In re K.H. CA2/1 ( 2023 )


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  • Filed 6/22/23 In re K.H. CA2/1
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
    opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
    8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
    purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION ONE
    In re K.H., a Person Coming Under                                B322384
    the Juvenile Court Law.                                          (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. 18CCJP08255)
    LOS ANGELES COUNTY
    DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
    AND FAMILY SERVICES,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    v.
    APRIL H.,
    Objector and Appellant.
    APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
    Angeles County, Ashley Price, Judge Pro Tempore. Affirmed.
    Maryann M. Goode, under appointment by the Court of
    Appeal, for Objector and Appellant.
    Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
    Assistant County Counsel, Kelly G. Emling, Deputy County
    Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    ___________________________________
    In these dependency proceedings April H. (mother), appeals
    from a juvenile court’s visitation order, contending the court
    abused its discretion by denying her last-minute request for a
    continuance and in instituting an unclear visitation scheme. We
    affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    Because mother’s only contentions on appeal pertain to
    procedural issues, we will limit the presentation of facts.
    The family consists of mother, April H. (father, who is not
    party to this appeal), the minor K.H., and her six siblings, five of
    whom are subjects of this appeal (collectively Minors B through
    G).
    On June 26, 2019, the juvenile sustained a Welfare and
    1
    Institutions Code section 300 petition, finding Minors B through
    G were at substantial risk of serious physical injury because (1)
    the parents inappropriately physically disciplined them and
    mother told them not to disclose the abuse, (2) mother had a
    history of substance abuse and failed to protect the children while
    under the influence, (3) the parents failed to provide the children
    with basic necessities, including medical care, and (4) the parents
    failed to protect the children from sexual abuse by a cousin and
    told the children not to speak about the abuse.
    1
    Undesignated statutory references will be to the Welfare
    and Institutions Code.
    2
    Over the next two years, father complied with the case plan
    but mother failed to satisfy requirements regarding a drug and
    alcohol program, drug testing, and parenting, and only partially
    complied with visitation requirements. Visitation with K.H., in
    particular, was very poor, causing the child serious emotional and
    psychological harm. The court continued father’s reunification
    services but terminated mother’s services, and found that
    visitation with mother was detrimental to the children. It
    ordered that mother have no contact and no visits with the
    children.
    On July 8, 2021, the court ordered the children returned to
    father’s care with family maintenance services. Mother agreed
    with the placement. That portion of the family now resides in
    Texas, while mother resides in California.
    A year later, mother was given notice of a status review
    hearing to be held on July 6, 2022, but failed to appear. Mother’s
    counsel was present, and had tried several times that morning to
    get her on the phone, without success. The court paused
    proceedings to allow mother to join telephonically, but counsel
    was again unable to reach her.
    Counsel represented that mother was “very concerned
    about the outcome” of the hearing, and asked for a continuance or
    second call to give her an opportunity to appear. The court
    denied the request and proceeded with the hearing.
    The court ordered that mother have “monitored virtual
    visits in a therapeutic setting to occur a minimum of once per
    month.” It granted “discretion to liberalize Mother’s visits upon
    the recommendation of the conjoint therapist,” and ordered that
    “the conjoint therapist . . . be provided with copies of all
    necessary reports.”
    3
    Mother’s counsel responded to the visitation order as
    follows: “As far as the therapeutic visitation, it seems that if the
    court makes an order that visits can occur in a therapeutic
    setting or conjoint especially [sic] be good . . . . The detriment is
    not needed. The therapeutic setting provides sufficient
    safeguards regarding the children’s wellbeing and visitation with
    the children.”
    On July 13, 2022, the court terminated jurisdiction.
    Mother filed a timely appeal from the July 6, 2022
    visitation order.
    DISCUSSION
    A.     Continuance
    Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in
    denying her request for a brief delay of the visitation hearing.
    We disagree.
    A juvenile court exercises broad control over dependency
    proceedings. (In re Kelly D. (2000) 
    82 Cal.App.4th 433
    , 439.) For
    example, the decision to grant or deny a requested continuance is
    committed to the sound discretion of the court. (In re D.Y. (2018)
    
    26 Cal.App.5th 1044
    , 1053.) Even where a party requests not a
    continuance per se but only a brief delay in proceedings, for
    example to get a party on the telephone line, the court enjoys
    discretion to grant or deny the request as circumstances dictate.
    (See In re Hunter W. (2011) 
    200 Cal.App.4th 1454
    , 1465.) We will
    reverse a court’s exercise of this discretion only upon a showing
    that it “ ‘ “exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more
    inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the
    reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for
    that of the trial court.” ’ ” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 
    7 Cal.4th 295
    , 318-319.)
    4
    Here, nothing in the record suggests delaying the visitation
    hearing to get mother on the telephone would have made any
    difference. Mother had already been notified of the hearing and
    represented (through counsel) that it was important to her. Her
    counsel had tried unsuccessfully to reach her on the phone
    several times before the hearing, and was granted an opportunity
    during the hearing to try again. Mother’s counsel did not
    represent at the hearing that mother was in fact reachable, and
    on appeal mother again fails to contend she was reachable. We
    therefore conclude the court acted within its discretion in denying
    a brief delay to get mother on the phone.
    B.     Visitation Order
    Mother contends the final visitation orders are confusing
    and impracticable. We deem the contention forfeited.
    When the juvenile court terminates jurisdiction over a
    dependent child, it may issue an order determining custody and
    visitation as it relates to the child. (§ 362.4; In re Roger S. (1992)
    
    4 Cal.App.4th 25
    , 30.) We review a visitation exit order for abuse
    of discretion. (In re T.H. (2010) 
    190 Cal.App.4th 1119
    , 1124.)
    However, an appellant generally may not complain of an
    error the appellant acceded to at trial. (Pioneer Const., Inc. v.
    Global Investment Corp. (2011) 
    202 Cal.App.4th 161
    , 169.) The
    forfeiture rule “prevent[s] a party from standing by silently until
    the conclusion of the proceedings.” (In re Dakota H. (2005) 
    132 Cal.App.4th 212
    , 221-222.)
    Here, mother’s counsel raised no objection to the visitation
    order. On the contrary, counsel stated that the order “provides
    sufficient safeguards regarding the children’s wellbeing and
    visitation with the children.”
    Any contrary claim on appeal is forfeited.
    5
    DISPOSITION
    The juvenile court’s order is affirmed.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
    CHANEY, J.
    We concur:
    ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
    BENDIX, J.
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B322384

Filed Date: 6/22/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 6/22/2023