People v. Phelps CA4/2 ( 2023 )


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  • Filed 6/27/23 P. v. Phelps CA4/2
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION TWO
    THE PEOPLE,
    Plaintiff and Appellant,                                       E078698
    v.                                                                      (Super.Ct.No. INF059428)
    ALEX ALLEN PHELPS,                                                      OPINION
    Defendant and Respondent.
    APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Dean Benjamini, Judge.
    Reversed.
    Michael A. Hestrin, District Attorney, and Sophia Choi, Deputy District Attorney,
    for Plaintiff and Appellant.
    Britton Donaldson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
    Respondent.
    1
    INTRODUCTION
    A trial court granted defendant and respondent Alex Allen Phelps’s petition for
    dismissal of all charges against him filed pursuant to Penal Code1 section 1203.4b. The
    People appeal, and in its opening brief contend that the court had no authority to grant the
    petition since defendant failed to meet the statutory requirements for relief.
    On May 1, 2023, on our own motion, we requested supplemental briefing on
    whether the amendment to section 1203.4b, subdivision (a)(1), which expanded relief and
    became effective on September 29, 2022, had any effect on the appeal. The parties
    submitted supplemental briefing as requested, which we have considered in deciding this
    case.
    We agree with the People that defendant has failed to meet the statutory
    requirements for relief and reverse.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
    Defendant’s son (the child), who was two and one-half months old, was left in
    defendant’s exclusive care and custody, while the child’s mother left to check on their
    other child. When she returned, the child was not breathing. They took the child to the
    hospital, where she died as a result of blunt-force trauma to the head. Defendant initially
    denied knowing how the child sustained a head injury, but then claimed the injury may
    1All further statutory references will be to the Penal Code unless otherwise
    indicated.
    2Because defendant pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement, the factual
    background is derived from the People’s request for disposition/ruling filed on August
    18, 2021.
    2
    have occurred when she rolled off the couch and onto the carpet. During an autopsy, the
    medical examiner observed multiple retinal hemorrhages, a subdural hematoma, bruises
    and swelling to the brain, and a bruise on the child’s right eyelid. The medical examiner
    opined that the injuries were consistent with being struck or thrown against a soft object.
    On December 1, 2008, the People filed an information charging defendant with
    murder (§ 187, subd. (a), count 1) and assault resulting in the death of a child under the
    age of eight (§ 273ab, count 2). On August 12, 2010, the People filed a first amended
    information charging defendant with voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a), count 1)
    and four counts of infliction of cruel and inhuman corporal punishment on a child
    (§ 273d, subd. (a), counts 2-5). Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to all
    five counts. The court sentenced him to 16 years four months in state prison, in
    accordance with the terms of the agreement.
    On July 29, 2021, defendant filed a petition for dismissal pursuant to section
    1203.4b, alleging that he successfully participated in a conservation camp program called
    “Firefighter Training Program” from September 18, 2020, to the present. He also
    requested early termination of parole. Defendant attached a personal letter to the court
    stating that he served as an institutional firefighter from November 9, 2019, to September
    18, 2020, with the California Rehabilitation Center Fire Department. He also stated that
    he was currently enrolled in the CAL-FIRE Ventura Training Center (VTC) Fire
    Academy in Camarillo, California. Defendant asked the court to dismiss his case so that
    he could obtain his Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) license. He attached
    documentation showing he was currently participating in the Firefighter Training and
    3
    Reentry Program at the VTC. A letter from Parole Agent Angelica Garcia indicated
    defendant was accepted into the voluntary 18-month program on November 16, 2020,
    and a letter from an administrative specialist at VTC also said he started in November
    2020. The documentation also included a letter from Fire Captain Mikeal Gates, who
    worked at the California Rehabilitation Center in Norco, stating that defendant was
    assigned to his institutional firefighter program on November 9, 2019, and defendant was
    “paroled in good standing from” the program on September 4, 2020. Defendant also
    attached copies of various certificates he earned.
    The People opposed the petition. On August 20, 2021, the court held a hearing,
    and the prosecutor pointed out that one of the requirements of section 1203.4b is that the
    Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) certify
    to the court that a defendant has successfully completed the required program, before the
    court exercises its decision on whether to grant or deny the petition. The prosecutor
    further argued that based on the facts of the case and the nature of what defendant pled to,
    it was not in the interests of justice to grant the petition. Defense counsel asserted that
    defendant had completed an 18-month program and took advantage of various programs
    in custody. The court noted that the form submitted by defendant said he was asking to
    terminate his parole, and it was unsure about doing that. The People responded that
    perhaps it would be better for defendant to request dismissal after completing his parole,
    and further noted the facts of the case were egregious. The court denied the petition.
    On November 9, 2021, defendant filed another petition for dismissal pursuant to
    section 1203.4b, alleging that he successfully participated in a conservation camp
    4
    program called “Firefighter Training Program” from September 18, 2020, to October
    2021, and stating he had been released from custody. He attached the same
    documentation from the prior petition. The People again opposed the petition.
    On or about November 10, 2021, the superior court clerk sent a notice of filing of
    petition for dismissal (Pen. Code, § 1203.4b) and request for certification to the
    California Rehabilitation Center in Norco, stating that defendant had filed a petition. The
    notice further stated: “Pursuant to statute, when a petition is filed, the court is required to
    provide a copy of the petition to the responsible authority to obtain certification of the
    petitioner’s participation [in] fire camp. CDCR is then required to certify whether the
    petitioner successfully participated in the incarcerated individual conservation camp and
    has been released from custody. [¶] Please provide certification of the petitioner’s
    participation to the court indicated above by: 11/24/2021.”
    On November 30, 2021, the court continued the hearing on the petition to obtain
    the certification from the CDCR.
    On December 16, 2021, a certification of participation of fire camp form was filed.
    It was signed by a CDCR Classification and Parole Representative and stated that
    defendant “[d]id not participate in the above-listed fire camp.” The fire camp listed was
    the California Rehabilitation Center in Norco.
    Defendant moved to continue the hearing two more times, and it was eventually
    held on February 7, 2022. That day, a memorandum from Fire Captain Mikeal Gates,
    dated January 25, 2022, was filed, in which he answered a series of questions from the
    defense attorney. Gates’s responses included that defendant was incarcerated and
    5
    participated in the institutional firefighter program from November 9, 2019, until
    September 18, 2020, “when he paroled.” Gates explained the difference between the
    institutional firefighter program and fire camp, stating that institutional firefighters
    protect prison infrastructure, and are available to respond to any incident in the county if
    requested, whereas fire camp firefighters only respond to wildfires, flooding, and forest
    restoration. Gates also stated that defendant responded to a wildland fire and several fires
    within the prison grounds in Norco.
    After reviewing the evidence and the law, the court stated: “Although I will say
    that [defendant] does not fit within the specific letter of the law, I do believe he clearly
    fits within the spirit of the law. There is apparently a difference between one who is an
    institutional firefighter, meaning that they actually staffed the fire department within the
    institution and respond to fires within the institution that are structural fires, and someone
    who is part of the California Conservation Corps [sic] fire—conservation camp
    firefighting wildfires—or wildland firefighters. [¶] In [defendant’s] position, he was part
    of the institutional firefighters, but he also responded to wildland firefighters and was
    trained in that as well. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] To say that [defendant] does not fall within the
    spirit of the law by virtue of him having the institutional firefighter training versus the
    wildland firefighter training, I think puts form before substance, and I don’t think that
    would be the equitable and the just resolution in this particular case.”
    The People acknowledged the certificates and letters defendant submitted in
    support of his petition and commended him for all he had done, but argued that he was
    not eligible for relief since he did not participate in the specific program required by the
    6
    statute. Defense counsel stated that defendant participated in 10 months of training “in
    good faith as an incarcerated firefighter” with the expectation that he would have his
    record expunged for purposes of being employed, after he was paroled. Defense counsel
    added that defendant was already discharged and had completed 18 months of training at
    VTC, which was a California Conservation Camp program. The court reiterated that
    defendant fell within the spirit as opposed to the letter of the law. Thus, it granted the
    requested relief and ordered dismissal of the underlying charges.
    DISCUSSION
    Defendant Failed to Establish His Compliance with the Statutory Requirements
    The People argue that the trial court was without authority to exercise its
    discretion and grant defendant’s petition for dismissal pursuant to section 1203.4b since
    he did not meet the statutory requirements for relief. In its opening brief, the People
    contend that (1) defendant did not successfully participate in a California Conservation
    Camp program while incarcerated, and (2) the Secretary of the CDCR (the Secretary) did
    not provide the required certification. Defendant contends the court properly found that
    he came within the spirit of the law and that a reversal of the court’s order would be a
    violation of his Equal Protection rights. In its supplemental brief, the People
    acknowledge that section 1203.4b was amended to include relief for a defendant who
    participates in an institutional firehouse, and that defendant likely now qualifies.
    However, before the trial court may exercise its discretion and grant a dismissal, the
    Secretary must certify his successful participation. In his supplemental brief, defendant
    contends he has successfully participated in an approved institutional firehouse program,
    7
    and we should affirm the court’s order; however, if certification from the Secretary is
    required, this court should remand the case to the trial court to obtain the certification.
    Although we recognize defendant’s outstanding efforts, we agree with the People that the
    Secretary must certify defendant’s participation in the required program. Thus, we will
    reverse the order.
    A. Principles of Statutory Interpretation
    “Where a question of statutory interpretation based on undisputed facts is
    presented, we conduct an independent review of the statute in question.” (People v.
    Paige (2020) 
    51 Cal.App.5th 194
    , 200.) “We have long recognized that the language
    used in a statute or constitutional provision should be given its ordinary meaning, and
    ‘[i]f the language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, nor is it
    necessary to resort to indicia of the intent of the Legislature (in the case of a statute) or of
    the voters (in the case of a provision adopted by the voters).’ [Citation.] To that end, we
    generally must ‘accord[ ] significance, if possible, to every word, phrase and sentence in
    pursuance of the legislative purpose,’ and have warned that ‘[a] construction making
    some words surplusage is to be avoided.’ ” (People v. Valencia (2017) 
    3 Cal.5th 347
    ,
    357 (Valencia).)
    B. Section 1203.4b
    Assembly Bill No. 2147 (Assem. Bill 2147), approved by the Governor on
    September 11, 2020, became effective January 1, 2021, and added section 1203.4b to the
    Penal Code. When enacted, this section provided: “If a defendant successfully
    participated in the California Conservation Camp program as an incarcerated individual
    8
    hand crew member, as determined by the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and
    Rehabilitation, or successfully participated as a member of a county incarcerated
    individual hand crew, as determined by the appropriate county authority, and has been
    released from custody, the defendant is eligible for relief pursuant to this section.”
    (Former § 1203.4b, subd. (a)(1).) Section 1203.4b was subsequently amended and now
    provides, “If a defendant successfully participated in the California Conservation Camp
    program as an incarcerated individual hand crew member, as determined by the Secretary
    of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation . . . or participated at an
    institutional firehouse, as determined by the Secretary of the Department of Corrections
    and Rehabilitation, and has been released from custody, the defendant is eligible for
    relief pursuant to this section.” (§ 1203.4b, subd. (a)(1) (italics added), amended by Stats
    2022, ch. 771, §16 (Assem. Bill No. 160), eff. Sept. 29, 2022.)
    “If the requirements of this section are met, the court, in its discretion and in the
    interest of justice, may permit the defendant to withdraw the plea of guilty or plea of nolo
    contendere and enter a plea of not guilty [and] the court shall thereupon dismiss the
    accusations or information against the defendant and the defendant shall thereafter be
    released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense of which the
    defendant has been convicted, . . .” (§ 1203.4b, subd. (c)(1).)
    C. Defendant Did Not Meet the Statutory Requirements of Section 1203.4b
    In its opening brief, the People argue that defendant did not participate in a
    California Conservation Camp program while incarcerated, and the Secretary did not
    certify his successful participation in such, as required by the statute. However, in its
    9
    supplemental brief, the People acknowledge that the amendment to section 1203.4b
    expands relief to a defendant who participates at an institutional firehouse and thus likely
    includes defendant. Even so, the Secretary must determine and certify defendant’s
    participation in such program. We agree. Defendant has not established that he met the
    statutory requirements, and it is even unclear from his petition and attachments how he
    was attempting to satisfy them.
    Defendant’s petition, filed on November 9, 2021, alleged that he successfully
    participated in a conservation camp program called “Firefighter Training Program” from
    September 18, 2020, to October 2021, and stated that he had been released from custody.
    The personal letter he attached to his petition requested the dismissal of his case under
    Assembly Bill 2147 and asserted that he was “currently . . . enrolled in the CAL-FIRE
    Ventura Training Center (VTC) Fire Academy.” He attached a letter from Parole Agent
    Angelica Garcia, indicating he was released on parole on September 18, 2020, and
    confirming his participation at VTC. Garcia stated that VTC was a voluntary, 18-month
    firefighter training and reentry program that emphasized rehabilitation. She further stated
    that defendant was accepted into that program on November 16, 2020. From Garcia’s
    description, the VTC Fire Academy does not appear to be a California Conservation
    Camp program that defendant participated in while incarcerated; rather, it was a
    voluntary training program, which defendant participated in while he was on parole.
    Moreover, the participation dates he alleged on his petition (September 18, 2020, to
    October 2021) do not match the acceptance date indicated by Garcia (November 16,
    2020).
    10
    Defendant asserted in his letter, but not on his petition, that he served as an
    institutional firefighter from November 9, 2019, to September 18, 2020. We note that
    these dates also do not match the dates he alleged on his petition. Defendant attached a
    letter from Fire Captain Mikeal Gates from the California Rehabilitation Center in Norco,
    stating that defendant was assigned to his institutional firefighter program on November
    9, 2019, while serving his sentence there. Notably, at the time defendant filed his
    petition, section 1203.4b, in relevant part, only applied to defendants who “participated in
    the California Conservation Camp program as an incarcerated individual hand crew
    member, as determined by the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and
    Rehabilitation.” The evidence did not clearly establish that the California Rehabilitation
    Center in Norco was a California Conservation Camp program.
    Furthermore, as to the statutory requirement that a defendant “participate[] in the
    California Conservation Camp program as an incarcerated individual hand crew member,
    as determined by the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation”
    (§ 1203.4b, subd. (a)(1)), the only evidence of certification by the CDCR showed that
    defendant did not participate in a fire camp. The superior court clerk sent a request for
    certification to the California Rehabilitation Center in Norco, stating that defendant had
    filed a section 1203.4b petition and asking the CDCR to certify to the court whether he
    successfully participated in the “incarcerated individual conservation camp.” In
    response, the CDCR representative filed a Certification of Participation of Fire Camp
    form, which stated that defendant “[d]id not participate in the above-listed fire camp.”
    (Italics added.) The camp listed was the California Rehabilitation Center in Norco. With
    11
    regard to the expanded relief under the amended statute, the evidence appears to
    demonstrate that defendant participated in an institutional firefighter program while he
    was incarcerated. However, section 1203.4b requires that such participation be
    “determined by the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation”
    (§ 1203.4b, subd. (a)(1)), and there has been no attempt to have the Secretary certify
    defendant’s participation in an institutional firefighter program.
    In sum, “courts must look first to the words of the statute, giving effect to their
    plain meaning. If those words are clear, we may not alter them to accomplish a purpose
    that does not appear on the face of the statute or from its legislative history.” (In re Jerry
    R. (1994) 
    29 Cal.App.4th 1432
    , 1437; see Hennigan v. United Pacific Ins. Co. (1975) 
    53 Cal.App.3d 1
    , 7 [“We may not disregard or enlarge the plain provisions of the statute, nor
    may we go beyond the meaning of the words used when they are clear and
    unambiguous.”].) Section 1203.4b does not require interpretation since it is not
    ambiguous. (Valencia, 
    supra,
     3 Cal.5th at p. 357.) Defendant’s petition and supporting
    documentation did not clearly allege or establish that he satisfied the requirements of the
    statute. Specifically, the petition alleges that he successfully participated in a
    conservation camp program, but the evidence does not establish such. Conversely, the
    petition does not allege that he participated at an institutional firehouse, although the
    evidence appears to show that he did; however, the Secretary has not determined or
    certified such participation. Since the requirements were not met, according to the
    statutory terms at the time of the hearing, the court erred in granting him relief.
    (§ 1203.4b, subd. (c)(1) [“If the requirements of this section are met, the court, in its
    12
    discretion and in the interest of justice, may permit the defendant to withdraw the plea of
    guilty . . . .” (Italics added)].)3 Since the petition in this case does not allege that
    defendant participated at an institutional firehouse, and the Secretary has not determined
    such, the statutory requirements have still not been met.
    We acknowledge defendant’s contention that the denial of his petition, based on
    the People’s argument, would violate his right to equal protection. He asserts that he
    participated in the California Conservation Camp at VTC after he was released on parole,
    while noting that only individuals who participate in a fire camp while incarcerated are
    entitled to relief under section 1203.4b. Defendant concedes that he did not raise an
    equal protection argument below. We conclude he forfeited his equal protection claim by
    failing to raise or develop it below. (People v. Hartshorn (2012) 
    202 Cal.App.4th 1145
    ,
    1151.) Although we have discretion to address the claim, we decline to do so, especially
    since defendant alleged in his supplemental brief that he qualifies for relief based on his
    participation in an institutional firehouse program.
    We note the statute provides that “[a]ny denial of relief pursuant to this section
    shall be without prejudice.” (§1203.4b, subd. (a)(2).) Therefore, we will reverse the
    court’s order, and defendant may file another petition if he so chooses.
    3  In light of our conclusion, we decline to further address defendant’s claims that
    the court properly found he came within the spirit of the law.
    13
    DISPOSITION
    The order granting defendant’s section 1203.4b petition is reversed.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    FIELDS
    J.
    We concur:
    McKINSTER
    Acting P. J.
    RAPHAEL
    J.
    14
    

Document Info

Docket Number: E078698

Filed Date: 6/27/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 6/27/2023