In re C.L. CA2/1 ( 2023 )

Filed 7/3/23 In re C.L. CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re C.L., a Person Coming Under B317015
Juvenile Court Law.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct. No. 21CCJP03203G)
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
CHRISTIAN L.,
Defendant and Appellant.
In re C.L., et al., Persons Coming B321889
Under Juvenile Court Law.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct. No. 21CCJP03203G)
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
CHRISTIAN L. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Pete R. Navarro, Judge. Affirmed in part and dismissed
in part (No. B317015). Affirmed in part and reversed in part
with directions (No. B321889).
Benjamin Ekenes, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Christian L. (Nos. B317015
& B321889).
Shaylah Padgett-Weibel, under appointment by
the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Myra L.
(No. B321889).
Dawyn R. Harrison, Interim County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Navid Nakhjavani, Principal
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent
(Nos. B317015 & B321889).
___________________________________
In these consolidated appeals, Myra L. (Mother) and
Christian L. (Father) challenge various dependency orders
regarding their son, C.L., and Mother’s six other children.
Father challenges the court’s order, made pursuant to Welfare
and Institutions Code section 300,1 invoking jurisdiction over
C.L. and his siblings; an order removing C.L. from Father;
an order requiring Father to submit to drug testing and that
his visits be monitored; and an order sustaining a supplemental
section 387 petition alleging that the previous disposition, which
released all the children to Mother, was no longer sufficient to
maintain their safety. Both Mother and Father challenge the
1Subsequent unspecified statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.
2
removal of the children from Mother’s care after the court
sustained the section 387 petition. Finally, Father argues that
respondent, the Los Angeles County Department of Children
and Family Services (DCFS), did not comply with its initial
duty of inquiry under the Indian Child Welfare Act and related
California statutes (ICWA).
We affirm the court’s jurisdictional order, its order
removing children from Father, and its order requiring monitored
visits for Father. We conclude Father’s challenge to the drug
testing requirement is now moot, and dismiss this portion of the
appeal. We conclude substantial evidence does not support the
factual allegations in the section 387 petition, and that the court
reversibly erred in sustaining it. We thus reverse both the order
sustaining the section 387 petition and the order removing the
children from Mother at the section 387 hearing. Finally, we
instruct DCFS, upon remand, to comply with its ongoing duty
of inquiry under ICWA, to the extent it has not already done so.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
C.L., born in 2019, is the child of Mother and Father.
He has six maternal half siblings: S.C. (born 2009), Jo.H. (born
2011), Da.H. (born 2012), K.H. (born 2013), De.H. (born 2015),
and Je.H. (born 2016). At the time of the events leading to these
dependency proceedings, Mother, five of her seven children (S.C.,
Jo.H., Da.H., Je.H., and C.L.), and Father all lived in a studio
apartment. The apartment had one bathroom, a small kitchen,
and a living room. The family slept on one queen size mattress
and one blow-up mattress in the living room. De.H. lived with
her paternal grandmother. K.H. lived with I.H., her paternal
aunt.
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A. Family Child Welfare History
The family participated in voluntary family maintenance
services in 2010 based on domestic violence between Mother and
Jonathan C., the father of some of C.L.’s half siblings. In March
2011, the juvenile court sustained a section 300 petition based
in part on these same issues between Mother and Jonathan C.
After the parents participated in family reunification services,
the court terminated jurisdiction in January 2013 and returned
all the children to Mother’s care.
In October 2013, the court sustained another section 300
petition based on allegations that Mother physically abused
S.C. The court found Mother’s physical abuse of S.C. placed S.C.
and her siblings at serious risk of harm. In February 2014, the
court sustained a similar petition on behalf of K.H. The court
returned the children to Mother’s custody in September 2014
and terminated jurisdiction in July 2015.
The family had numerous other referrals from 2010
through 2020 that were closed as inconclusive or unfounded,
none of which involved Father.
B. Referral and Investigation Leading to Instant
Dependency Proceedings
In June 2021, DCFS received a referral reporting that
Je.H., then five years old, was running around the family’s
apartment complex unsupervised and had knocked over a
barbeque. Upon investigation, both Mother and Father denied
any abuse, domestic violence, or drug use in the home. Father
reported that he smoked marijuana “ ‘here and there about once
a week[,]’ ” but denied being under the influence of drugs when
he was around the children. He declined to submit to a drug test
unless ordered by the court.
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Soon thereafter, a DCFS social worker interviewed S.C.,
Jo.H., Da.H., and Je.H., who all denied any form of physical
abuse, neglect, or inappropriate discipline. According to I.H.
(K.H.’s paternal aunt, with whom K.H. was living), Mother
had agreed that K.H. should live with I.H. and made I.H. K.H.’s
legal guardian approximately three months earlier. I.H. further
stated that Mother “labeled [K.H.] as a troubled child” and has a
strained relationship with her because, according to Mother, K.H.
“ ‘lies and has called DCFS on [Mother].’ ”
K.H. told DCFS that Mother and Father “say bad words
to each other and stated, ‘they will fight talk and hit each
other.’ . . . ‘I’ve seen them hit each other and gave [sic] [Mother] a
purple eye.’ ” She recalled this incident took place at the paternal
grandmother’s home sometime after C.L. had been born (meaning
after 2019). She added that, “ ‘a long time ago’ ” when C.L. was
a baby, “ ‘[Mother] cut [Father] on his finger and there was blood
on the floor.’ ” She said, “ ‘I think it was on purpose.’ ” K.H.
also reported that Father had once punched Jo.H. in the stomach.
Jo.H. denied this. K.H. reported Mother had hit her with a
broom, and that Mother hit S.C. and pulled S.C.’s hair when S.C.
was approximately 10 years old. K.H. denied that Mother drank
or smoked; she said she had observed Father smoke “ ‘stuff’ ” in a
brown cigarette.
C. Section 300 Petition and Post-Petition
Investigation
On July 12, 2021, DCFS filed a petition under section 300
subdivisions (a), (b)(1), and (j), alleging that the past domestic
violence between Mother and Father and Mother’s physical abuse
of K.H. and S.C. placed all children at risk of harm. None of the
children was detained.
5
The continuing DCFS investigation prior to the court’s
adjudication of the petition yielded the following additional
information:
1. August 19, 2021 incident
In August 2021, an anonymous reporter claimed “[M]other
frequently hits the children, especially the child [S.C.],” and
that on August 19, 2021, “around midnight, [Father] went to . . .
[M]other’s home to get his clothes, and when [M]other opened the
door, [M]other lunged at him and stabbed him in the hand/arm
with an unknown object. The children were crying inside the
home, and . . . [M]other was trying to set up [Father] by saying[,]
‘[Father], you’re hurting her.’ ” The reporting party further
stated that “[M]other coaches the children to not disclose
[information] to social workers and police, and warns them they
will be removed.”
Mother denied that she had stabbed Father. She told
DCFS that, on the night in question, Father had come to retrieve
his belongings. When she asked him to wait outside, he broke
a window. Mother called the police but he fled before the police
arrived. S.C., Jo.H. and Da.H. likewise denied seeing Mother
attack Father on August 19, but reported seeing Father break
the window that evening. Jo.H. stated he had seen Father’s hand
bleeding.
The referral was deemed inconclusive as to the children
living with Mother and unfounded as to De.H. and K.H.
2. August 25, 2021 incident
Later in August 2021, a mandatory reporter related
another, separate incident, reporting that “[M]other called law
enforcement to report domestic violence with [Father].” Pursuant
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to the Los Angeles County Sheriff ’s Department (LASD) incident
report, Mother told law enforcement that she and the children
had returned home on the evening of August 25, 2021 to find
Father sleeping in the living room of the studio apartment,
although she had kicked him out of the home a week earlier
(presumably on August 19). Mother told Father to leave, he
refused, and an argument ensued. Father moved off the bed
when Mother put the children to sleep there, and Mother and
Father “continued to argue near the front door.” When Mother
called 9-1-1, Father “placed [his] right hand on [her] neck . . .
and stated, ‘Bitch, you’re not gonna call the cops.’ ” Father then
“forcibly took her cell phone . . . from her hand[,] preventing her
from calling law enforcement[,] and ran out the front door, out of
view.” When asked by LASD deputies whether alcohol or drugs
were a factor in this incident, “[Mother] stated [Father] often
uses [m]ethamphetamine.”
S.C., Da.H., and Jo.H. similarly reported coming home to
find Father asleep, and that Mother and Father began arguing
after Mother told him to leave. Jo.H. and Da.H. both reported
they saw Father “chok[ing]” Mother “with his right hand.” C.L.
and Je.H. also were present but were too young to provide a
statement. Mother “was offered an Emergency Protective Order
(EPO) to which she accepted,” and “[a]n EPO was obtained . . .
with an expiration date of [November 1, 2021]” that prohibited
Father from contacting Mother in any way, even via telephone or
email, and from coming within 100 feet of her or her residence.
When interviewed by DCFS on two separate occasions
a month later, S.C., Jo.H., Da.H., and Je.H. contradicted their
earlier statements regarding August 25 and instead denied any
domestic violence in the home. In the two interviews they also
7
offered different versions of nonviolent events they claimed they
had witnessed on August 25.
During a September 29, 2021 DCFS interview, Mother
denied that Father ever grabbed her neck, stating, “Held me
by my neck? No! I didn’t say that to the cops! I don’t know
why they would write that! No, he didn’t choke me!” Mother
stated that she did not know whether she planned to get back
together with Father. She denied asking for the EPO or that
Father had ever abused methamphetamine or any other
substances.
3. Additional DCFS interviews
The jurisdiction/disposition report included information
about four separate interviews with K.H., the details of which
are of significance to Father’s arguments on appeal.
On July 15, 2021, K.H. was examined at a hospital for
suspected physical abuse and neglect, based on K.H.’s earlier
statements to DCFS that Mother had hit her and the August
2021 referral describing Mother hitting “the children.” The exam
yielded no physical findings, but K.H. again reported physical
abuse by Mother and further stated, “ ‘I’m scared of my mom. I
don’t know why. I like it better with my tia[;] she is nicer. My
mom usually hits me with her hand on my body, everywhere.
I have my own bed at my tia’s but not at my mom’s.’ ”
On August 14, 2021, a dependency investigator interviewed
K.H. She again reported that Mother used to hit her and S.C.
With respect to domestic violence, “[K.H.] stated that she knows
what domestic violence is as she has seen . . . ‘[M]other and
[Father] argue and [she] [has] seen [Father] hit [Mother]. [She]
[has] seen when [Father] will get violent as [she] saw when
[Father] punched her brother [Jo.H.] as well in the stomach.’ ”
8
DCFS again interviewed K.H. on August 31, 2021 at I.H.’s
house. During the interview, K.H. stated that the first time she
met Father, it was when she was still living with Mother, and
Mother picked her up from school accompanied by Father. While
in the car, Mother and Father began arguing and Father hit
Mother in the face.
During a September 13, 2021 forensic interview, K.H.
stated Mother would “ ‘whoop’ ” her with a belt “ ‘on [her]
stomach and [her] butt’ ” but not anymore because she lived
with her “ ‘Tia.’ ”
DCFS also interviewed De.H., who confirmed she did not
live with Mother. De.H. also corroborated that Mother previously
“sometimes” hit S.C. and K.H., but that when the family all
lived with her “[G]randma,” Mother did not hit anyone because
“[G]randma” would get mad at Mother. At a hospital abuse and
neglect examination approximately a month later, De.H. had no
signs of physical abuse and told the examiner that she was not
fearful of anyone “except [Mother’s] boyfriend [Father] [stating,]
‘I don’t like him. He is the meanest person. I’m scared of him.’ ”
When DCFS interviewed Father on September 30, 2021,
he denied all of the allegations of domestic violence. DCFS
asked Father twice whether he had taken Mother’s cell phone to
prevent her from calling the police, and Father did not answer.
During the interview, Father again refused to drug test without
court order. He contradicted his earlier statement that he
smoked marijuana, saying, “ ‘I smoked weed a long time ago, I
dropped it though.’ ” Father stated he did not currently have
a home address, as he was sleeping in the homes of family and
friends. He admitted to talking to Mother as recently as a week
prior.
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4. Father’s criminal record and law
enforcement reports
Father’s criminal record includes an arrest in 2017 for
being under the influence of an illicit substance, two arrests in
2019 for possession of a controlled substance, a 2019 conviction
for assault with a deadly weapon, and a September 2020 arrest
for possessing drug paraphernalia. One of Father’s 2019 arrests
resulted from police stopping Father while he was driving a car
with five children under the age of 10 years in the backseat, none
of whom were in safety seats. Police found open beer bottles in
the car—some empty, two half full and cold to the touch. A pat
down revealed a plastic baggie containing what appeared to be
methamphetamine, as well as ecstasy pills. During another
arrest in September 2020, Father disclosed he had drugs in his
waistband and admitted to smoking methamphetamine once or
twice a week.
5. September 2021 altercation between
Father and Alfredo H.
In September 2021, the maternal grandmother contacted
DCFS and reported that she had learned of an incident at
Mother’s house involving Father and Alfredo H., the father
of two of Mother’s children. She reported that Father and the
paternal grandmother had gone to Mother’s home to pick up
C.L., when Alfredo H. arrived around the same time to pick up
his children, and the two men had an altercation. She did not
know if the children had witnessed the incident. Mother told
DCFS Father had met Alfredo H. that day, but denied anything
untoward happened between the two men.
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D. C.L.’s Detention from Father Before the
Jurisdiction/Disposition Hearing
On October 26, 2021, based on DCFS’s ex parte request,
the court detained C.L. from Father. The court granted Father
monitored visits, but required the visits be monitored “by a DCFS
approved monitor” and specifically that “Mother is not to monitor
[F]ather’s visits.”
E. Jurisdiction/Disposition Hearing
At the December 2, 2021 combined jurisdiction and
disposition hearing, the court received into evidence DCFS
reports containing the information outlined above. In addition,
DCFS filed a Last Minute Information attaching copies of
November 2021 text messages between Mother and Father. In
the text messages, Mother tells Father to leave her alone and
castigates him for having impregnated another woman, but in a
follow-up message, she apologizes, writing: “ ‘[It] is all my fault.
I miss you.’ ”
The court sustained the petition based on domestic violence
between Mother and Father and Mother’s physical abuse of K.H.
and S.C.
The court removed C.L. from Father’s custody, and ordered
family maintenance services for Mother and enhancement
services for Father, including parenting classes, individual
counseling, and a DCFS-approved domestic violence program for
both parents. It also ordered Father to undergo five consecutive
drug tests. The court granted Father monitored visits with C.L.,
but permitted only DCFS-approved monitors and the paternal
11
grandmother2 as monitors. The court further ordered the
parents to communicate via Talking Parents. The disposition
order did not include the explicit restriction, included in the
detention order, prohibiting Mother from serving as a monitor.
Mother was, nonetheless, not a permitted monitor, as she was
not DCFS-approved.
By this time, Mother’s EPO had expired, but Mother did
not request, and the court did not impose, any restrictions on
Mother and Father’s interactions other than requiring that they
communicate using Talking Parents.
Father timely appealed the December 2021 jurisdiction and
disposition orders.
F. Section 342 Petition and Restraining Order
Based on Alfredo H.’s Domestic Violence
On January 15, 2022, Alfredo H. assaulted Mother by
physically dragging her from his parked car and hitting her
repeatedly in the face, causing a laceration to her forehead
that required approximately seven stitches. Mother called
law enforcement, but Alfredo H. fled before the officers arrived.
Two days later Alfredo H. and a friend arrived uninvited at
Mother’s apartment after 11:00 p.m. When Mother called 9-1-1,
Alfredo H. grabbed her phone and ran out of the apartment.
On April 5, 2022, the court sustained a section 342 petition
based on domestic violence between Mother and Alfredo H. The
court found that “there [we]re reasonable services available to
prevent removal,” and “[i]n light of these services[,] the [c]ourt
2The order required DCFS to assess the paternal
grandmother as a potential monitor. DCFS subsequently did so,
and approved the paternal grandmother as a monitor for visits.
12
[found the] release of the child[ren] to [Mother] would not be
detrimental to [their] safety, protection, or physical or emotional
well-being.”
G. Removal from Mother and Section 387
Supplemental Petition
1. Evidence regarding Mother and
Father’s continuing contact
In early to mid 2022, DCFS received reports that Father
might be frequently visiting and/or living with Mother at her
home.
In a March 2022 report, DCFS related Father again telling
a DCFS social worker that he “still talks to [M]other about their
baby [C.L.] on the phone.” Father also told DCFS he and Mother
were not in a relationship and “ ‘just talk for the baby.’ ”
On April 13, 2022, an anonymous caller informed DCFS
that “[M]other[’]s ex[-boyfriend] has been staying in the
apartment with [M]other.” The caller “stated she took [a]
photograph of [Father’s] car in [the] parking structure and
provided [it] to” DCFS.
DCFS reported to the court that around April 25, 2022, I.H.
texted DCFS alleging Mother had allowed Father to have contact
with C.L. and attaching as support for this assertion a Facebook
photograph, dated April 12, of Mother, Father, and C.L. together.
When confronted by DCFS with the photograph, Mother
admitted its genuineness and explained it was taken in January
2022 in a park during a visit between Father and C.L., monitored
by the paternal grandmother. Mother explained that she did not
stay for the visit but only took the picture and left. She denied
reports that she and Father were living together. When Father
was questioned about the photograph, he admitted that he and
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Mother were “cordial and took a picture together at one of the
visitation days.”
When interviewed by DCFS in late May 2022, S.C., Jo.H.,
Da.H., and Je.H. all denied that Father lived in their home or
had any contact with them. K.H., however, reported she saw
Father’s shoes “ ‘were still there [at Mother’s home]’ ” on one
occasion in March 2022. The children’s therapist informed
DCFS that she believed Mother was “coaching” the children
in their statements to DCFS.
According to I.H.’s interview, “[Mother] had called
[Alfredo H.] and [Alfredo H.’s] girlfriend using [Father’s]
Facebook.” Alfredo H. reported this as well. Alfredo H. and
I.H. both reported that after the January 19, 2022 domestic
violence incident between Alfredo H. and Mother, Alfredo H.
started getting harassing phone calls from both Mother and
Father.
Finally, the DCFS report relayed that LASD deputies
had come to Mother’s house on April 19, 2022 in response to
an assault with a deadly weapon emergency call. Upon their
arrival, however, Mother told the deputies that “nothing was
occurring at her residence” and that she had allowed an unknown
female to use her cell phone to call the fire department, but the
unknown female then left. While conducting the interview with
Mother, the deputy noticed a blood trail. The deputy then found
a man in the bathroom who identified himself as “Jesus Duran.”
Upon questioning, the man explained that he had been attacked
on the street and ran to “his friend’s house” (Mother’s residence)
to seek help, at which point Mother called the fire department
for assistance. “Jesus Duran” is also the false name Father gave
law enforcement when he was arrested in June 2019. The LASD
14
report does not indicate that anyone other than Mother and
“Jesus Duran” were present during the time LASD deputies
were at Mother’s home.
2. May 2022 temporary removal of children
from Mother
On May 5, 2022, DCFS filed an application requesting
temporary removal of all children from Mother, pending a
hearing, “due to concerns regarding failure to protect the children
from [Father] or comply with court orders. . . . [M]other has
allowed [Father] to have unlimited access to all the children.
There is photographic evidence of . . . [M]other and [Father]
together, and it was reported that he is residing in the home.”
The court granted the temporary removal order and, on May 6,
2022, DCFS removed the children from Mother. DCFS placed
S.C., Jo.H., Da.H., Je.H., and C.L. in the home of nonrelative
foster parent A.T. The court did not modify De.H. and K.H.’s
placement with the maternal grandmother and I.H., respectively.
3. Section 387 petition
On May 10, 2022, DCFS filed a section 387 petition seeking
removal of the children from Mother based solely on Mother’s
alleged failure to comply with the juvenile court’s orders
regarding visitation by allowing Father to live in the home and
have unlimited contact with the children.
4. Reports submitted in advance of the
section 387 hearing
Reports submitted in advance of the section 387 hearing
contained the information outlined above regarding suspected
contact between Mother and Father and the photograph of
Mother, Father, and C.L. They also relayed DCFS concerns
15
that Mother had not gained sufficient insight into the cycle of
domestic violence. Finally, the reports included an update on
the parents’ progress with their respective court-ordered services.
Mother had participated in family preservation services from
December 2021 until the children’s detention in May 2022.
The preservation services provider acknowledged that Mother
and the children were cooperative but were still addressing
various issues. Mother had completed individual counseling
and a 12-week domestic violence class. Father “had not enrolled
in services but had already received referrals . . . [and] declined
additional referrals.” Between December 2021 and February
2022, he had submitted to all five court-ordered drug tests, with
negative results.
H. Section 387 Hearing
At the disposition portion of the section 387 hearing, all
the children’s counsel joined DCFS in arguing that the petition
should be sustained. The court agreed and sustained the sole
count in the petition, which provided as follows: “[M]other . . .
failed to comply with the juvenile court orders in that . . .
[Mother’s] male companion, [Father,] . . . is to have monitored
visits by a DCFS approved monitor and that [M]other was not
to monitor . . . [F]ather’s visits. On multiple occasions, . . .
[M]other has allowed . . . [F]ather to have unlimited contact with
the children without an approved DCFS monitor present. . . .
[Mo]ther’s failure to comply with juvenile court orders endangers
the children’s physical health and safety, and places the children
at risk of serious physical harm and damage.” (Capitalization
omitted.) The court stated its “serious concerns about Mother’s
protective capacities, her abilities to provide a safe home”
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because “the evidence supports a finding that . . . Mother has
allowed [Father] to have unfettered access to these kids.”
The court also found that “by clear and convincing
evidence [that] there is substantial danger if [the] children
were returned home to the mother’s home to their physical
health, safety, protection, physical and emotional well-being”
and that “[r]easonable efforts [had] been made to prevent
removal.” The court ordered the children to remain removed
from Mother and that DCFS suitably place them.
Both Mother and Father timely appealed the June 2022
orders.
On its own motion, this court consolidated Father’s appeal
of the December 2021 orders with Mother’s and Father’s appeals
of the June 2022 orders.
DISCUSSION
In appeal No. B317015, Father challenges: (1) the
jurisdictional findings under the section 300 petition, (2) the
removal of C.L. from Father’s custody, (3) the requirement
that Father submit to drug tests, and (4) the requirement
that his visits with C.L. be monitored. In appeal No. B321889,
(1) Father challenges the order sustaining the section 387
petition; (2) Both Mother and Father challenge the removal
of the children from Mother’s care; and (3) Father further
contends that the dispositional orders, if not reversed, must be
conditionally affirmed and the court instructed to order further
inquiry because DCFS did not comply with its initial duty of
inquiry under ICWA.
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A. Father’s Jurisdictional Arguments
Father challenges the court’s assertion of jurisdiction over
C.L. He argues that substantial evidence does not support that
Mother and Father engaged in domestic violence in the presence
of the children, and that even if it did, substantial evidence does
not support that, at the time of the jurisdictional hearing, past
domestic violence between Mother and Father put C.L. at risk
of harm.
In reviewing for substantial evidence, “[w]e do not pass
on the credibility of witnesses, attempt to resolve conflicts in the
evidence or weigh the evidence. Rather, we draw all reasonable
inferences in support of the findings, view the record favorably
to the juvenile court’s order and affirm the order even if other
evidence supports a contrary finding.” (In re James R. (2009)
176 Cal.App.4th 129, 135.)
Applying that standard, we conclude the domestic
violence allegations are both supported by substantial evidence
and sufficient to support section 300 jurisdiction. We therefore
need not reach Father’s additional challenge to the court’s
jurisdictional findings based on Mother physically abusing C.L.’s
siblings. (See In re Jonathan B. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 873, 875
[“[t]he reviewing court may affirm . . . if the evidence supports
the decision on any one of several grounds”]; In re Alexis E. (2009)
171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451 [same].)
1. Substantial evidence supports the finding
that the children witnessed domestic
violence between Mother and Father
Father contends that substantial evidence does not
support the court’s finding of domestic violence between Mother
and Father in the presence of the children. Specifically, Father
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argues that five of C.L.’s six half siblings deny ever witnessing
any domestic abuse, and the only child that gave a contrary
report, K.H., was not believable because she made inconsistent
statements and had a motive to lie.
But Jo.H., Da.H., and Mother all initially reported
witnessing domestic violence in the children’s presence.
Although they later denied it, the court was free to believe their
first version of events. As to K.H., K.H.’s statements are not
so inherently improbable that they were unworthy of belief.
Likewise, the court was free to believe K.H. despite her alleged
lying and motive to prevaricate.
2. The domestic violence is a legally
sufficient basis to establish jurisdiction
“Exposure to domestic violence may serve as the basis
for dependency jurisdiction. (In re R.C. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th
930, 941 . . . .) ‘ “ ‘Both common sense and expert opinion
indicate spousal abuse is detrimental to children.’ ” ’ [Citations.]”
(In re Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591, 602–603 (Cole L.).) We
acknowledge, as Father asserts, that past violence alone is not
sufficient to support jurisdiction. Rather, the evidence must
show that, as of the time of the jurisdictional hearing, the
domestic violence is likely to reoccur and to place the child at
“substantial risk” of “serious physical harm.” (§ 300, subds. (a) &
(b); see In re C.V. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 566, 572 [“[j]urisdiction
‘may not be based on a single episode of endangering conduct in
the absence of evidence that such conduct is likely to reoccur’ ”];
In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 824 [“[w]hile evidence of
past conduct may be probative of current conditions, the question
under section 300 is whether circumstances at the time of the
hearing subject the minor to the defined risk of harm,” italics
19
omitted], abrogated on another ground by In re R.T. (2017) 3
Cal.5th 622.)
Father argues that the evidence does not support that
past domestic violence between Mother and Father creates the
requisite current risk to the children, because the record at most
reflects minor incidents of violence and, in any case, does not
support that they were witnessed by the children. We disagree
with both assertions based on the evidence we described earlier.
As discussed, that evidence is sufficient to support a finding that
the children witnessed domestic violence between Mother and
Father. It is also sufficient to support, based on Mother, Jo.H.,
and Da.H.’s initial accounts of the August 25 incident, that the
violence included Father “chok[ing]” Mother—far from a minor
act of violence.
Father’s reliance on Cole L., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th 591,
is misplaced. In Cole L., the Court of Appeal reversed the lower
court’s assumption of jurisdiction because the record reflected
only a single minor episode of domestic violence which took place
outside the presence of the children. (Id. at p. 606.) But unlike
in Cole L., the instant record contains evidence of multiple
instances of domestic violence. And here, also unlike in Cole L.,
there is sufficient evidence that the children witnessed the
violence. Other cases Father cites in which a court found
insufficient evidence of current risk are distinguishable because
they all involve domestic violence that occurred a year or more
before the court asserted jurisdiction. (See In re Jesus M. (2015)
235 Cal.App.4th 104 [three years]; In re Daisy H. (2011) 192
Cal.App.4th 713, 717 [two to seven years].) Here, violence
occurred less than six months prior to the jurisdiction hearing.
20
Thus, we conclude substantial evidence supports the court’s
conclusion that Mother and Father’s history of domestic violence
created a current risk of harm to the children at the time of
the jurisdictional hearing sufficient to support juvenile court
jurisdiction.
B. The Record Supports C.L.’s Removal from
Father
Father next argues the court failed to make the requisite
factual findings to support removal of C.L. from his care, and, in
any event, substantial evidence would not support such findings.
Under section 361, subdivision (c)(1), a juvenile court may
remove a child from a parent’s physical custody where it finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, that there is a substantial danger
to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional
well-being of the child, or there would be if the child were
returned home, and there are no reasonable means to protect the
child without removal from the parent’s physical custody. (§ 361,
subd. (c)(1).) Before the court orders the child removed pursuant
to section 361, “[t]he court shall make a determination as to
whether reasonable efforts were made to prevent or to eliminate
the need for removal of the minor from his or her home” and
“shall state the facts on which the decision to remove the minor
is based.” (§ 361, subd. (e).)
“Due process requires the findings underlying [an] initial
removal order to be based on clear and convincing evidence.” (In
re Henry V. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 522, 530.) Where, as here, we
are presented with “a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
associated with a finding requiring clear and convincing evidence,
[we] must determine whether the record, viewed as a whole,
contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of
21
fact could have made the finding of high probability demanded by
this standard of proof.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th
989, 1005; In re V.L. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 147, 155 [“O.B. is
controlling in dependency cases”].)
1. Requisite risk of harm to support removal
To establish the requisite level of risk to a child to
justify removal from a custodial parent, “[t]he parent need
not be dangerous and the [child] need not have been actually
harmed . . . . The focus of the statute is on averting harm to the
child.” (In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 135–136.) “[T]he
juvenile court may consider the parent’s past conduct and current
circumstances, and the parent’s response to the conditions that
gave rise to juvenile court intervention.” (In re D.B. (2018) 26
Cal.App.5th 320, 332.)
Father argues that, considering the record as a whole,
the domestic violence between Mother and him was insufficient
to establish the requisite level of risk to justify removal, in
particular given the heightened “clear and convincing” burden
of proof below and the need for the risk to be established at the
time the child is removed. He argues the violence did not result
in any physical injuries, and that C.L., although present during
at least one of the altercations, was not within the zone of danger.
According to Father, such nonextreme violence in which C.L. was
not at risk of being physically injured is insufficient to establish
the requisite level of risk of harm to C.L. three months later.
But as noted in response to similar arguments discussed
above, the record does contain substantial evidence that C.L. and
the other children were in the zone of danger created by Mother
and Father’s domestic violence: There is evidence that C.L. was
present in the studio apartment during the August 2021 incident,
22
and other children present indicated (at least at one point) that
they witnessed the violence as well.
As to currentness of the risk at the time of the initial
dispositional hearing, we note that the August 25, 2021
incident—during which Father “chok[ed]” Mother—occurred
after DCFS and the juvenile court had already been involved
with the family for several months, as did the altercation
between Father and Alfredo H. in September 2021. The passage
of another three months without incident—during most of which
time Father was restricted by an EPO protecting Mother—does
not undermine the court’s implied conclusion that the August
and September 2021 incidents supported a current risk of harm
to C.L. at the time of the December 2021 hearing.3
Moreover, in addition to the evidence of domestic
violence episodes, substantial evidence also supports that
Father could not be trusted to care for C.L. based on his use
of illegal drugs. According to Mother, Father regularly smoked
methamphetamines and had done so as recently as August 25,
2021, approximately four months before the jurisdiction hearing.
Further, the disposition hearing record reflected Father’s drug-
related criminal history dating back to 2017. Indeed, during one
arrest in September 2020, Father admitted to the officers that he
smoked methamphetamine once or twice a week, and the police
found methamphetamine on his person during one of his 2019
3 Father also briefly argues that, to the extent there was
a risk of harm to C.L. based on the parents’ domestic violence
history, it existed when C.L. was in Mother’s care as well.
But this is a basis on which one might argue the court’s order
permitting C.L. to be released to Mother was error—not a basis
for arguing that the court erred in removing C.L. from Father.
(See In re I.R. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 510, 521, fn. 6.)
23
arrests. Further, Father gave DCFS inconsistent information
regarding his marijuana use, initially stating that he smoked
marijuana on a weekly basis but months later, in an October
2021 interview with DCFS, indicating he had stopped smoking
marijuana “ ‘a long time ago.’ ” (See In re Lana S. (2012) 207
Cal.App.4th 94, 105–106 [“lengthy history of drug abuse, denial
of any drug problem, [and] refusal to voluntarily drug test and
enter drug treatment, and her reference to her live-in boyfriend
as a heroin addict” constituted substantial evidence supporting
removal from Mother].)
Thus, Father’s history of drug use, when combined with
the domestic violence, provide a basis on which the court could
reasonably infer that, as of December 2021, allowing C.L. to be
in Father’s custody posed a risk to C.L.’s safety and well-being
of sufficient magnitude to satisfy section 361, subdivision (c).
2. The court’s failure to make a finding
supporting lack of alternatives to
removal was not prejudicial
Father argues that, even if substantial evidence supports
the requisite level of risk to support removal, it is undisputed
that the court failed to make the statutorily-mandated findings
regarding whether reasonable means other than removal could
have neutralized that risk, thus requiring us to reverse for the
court to make the necessary findings. (See § 361, subd. (e).)
Such failure, however, constitutes reversible error only if it is
“ ‘ “reasonably probable” ’ ” the Father would have achieved a
more favorable result, had the court made such findings. (In re
D.P. (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 1058, 1067; see In re Jason L. (1990)
222 Cal.App.3d 1206, 1218 [failure to make required findings
under § 361, subd. (e) is harmless if “ ‘it is not reasonably
24
probable such finding, if made, would have been in favor of
continued parental custody’ ”].) Here, it is not reasonably
probable that, had the court made the required findings, it
would aid Father.
Father argues that the court and DCFS’s ongoing
supervision were alternatives to removal sufficient to protect
C.L. We disagree. In the time between DCFS filing the petition
and the hearing at which C.L. was ordered removed from Father,
DCFS was already supervising the family, yet at least two
additional incidents of domestic violence occurred involving
Father, for which at least some of the children were present.
This evidence supports that DCFS and/or juvenile court
supervision would be insufficient to neutralize the risk to C.L.
from further domestic violence incidents or insulate C.L. from
Father’s dangerous drug use.
In these ways, substantial evidence supports that no
reasonable alternative means could protect C.L. from Father,
and the record does not present “a reasonable chance, more than
an abstract possibility” (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court
(1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 715, italics omitted) that had the court
made the requisite findings regarding reasonable alternatives
to removal, it would not have removed C.L. from Father.
C. The Drug Testing and Monitored Visitation
for Father
Father next challenges the requirement that he submit
to five on-demand drug tests, and complete a drug treatment
program if he misses any of the tests or tests positive. Father
has already submitted to the five tests and received all
negative results, so this portion of his appeal is moot. (See
In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276 [A case is moot when it is
25
“ ‘ “impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor
of plaintiff, to grant him any effect[ive] relief.” ’ [Citation.]
For relief to be ‘effective,’ . . . the plaintiff must complain of
an ongoing harm [that is] . . . redressable or capable of being
rectified by the outcome the [appellant] seeks”].)
Father also argues the court erred in requiring, as part
of the December 2021 dispositional order, that his visits be
monitored. We disagree.
“The juvenile court may make ‘all reasonable orders
for the care, supervision, custody, conduct, maintenance, and
support of the child.’ ” (In re Briana V. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th
297, 311, quoting § 362, subd. (a); see § 362, subd. (d).) The court
has broad discretion to fashion such orders as are in the best
interests of the child, and is not limited to the content of the
sustained petition when it considers what dispositional orders
would be in the best interests of the children. Father argues
that the court’s visitation order reflects an abuse of discretion
for effectively the same reason he argues the court’s order
removing C.L. from Father should be reversed: that substantial
evidence does not support Father either abused drugs or
engaged in domestic violence to a sufficient extent. We reject
this argument for the same reasons we reject it in our analysis
of the court’s removal order above.
D. Section 387 Petition and Removal of Children
From Mother
Section 387 provides the proper vehicle to invoke when
DCFS seeks to change the previously ordered placement of a
dependent child from the physical custody of a parent to a more
restrictive level of court-ordered care. (In re T.W. (2013) 214
Cal.App.4th 1154, 1161 (T.W.).) Section 387 requires that “[f]irst,
26
one of the parties must file a supplemental petition setting forth
‘a concise statement of facts sufficient to support the conclusion
that the previous disposition has not been effective in the . . .
protection of the child . . . .’ (§ 387, subd. (b) . . . ; see Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 5.560(c); [citations].)” (In re Brianna S. (2021)
60 Cal.App.5th 303, 312 (Brianna S.), italics omitted.) Because
the court has previously taken jurisdiction over the child, a
section 387 petition need not allege facts sufficient to support
jurisdiction. (See T.W., supra, at p. 1161.) “Second, the court
must convene a ‘noticed hearing’ within 30 days of its filing
of the supplemental petition and the party filing the petition
must give notice of the petition at least five days in advance of
the hearing where . . . the child remains in [his or] her current
custody placement. (§ 387, subd. (a); see §§ 297, subd. (b)(1),
290.2, subd. (c)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.565(c)(1).) [¶]
Third, the court must decide whether (1) the allegations in the
supplemental petition are true, and (2) whether it is appropriate
to change or modify the previous placement order by removing
the child from her current placement.” (Brianna S., supra, at
p. 312.)
In the first step—assessing whether the factual allegations
of the supplemental petition are true and the previous disposition
has been ineffective in protecting the child—the court must follow
the procedures for jurisdictional hearings, and this phase of the
hearing is thus referred to as the jurisdictional phase, although
it cannot establish additional bases for juvenile court jurisdiction.
(§ 387, subd. (b); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.565(e)(1); In re
Jonique W. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 685, 691.)
If the court finds that the petition allegations are true,
the court progresses to the dispositional portion of the hearing,
27
at which it considers whether removal is proper. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 5.565(e)(2); In re H.G. (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 1, 11;
In re Javier G. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 453, 461 (Javier G.).)
Where, as here, “the section 387 supplemental petition seeks
to remove the child from her ‘parent’ or ‘guardian,’ ” in assessing
the need for removal at the dispositional phase of the section 387
hearing, the court must assess whether the evidence supports
the findings necessary to justify removal under section 361,
subdivision (c). (Brianna S., supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 312;
Javier G., supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at p. 462; T.W., supra, 214
Cal.App.4th at p. 1163; but see In re A.O. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th
103, 111–112 [not so requiring].)
Father argues that substantial evidence does not support
the factual allegations in the section 387 petition, and thus the
court erred in sustaining it. In addition, Mother and Father
both argue that, even if the court properly found the allegations
in the petition true and proceeded to the dispositional phase
of the hearing to determine whether removal was appropriate,
substantial evidence does not support the circumstances
necessary to justify removal under section 361, subdivision (c).
We agree that substantial evidence does not support
the factual allegations in the section 387 petition. Because we
conclude this error was prejudicial, we reverse both the order
sustaining the section 387 petition and the order removing the
children from Mother that followed.
The section 387 petition alleged that the previous
disposition permitting the children to remain with Mother was
no longer sufficient to protect the children, because Mother and
Father had violated court orders regarding monitored visitation,
thereby allowing Father “to have unlimited contact with the
28
children without an approved DCFS monitor present.” This is
the entirety of the factual basis for the petition.
The evidence does not support that Mother and Father
violated any court order regarding visitation or Father’s
contact with the children. The only such visitation order in
place required that Father’s visits with C.L. be supervised by
a DCFS-approved monitor or the paternal grandmother, once
approved by DCFS (as the paternal grandmother ultimately
was). This order thus prohibits Mother, who is not an approved
monitor, from monitoring Father’s visits with C.L. But it does
not restrict Mother’s presence during Father’s visits, as long as
the visits are properly monitored. Nor does the requirement
that Father’s visits be supervised by a DCFS-approved monitor
restrict Father’s ability to be near C.L., Mother, or Mother’s other
children during a properly monitored visit. The photograph of
Mother with Father and C.L. thus is not evidence that Mother
violated an order regarding visitation, because it does not inform
whether a monitor was present or whether such monitor was
DCFS-approved.
Nor is there evidence in the record that Mother was
allowing Father “unlimited access” to any of the children.
Indeed, there is no evidence of any interaction between Father
and any of the children during the period between the December
2021 dispositional order placing the children with Mother and
the adjudication of the section 387 petition in June 2022, save
the photograph of Mother, Father, and C.L. and evidence of
properly monitored visits between Father and C.L. DCFS notes
that the children’s therapist was concerned Mother was coaching
the children in their statements to DCFS. But even assuming
the court found the children’s statements that they had no
29
contact with Father not credible on this basis, such lack of
credibility would only prevent the statements from serving as
evidence the children had not had contact with Father—not
transform the statements into evidence that the children actually
did have such contact.
The evidence supporting the petition provides a basis on
which the court could infer contact between Mother and Father;
for example, K.H.’s statement that she noticed Father’s shoes
at Mother’s home, the LASD incident report regarding “Jesus
Duran,” or Facebook activity suggesting Mother and Father
were in contact. Such contact would violate the court’s order
that Mother and Father communicate solely via the application
Talking Parents. (The EPO against Father had expired in
November 2021, and thus no longer restricted them.) But contact
between Mother and Father—even contact that violates a court
order regarding how they are to communicate—is not a basis
for a reasonable inference that Father had any access to the
children. Rather, it is a basis for mere speculation to that effect.
(In re Albert T. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 207, 217 [“ ‘ “inferences
that are the result of mere speculation or conjecture cannot
support a finding,” ’ ” italics omitted].) Nor is it a basis on which
we can conclude—at least not without additional allegations
establishing that this continuing contact placed the children at
risk—that the court’s previous order permitting the children to
remain with Mother was insufficient to protect them. (See In re
W.O. (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 906, 910 [“Violations of court orders
are not to be encouraged and violators may be appropriately
punished. Taking away one’s children is not an appropriate
punishment”].) Thus, substantial evidence does not support
30
the specific factual allegations in the section 387 petition, and
the court’s order sustaining the petition was error.
DCFS urges that we may affirm based on substantial
evidence supporting that the previous disposition was insufficient
to keep the children safe in ways not alleged in the section 387
petition. Specifically, DCFS points to the continuing domestic
violence the court could infer occurred between Father and
Mother based on the LASD report regarding “Jesus Duran” and
the January 2022 domestic violence of Alfredo H. This, combined
with the continued contact between Mother and Father in
violation of the Talking Parents order, could potentially provide
substantial evidence to support a finding that Mother and
Father’s continuing domestic violence and continuing contact
in violation of court orders rendered the previous disposition
insufficient to protect the children. But the court never made
such a factual finding, and “[w]e cannot affirm a jurisdictional
finding that was never alleged or made in the trial court.” (In re
V.M. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 245, 253.) Nor can such a finding
by the court below be implied, given the extremely narrow factual
allegations in the petition. “To be sure, ‘ “ ‘a ruling or decision,
itself correct in law, will not be disturbed on appeal merely
because given for the wrong reason.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (Cole L.,
supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 606.) But DCFS is “asking us not to
affirm a decision by the court that is by law correct on different
grounds.” (Ibid.) Rather, we are asked “to make an entirely
new decision based on a factual finding”—namely, a finding
that domestic violence was continuing between Mother and
Father as recently as April 2022—“not made by the juvenile
court. That decision and finding were for the juvenile court
in the first instance, not this court.” (Ibid.)
31
Moreover, affirming based on the evidence supporting
factual allegations never made below4 would deny Mother the
process she is due under section 387: namely, notice and an
opportunity to be heard on the facts, based on which section 387
authorizes the court to modify its previous order and potentially
remove her children from her. “A parent’s fundamental right to
adequate notice and the opportunity to be heard in dependency
matters involving potential deprivation of the parental interest
[citation] has little, if any, value unless the parent is advised
of the nature of the hearing giving rise to that opportunity,
including what will be decided therein.” (In re Stacy T. (1997)
52 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1424, italics omitted; cf. Brianna S.,
supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 315 [no prejudice from section 387
procedural error where appellant was “effectively accorded all
of the process she was due under section 387” where DCFS “filed
a supplemental petition with the appropriate content,” appellant
was afforded “the opportunity to argue against [DCFS’s] request”
at a timely hearing, and substantial evidence supported the
allegations in the section 387 petition].) Had Mother and Father
been given notice—via additional allegations in the section 387
petition—that DCFS was seeking a section 387 modification
based on Father and Mother engaging in domestic violence in
recent months and/or Alfredo H.’s attacks on Mother, Mother
and/or Father may have offered argument or evidence on these
issues. For example, they may have offered evidence bearing
on the identity of “Jesus Duran” or additional evidence regarding
Mother’s efforts to protect her children following the attack and
4DCFS also did not allege continuing domestic violence
between Mother and Father as a basis for C.L.’s detention from
Mother before the section 387 hearing.
32
threats by Alfredo H. We cannot say that denying Mother such
an opportunity was harmless, as Mother did not have reason to
offer such evidence at the jurisdictional phase of the section 387
hearing, which focused solely on alleged violations of visitation
orders and Father’s access to the children. (See Brianna S.,
supra, at p. 315.)
“The standard for removal from parental custody under
section 361, subdivision (c)(1), is relevant only in a disposition
hearing after the court has made true findings” as to the
allegations in the section 387 petition. (Javier G., supra, 137
Cal.App.4th at p. 461.) Because we conclude that the court
reversibly erred in concluding the allegations in the section 387
petition were true, we need not address the parties’ arguments
regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to support removal
under section 361. Rather, we reverse both the court’s order
sustaining the section 387 petition and the court’s order removing
the children from Mother at the section 387 hearing.
E. ICWA Compliance
Finally, Father asserts DCFS failed to inquire of C.L.’s
extended family—including several specific paternal family
members and the maternal grandmother—as to whether C.L.
is or may be an “Indian child” under ICWA, requiring the
dispositional orders to be conditionally affirmed and the matter
remanded for ICWA compliance. DCFS does not dispute Father’s
contention that DCFS has not complied with its initial duty
of inquiry under ICWA, nor does it argue that this failure
was not prejudicial. (See § 224.2, subds. (a) & (b) [setting forth
ICWA duty of inquiry].) Rather, the parties disagree as to the
appropriate remedy for this failure to comply. We conclude that,
because the juvenile court still has jurisdiction over C.L., as well
33
as an ongoing duty to ensure compliance with ICWA, we can
sufficiently address any failure by DCFS to comply with its ICWA
duties by directing the juvenile court to require that DCFS do so,
to the extent it has not already.5 (See, e.g., In re A.C. (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 1009, 1018 [affirming jurisdictional and dispositional
orders with instructions that DCFS comply with ICWA duty
of inquiry]; see also In re Baby Girl M., supra, 83 Cal.App.5th
at p. 639, fn. 2 [“[w]e see no need to order any ICWA findings
vacated because ICWA-related obligations are continuing duties;
that means earlier ICWA-related findings are subject to change
and no order vacating an earlier finding is necessary here”]; see
also id. at pp. 638–639 [where appeal from ongoing dependency
proceedings based solely on lack of sufficient ICWA inquiry, “all
[the Court of Appeal] could order in resolving th[e] appeal [was]
that [DCFS] and [the] juvenile court fulfill their inquiry and
notice obligations under ICWA”].) The parties have not briefed
what specifically the ICWA duty of inquiry requires under the
circumstances of this case. We thus do not consider the issue.
5 Nor is Father’s appeal moot as to the ICWA issue, as
was the appeal in In re Baby Girl M. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 635,
because here, unlike in that case, the record does not reflect that
DCFS is already remedying the alleged lack of sufficient inquiry,
or that the juvenile court has already ordered DCFS to do so.
(See id. at pp. 638–639 [concluding that, because DCFS was
already starting to fulfill inquiry and notice obligations, “there
is no effective relief we can now provide”].)
34
DISPOSITION
The orders sustaining the section 387 petition and
removing the children from Mother are reversed. In all other
respects, we affirm.
Upon remand, the juvenile court is directed to order
DCFS to comply with the requirements of section 224.2 and
California Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a) forthwith, to the extent
it has not already. The court shall conduct further proceedings
in accordance with ICWA, if applicable.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:
CHANEY, J.
WEINGART, J.
35