People v. Washington CA1/5 ( 2023 )

Filed 7/6/23 P. v. Washington CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for pur-
poses of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A166126
v.
ISAIAH WASHINGTON, (Alameda County Super. Ct. No.
Defendant and Appellant. H53084A)
Isaiah Washington was 21 years old when he murdered two
people while robbing them and attempted to murder a third. In
2015 he was convicted and sentenced to life in prison without the
possibility of parole. Seven years later he filed a postjudgment
motion in the trial court, requesting a hearing to develop a record
of mitigating circumstances for an eventual youthful offender
parole hearing pursuant to Penal Code, section 3051.1 (See
People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin).) This appeal
is from the court’s denial of that motion.
Washington acknowledges his life without parole sentence
renders him statutorily ineligible for the youthful offender parole
program (§ 3051, subd. (h)), but contends this exclusion violates
his constitutional equal protection rights and prohibitions
against cruel and unusual punishment. We reject the former
1 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
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claim for the reasons we articulated in People v. Sands (2021) 70
Cal.App.5th 193 (Sands) and deem the latter forfeited and
meritless.
BACKGROUND
A.
The Legislature enacted section 3051 to bring juvenile
sentencing into conformity with recent United States and
California Supreme Court cases addressing Eighth Amendment
limits on juvenile sentencing. (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p.
277; Sands, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 197-198.) With certain
exceptions, persons convicted of an offense committed when they
were 25 or younger “shall be eligible for release on parole at a
youth offender parole hearing” during their 15th, 20th, or 25th
year of incarceration, depending on the sentence originally
imposed. (§ 3051, subds. (b)(1)-(3).) Eligible offenders are also
entitled to a hearing (known as a Franklin hearing) to make an
accurate record of their characteristics and circumstances at the
time of the offense, so that, years later, the Board of Parole
Hearings may properly discharge its obligation to “ ‘give great
weight’ ” to the offender’s youth-related factors at the youth
offender parole hearing. (Franklin, supra, at p. 284.)
Several categories of juvenile and young adult offenders are
statutorily excluded from eligibility for youth offender parole.
Among them are offenders who, like Washington, were sentenced
to life without the possibility of parole for an offense committed
when they were 18 or older. (§ 3051, subd. (h); Sands, supra, 70
Cal.App.5th at p. 199.)
B.
In 2015, a jury convicted Washington of (1) two murders
with the use of a firearm, with the special circumstances that he
killed the victims during the commission of a robbery and
committed more than one murder; (2) attempted murder with the
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use of a firearm; and (3) being a felon in possession of a firearm.
The trial court imposed two consecutive terms of life without the
possibility of parole, plus concurrent terms for attempted murder
and illegal firearm possession. We affirmed the conviction in an
unpublished opinion. (People v. Washington (June 12, 2018,
A146433) [nonpub. opn.].)
In 2022, Washington moved for a Franklin hearing. He
argued the exclusion of 18-to-25-year-olds from eligibility for
youth offender parole violated his constitutional equal protection
rights and prohibitions against cruel or unusual punishment.
The court rejected both claims and denied the motion.
DISCUSSION
A.
In Sands, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th 193, we rejected the
contention Washington makes here. At issue are two different
classes of offenders who were in the same age group when they
committed their crimes (18 to 25 years old)—one group consists of
offenders who have been sentenced to life without parole, and the
second group consists of offenders who, having committed
different crimes, received sentences by which they are technically
eligible for parole but will not live long enough to actually become
eligible (sometimes called “de facto life without parole”). (See id.
at p. 203.) In Sands, we determined that the Legislature may,
consistent with equal protection principles, make the latter group
eligible for a youth offender parole hearing while excluding the
former group.
We observed the requirement of equal protection ensures
the government does not treat groups of people unequally
without justification. (Sands, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 202.)
To that end, courts must consider whether the state has adopted
a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups
in an unequal manner. If it has, and no suspect class or
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fundamental rights are at issue, we ask whether there is any
conceivable rational basis for the disparate treatment. (Id. at pp.
202, 204.)
In Sands, we assumed for purposes of argument that young
adult offenders sentenced to life without parole are similarly
situated to young adult offenders sentenced to de facto life
without parole. (Sands, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 203.) We
concluded, as have other courts, that the Legislature may
rationally treat the latter group less harshly because it deems
their crimes less severe than special circumstance murders
punishable by life without parole. (Id. at p. 204; see People v.
Morales (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 326, 348-349 ; People v. Jackson
(2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 189, 200 (Jackson); People v. Acosta (2021)
60 Cal.App.5th 769, 780 (Acosta); In re Williams (2020) 57
Cal.App.5th 427, 436 (Williams).) As we explained, offenses
punishable by life without parole “ ‘are the crimes the Legislature
deems so morally depraved and so injurious as to warrant a
sentence that carries no hope of release for the criminal and no
threat of recidivism for society.’ ” (Sands, supra, at p. 204,
quoting Williams, supra, at pp. 436, 460-461 [special
circumstances multiple murder warrants penalty reserved for the
most heinous crimes].)
We also rejected the claim Washington makes here that the
distinction lacks a rational basis simply because some offenders
sentenced to de facto life without parole terms may arguably be
equally or more culpable than some offenders sentenced to life
without parole. (Sands, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 204-205.)
“A legislative classification does not fail rational basis review
because it is ‘ “imperfect” ’ or ‘ “because it may be ‘to some extent
both underinclusive and overinclusive.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 205.)
Washington urges us to instead follow People v. Hardin
(2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 273, 278, 286-291 (Hardin), review granted
Jan. 11, 2023, S277487, which reached the opposite conclusion.
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The defendant, a youthful offender sentenced to life without
parole, raised the equal protection claim Washington advances
here. (Id. at pp. 280, 284.) The Hardin court agreed, reasoning
that section 3051 is “decidedly not a sentencing statute.” (Id. at
p. 287.) In its view, the Legislature’s sole purpose in enacting the
statute’s current iteration was to account for juvenile and
youthful offenders’ potential for rehabilitation after gaining
maturity, “not to assess culpability.” (Ibid.; see also id. at pp.
279, 288.) But even assuming culpability did have some “proper”
role in the statute, the court found it bore no rational relationship
to the exclusion of youthful offenders sentenced to life without
parole because the statute did not also exclude youthful offenders
sentenced to functionally equivalent terms. (Id. at pp. 289-290.)
As noted above, the Supreme Court has granted review of
Hardin. We are not persuaded to depart from Sands pending the
Court’s decision. First, we question Hardin’s characterization of
section 3051. As we said in Sands, while it may not be “ ‘a
sentencing statute per se, it nevertheless impacts the length of
sentence served.’ ” (Sands, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 205; see
also People v. Ngo (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 116, 125, review granted
May 17, 2023, S279458.) Moreover, under this scheme, an
offender’s eligibility for parole varies commensurately with the
length of the originally imposed sentence and, therefore, reflects
(albeit roughly) the culpability assessed at sentencing. (§ 3051,
subds. (b)(1)-(3).)
More fundamentally, the Legislature’s classifications are
presumed rational; the challenger has the burden of showing
they lack any conceivable rational basis. (Sands, supra, 70
Cal.App.5th at p. 204.) In considering an equal protection
challenge, we must accept any plausible rational basis without
questioning its wisdom, logic, persuasiveness, or fairness, and
regardless of whether the Legislature articulated it. (Ibid.)
Applying these principles, our analysis in Sands followed a well-
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trodden path to conclude the Legislature may rationally punish
youthful offenders sentenced to life without parole more severely
than those sentenced even to de facto life sentences. (Ibid.; see
People v. Morales, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at pp. 348-349 ; Jackson,
supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at p. 200; Acosta, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 780-781; Williams, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 436.) Simply
put, the Legislature has broad discretion to define degrees of
culpability and punishment and to distinguish between crimes in
this regard. (People v. Turnage (2012) 55 Cal.4th 62, 74.) It did
not abuse that discretion in denying eligibility for youthful parole
hearings for offenders who commit the most morally depraved
and injurious murders while extending it to those convicted of
murders it deems to be less grave. (Jackson, supra, at p. 200;
Williams, supra, at p. 436.)
B.
Washington next contends excluding him from section
3051’s youth parole hearing provisions violates constitutional
protections against cruel and unusual punishment. (U.S. Const.,
8th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 17.) As we understand the
argument, he maintains his sentence is unconstitutionally
disproportionate to his culpability and rehabilitative potential
because the sentencing court did not consider the mitigating
qualities of youth that must be taken into account in sentencing
juvenile murderers. (See Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460,
477-481, 489 [sentencing court must consider juvenile offender’s
youth and its attendant characteristics before imposing life
without parole].)
Washington forfeited this claim by failing, as far as we can
discern from his briefs and the record provided to us, to raise it at
sentencing—which, we observe, occurred several years after the
Supreme Court issued Miller v. Alabama, supra, 567 U.S. 460.
(See People v. Speight (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1247 [failure
to contemporaneously object sentence constituted cruel or
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unusual punishment forfeits claim on appeal].) In moving for a
Franklin hearing, Washington identified as relevant factors his
lack of cognitive development; abandonment issues; the
imprisonment of two family members; codependency issues; and
abuse. Such fact-specific challenges to sentencing decisions must
be raised at the sentencing hearing, where the trial court may
consider them in exercising its sentencing discretion. (People v.
Russell (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 981, 993.)
In any event, we agree with other courts that have rejected
the contention. (Acosta, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 782;
Williams, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at pp. 437-439.) The Eighth
Amendment prohibits only sentences that are grossly
disproportionate to an individual's crime. (Ewing v. California
(2003) 538 U.S. 11, 21 (Ewing); In re Dannenberg (2005) 34
Cal.4th 1061, 1096.) This limitation “will rarely apply to those
serious offenses and offenders currently subject by statute to life-
maximum imprisonment.” (In re Dannenberg, supra, at p. 1071;
see also Ewing, supra, at p. 21 [“ ‘[o]utside the context of capital
punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of
particular sentences have been exceedingly rare’ ”].) It does not
apply here. Even assuming Washington’s age when he robbed
and murdered two people to some extent diminished his
culpability, his sentence is not “grossly disproportionate” to those
egregious crimes. (See Williams, supra, at pp. 438-439.)
Finally, Washington asserts without cogent legal argument
or authority that imposing mandatory life without parole
sentences on African Americans is unconstitutionally
disproportionate “under the Racial Justice Act” (see § 745) in
light of a legislative committee report that 79 percent of those
serving life without parole sentences are people of color and 38
percent are Black youths under age 26. It is not this court’s role
to construct a legal theory linking these statistics to an Eighth
Amendment violation. (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764,
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793; Public Employment Relations Bd. v. Bellflower Unified
School Dist. (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 927, 939.) This contention,
too, is forfeited.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
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______________________
BURNS, J.
We concur:
____________________________
SIMONS, ACTING P.J.
____________________________
CHOU, J.
A166126
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