People v. Gautier CA2/6 ( 2023 )


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  • Filed 6/20/23 P. v. Gautier CA2/6
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
    not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
    has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION SIX
    THE PEOPLE,                                                  2d Crim. No. B318911
    (Super. Ct. No. 2021001035)
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                 (Ventura County)
    v.
    TIM RAY GAUTIER,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    Tim Ray Gautier appeals from the judgment entered after a
    jury had convicted him of first degree murder. (Pen. Code, §§
    187, subd. (a), 189, subd. (a).)1 The victim was his wife, Gina
    Gautier (wife). The jury found true an allegation that he had
    personally discharged a firearm causing death. (§ 12022.53,
    subd. (d).) For the murder, appellant was sentenced to prison for
    25 years to life. For the firearm enhancement, he was sentenced
    to a consecutive term of 25 years to life.
    1   All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
    Appellant contends the trial court erroneously failed to
    instruct the jury sua sponte on the lesser included offense of
    voluntary manslaughter based on provocation and heat of
    passion. In addition, he claims the trial court abused its
    discretion in denying his request to strike the firearm
    enhancement. We affirm.
    Appellant’s Trial Testimony
    In “determin[ing] whether the trial court had a duty to
    instruct on a lesser included offense,” we must “consider
    the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant.
    [Citation.] We recount the facts below with this standard in
    mind.” (People v. Miranda (2021) 
    62 Cal.App.5th 162
    , 168.) We
    rely on appellant’s trial testimony.
    Appellant testified that wife had severe mental problems.
    She “cried every day for two weeks.” She became paranoid.
    “[S]he began to think that people were following us.” “In late
    2020, [wife] barely spoke. Whenever she spoke to me, it would be
    about things that weren’t reality based.” “She was consumed
    with fear.” “She thought her [employer] and the Thousand Oaks
    Sheriff’s Department had placed listening devices in the vents in
    our house.” Because of wife’s mental problems, “the stress level
    [at home] was super high. It was a very toxic environment.”
    In the morning on January 11, 2021, appellant and wife got
    into an argument. Appellant “grab[bed wife] by the lapel[s of her
    bathrobe and said] . . . ‘Knock it off. What are you doing? Why
    are you playing games with me?’ And she went into a rage.”
    Wife “stabbed [appellant] with a pen.” “We’re fighting. She’s
    going crazy.” “We struck each other.”
    Appellant said, “‘Stop,’” and walked away. “And [wife]
    began to follow me. Like stalking me.” “Like following me
    2
    around the apartment.” Wife looked in the mirror and said,
    “‘Look what you did to my face.’”
    Appellant “noticed that [his] arm’s bleeding.” He said, “‘I’m
    going to take a photo of [the blood], and I'm calling the police.’”
    Appellant walked into the kitchen to take the photograph. Wife
    “whacked” him on the head with a frying pan.
    Appellant testified: “I got hit. I don’t know what it was. I
    didn’t know what happened. All I know is it went black. I didn’t
    know where I was. Honestly, I didn’t even know if I was dead or
    alive.” “The next thing I remember happening is I’m stumbling
    out in the living room . . . . I don’t know how I got there.”
    Appellant walked into the bathroom, looked in the mirror,
    and saw “a knot on my head, above my right eye.” He said to
    wife: “‘Look what you did to my head’ . . . Im going to shoot you.’”
    Appellant continued: “I was fearing for my life. I thought
    she was going to kill me. So I ran . . . back to [the bedroom to] get
    the gun.” The firearm – a nine-millimeter semi-automatic
    handgun – was under the bed inside a safe. Appellant opened the
    safe and removed the gun.
    Wife was standing by the open front door. She was not
    holding the frying pan. Appellant “turn[ed] around to put the
    gun away. But as I was walking . . . , the Holy Spirit said, she
    may hit me in the back of the head. I was scared at that point.
    So I turned [around], and there she is with that pan.” Wife
    advanced toward appellant. She raised the pan upward as if she
    were going to strike him with it.
    “At this point,” appellant was “totally confused. The room
    is starting to spin. My head feels like it’s going to explode, like
    literally inflating. Like somebody's putting helium in it.”
    3
    Wife started “[b]acking away from me with the pan.”
    “[S]he’s walking back saying, ‘You’re going to shoot me. You’re
    going to shoot me.[’] And all I remember is yelling, screaming,
    head feeling like it’s going to explode, ringing in my ears.”
    Appellant “just started shooting at that point.” “I just
    started firing the gun because I don’t want to die.” “She already
    hit me with that pan once, blind sided me. I’m not dying here.”
    “After the shots rang out, I couldn’t believe I shot her. I was in
    shock.”
    On redirect examination, appellant was asked, “Are you
    shooting your wife because you think you are going to get
    assaulted with that pan again?” Appellant answered:
    “Absolutely. That’s the only reason I shot my wife.” (Italics
    added.) “I’m afraid I’m going to die.” Appellant was asked, “You
    didn’t shoot your wife because you were mad at her?” Appellant
    responded, “No. I shot my wife because I thought I was going to
    die.”
    Appellant’s 911 Call
    After the shooting, appellant called 911. He told the
    operator that he had just shot his wife: “She got shot, she hit me
    with a pan and . . . I shot her. She was coming at me.” “She
    came at me with a frying pan . . . .” “She’s fuck’n dead.” “I tried
    everything to help her. . . . [B]ut she was having a mental break
    down . . . .”
    Cause of Death and Other Injuries
    The cause of death was “multiple gunshot wounds.” Wife
    was shot twice. One of the bullets perforated her heart. Wife
    had sustained recent bruising to her face, eyelid, and lips.
    4
    Jury Instructions Given
    The jury was instructed on first and second degree murder
    (CALCRIM Nos. 520, 521), the effect of provocation on the degree
    of murder (CALCRIM No. 522), lawful (reasonable) self-defense
    (CALCRIM Nos. 505, 3471, 3472, 3474), and voluntary
    manslaughter based on imperfect (unreasonable) self-defense
    (CALCRIM No. 571).
    Jury Instruction Not Given: Voluntary
    Manslaughter Based on Heat of Passion
    The omitted instruction, CALCRIM No. 570, provides:
    A killing that would otherwise be murder is reduced to
    voluntary manslaughter if the defendant killed someone because
    of a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion.
    The defendant killed someone because of a sudden quarrel
    or in the heat of passion if:
    1. The defendant was provoked;
    2. As a result of the provocation, the defendant acted rashly
    and under the influence of intense emotion that obscured
    (his/her) reasoning or judgment;
    AND
    3. The provocation would have caused a person of average
    disposition to act rashly and without due deliberation, that is,
    from passion rather than from judgment.
    Heat of passion does not require anger, rage, or any specific
    emotion. It can be any violent or intense emotion that causes a
    person to act without due deliberation and reflection.
    In order for heat of passion to reduce a murder to voluntary
    manslaughter, the defendant must have acted under the direct
    and immediate influence of provocation as I have defined it.
    While no specific type of provocation is required, slight or remote
    provocation is not sufficient. Sufficient provocation may occur
    over a short or long period of time.
    It is not enough that the defendant simply was provoked.
    The defendant is not allowed to set up (his/her) own standard of
    5
    conduct. You must decide whether the defendant was provoked
    and whether the provocation was sufficient. In deciding whether
    the provocation was sufficient, consider whether a person of
    average disposition, in the same situation and knowing the same
    facts, would have reacted from passion rather than from
    judgment.
    The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable
    doubt that the defendant did not kill as the result of a sudden
    quarrel or in the heat of passion. If the People have not met this
    burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of murder.
    Duty to Instruct Sua Sponte on Lesser
    Included Offense and Standard of Review
    “[W]hen the evidence suggests the defendant may not be
    guilty of the charged offense, but only of some lesser included
    offense, the jury must be allowed to ‘consider the full range of
    possible verdicts—not limited by the strategy, ignorance, or
    mistakes of the parties,’ so as to ‘ensure that the verdict is no
    harsher or more lenient than the evidence merits.’
    [Citations.] . . . [R]egardless of the tactics or objections of the
    parties, or the relative strength of the evidence on alternate
    offenses or theories, [this] rule requires sua sponte instruction
    on any and all lesser included offenses, or theories thereof, which
    are supported by the evidence. In a murder case, this means that
    both heat of passion and unreasonable self-defense, as forms of
    voluntary manslaughter, must be presented to the jury if both
    have substantial evidentiary support.” (People v. Breverman
    (1998) 
    19 Cal.4th 142
    , 160.) “‘“Substantial evidence” in this
    context is “‘evidence from which a jury composed of reasonable
    [persons] could . . . conclude[ ]’” that the lesser offense, but not
    the greater, was committed. . . .’” (People v. Moye (2009) 
    47 Cal.4th 537
    , 553 (Moye).) “In deciding whether evidence is
    “substantial” . . . , a court determines only its bare legal
    6
    sufficiency, not its weight.” (Id. at p. 556.) “We review de novo a
    trial court’s failure to instruct on a lesser included offense . . . .”
    (People v. Millbrook (2014) 
    222 Cal.App.4th 1122
    , 1137.)
    Any Error in Failing to Instruct Sua Sponte on Heat
    of Passion Voluntary Manslaughter Was Harmless
    We need not decide whether the evidence is substantial
    enough for a “reasonable juror [to] conclude [that, as a result of
    sufficient provocation, appellant had] acted ‘“‘rashly or without
    due deliberation and reflection, and from this passion rather than
    from judgment,’” . . . ’” when he shot wife. (Moye, 
    supra,
     47
    Cal.4th at p. 553.) “Assuming arguendo it was error
    to fail to instruct on heat of passion voluntary manslaughter on
    this factual record, we find any such error harmless under the
    applicable Watson test (People v. Watson (1956) 
    46 Cal.2d 818
    ,
    836 . . .).” (Id. at p. 541.) “[A]ny such error was harmless [under
    this test] as it is not reasonably probable [appellant] would have
    obtained a more favorable outcome had the jury been so
    instructed.” (Id. at p. 556.) Appellant erroneously claims that
    “[t]he standard of prejudice . . . is harmless beyond a reasonable
    doubt under Chapman v. California (1967) 
    386 U.S. 18
     . . . .”
    “In employing the Watson standard of review here, it is
    reasonable to assume the jury considered all of the defense
    evidence bearing on [appellant’s] state of mind and the question
    whether he harbored malice when it entertained and rejected his
    claims of reasonable and unreasonable (or imperfect) self-
    defense.” (Moye, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 556.) “Once the jury
    rejected [appellant’s] claims of reasonable and imperfect self-
    defense, there was little if any independent evidence remaining
    to support his further claim that he killed in the heat of passion,
    and no direct testimonial evidence from defendant himself to
    7
    support an inference that he subjectively harbored such strong
    passion, or acted rashly or impulsively while under its influence
    for reasons unrelated to his perceived need for self-defense.” (Id.
    at p. 557.) Appellant testified that “the only reason” why he shot
    wife was that he feared she would assault him again with the
    frying pan. “[T]he jury having rejected the factual basis for the
    claims of reasonable and unreasonable self-defense, it is not
    reasonably probable the jury would have found the
    requisite objective component of a heat of passion defense (legally
    sufficient provocation) even had it been instructed on that theory
    of voluntary manslaughter.” (Ibid.)
    Moreover, the jury found appellant guilty of first degree
    murder. Pursuant to CALCRIM No. 521, the trial court
    instructed the jury: “The defendant is guilty of first degree
    murder if the People have proved that he acted willfully,
    deliberately, and with premeditation. The defendant acted
    willfully if he intended to kill. The defendant acted deliberately if
    he carefully weighed the considerations for and against his choice
    and, knowing the consequences decided to kill. The defendant
    acted with premeditation if he decided to kill before completing
    the act that caused the death.” Based on this instruction, the
    jury “must have believed the evidence showed [appellant] shot
    [wife] with ‘a state of mind equivalent to deliberation or
    premeditation’ . . . . That finding cannot be reconciled with a
    finding [appellant] . . . lacked malice because [wife’s] conduct
    provoked in [him] an ‘emotion so intense that an ordinary person
    would simply react, without reflection.’” (People v. Wright (2015)
    
    242 Cal.App.4th 1461
    , 1497.)
    Our Supreme Court applied similar reasoning in People v.
    Wharton (1991) 
    53 Cal.3d 522
    , 572: “By finding defendant was
    8
    guilty of first degree murder, the jury necessarily found
    defendant premeditated and deliberated the killing. This state of
    mind, involving planning and deliberate action, is manifestly
    inconsistent with having acted under the heat of passion . . . and
    clearly demonstrates that defendant was not prejudiced by the
    failure to give his requested instruction.”
    Finally, “the jury was instructed on second degree murder,
    and accordingly had a choice in evaluating [appellant’s]
    culpability.” (People v. Avila (2009) 
    46 Cal.4th 680
    , 707.) The
    jury was instructed: “Provocation may reduce a murder from first
    degree to second degree . . . . [¶] If you conclude that the
    defendant committed murder but was provoked, consider the
    provocation in deciding whether the crime was first . . . or second
    degree murder.” The jury rejected a second degree murder
    verdict. “[W]e conclude that the jury in this case, by rejecting the
    lesser-included offense of second degree murder [and convicting
    appellant of first degree premeditated murder], necessarily
    rejected the factual basis upon which it might have rendered a
    verdict on the lesser-included offense of [heat of passion]
    voluntary manslaughter.” (Turner v. Commonwealth (Va.App.
    1996) 
    476 S.E.2d 504
    , 508, fn. omitted, affirmed by Turner v.
    Commonwealth (Va. 1997) 
    492 S.E.2d 447
    .)
    Thus, “it is not ‘reasonably probable’ [appellant] would
    have obtained a more favorable outcome at trial had a heat
    of passion instruction been given.” (Moye, 
    supra,
     47 Cal.4th at
    pp. 557-558.)
    Appellant Has Failed to Show that the Court Abused Its
    Discretion in Refusing to Strike the Firearm Enhancement
    The trial court denied appellant’s request to strike the
    firearm enhancement in furtherance of justice pursuant to
    9
    sections 1385 and 12022.53, subdivision (h). We review its
    decision for abuse of discretion. (People v. Carmony (2004) 
    33 Cal.4th 367
    , 374 (Carmony).)
    “In reviewing for abuse of discretion, we are guided by two
    fundamental precepts. First, ‘“[t]he burden is on the party
    attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing
    decision was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of
    such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to
    achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary
    determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set
    aside on review.”’ [Citations.] Second, a ‘“decision will not be
    reversed merely because reasonable people might disagree. ‘An
    appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in
    substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.’”’
    [Citations.] Taken together, these precepts establish that a trial
    court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so
    irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with
    it.” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 376-377.)
    Appellant has failed to carry his burden “‘“to clearly show
    that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. . . .”’”
    (Carmony, 
    supra,
     33 Cal.4th at pp. 376-377.) In his opening brief
    appellant makes a perfunctory, undeveloped argument that the
    trial court abused its discretion: “Given, appellant’s age, of 57
    years, lack of prior criminal record and the unique circumstances
    of the offense, the court’s failure to strike the firearm
    [enhancement] was an abuse of discretion.” Appellant also
    claims the trial court abused its discretion because “[a]bsent the
    firearm enhancement, appellant’s sentence would still have been
    25 years to life.”
    10
    Appellant does not mention the trial court’s detailed,
    careful analysis of the firearm enhancement at the sentencing
    hearing. The court considered each of the nine mitigating
    circumstances listed in subparagraphs (A) through (I) of section
    1385, subdivision (c)(2). Subdivision (c)(2) provides, “In
    exercising its discretion [whether to strike an enhancement]
    under this subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great
    weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of
    the mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are
    present. Proof of the presence of one or more of these
    circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the
    enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the
    enhancement would endanger public safety.” The court
    explained why none of the mitigating circumstances applied.2
    Appellant does not dispute this finding.
    2  The nine mitigating circumstances are:
    “(A) Application of the enhancement would result in a
    discriminatory racial impact as described in paragraph (4) of
    subdivision (a) of Section 745.
    “(B) Multiple enhancements are alleged in a single case. In
    this instance, all enhancements beyond a single enhancement
    shall be dismissed.
    “(C) The application of an enhancement could result in a
    sentence of over 20 years. In this instance, the enhancement
    shall be dismissed.
    “(D) The current offense is connected to mental illness.
    “(E) The current offense is connected to prior victimization
    or childhood trauma.
    “(F) The current offense is not a violent felony as defined in
    subdivision (c) of Section 667.5.
    “(G) The defendant was a juvenile when they committed
    the current offense or any prior offenses, including criminal
    11
    The trial court expressed concern that appellant’s
    comments about the offense “seem to show a defiance as to what
    happened, not any remorse for what happened.” The court
    believed that these comments indicate “there still is a potential
    for a danger to public safety and a risk to physical injury to
    someone else if [appellant] were released” at a future date.
    The court found only a single mitigating factor – appellant’s
    lack of a criminal record. As an aggravating factor, the court
    found that appellant’s conduct showed “sophistication or
    planning.” The court stated: “You [appellant] watched a
    [You]Tube video shortly before the murder on how to fire the gun.
    You’re heard muttering as you go get the gun. [‘]Self-defense.[’][3]
    You get the gun. The shooting isn’t immediately after you're hit
    in the head with the frying pan. The shooting takes place after
    you told her 17 times to close the [front] door. She doesn’t close
    the door. She says the reason she doesn’t close the door is
    convictions and juvenile adjudications, that trigger the
    enhancement or enhancements applied in the current case.
    “(H) The enhancement is based on a prior conviction that is
    over five years old.
    “(I) Though a firearm was used in the current offense, it
    was inoperable or unloaded.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2), subparagraphs
    (A)-(I).)
    3 Here, the trial court was referring to what it had heard
    while listening to audio recordings of events inside appellant’s
    residence around the time of the shooting. The audio recordings
    were played for the jury. The audio was captured by security
    cameras that appellant had installed. There were three cameras.
    “One was in the kitchen, one in the living room and another one
    was inside the guest bedroom.”
    12
    because she's afraid you’re going to shoot her. You say if I was
    going to shoot you I would have already done it, and then you
    shoot her not once, but twice.”
    As an additional aggravating factor, the court found: “The
    victim was particularly vulnerable. She was unarmed, and
    apparently . . . was suffering from some level of mental illness.”
    “The court's detailed explanation of its reasoning
    demonstrates that, as directed by section 1385(c), it engaged
    in a [w]holistic balancing with special emphasis on the
    enumerated mitigating factors.” (People v. Ortiz (2023) 
    87 Cal.App.5th 1087
    , 1096, review granted 4/12/23, S278894.) In his
    opening brief appellant fails to present any analysis of the court’s
    reasoning. He simply ignores it.
    In his reply brief appellant responds to the trial court’s
    reasoning by arguing: “The potential danger to public safety if
    appellant, who was 57 at the time of sentencing, were to bec[o]me
    eligible for parole in 25 years was non existent. First of all, if
    despite his old age the parole board considered him a danger they
    would not be required to parole him. In all likelihood his mental
    health issues which played an important part both in the offense
    and in his statement at sentencing would be addressed during his
    first 25 years in prison.[4] If so his rationality, if not fragility,
    would prevent him from being a danger to the public. If not he
    would remain in prison. The evidence that the court and
    respondent see . . . as evidence of premeditation, buying a gun
    4  But the trial court found that appellant’s commission of
    the offense was not connected to any mental illness on his part.
    The court said, “[T]he predominant theme throughout the trial
    certainly was mental illness, but it was mental illness of Gina
    [wife], it wasn't mental illness of the defendant.”
    13
    and trying to figure out how to shoot it was more likely due to the
    same fear or paranoia that caused him to put up the elaborate
    security system. While under normal circumstances buying . . . a
    gun and learning to shoot could be seen as evidence of planning,
    installing the security system indicates otherwise.” Appellant
    omits to mention that although the gun was purchased in 2019, it
    was not until January 9, 2021 – two days before the murder –
    that appellant viewed a YouTube video “on how to properly grip a
    semi-auto pistol handgun.” (Capitalization omitted.)
    Appellant does not consider other aspects of the trial court’s
    reasoning, e.g., the inapplicability of the mitigating factors listed
    in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), subparagraphs (A) through (I);
    the finding that wife “was particularly vulnerable”; and the
    finding that appellant’s comments about the offense “seem to
    show a defiance as to what happened, not any remorse for what
    happened.”
    “[I]t is settled that: ‘A judgment of the lower court
    is presumed correct. . . . [E]rror must be affirmatively
    shown. . . .’” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 
    2 Cal.3d 557
    ,
    564.) Because appellant has failed to clearly show that the trial
    court’s reasoning for refusing to strike the firearm enhancement
    was irrational or arbitrary, the “‘“court is presumed to have acted
    to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives . . . .”’” (Carmony,
    
    supra,
     33 Cal.4th at pp. 376-377.)
    Disposition
    The judgment is affirmed.
    14
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
    YEGAN, J.
    We concur:
    GILBERT, P. J.
    BALTODANO, J.
    15
    Anthony J. Sabo, Judge
    Superior Court County of Ventura
    ______________________________
    Marilee Marshall, for Defendant and Appellant.
    Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
    Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
    Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy
    Attorney General, David A. Voet, Deputy Attorney General, for
    Plaintiff and Respondent.