Rancheria v. Martin ( 2023 )

Filed 7/12/23
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Tehama)
----
GREENVILLE RANCHERIA, C096097
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. 21CI000234)
v.
ANGELA MARTIN et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tehama County, Jonathan W.
Skillman, Judge. Reversed.
Peebles Kidder Bergin & Robinson, John M. Peebles, Gregory M. Narvaez, Tim
Hennessy and Curtis Vandermolen for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Big Fire Law & Policy Group, Rose M. Weckenmann and Calandra Skye McCool
for Defendants and Respondents.
1
Plaintiff Greenville Rancheria (Greenville) is a sovereign Indian tribe that owns
administrative and medical offices (property) in the City of Red Bluff. Following a
contested election, defendant Angela Martin was elected as Greenville’s chairperson,
which included the authority to act as Greenville’s chief executive officer. After her
election, Martin, along with approximately 20 people, including defendants Andrea
Cazares-Diego, Andrew Gonzales, Hallie Hugo, Elijah Martin, and Adrian Hugo,1
entered the property and refused to leave despite the remaining members of the tribal
council ordering them to leave and removing Martin’s authority as chairperson under
Greenville’s constitution.
Given defendants’ failure to vacate the property, Greenville filed a verified
emergency complaint for trespass and injunctive relief. The trial court granted Greenville
a temporary restraining order, but later granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Greenville appeals. We reverse.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In June 2021, Greenville held a contested election for all five of its tribal council
positions. Defendants were members of a political party seeking to challenge the then-
existing leadership. Martin was successful in securing the tribal chairperson/chief
executive officer position in an at-large election. Defendants’ party was unsuccessful at
electing any other candidates to the tribal council. While defendants disputed the election
results, they did not challenge the outcome pursuant to Greenville’s constitution. The
election results were ratified and sent to the Bureau of Indian Affairs (Bureau).
On September 29, 2021, a group of approximately 20 people, including
defendants, entered the property, which was located entirely within the City of Red Bluff
and owned in fee simple by Greenville. Once inside, defendants spoke loudly and
1 We refer to all named defendants collectively as defendants and Angela Martin
individually as Martin.
2
expressed disagreement with tribal operations. Martin ordered Greenville’s staff to
provide defendants with a “list of personal addresses for each of Greenville’s members.”
Defendants directed Greenville’s staff to make copies of letters, print address labels, and
get envelopes, so that defendants could mail two separate mailings unrelated to
Greenville’s operations to all tribal members. Greenville’s staff reported the incident to
the tribal council.
That same day, defendants purported to hold a “Greenville Rancheria Tribal
Membership Special Meeting” at which 27 Greenville members were present. Those 27
members voted, among other things, to suspend Greenville’s vice-chairperson,
secretary/treasurer, and tribal administrator pending an investigation. The members also
voted to change the locks to the property and to authorize a new check signor on
Greenville-related bank accounts. The members further declared tribal council positions
vacant and filled them with other members.2
The next day, the tribal council adopted a resolution informing defendants their
occupation of the property was unlawful and directing defendants to vacate the property.
Defendants were served with the resolution the same day the tribal council passed it;
they, however, refused to vacate the property. Instead, defendants attempted to change
the locks on the property’s doors. “Greenville’s staff noticed the activity and the
locksmith provided Greenville with the keys instead.” Despite being ordered to leave,
defendants maintained “persistent and daily occupation of the [p]roperty.”
On October 1, 2021, Martin used her authority as chairperson to order three staff
members into an unscheduled meeting with her. At the meeting, “Martin made
statements about Greenville’s employees being held responsible for decisions that the
[t]ribal [c]ouncil may make, even if [the employees] did not take part in the decision.”
2 Martin later admitted to the trial court that this was not a valid meeting.
3
Martin did not explain her statement and two of the employees in the meeting felt
intimidated and believed Martin was threatening their jobs. Later that day, at a duly
called tribal council meeting, the other four members of the tribal council passed a
resolution suspending Martin’s “actual or implied authority under the Constitution, and
any attendant powers as the Chief Executive Officer of Greenville.” The tribal council
further “affirmed that it never authorized . . . Martin to exercise independent power
under” Greenville’s constitution and appointed Crystal Rios as acting chairperson.
Following these actions, Greenville sent an e-mail to the Bureau questioning who the
Bureau recognized as representing the tribe. A representative from the Bureau responded
to the e-mail, requesting Rios to confirm her status as Greenville’s acting chairperson.
Greenville submitted to the Bureau the resolution passed by the majority of the tribal
council suspending Martin as chairperson. In subsequent communications between the
Bureau and Greenville related to funding through the Bureau, representatives from the
Bureau addressed letters to Rios as the “Chairwoman” and “Acting Chairwoman” of
Greenville.
On October 8, 2021, Greenville filed a verified emergency complaint for trespass
and injunctive relief against defendants. It alleged defendants were overrunning its
administrative and medical offices, “disrupting vital governmental and medical services,”
and “compromising the security of confidential medical, child-welfare[,] and financial
records.” Greenville alleged that, as a consequence of defendants’ conduct, it was forced
to close its medical and administrative offices located on the property. Greenville further
alleged the trial court had jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure section 410.10 and that the property was “not within the boundaries of any
Indian reservation” and was not on Indian land. As a prayer for relief, Greenville
requested the trial court to “temporarily, preliminarily, and permanently enjoin . . .
[d]efendants from entering, accessing, or loitering near” the property “for a period of one
year, or shorter time if resolved by” the tribal council.
4
The trial court granted Greenville a temporary restraining order ordering
defendants to vacate and stay away from the property. Defendants complied. The trial
court then scheduled a hearing on Greenville’s request for a permanent injunction.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. In the motion’s supporting points and authorities, defendants argued that
“California courts lack jurisdiction to make trespass determinations arising from” tribal
leadership disputes or arising from disputes on tribal property among tribal members.
(Capitalization omitted.) Greenville opposed the motion, arguing that the trial court’s
trespass determination did not depend on resolving any dispute regarding Greenville’s
internal governance and the dispute was not over Indian trust lands or land otherwise held
by the federal government in trust for Greenville.
Greenville filed an opening brief in support of issuing a permanent injunction,
asserting defendants committed a trespass and should be enjoined from entering the
property for one year. Defendants refuted these claims in their own brief.
On February 18, 2022, the court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss.
Defendants argued the dispute between the parties whittled down to whether Martin
remained chairperson and chief executive officer of Greenville and thus had authority to
enter the property. Defendants asserted this question was actively disputed by
Greenville’s membership. Defendants’ attorney stated that Greenville did not have a
tribal court available and agreed to have these matters resolved by the Bureau, which
Martin was in the process of petitioning for resolution of the leadership dispute. Martin
asserted that she was denied due process when the tribal council stripped her of her
authority as chairperson without notice, and she planned to pursue a claim with the
Bureau so that she could remain chairperson and chief executive officer of Greenville.
Greenville countered that there was no genuine leadership dispute because Martin
was lawfully removed as chairperson under Greenville’s constitution. Greenville
asserted that the Bureau had no authority to determine who is the chairperson of the tribe.
5
Instead, the Bureau is merely responsible for ensuring the persons who contract on behalf
of the tribe with the federal government represent the tribe. Here, the Bureau already
made the determination that Rios represented the tribe as chairperson.
The trial court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, expressly finding that “California courts lack jurisdiction to make trespass
determinations arising from intra-[t]ribal leadership disputes” and “California courts lack
jurisdiction to make trespass determinations arising from disputes on [t]ribal property
among [t]ribal [m]embers.”
Greenville appeals.
DISCUSSION
I
The Trial Court Does Not Lack Subject
Matter Jurisdiction Due To A Tribal Leadership Dispute
Greenville contends the trial court erred by dismissing the complaint on the
grounds that “California courts lack jurisdiction to make trespass determinations arising
from intra-[t]ribal leadership disputes.” Greenville argues this conclusion was error
because the undisputed facts demonstrate there was no tribal leadership dispute and, even
if there was a dispute, the court should defer to the Bureau when deciding who to
recognize as leaders of Greenville. We agree with Greenville that no tribal leadership
dispute exists.
A
Appropriate Burden Of Proof
Our Supreme Court has defined subject matter jurisdiction as “the power of the
court over a cause of action or to act in a particular way.” (Greener v. Workers’ Comp.
Appeals Bd. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1028, 1035.) “By contrast, the lack of subject matter
jurisdiction means the entire absence of power to hear or determine a case, i.e., an
6
absence of authority over the subject matter.” (Dial 800 v. Fesbinder (2004)
118 Cal.App.4th 32, 42.)
As it pertains to Indian tribes, state courts have no power to intervene in purely
tribal matters. (Lamere v. Superior Court (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1059, 1067-1068.)
“Indian tribes are ‘distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original
natural rights’ in matters of local self-government. [Citations.] Although no longer
‘possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty,’ they remain a ‘separate people, with the
power of regulating their internal and social relations.’ [Citations.] [Indian tribes] have
[the] power to make their own substantive law in internal matters, [citations], and to
enforce that law in their own forums.” (Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez (1978) 436 U.S.
49, 55-56 [56 L.Ed.2d 106].) Thus, courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to determine
the elected leadership, governance, or membership of Indian tribes. (In re Sac & Fox
Tribe of Mississippi in Iowa / Meskwaki Casino Litigation (8th Cir. 2003) 340 F.3d 749,
763 (Meskwaki Casino Litigation).)
“The general rule is that subject matter jurisdiction is determined from the face of
a well-pleaded complaint.” (Boisclair v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1140, 1156
(Boisclair).) Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent, waiver, or
estoppel. (People v. Williams (1999) 21 Cal.4th 335, 340.) “A court has jurisdiction to
determine its own jurisdiction, for a basic issue in any case before a tribunal is its power
to act, and it must have authority to decide that question in the first instance.” (Rescue
Army v. Municipal Court of City of Los Angeles (1946) 28 Cal.2d 460, 464.)
Greenville contends we should not apply the above burden of proof—that
plaintiffs must show subject matter jurisdiction from the face of the complaint—to our
review of the trial court’s order on defendants’ motion to dismiss and whether the issue to
be litigated relates to tribal self-governance. Instead, Greenville proposes we adopt the
burden advanced in People v. Miami Nation Enterprises (2016) 2 Cal.5th 222, pertaining
to whether tribal-affiliated entities are “ ‘sufficiently related to their respective tribes to
7
be protected by tribal sovereign immunity’ ” (id. at p. 233; id. at p. 236). Our Supreme
Court concluded that a tribal-affiliated entity bears the burden of proving it is entitled to
immunity by a preponderance of the evidence, and then the burden shifts to the plaintiff
to prove the existence of jurisdiction through abrogation or waiver. (Id. at p. 236.)
When justifying its divergence from the typical burden for subject matter
jurisdiction, our Supreme Court noted that tribal immunity does not implicate subject
matter jurisdiction in the fundamental sense. (People v. Miami Nation Enterprises,
supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 243-244.) Indeed, state courts are empowered to answer the
underlying question that gave rise to the suit in Miami Nation, i.e., whether a state statute
was violated. (See id. at pp. 229-230.) The issue before our Supreme Court was whether
state courts were empowered to answer that question as it pertained to a particular entity.
(See id. at p. 230.) Thus, tribal sovereign immunity does not pertain to subject matter in
the fundamental sense given that it does not equate to an absence of authority over the
subject matter.
That is not the case here. With this suit, we are not determining over whom we
are empowered to exercise jurisdiction, but whether we are empowered to decide a
particular subject that is reserved to the sole authority of a tribe. While the question
underlying the suit is whether a trespass occurred such that a permanent injunction is
necessary, the parties agree the answer to that question, in part, hinges on whether Martin
has authority (1) to be on the property after the tribal council adopted a resolution
informing defendants to vacate the property and (2) as chairperson of Greenville after the
tribal council passed a resolution suspending her authority. Thus, the question before us
pertains to subject matter jurisdiction in the fundamental sense and cannot be waived,
contrary to Greenville’s contention. (See People v. Williams, supra, 21 Cal.4th at
p. 340.) Accordingly, we decline to adopt the burden shifting framework employed in
sovereign immunity cases.
8
We will, however, look beyond the face of the complaint to determine subject
matter jurisdiction. This is not to say the complaint filed here is insufficient, but “it is
rare that a lack of subject matter jurisdiction will be disclosed by [a] plaintiff’s
complaint,” and thus it is appropriate to look to the parties’ declarations, admissions, or
deposition testimony to inform the determination. (Rowland v. County of Sonoma (1990)
220 Cal.App.3d 331, 335.) After all, we have authority to determine our own
jurisdiction, and subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time. (Rescue Army v.
Municipal Court of City of Los Angeles, supra, 28 Cal.2d at p. 464; Alliance for
California Business v. State Air Resources Bd. (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 1050, 1060.) The
parties’ declarations and admissions are probative to that determination, and thus we
consider them.
B
There Is No Tribal Leadership Dispute
“In the absence of conflicting extrinsic evidence relevant to the issue, the question
of whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction over an action against an Indian tribe is
a question of law subject to our de novo review.” (Lawrence v. Barona Valley Ranch
Resort & Casino (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1364, 1369.)
Taking the lead from the Supreme Court’s decision in Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, supra, 436 U.S. 49, courts have recognized that “the tribal self-government
exception [to subject matter jurisdiction] is designed to except purely intramural matters
such as conditions of tribal membership, inheritance rules, and domestic relations from
the general rule that otherwise applicable federal statutes apply to Indian tribes.”
(Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm (9th Cir. 1985) 751 F.2d 1113, 1116; see
Apodaca v. Silvas (5th Cir. 1994) 19 F.3d 1015; 1016; Smith v. Babbitt (8th Cir. 1996)
100 F.3d 556, 558-559.) Cases pertaining to subject matter jurisdiction involving
questions related to tribal leadership are hard to come by in California state appellate
courts. We thus look at how other jurisdictions have resolved this question.
9
In Healy Lake Village v. Mt. McKinley Bank & Healy Lake Traditional Council
(Alaska 2014) 322 P.3d 866 (Healy Lake), the Supreme Court of Alaska considered
whether it had subject matter jurisdiction to determine if a bank was required to change
the signatory authority of a tribe’s accounts to reflect a change in leadership. (Id. at
p. 867.) There, two factions of tribal members claimed they were properly elected and
served as the legitimate council. (Ibid.) Both factions argued the election that seated the
other faction failed to comply with tribal law and regulations, each pointing to various
violations of provisions in the tribe’s constitution. (Id. at pp. 867-868.) Further, while
one faction utilized the assistance of the Bureau for its election, the other faction’s
recognized chief signed on behalf of the tribe in contracts between the tribe and the
United States Department of Transportation. (Id. at p. 868.) The Supreme Court of
Alaska determined it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the case because the
claims to be resolved depended on first resolving who was the leadership of the tribe.
The court noted that both factions offered conflicting facts about who was the legitimate
tribal council and conflicting interpretations of tribal laws. (Id. at p. 873.) Ultimately,
the Alaska Supreme Court concluded its decision depended on an evaluation of alleged
violations of tribal law and contested definitions of tribal membership, and thus it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction. (Ibid.)
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals determined it did not have
jurisdiction over a dispute arising between two factions of a tribe competing for control
of a tribal government. (Meskwaki Casino Litigation, supra, 340 F.3d 749.) The
incumbent faction had been in power prior to 2003, and an opposition faction submitted
petitions to the incumbent faction challenging its authority. (Id. at p. 751.) According to
the tribal constitution, receipt of this type of petition mandated a special election, but the
incumbent faction did not call an election. (Ibid.) Subsequently, the opposition faction
formed a new tribal government and gained control of some of the tribe’s assets,
including the tribal casino. (Id. at pp. 751-752.) The opposition faction notified the
10
banks that held gaming proceeds that it was the only faction with authority to act on
behalf of the tribal accounts. (Id. at p. 752.) “Faced with uncertainty over which
[faction] possessed authority to act on behalf of the [t]ribe, the banks froze” the accounts.
(Ibid.) The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals determined it could not resolve either
faction’s claims against the banks because the claims sought a form of relief dependent
on resolution of an internal tribal leadership dispute. (Id. at p. 767.)
These cases concluded a leadership dispute prevented subject matter jurisdiction
when the court was called upon to interpret tribal laws and resolve disputed facts between
two factions asserting entitlement to tribal leadership.3 (Meskwaki Casino Litigation,
supra, 340 F.3d at pp. 751-752, 767; Healy Lake, supra, 322 P.3d at p. 873.) A
California court has had occasion to address a similar question in the context of the
state’s regulatory authority over tribes. In California Valley Miwok Tribe v. California
Gambling Control Com. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 885 (California Valley), a question
before the court was whether a tribe was “currently in the middle of an unresolved
dispute over its leadership and membership.” (Id. at p. 904.) Our colleagues in Division
One of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District determined the answer was yes
(ibid.) given the long and tortured relations between two factions of the California Valley
Miwok Tribe—the Burley faction and the Yakima faction (id. at pp. 891-892). In the late
1990’s, each faction attempted to organize the tribe under federal law by submitting to
the Bureau competing constitutions and forms establishing a person from each faction as
3 We decline Greenville’s proposition to defer only to the Bureau’s recognition of
tribal authority. While the entity our federal government recognizes for the purposes of
government-to-government relations is relevant, it is one circumstance to take under
consideration when determining subject matter jurisdiction. Indeed, in the Healy Lake
case, the Bureau recognized a different tribal representative than another federal agency.
(Healy Lake, supra, 322 P.3d at p. 868.) And, as this case and others demonstrate, tribal
disputes evolve quickly and sometimes before the Bureau is aware of the full facts
alleged in complaints courts are called to rule upon.
11
chairperson of the tribe. (Ibid.) The Bureau issued payments to the tribe despite
challenges by the Yakima faction and ongoing internal disputes between the factions
regarding leadership. (Id. at pp. 892-893.)
Then in the mid-2000’s, the Bureau rejected a new tribal constitution from the
Burley faction because “ ‘it did not appear that [the] Burley [faction] had made any effort
to include the whole tribal community . . . .’ in the process.” (California Valley, supra,
231 Cal.App.4th at p. 893.) In 2005, the Bureau stopped recognizing any tribal
government because it found the tribe was not organized under federal law. (Ibid.) The
Bureau’s decision withstood challenge in federal court. (Ibid.) In 2010, after efforts
from the Bureau to assist the tribe in organizing, the Bureau rescinded its prior position
that it would not recognize the tribe’s government and recognized the Burley faction as
the legitimate leadership of the tribe. (Id. at p. 894.) The Yakima faction challenged this
decision, and the Bureau’s decision was overturned by the federal court. (Id. at pp. 894-
895.)
The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, found these facts
established that “a tribal leadership and membership dispute currently exist[ed] . . . .”
(California Valley, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 900, italics & capitalization omitted.) In
coming to this conclusion, the court held that the tribe had experienced a leadership
dispute since the late 1990’s as demonstrated by various court actions and the Bureau’s
decision to recognize the Burley faction had not settled the dispute because the decision
was overturned by the federal court. (Id. at pp. 900-902.) The Fourth District rejected
the Burley faction’s reliance on correspondence from the Bureau recognizing Burley as
the legitimate chairperson because the correspondence did not pertain to a determination
of leadership and because the correspondence occurred prior to the federal order
overturning the Bureau’s recognition of the Burley faction as tribal leadership. (Id. at
pp. 902-903.) It similarly dismissed the Burley faction’s reliance on the Bureau’s
recognition of the tribal name change initiated by the Burley faction in 2001 because the
12
Bureau’s recognition was before the federal court ordered the Bureau to withdraw its
recognition of the Burley faction as the leadership of the tribe. (Id. at pp. 903-904.)
The California Valley court also considered and then distinguished the facts of
Timbisha Shoshone Tribe v. Salazar (D.C. Cir. 2012) 678 F.3d 935 (Timbisha) because
the tribal dispute at the center of that case was settled (California Valley, supra,
231 Cal.App.4th at p. 903). In Timbisha, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals found no ongoing dispute for the purposes of determining whether a faction of a
tribe had standing to sue. (Timbisha, at pp. 937-939.) At the time the suit was filed in
that case there were two factions claiming leadership of the tribe—the Kennedy faction
and the Gholson faction—and the federal government did not recognize either one. (Id.
at p. 937.) Before the appeal was heard, the federal government recognized the Gholson
faction “for ‘a limited time and for a limited purpose of conducting government-to-
government relations necessary for holding a special election’ to determine who
constituted the [t]ribal [c]ouncil.” (Ibid.) After the election was held, the Gholson
faction was declared the winner and the results were eventually certified. (Id. at p. 937.)
The Bureau recognized in a letter that the Gholson faction represented the tribe’s
leadership. (Id. at pp. 937-938.) The Kennedy faction challenged the Bureau’s
recognition in the Eastern District of California, which was pending at the time the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals was to determine whether the Kennedy
faction had standing to sue on behalf of the tribe. (Id. at p. 938.)
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals determined the Kennedy
faction did not have standing given the currently settled tribal leadership dispute. It
reasoned, “It is a ‘bedrock principle of federal Indian law that every tribe is “capable of
managing its own affairs and governing itself.” ’ [Citations.] The [Bureau]’s letter
acknowledges that the [tribe] resolved their own leadership dispute through a valid
internal tribal process. [Citation.] [¶] The Second Circuit has noted that ‘[t]he [federal
government’s] determination that [plaintiffs’ claimed leader] does not represent . . . [the
13
tribe] may well moot [the] plaintiffs’ claims.’ [Citation.] We agree. In these
circumstances, we owe deference to the judgment of the Executive Branch as to who
represents a tribe. [Citations.] There is no dispute here that [the Bureau]’s letter is
authentic and constitutes final agency action. [Citation.] [¶] The Kennedy faction is
unhappy with how the election was run, who voted, and the results, but ours is not the
forum for that debate. Both parties agreed at oral argument that we have all the necessary
facts to decide whether the [Kennedy faction] ha[s] standing to bring this suit, and we
need not remand to the district court. [Citation.] The fact is that we have a letter from
the Executive Branch recognizing the Gholson faction, and we must not turn a blind eye
to facts in assessing jurisdiction. [Citation.] . . . [¶] Our decision has no impact on the
litigation in the Eastern District of California or, if that litigation is successful, on the
plaintiffs’ ability to re-file this lawsuit. [Citation.] We only consider standing, and we
conclude that the Kennedy faction has none.” (Timbisha, supra, 678 F.3d at pp. 938-939,
italics omitted.)
Returning to California Valley, the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District,
Division One also distinguished Goodface v. Grassrope (8th Cir. 1983) 708 F.2d 335(Goodface), based on the particular issue presented in that case (California Valley, supra,
231 Cal.App.4th at p. 911, fn. 25). Whereas California Valley determined whether a state
agency could withhold monetary disbursements to a tribe given the tribe’s clearly
disputed leadership (ibid.), Goodface determined which of two factions the Bureau must
recognize for the purpose of government-to-government relations (Goodface, at pp. 338-
339). In Goodface, the Bureau determined it could not intervene in a tribal election
dispute when a former tribal council refused to recognize the authority of a newly elected
tribal council. (Id. at pp. 336, 338-339.) Instead, the Bureau decided to correspond with
both tribal councils on an interim basis so it could provide necessary services to the tribe
pending internal tribal resolution of the dispute. (Id. at p. 337.) The Bureau’s decision
was challenged in the district court, where the district court examined the tribe’s
14
constitution and bylaws, addressed the merits of the election dispute, determined that the
newly elected council was entitled to recognition, and issued an order requiring the
Bureau to recognize the new council. (Id. at p. 339.)
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s order holding that
by recognizing both factions, the Bureau in effect recognized neither faction when it was
required to recognize a tribal authority. (Goodface, supra, 708 F.2d at p. 339.) The
Eighth Circuit then instructed the district court to order the Bureau to recognize the newly
elected tribal council on an interim basis and await a final tribal determination as to
leadership. (Ibid.) The Eighth Circuit specifically found that the district court acted
without authority when it interpreted the tribal constitution and bylaws and addressed the
merits of the election dispute. (Ibid.)
The California Valley court also distinguished Goodface by finding the holding in
that case was applicable to the specific facts presented. (California Valley, supra,
231 Cal.App.4th at p. 911, fn. 25.) Indeed, “Goodface concerned a specific situation in
which the [Bureau] was already dealing with an Indian tribe in a government-to-
government relationship and providing needed federal benefits to the reservation when a
tribal election dispute arose involving improprieties during the election process, calling
into question whether the new tribal council was the legitimate tribal government or
whether the old tribal council should stay in place until a new election could be called.
[Citation.] Goodface held that the [Bureau] erred by refusing to recognize either
government because the [Bureau] was ‘obligated to recognize and deal with some tribal
governing body’ so that it did not jeopardize the continuation of necessary day-to-day
services on the reservation. [Citation.] Based on ‘equitable principles,’ Goodface
concluded that the [Bureau] should deal with the tribal council that had been certified and
sworn in after the tribal election. [Citation.] It is clear from Goodface’s discussion that it
did not purport to establish a rule applicable to all situations. The decision was reached
on pragmatic and equitable grounds.” (California Valley, at p. 911, fn. 25.)
15
In cases decided since Goodface, the holding has been described as “where tribal
leadership is in dispute, the [Bureau] abuses its discretion under the [Administrative
Procedures Act] by failing to take sides until the tribe sorts out the dispute internally.
[Citations.] Still, a federal agency or court should not address the merits of a tribal
election dispute, so long as there is a functional tribal court that can sort out the dispute
internally. [Citations.] Where there is no functional tribal court, and the dispute is in
danger never of being sorted out internally within the tribe, the [Bureau], and then a
federal district court, may have to address the merits of the dispute.” (Winnemucca
Indian Colony v. U.S. ex rel. Dept. of the Interior (D. Nev. 2011) 837 F.Supp.2d 1184,
1191.)
Taking into consideration the varying factual circumstances and legal conclusions
discussed in the preceding cases, we conclude there is no tribal leadership dispute
preventing subject matter jurisdiction in this case. We are guided by the “ ‘bedrock
principle of federal Indian law that every tribe is “capable of managing its own affairs
and governing itself.” ’ ” (Timbisha, supra, 678 F.3d at p. 938.) This is especially true
on matters of elected leadership, governance, and membership. (Meskwaki Casino
Litigation, supra, 340 F.3d at p. 763.) Further, courts do not have authority to interpret
tribal constitutions or laws as to address the merits of election or leadership disputes.
(Goodface, supra, 708 F.2d at p. 339.)
It is also important to consider the posture of this case. The parties agree Martin
was elected as Greenville’s chairperson and that the rest of the tribal council passed,
either validly or invalidly, resolutions to suspend her authority and order defendants to
vacate the property. The remaining members of the tribal council did this without
notifying Martin of their intent to suspend her authority and without providing her with
an opportunity to be heard before the vote was taken. Defendants summarize the facts of
this case as “represent[ing] an internal tribal dispute that arose following a contested
election.” Not so. The undisputed facts are that defendants never challenged the election
16
resulting in Martin being elected chairperson through any official means under Greenville
law or through the Bureau. Further, the facts do not show that Martin has challenged her
suspension pursuant to Greenville law or by filing an administrative action with the
Bureau. Indeed, the hearing on defendants’ motion to dismiss was held in February, four
months after defendants vacated the property and Martin was suspended as chairperson.
Martin had not challenged her suspension by the time of the hearing and there is nothing
to indicate she has done so now.
Further, Greenville, as a tribe, is suing on behalf of itself. Defendants do not
assert that the tribal council, as currently constituted, lacks standing to sue on behalf of
Greenville. Greenville is currently recognized by the Bureau as a federally organized
tribe. While the Bureau has not corresponded with Greenville specifically
acknowledging settlement of the leadership dispute, as was the case in Timbisha, supra,
678 F.3d at pages 937 to 938, the Bureau is in receipt of the resolution suspending
Martin’s authority under Greenville’s constitution and appointing Rios as interim
chairperson. As a result, the Bureau began communicating with Greenville through Rios
as chairperson. While not determinative, as was the case in Timbisha, Rios’s documented
status with the Bureau is entitled to some deference. (See id. at pp. 938-939.)
Ultimately, there is nothing calling into question the current tribal council’s
authority to act on behalf of Greenville as a sovereign nation. Thus, we assume the
resolution suspending Martin of her authority as chairperson is valid under Greenville’s
constitution, as is the resolution ordering defendants to vacate the property. While
Martin may challenge Greenville’s removal of her as chairperson through the Bureau,
that potentiality does not serve to dilute Greenville’s sovereignty today. By passing the
resolutions, the tribal council, i.e., Greenville, ordered that to the extent defendants’
claims to leadership or defenses to trespass rest on tribal law, the issues must be resolved
against them.
17
Further, Martin does not purport to act on behalf of Greenville. Martin
acknowledged to the trial court that the membership meeting led by defendants
purporting to unseat several tribal councilmembers was not a valid meeting and did not
result in any leadership change to Greenville’s tribal council. While Martin held
authority as chairperson and chief executive officer of Greenville, defendants as a group
do not control Greenville’s assets or administer any of Greenville’s funded programs.
Unlike the case in Meskwaki Casino Litigation, where the opposition faction took control
of a casino and its operation (Meskwaki Casino Litigation, supra, 340 F.3d at pp. 751-
752), defendants acknowledge they hold no authority over tribal matters as demonstrated
by their acknowledgement that the meeting held in the property was invalid. Defendants
also have never been recognized by any federal agency for the purposes of contracting, as
was the case in Healy Lake. (Healy Lake, supra, 322 P.3d at p. 868.) We are not called
upon to choose between two factions claiming to have won elections or engaging in
active litigation or claims before the Bureau, as were the facts in all the cases accounted
above. (Timbisha, supra, 678 F.3d at p. 938; Meskwaki Casino Litigation, at pp. 751-
752; Goodface, supra, 708 F.2d at pp. 339-340; California Valley, supra,
231 Cal.App.4th at pp. 891-896; Healy Lake, at pp. 867-868.)
Here, we are presented with a tribal chairperson removed from power through the
acts of tribal councilmembers empowered to act on behalf of the tribe. Martin claims
only that she was denied due process, and Martin may be right. But we are not the forum
to entertain such a claim and we must defer to Greenville’s determination of the dispute.
(See Timbisha, supra, 678 F.3d at pp. 938-939; see also Goodface, supra, 708 F.2d at
p. 339.)
Defendants disagree with our conclusion that subject matter jurisdiction exists
here, citing Ackerman v. Edwards (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 946. This case does not assist
defendants. There, the plaintiffs were members of the Redding Rancheria Tribe and filed
a petition for writ of mandate against members of the Redding Rancheria tribal council
18
challenging a resolution adopting procedures for reexamining membership status. (Id. at
pp. 948, 950.) The plaintiffs claimed the resolution violated the tribe’s constitution. (Id.
at p. 948.) We held the plaintiffs did not demonstrate the tribe’s constitution contained a
private right of action, and thus the courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction to rule on
claims related to the tribe’s internal governance. (Id. at p. 955.) In Ackerman, we
deferred to the tribe on issues of internal governance. (Id. at pp. 951-952, 955.) We do
the same here. Consequently, we conclude there is no tribal leadership dispute
preventing subject matter jurisdiction in this case because the facts demonstrate the tribe
has settled the dispute.
II
Public Law No. 280 Does Not Deprive The Trial Court Of Jurisdiction
The trial court found it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because “California
courts lack jurisdiction to make trespass determinations arising from disputes on [t]ribal
property among [t]ribal [m]embers.” As support for this conclusion, defendants argued
in the trial court, and again on appeal, that Public Law No. 280 (Pub.L. No. 83-280(Aug. 15, 1953) 67 Stat. 588-590 (Public Law 280)), as codified at title 28 United States
Code section 1360 (section 1360) and discussed in Boisclair, supra, 51 Cal.3d 1140,
prevent state court jurisdiction in this case. We disagree.
“ ‘ “The policy of leaving Indians free from state jurisdiction and control” ’ ” “has
two independent but interrelated bases: federal preemption and the internal sovereign
rights of Indian tribes.” (Boisclair, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 1147, quoting McClanahan v.
Arizona State Tax Comm’n (1973) 411 U.S. 164, 168.) “In more recent times, courts
have come to favor federal preemption over inherent sovereignty as the primary
justification for the preclusion of state authority over Indian affairs. [Citation.] The basis
for this assertion of exclusive federal authority over Indian affairs is rooted in three
provisions of the United States Constitution: the Indian commerce clause (art. I, § 8,
cl. 3), which gives Congress the exclusive power to control Indian commerce; the treaty
19
clause (art. II, § 2, cl. 2); and the supremacy clause (art. VI, cl. 2), which, together with
extensive congressional legislation on Indian affairs, has broadly preempted state law.”
(Boisclair, at p. 1148.)
“Under Public Law 280, Congress granted California and five other states plenary
criminal jurisdiction over ‘offenses committed by or against Indians’ within Indian
country [citations], and limited civil jurisdiction over ‘causes of action between Indians
or to which Indians are parties’ in cases arising in Indian country [citations]. Construing
the statute narrowly so that it does not grant these states general civil regulatory control
over Indian tribes, the high court held in Bryan v. Itasca County (1976) 426 U.S. 373,
385 [48 L.Ed.2d 710, 96 S.Ct. 2102] . . . that section 4 of Public Law 280 confers limited
adjudicative jurisdiction to resolve private civil disputes.” (People ex rel. Becerra v.
Huber (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 524, 533-534, fns. omitted.)
In Boisclair, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pages 1147 to 1157, our Supreme Court
examined section 1360(b), which limits state civil jurisdiction by providing that
“ ‘[n]othing in this section . . . shall confer jurisdiction upon the State to adjudicate . . .
the ownership or right to possession’ ” of any Indian property that is “ ‘held in trust by
the United States or is subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by the United
States.’ ” (Boisclair, at p. 1147, fn. 4.)
Our Supreme Court noted that statutes passed for the benefit of Indians are to be
liberally construed in favor of Indians. (Boisclair, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 1153.) It
therefore interpreted section 1360(b) as “preclud[ing] states from asserting jurisdiction
over disputes concerning Indian land, including . . . disputes in which one party claims
the disputed property is non-Indian. . . . [I]n order for section 1360(b)’s jurisdictional
preclusion to operate and its protective purpose to be fulfilled, the threshold question
must be whether one possible outcome of the litigation is the determination that the
disputed property is in fact Indian trust land. If that outcome is possible, then a state
court is barred from assuming jurisdiction of the case.” (Boisclair, at p. 1152.) Our
20
Supreme Court concluded, “[S]tate court jurisdiction is barred whenever one litigant
claims the disputed property is Indian trust land.” (Id. at p. 1153.)
Here, defendants do not assert the property is Indian trust land and they
acknowledge Greenville owns the property in fee simple. Instead, they argue that the
same type of property rights at issue in Boisclair are at issue here. Specifically, that
Indian title is unique in that it “ ‘bestows a right not of ownership but of occupancy.’ ”
(Boldface omitted.) The argument continues that, because Greenville represents all
members of the tribe through the tribe’s constitution, the same rights of occupancy every
tribe has been granted by the federal government flow to the tribe members individually.
Not so.
The language defendants rely on from Boisclair was said in the context of lands
held in trust for Indian tribes by the federal government, e.g., reservations. (Boisclair,
supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 1148-1149.) As our Supreme Court in Boisclair explained, “As
stated [by the Supreme Court], Congress intended section 1360(b) to help preserve the
property base of the reservation system. One cornerstone of that system is the exclusive
and protective federal jurisdiction over Indian trust land and Indian allotments, and the
requirement of prior federal approval for any alienation of Indian property in order to
prevent the loss of reservation land to market forces and state taxation. Section 1360(b)
seeks to maintain that protective exclusivity by denying to states the ability both to
legislate concerning Indian property and to adjudicate disputes involving that property.”
(Id. at pp. 1153-1154.) Thus, exclusive federal jurisdiction flows from the interest the
federal government has in the land in dispute. Further, section 1360(b) expressly limits
its application to land “that is held in trust by the United States or is subject to a
restriction against alienation imposed by the United States.” That is not the case here,
where neither party claims the federal government has ownership or a possessory interest
in the property. Thus section 1360(b) does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction in
this dispute.
21
Defendants have not pointed to any authority demonstrating the federal
government’s intent to preempt state law or deprive state courts of subject matter
jurisdiction in property disputes between tribal members occurring on lands outside tribal
trust lands. (See Loma Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines, Inc. (1964) 61 Cal.2d
582, 591 [preemption depends on “whether the enforcement of state law would conflict
with the purposes of the federal legislation, whether by frustrating an affirmative federal
purpose or by interfering with a matter intentionally left unregulated by Congress”].)
Indeed, “[t]he definition and adjustment of property rights and the protection of health
and welfare are matters primarily of state law.” (Id. at p. 592.) To conclude we lack
jurisdiction over property disputes between tribal members on nontribal lands would limit
tribal members’ access to state court, especially considering California courts have
subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Public Law 280 over property disputes between
tribal members on tribal trust lands. (Section 1360.) Consequently, the state court has
jurisdiction to hear Greenville’s dispute against defendants regarding land it owns in fee
simple that is not held in trust by the federal government.4
4 Defendants argue that whether they, as members of Greenville, have a right to
occupy the property depends on an interpretation of Greenville’s constitution, which they
claim gives them the right to occupy all tribally owned land whether that land is held in
trust by the federal government or not. Defendants urge us to leave this interpretation of
Greenville’s constitution to Greenville’s internal resolution at a tribal forum. As
described in the prior section of this opinion, Greenville has settled this dispute in a tribal
forum by Greenville’s tribal council ordering defendants to vacate the property. We must
respect Greenville’s sovereignty by recognizing its determination. In the event the
internal tribal resolution evolves, the parties are welcome to petition the trial court for an
order complying with the current state of the facts. Until that time, we must defer to
Greenville’s resolution of tribal disputes.
22
III
Remand Is Appropriate
Greenville contends that instead of remanding the matter for the trial court’s
consideration of Greenville’s trespass claim, we should instruct the lower court to enter
judgment in favor of Greenville and issue a permanent injunction against defendants for
one year. Greenville believes that a finding of subject matter jurisdiction equates to a
finding of trespass because defendants’ only asserted defense to the trespass allegation is
that they have authority to occupy the property. By concluding Martin is no longer
chairperson of Greenville, the argument continues, the question of whether she and
defendants have such authority has been resolved.
Whether a party has met its burden to prove a cause of action is a highly factual
inquiry typically reserved for the trial court which is in the best position to hear and
consider such facts. (See In re Daisy D. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 287, 292.) Whether to
grant an injunction and the scope of that injunction is similarly left to the sound
discretion of the trial court. (Shapiro v. San Diego City Council (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th
904, 912.)
Given Greenville’s requested relief, whether a trespass occurred is not as pertinent
as the scope of the alleged trespass and whether it justifies a permanent injunction. The
parties dispute the facts relevant to this inquiry and what the scope of the injunction
should be. Thus, we will leave it to the trial court to decide this issue in the first instance.
23
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. Greenville shall recover its costs on appeal. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).)
/s/
ROBIE, J.
We concur:
/s/
EARL, P. J.
/s/
HORST, J.*
* Judge of the Placer County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
24