the record.” (Professional Collection Consultants v. Lauron (2017)
8 Cal.App.5th 958, 970; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).) We
exercise our discretion to disregard the parties’ unsubstantiated statements
concerning the status of C.S.’s lawsuit against Hamouda.
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(Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 (Aguilar).) A
defendant who moves for summary judgment “bears the burden of persuasion
that ‘one or more elements of’ the ‘cause of action’ in question ‘cannot be
established,’ or that ‘there is a complete defense’ thereto.” (Ibid.)
“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of
production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable
issue of material fact ….” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.) Where the
plaintiff would bear the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence at
trial, a defendant moving for summary judgment “must present evidence that
would require a reasonable trier of fact not to find any underlying material
fact more likely than not—otherwise, he [the defendant] would not be entitled
to judgment as a matter of law, but would have to present his evidence to a
trier of fact.” (Id. at p. 851.) If the moving party satisfies the initial burden
of production, “he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a
burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the
existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Id. at p. 850.)
“ ‘Because this case comes before us after the trial court granted a
motion for summary judgment, we take the facts from the record that was
before the trial court when it ruled on that motion. [Citation.] “ ‘We review
the trial court’s decision de novo, considering all the evidence set forth in the
moving and opposing papers except that to which objections were made and
sustained.’ ” [Citation.] We liberally construe the evidence in support of the
party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the
evidence in favor of that party.’ ” (Conroy v. Regents of University of Cal.
(2009) 45 Cal.4th 1244, 1249–1250.)
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B. Gentry Owed No Legal Duty of Care to C.S.
“To establish a cause of action for negligence, the plaintiff must show
that the ‘defendant had a duty to use due care, that he breached that duty,
and that the breach was the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.’
[Citation.] Recovery for negligence depends as a threshold matter on the
existence of a legal duty of care. [Citation.] [¶] Duty is not universal; not
every defendant owes every plaintiff a duty of care. A duty exists only if
‘ “the plaintiff’s interests are entitled to legal protection against the
defendant’s conduct.” ’ ” (Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204,
213 (Brown); see also Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 456,
472 (Parsons) [the concept of legal duty is “ ‘ “ ‘only an expression of the sum
total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the
particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.’ ” ’ ”].) “ ‘A duty of care may arise
through statute’ or by operation of the common law.” (Sheen v. Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 905, 920.) “Whether a duty exists is a question
of law to be resolved by the court.” (Brown, at p. 213.)
C.S. asserts Gentry owed him a legal duty of care under Civil Code
section 1714,2 which codifies “the default rule that each person has a duty ‘to
exercise, in his or her activities, reasonable care for the safety of others.’ ”
(Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 214.) Although Civil Code section 1714
pronounces a broad rule, “it has limits. … [T]he law imposes a general duty
of care on a defendant only when it is the defendant who has ‘ “created the
risk” ’ of harm to the plaintiff, including when ‘ “the defendant is responsible
2 Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a), provides in relevant part:
“Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but
also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or
skill in the management of his or her property or person, except so far as the
latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon
himself or herself.”
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for making the plaintiff’s position worse.” ’ … The law does not impose the
same duty on a defendant who did not contribute to the risk that the plaintiff
would suffer the harm alleged. Generally, the ‘person who has not created a
peril is not liable in tort merely for failure to take affirmative action to assist
or protect another’ from that peril.” (Brown, at p. 214.)
In addition, C.S. argues Gentry was Gunnie’s “keeper” because she
allowed Hamouda to stay in her home with Gunnie prior to the dog bite
incident. According to C.S., the common law imposes a duty on a “keeper” of
a domestic animal to anticipate the threat of harm posed by the animal and
exercise ordinary care to prevent such harm. (See Drake v. Dean (1993) 15
Cal.App.4th 915, 924–925; Buffington v. Nicholson (1947) 78 Cal.App.2d 37,
42 (Buffington) [“ ‘The word “keeper” is equivalent to “the person who
harbors.” Harboring means protecting. So one who treats a dog as living at
his house, and undertakes to control his actions is the owner or keeper within
the meaning of the law; but the casual presence of an animal on his premises,
if not so treated, does not constitute him such owner or keeper.’ ”], italics
omitted.)
Notwithstanding Civil Code section 1714, and the common law
principles on which C.S. relies, Gentry argues the trial court correctly ruled
she owed no legal duty of care to C.S. In support of this argument, Gentry
invokes the multifactor test promulgated in Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69
Cal.2d 108 (Rowland). The Rowland test is not “a freestanding means of
establishing duty, but instead … a means for deciding whether to limit a duty
derived from other sources.” (Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 217.) Stated
differently, it is “a guide for determining whether to recognize an ‘exception’
to the general duty of care under [Civil Code] section 1714,” or an exception
to a duty derived from some other source. (Id. at p. 218; see Golick v. State of
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Cal. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 1127, 1151 [“the ‘purpose of the Rowland factors
is to determine whether the relevant circumstances warrant limiting a duty
already established’ ”].)
The Rowland factors include “the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff,
the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the
connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the
moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing
future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to
the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for
breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk
involved.” (Rowland, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 113.)
The first three Rowland “factors—foreseeability, the certainty of the
injury, and the closeness of the connection between the plaintiff and the
defendant—address the foreseeability of the relevant injury. [Citation.] The
remaining four—moral blame, the policy of preventing future harm, the
burden on the defendant and the general public, and the availability of
insurance—focus on the public policy justifications for or against carving out
an exception” to the duty of care for a category of cases. (T.H. v. Novartis
Pharmaceuticals Corp. (2017) 4 Cal.5th 145, 165.) “Because a judicial
decision on the issue of duty entails line-drawing based on policy
considerations, ‘the Rowland factors are evaluated at a relatively broad level
of factual generality.’ ” (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132,
1143.) In evaluating the Rowland factors, our role is not to determine
“ ‘whether they support an exception to the general duty of reasonable care
on the facts of the particular case before us, but whether carving out an
entire category of cases from that general duty rule is justified by clear
considerations of policy.’ ” (Id. at pp. 1143–1144.)
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We agree with Gentry that the Rowland factors counsel against
recognition of a legal duty of care under the circumstances presented. Of all
the Rowland factors, “whether the injury was foreseeable is the most
important in determining whether an exception should exist to the duty to
protect.” (Colonial Van & Storage, Inc. v. Superior Court (2022) 76
Cal.App.5th 487, 502.) In assessing foreseeability, “[o]ur task ‘ “is not to
decide whether a particular plaintiff’s injury was reasonably foreseeable in
light of a particular defendant’s conduct, but rather to evaluate more
generally whether the category of negligent conduct at issue is sufficiently
likely to result in the kind of harm experienced that liability may
appropriately be imposed.” ’ [Citations.] We do, however, evaluate the kind
of third party conduct involved in light of all the surrounding circumstances
as probative in assessing generally whether the category of [Gentry’s] alleged
negligent conduct is sufficiently likely to result in the kind of harm plaintiff[]
experienced. ‘What is “sufficiently likely” means what is “ ‘likely enough in
the setting of modern life that a reasonably thoughtful [person] would take
account of it in guiding practical conduct.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.)
The evidence presented to the trial court indisputably showed that
Gentry was not Gunnie’s owner—a fact all parties appear to accept on appeal.
Gentry also presented uncontroverted evidence that she had no prior
knowledge Gunnie had violent or aggressive tendencies,3 and no evidence
was submitted establishing that Gunnie had previously bitten, attacked, or
otherwise injured any person or any other animal. Thus, C.S. effectively
seeks to hold Gentry liable in negligence for the mere act of accompanying an
3 For instance, Gentry submitted a declaration in which she averred she
“did not feel or believe Gunnie to be a dangerous dog before the Subject
Incident,” and she “had no reason to believe that Gunnie should be
considered a dangerous dog before the Subject Incident.”
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adult dog owner and her pet dog—a dog that was kept on its leash and had no
known aggressive or violent tendencies—to a public space.
We do not believe the kind of harm that occurred here was foreseeable
as a result of such conduct. In short, unless one actually knows a pet dog has
aggressive or violent tendencies, it is not sufficiently likely one’s mere act of
accompanying the owner of the pet dog and his or her dog to a public space
will result in a member of the public being bitten or otherwise harmed by the
dog.4 (See Martinez v. Bank of America (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 883, 895 [“In
the absence of prior similar incidents—i.e., previous attacks by vicious dogs
at the … property—the requisite degree of foreseeability rarely, if ever, can
be proven”]; accord Ucello v. Laudenslayer (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 504, 514 [a
landlord owes a duty of care to a tenant’s invitees to prevent injury from a
dangerous dog on the leased premises only when “he kn[ows] of the dog and
its dangerous propensities”]; Buffington, supra, 78 Cal.App.2d at p. 42 [“a
keeper in contrast to an owner, is not an insurer of the good behavior of a
dog, but must have scienter or knowledge of the vicious propensities of the
animal before liability for injuries inflicted by such animal shall attach to
4 C.S. does not explicitly argue that Gunnie’s breed—a type of pit bull-
like breed called American Bully—made it foreseeable that a member of the
public would suffer a dog bite or other injury. However, in his opening brief,
he broadly states that “[p]it bulls are commonly known to bite and be
vicious.” Insofar as C.S. impliedly suggests we can infer foreseeability of
harm based on Gunnie’s breed alone, we reject that argument. (Yuzon v.
Collins (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 149, 168 [“it would be improper to take
judicial notice that all adult male pit bulls are dangerous”]; Chee v. Amanda
Goldt Property Management (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1360, 1371–1372
[“evidence that the breed of dog has certain characteristics,[] by itself, is
insufficient to support an inference that [defendant] had actual knowledge
that his tenant’s dog had any dangerous propensities”].)
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him”].) The lack of foreseeable harm here weighs strongly in favor of
recognizing an exception to the duty of care.5
The second Rowland factor requires us to assess the degree of certainty
C.S. suffered injury. (Rowland, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 113.) Here, it is
undisputed C.S. suffered a serious bite wound requiring medical attention.
This factor weighs against finding an exception to the legal duty of care.
Under the third Rowland factor, we must consider “the closeness of the
connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered.”
(Rowland, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 113.) The third factor is “ ‘strongly related
to the question of foreseeability itself’ [citation], [and it] ‘also accounts for
third party or other intervening conduct.’ ” (Sakai v. Massco Investments,
LLC (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1185.) Here, there was little or no causal
link between Gentry’s asserted negligence and the harm suffered by C.S. No
evidence was introduced suggesting Gentry requested Gunnie’s presence at
the beach on the day in question, or that she even engaged in any affirmative
acts to bring him to the beach. Further, the undisputed evidence showed that
Gunnie was leashed at the beach and left in the care of his owner (Hamouda),
5 C.S. asserts the harm he suffered was foreseeable because Gentry
stated in a deposition that her children were bitten by dogs when they were
young and she was subjectively aware a child could be bitten by a dog at a
beach. This argument misapprehends the nature of our legal duty inquiry.
As the Supreme Court has explained, “ ‘a court’s task—in determining
“duty”—is not to decide whether a particular plaintiff’s injury was reasonably
foreseeable in light of a particular defendant’s conduct, but rather to evaluate
more generally whether the category of negligent conduct at issue is
sufficiently likely to result in the kind of harm experienced that liability may
appropriately be imposed ....’ (Italics omitted.) In other words, there are
numerous circumstances … in which a given injury may be ‘foreseeable’ in
the fact-specific sense in which we allow juries to consider that question, but
contrary to plaintiff’s understanding the ‘foreseeability’ examination called
for under a duty analysis … is a very different and normative inquiry.”
(Parsons, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 476.)
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including when Gentry left to walk the beach. Gentry’s mere accompaniment
of Hamouda and her pet dog to the public beach was not closely related to the
injuries C.S. suffered while Gentry was away on her beach walk.
“Even if the foreseeability factors of Rowland … weigh in favor of
recognizing a duty of care, the courts ‘must also consider whether public
policy requires a different result.’ [Citations.] ‘ “A duty of care will not be
held to exist even as to foreseeable injuries ... where the social utility of the
activity concerned is so great, and avoidance of the injuries so burdensome to
society, as to outweigh the compensatory and cost-internalization values of
negligence liability.” ’ ” (Jabo v. YMCA of San Diego County (2018) 27
Cal.App.5th 853, 885; see also Parsons, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 476 [“ ‘social
policy must at some point intervene to delimit liability’ even for foreseeable
injury [citation], and ‘policy considerations may dictate a cause of action
should not be sanctioned no matter how foreseeable the risk’ ”].) Thus, we
turn now to the four public policy factors articulated in Rowland.
Beginning with the first public policy factor, we ascribe no moral blame
to Gentry’s conduct. Gentry travelled to a public beach with a group of adults
including a dog owner and her pet dog, which was at all times leashed, left in
the care of its owner, and—prior to the day in question—had exhibited no
aggressive or violent tendencies of which Gentry was aware. There is
nothing morally blameworthy or problematic about Gentry’s behavior. Thus,
this factor weighs in favor of recognizing an exception to the duty of care.
Turning to the next public policy factor, we are dubious that imposing
liability on a person like Gentry would prevent future harm. A dog owner
may choose to take his or her pet dog to a public space, irrespective of
whether the pet owner is accompanied by a companion like Gentry. Indeed,
someone like Gentry simply cannot compel a dog owner to refrain from
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bringing his or her pet dog into a public space. A person like Gentry—who
does not own or care for the pet dog at issue—also has no control over which
precautionary measures the pet owner might take, if any, should the owner
decide to take his or her pet dog to a public space. Nor would a person like
Gentry be able to control the public space itself in a manner that might
otherwise minimize or eliminate the risk of harm posed by the pet dog.
Because a defendant in Gentry’s shoes has little or no control over whether a
pet owner takes his or her pet dog to a public space, and under what
conditions he or she does so, the imposition of liability on a defendant like
Gentry would not serve the interests of preventing future harm. (See Cody F.
v. Falletti (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1232, 1244 [the goal of preventing future
harm would not be “served by imposing liability on neighbors who ha[d] … no
control over the [dog owner’s] actions or the property from which the dogs
escaped”]; Donchin v. Guerrero (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1832, 1846 [“If [a] dog
is taken on a leash by its owner, off the [defendant’s] premises, prevention of
an attack by the dog may be beyond the [defendant’s] control.”].)
The imposition of negligence liability in cases like the present one
would also impose unjustified burdens on persons like Gentry. It would
saddle them with the obligation to refrain from venturing into the public with
pet owners and their pet dogs, even if those pets have never shown aggressive
or violent tendencies. Further, to the extent C.S. argues that people like
Gentry could issue warnings to members of the public about the dangers
posed by their companions’ pet dogs, the burden is no less onerous. It is
impractical, and intolerable, to expect a non-pet owner like Gentry to provide
a warning to every member of the public in his or her vicinity that someone
else’s pet dog—in this case, Gunnie—poses a threat of harm, despite the fact
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the pet in question has never shown signs of violence or aggression before.
This factor strongly indicates that no legal duty of care exists.
The final public policy factor requires that we consider the prevalence
of insurance for the risk involved. (Rowland, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 113.) The
parties address this factor only briefly and neither party supports its analysis
with any reference to the appellate record. It will suffice for us to say we are
unaware of any type of insurance that would provide a policyholder with
coverage when a third party’s pet dog causes physical injuries to another
third party on property neither owned nor controlled by the policyholder.
In sum, the Rowland factors point overwhelmingly against recognition
of a legal duty of care in this case. We are of course sympathetic to young
C.S., who indisputably suffered serious physical injuries as a result of his
run-in with Gunnie. And we do not doubt that it was an emotionally painful
and terrifying experience for all involved, especially C.S. and his family
members. But the proper recourse is not to impose a legal duty of care on
Gentry, who did nothing more than accompany an adult companion and her
pet dog to the beach. Because Gentry did not owe a legal duty of care to C.S.,
the trial court properly dismissed the negligence cause of action against her.
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IV
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Gentry is entitled to her appellate costs.
McCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
HUFFMAN, J.
BUCHANAN, J.
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