People v. Guzman CA2/1 ( 2023 )

Filed 5/23/23 P. v. Guzman CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B323309
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA120225)
v.
GARDENIA GUZMAN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Juan Carlos Dominguez, Judge. Affirmed.
Kevin D. Sheehy, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No Appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________
INTRODUCTION
After initially being charged with murder, defendant
Gardenia Guzman pleaded no contest to voluntary manslaughter
pursuant to a plea agreement. After she was sentenced in accord
with her plea agreement, she filed a petition for resentencing
under Penal Code1 section 1172.6 (former section 1170.95 2 ). The
trial court denied her petition and she now appeals that decision.
Her appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v.
Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo), identifying no
issues on appeal and requesting that we independently review
the record for possible error.
Guzman filed a supplemental brief raising four arguments,
none of which addresses the merits of her resentencing petition.
Instead, her arguments all relate to the length of the sentence
imposed pursuant to her plea agreement. The issues raised by
Guzman are outside the scope of a section 1172.6 resentencing
proceeding, and fail to demonstrate any error in the court’s denial
of her petition. Accordingly, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
On January 25, 2019, Guzman stabbed her father to death
after the two had an argument in their apartment.
On December 2, 2019, the People charged Guzman with
murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), alleging that she personally used a
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 The Legislature renumbered the statute as section
1172.6, with no change in text, effective June 30, 2022 (Stats.
2022, ch. 58, § 10). For ease of reference, we use the current
citation at section 1172.6 throughout this opinion.
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knife in the crime (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). Guzman was also
charged with having suffered a prior conviction which was a
“serious and/or violent felony” within the meaning of sections
667, subdivision (d) and 1170.12, subdivision (b) and a “serious
felony” within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a)(1).
On September 30, 2020, as part of a plea deal, the People
moved to amend the information to add a voluntary
manslaughter count (§ 192, subd. (a)). The prosecutor informed
the court that the People were moving to amend due to issues of
proof related to the credibility of the only eyewitness, Guzman’s
mother. The trial court granted the amendment and dismissed
the murder charge. Guzman agreed to waive her trial rights and
pleaded no contest to the voluntary manslaughter charge; she
also admitted the prior conviction for a “serious or violent” felony
(§§ 667, subd. (d) and 1170.12, subd. (b)) and a “serious felony”
(§ 667, subd. (a)(1)). The court found a factual basis for the plea
and accepted both the plea and Guzman’s waivers on the record,
finding them to have been knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily made.
That same day, in accordance with the plea, the court
imposed a prison sentence of 17 years, based on the middle term
of six years for voluntary manslaughter (§§ 192, subd. (a), 193,
subd. (a)), doubled to 12 years due to the prior “serious or violent”
felony conviction (§§ 667, subd. (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)), plus
an additional five years due to the prior “serious felony”
conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)). Guzman was given credit for time
served.
On May 26, 2022, Guzman filed a resentencing petition
under section 1172.6. Guzman did not request the appointment
of counsel.
3
On June 22, 2022, the trial court summarily denied the
petition, stating in a memorandum of decision that Guzman was
“not entitled to relief as a matter of law, for the following reason:
[¶] The [c]ourt file reflects that [Guzman] was charged and
prosecuted on a theory of [m]alice [m]urder as the sole
perpetrator and actual killer. Through plea negotiations, she
plead[ed] ‘No Contest’ to [v]oluntary [m]anslaughter.”
Guzman filed a timely notice of appeal on August 5, 2022.
DISCUSSION
We appointed counsel to represent Guzman in this appeal.
Guzman’s attorney filed a brief raising no issues and requesting
that we exercise our discretion to independently review the
record for error pursuant to Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th 216. In
Delgadillo, our Supreme Court established procedures for cases
in which counsel determines that an appeal from an order
denying postconviction relief lacks merit. In such cases,
“(1) counsel should file a brief informing the court of that
determination, including a concise recitation of the facts bearing
on the denial of the petition; and (2) the court should send, with a
copy of counsel’s brief, notice to the defendant, informing the
defendant of the right to file a supplemental letter or brief and
that if no letter or brief is filed within 30 days, the court may
dismiss the matter.” (Id. at pp. 231-232.) If the defendant does
not file a supplemental brief, we “may dismiss the appeal as
abandoned.” (Id. at p. 232.) In that instance, we do “not need to
write an opinion but should notify the defendant when [we]
dismiss[ ] the matter.” (Ibid.) Because a defendant who has been
denied postconviction relief has no constitutional right to an
appeal, we are not required to conduct an independent review of
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the record before dismissing the appeal, but we may conduct such
a review at our discretion. (Id. at pp. 227-228, 232.)
If the defendant does file a supplemental brief or letter, we
are “required to evaluate the specific arguments presented in
that brief and to issue a written opinion. The filing of a
supplemental brief or letter does not compel an independent
review of the entire record to identify unraised issues.”
(Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232.)
On March 22, 2023, we sent Guzman a letter notifying her
of the no-merits brief and informing her that she had 30 days to
file a supplemental brief.3 On April 13, 2023, we received a
supplemental letter brief from Guzman.
Section 1172.6 was enacted by the Legislature in 2018 as
part of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.). The overall
purpose of the legislation was “to amend the felony murder rule
and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates
to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a
person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to
kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who
acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018,
ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) To accomplish this, the bill added section
189, subdivision (e) “to amend the felony-murder rule,” and added
section 188, subdivision (a)(3) “to amend the natural and
probable consequences doctrine.” (People v. Gentile (2020) 10
Cal.5th 830, 842-843.)
3In a declaration submitted with the brief he filed,
Guzman’s counsel averred that on March 21, 2023, he sent
Guzman a copy of the brief along with a copy of the entire record
on appeal.
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As relevant here, section 1172.6 provides a mechanism for
a defendant to seek resentencing where they plead guilty to
manslaughter after being charged with murder under a theory
that is no longer tenable after the amendments to sections 188
and 189 and they could not be convicted of murder under the
present law. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) Guzman, however, pleaded
guilty to manslaughter in a situation where she was the actual
killer; she was not convicted under any theory in which malice
was imputed to her. Section 1172.6 thus has no application to
her case, and the trial court did not err in summarily denying her
resentencing petition.
Guzman raises four arguments in her supplemental brief,
but none relate to the denial of her petition for resentencing.
Instead, they all relate to alleged improprieties in her original
sentencing. Guzman first argues that the court failed to consider
several factors listed in Senate Bill No. 81 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.)
when sentencing her; Senate Bill No. 81 concerns a trial court’s
authority to dismiss enhancements. (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1; see
§ 1385, subd. (c) [amended by Senate Bill No. 81].) Guzman next
contends the court should not have applied the enhancements to
her sentence. In her third argument, she complains that her
sentence was “[e]xcessive” and violated “double jeopardy,” and
she contends that her counsel rendered ineffective assistance.
Guzman’s fourth argument is premised on section 1025, which
concerns allegations that a defendant has suffered a prior
conviction.
Guzman did not appeal her conviction or sentence. Even if
she had, the issues she could have raised in such an appeal were
limited given that she pleaded guilty. Without a certificate of
probable cause, which Guzman has never obtained, a defendant
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who appeals following a no contest plea pursuant to a plea
agreement may only challenge the denial of a motion to suppress
evidence (which did not occur in this case) or raise grounds
arising after the entry of the plea that do not affect the validity of
the plea. (§ 1237.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b); People v.
Johnson (2009) 47 Cal.4th 668, 676-677 & fn. 3.) Notably, “a
certificate of probable cause is required if the challenge goes to an
aspect of the sentence to which the defendant agreed as an
integral part of a plea agreement.” (Johnson, supra, at p. 678;
see People v. Cuevas (2008) 44 Cal.4th 374, 382 [concluding the
defendant could not appeal his sentence without a certificate of
probable cause because by “challenging the very sentence he
negotiated as part of the plea bargain” he was, “in substance, . . .
attacking the validity of his plea”].) Here Guzman agreed to
plead no contest to voluntary manslaughter and be sentenced to
17 years, based on the midterm of six years for voluntary
manslaughter and two separate enhancements for her prior
felony conviction. Thus, Guzman cannot challenge the length of
her sentence (including the sentencing enhancements that make
up part of that sentence) without a certificate of probable cause.4
Nor are any of Guzman’s arguments cognizable in a
proceeding for postconviction relief under section 1172.6. In her
supplemental brief, Guzman does not argue she was charged
with murder under a theory that is now invalid as a result of the
amendments to sections 188 and 189, nor does she dispute the
4 We decline to address Guzman’s claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel regarding her underlying conviction and
sentence. Such claims of ineffective assistance are “more
appropriately decided in a habeas corpus proceeding.” (People v.
Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266-267.)
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trial court’s finding that she was ineligible for relief under section
1172.6 because she “was charged and prosecuted on a theory of
[m]alice [m]urder as the sole perpetrator and actual killer.” (See
People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 710 [“Senate Bill [No.]
1437 relief is unavailable if the defendant was . . . the actual
killer”].) Thus, Guzman’s challenge to the trial court’s order
necessarily fails. Finally, we decline counsel’s request that we
independently review the record, as nothing before us suggests
such an exercise is necessary. (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 232.)
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying Guzman’s petition for
resentencing is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
WEINGART, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
BENDIX, J.
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