People v. Maestas CA4/2 ( 2023 )

Filed 7/13/23 P. v. Maestas CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E078601
v. (Super. Ct. No. RIF1702492)
RONALD MAESTAS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Bernard Schwartz, Judge.
Affirmed.
Christine Vento, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa Mandel and Seth M.
Friedman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
A jury convicted defendant and appellant Ronald Maestas of 12 counts arising
from his sexual abuse of his stepdaughter, and the trial court sentenced him to 127 years
to life in prison. Defendant’s sole argument on appeal is that his sentence is
unconstitutional. We affirm.
II.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Jane Doe was two years old when her mother married defendant. She thought of
him as her father.
When she was around five years old, defendant began sexually abusing her. The
abuse continued for years and got progressively worse. Defendant penetrated her
digitally and with his penis, and made her masturbate him. Doe estimated that defendant
had intercourse with her about 100 times between the ages of nine and 12. When she got
her first period at age 12, however, defendant stopped the abuse and it never happened
again.
When she was 13, Doe finally reported defendant’s abuse to her mother. Doe and
her mother confronted defendant, and he became cagey. Eventually, however, he said it
1
Given that defendant’s only argument on appeal is that his sentence is
unconstitutional, our recitation of the facts and procedural history is truncated.
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was an “isolated event,” got down on his knees, began crying, and repeatedly said he was
sorry.
Defendant moved out, but moved back in a few weeks later. About three years
later, Doe’s mother and defendant began having marital problems and decided to
separate. Doe, who was 16 at the time, decided to report defendant’s abuse to the police.
A jury convicted defendant of one count of committing a lewd act on a child under
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14 years old in violation of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a) (count 1) , eight
counts of committing a forcible lewd act on a child under 14 years old in violation of
section 288, subdivision (b)(1) (counts 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 10, 11, & 12), and three counts of
engaging in sexual intercourse with a child aged 10 or younger in violation of section
288.7, subdivision (a) (counts 5, 7, & 9). The trial court sentenced defendant to 52 years
plus 75 years to life in prison.
III.
DISCUSSION
Defendant’s only argument is that his 127-years-to-life sentence is excessive in
violation of the Eighth Amendment to the federal constitutional and article I, sections 6
and 17 of the California Constitution because it is effectively a sentence of life without
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the possibility of parole (LWOP). We disagree.
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All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3
Although defendant forfeited the argument by failing to object to his sentence
(People v. Baker (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 711, 720), we will address it on the merits “to
[footnote continued on next page]
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Our colleagues in the First District, Division Four, recently rejected the same
argument on similar facts after thoroughly considering the applicable state and federal
precedent. (See People v. Johnson (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 487 (Johnson).) The
defendant in Johnson was convicted of 13 counts for sexually abusing his nine-year-old
daughter and was sentenced to 32 years plus 135 years to life. (Id. at p. 492.) He
challenged this “‘de facto [LWOP] sentence’” as grossly disproportionate and excessive
in violation of the California and federal constitutions. (Id. at p. 506.) Noting that at
least two other California courts had found sentences of 129 years and 135 years to life
were constitutional under both state and federal law, the Johnson court concluded that
“precedent does not enable us to say that defendant’s cumulative sentence of 32 years
plus 135 years to life shocks the conscience and is grossly disproportionate to the 13
crimes of which he was convicted and sentence was imposed.” (Id. at p. 507, citing
People v. Bestelmeyer (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 520, 523, 528-530, and People v. Retanan
(2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1230-1231.)
Defendant does not argue that Johnson is distinguishable. He instead points to
Justice Streeter’s concurrence in Johnson expressing his view that the defendant’s
sentence may be unconstitutional under the California constitution. (Johnson, supra, 88
Cal.App.5th at p. 507 (conc. opn. of Streeter, J.).) Justice Streeter acknowledged,
however, that binding precedent did not allow him to reach that conclusion. (Id. at pp.
507-509). He concluded his concurrence by urging the California Supreme Court to
avert [defendant’s] claim of inadequate assistance of counsel.” (People v. Yarbrough
(2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 303, 310.)
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reconsider the issue and to adopt Justice Mosk’s minority position that “‘[a] sentence . . .
that cannot possibly be completed in the defendant’s lifetime, makes a mockery of the
law and amounts to cruel or unusual punishment.’” (Id. at p. 507, quoting People v.
Hicks (1993) 6 Cal.4th 784, 797 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).)
We express no view on the issue other than recognizing that, as in Johnson,
“precedent does not enable us to say that defendant’s cumulative sentence” of 52 years
plus 75 years to life in prison violates the California or federal constitution. (Johnson,
supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 507.) We therefore must affirm defendant’s sentence. (See
id. at p. 510 [“Unfortunately, however, this court is bound by existing precedents to
affirm the judgment.”] (conc. opn. of Pollak, J.).)
IV.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON
Acting P. J.
We concur:
RAPHAEL
J.
MENETREZ
J.
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